[
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2093166",
    "date": "2024-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On approach into ROA, while turning base to final for a visual to runway 24, we got a Terrain Terrain aural (in full VMC) while descending out of 4,000 feet to intercept the inbound approach course. I Captain/ pilot flying had briefed in my briefing prior to descent about the company pages note saying not to descend below the lowest ATC cleared altitude until on a published portion of the approach. Due to operational complexity and (in looking back) a pretty fatiguing reserve schedule, I managed to forget to apply that note completely. Tower cleared us for 34, we said we needed 24 for performance reasons. They then cleared us to 5,000 feet and cleared us for the visual. They asked where we were going to turn base for planning for other traffic inbound. We told them we would be turning between HIBAN and PROSE, based on terrain considerations. I should've chosen to intercept outside PROSE based on the company note. I selected 4000 in the alt preselect based on discussion of terrain clearance and NOTAMS with my FO. I set 3700 in the altitude preselect for the inbound intercept and selected 300 fpm for my intercept turn on. Approaching the ridge just prior to course intercept we got Terrain Terrain. I clicked off the autopilot and climbed, FO and I acknowledged that in full VMC we had clearance on the terrain. Turning inbound for the intercept, I asked the FO (PM) to reengage the autopilot. I started down at 800 FPM, and we had to level off momentarily to miss 3 thermalling eagles on final, then I pitched over to get back on profile (acknowledging the change verbally). I touched down on-speed, just past the 1000 footers. I briefed the company notes (terrain considerations, not descending below cleared ATC mins-with care to discuss considerations at HIBAN and WUDAG) on the descent. WUDAG wasn't even on the approach so I added it in as a fix with a 1 mile ring to pay attention to crossing restriction. I did not apply the note correctly in spite of briefing it out loud. FO did not help me remember this either-we were both busy getting newest ATIS, rejecting the initial landing clearance, planning the visual. I was on day 4/4 on my 12th revision to my trip. I was tired, but I'm always tired on day 4, and do not believe I was more tired that normal (still believe that). Think it just got lost in the many changes we were handling on an approach into a new airport for me (FO had been in many times before). I did my math wrong for intercept, and its my responsibility to get that correct. Me thinking that I was cleared for the approach and able to do my own descent planning ran counter to the company note. FO did not contradict me/remember the company notes when I said where I planned to come in for the intercept. It would be helpful to add this to section Y as well, it was section X (and I briefed it), but really its on both of us that it was briefed and not applied correctly."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn approach into ROA, while turning base to final for a visual to runway 24, we got a Terrain Terrain aural (in full VMC) while descending out of 4,000 feet to intercept the inbound approach course. I Captain/ pilot flying had briefed in my briefing prior to descent about the company pages note saying not to descend below the lowest ATC cleared altitude until on a published portion of the approach. Due to operational complexity and (in looking back) a pretty fatiguing reserve schedule, I managed to forget to apply that note completely. Tower cleared us for 34, we said we needed 24 for performance reasons. They then cleared us to 5,000 feet and cleared us for the visual. They asked where we were going to turn base for planning for other traffic inbound. We told them we would be turning between HIBAN and PROSE, based on terrain considerations. I should've chosen to intercept outside PROSE based on the company note. I selected 4000 in the alt preselect based on discussion of terrain clearance and NOTAMS with my FO. I set 3700 in the altitude preselect for the inbound intercept and selected 300 fpm for my intercept turn on. Approaching the ridge just prior to course intercept we got Terrain Terrain. I clicked off the autopilot and climbed, FO and I acknowledged that in full VMC we had clearance on the terrain. Turning inbound for the intercept, I asked the FO (PM) to reengage the autopilot. I started down at 800 FPM, and we had to level off momentarily to miss 3 thermalling eagles on final, then I pitched over to get back on profile (acknowledging the change verbally). I touched down on-speed, just past the 1000 footers. I briefed the company notes (terrain considerations, not descending below cleared ATC mins-with care to discuss considerations at HIBAN and WUDAG) on the descent. WUDAG wasn't even on the approach so I added it in as a fix with a 1 mile ring to pay attention to crossing restriction. I did not apply the note correctly in spite of briefing it out loud. FO did not help me remember this either-we were both busy getting newest ATIS, rejecting the initial landing clearance, planning the visual. I was on day 4/4 on my 12th revision to my trip. I was tired, but I'm always tired on day 4, and do not believe I was more tired that normal (still believe that). Think it just got lost in the many changes we were handling on an approach into a new airport for me (FO had been in many times before). I did my math wrong for intercept, and its my responsibility to get that correct. Me thinking that I was cleared for the approach and able to do my own descent planning ran counter to the company note. FO did not contradict me/remember the company notes when I said where I planned to come in for the intercept. It would be helpful to add this to section Y as well, it was section X (and I briefed it), but really its on both of us that it was briefed and not applied correctly.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier Captain reported receiving a terrain alert during descent on visual approach. Captain climbed to safe altitude and continued approach.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=15",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 15,
      "pageEnd": 16,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=15",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 15,
        "pageEnd": 16,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2093166 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier Captain reported receiving a terrain alert during descent on visual approach. Captain climbed to safe altitude and continued approach.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2083422",
    "date": "2024-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "B777-200"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Aircraft X ZZZZ divert sequence of events: XA:16 block out, XA:32 takeoff, XD:38 oil quantity notification. Oil pressure deteriorated over 30 - 40 minutes. XE:38 approximate fuel jettison. XF:16 block in at ZZZZ. Captain’s leg from ZZZZ1 to ZZZZ2. At about XD:38, the secondary engine display popped up on the MFD (Multi-function Flight Display). I first noticed that the right oil quantity was highlighted in a white box showing 3 while the left engine oil quantity showed 18. Oil temp and oil pressure were normal at this time. The crew discussed that this may be a sensor issue with no secondary indications and that we should call Maintenance Control. The crew attempted to make multiple satellite calls. None of the SATCOM calls would go through. Each time the display would read SAT-1 /2 FAIL: CONNECTION. We did not get any EICAS for SATVOICE LOST on any of the attempted SATCOM calls. While the crew monitored the secondary engine display indications, right oil quantity continued to drop to 0. About 5 minutes after secondary engine display right oil quantity displayed 0, right engine oil pressure started decreasing. First indication, was the right engine oil pressure was 57 psi, while left engine oil pressure was 69 psi. The crew continued to try SATCOM calls to Dispatch and Maintenance Control while they tried to troubleshoot SATCOM with no indication of a malfunction displayed in the EICAS. The crew considered making a phone patch to Dispatch, but the crew could not find HF coverage of this area in the FOM. The crew started discussing divert options in this area. At this point the aircraft was approaching ZZZZ from the southeast. We had just passed a few countries, both which were declined by the crew as good options for a divert. We discussed pressing across [a body of water] to reach a more suitable divert closer to our destination with better security outlook, but with the engine oil pressure decreasing, we felt it was not the best option. We discussed possibly holding over ZZZZ. The crew also identified the potential requirement to jettison gas to normal landing weight prior to a divert into ZZZZ. The crew opened the Loss of Oil Pressure Right Non-normal Checklist to review it in case we had to perform a precautionary shutdown. In an attempt to maintain the right engine oil pressure as long as possible, the Captain elected to exercise Captain’s authority and disconnected the right autothrottle and slightly reduced the power to see if the right engine oil pressure would stabilize and stop decreasing. The right engine oil pressure continued to decrease over a period of approximately 30 minutes from 57 psi to 52 psi to 44 psi to 40 psi to 34 psi to 25 psi to 19 psi. Each time the oil pressure would decrease, then stabilize and increase slightly for a couple minutes, then it would decrease again. The crew directed the Jumpseat Loadmaster to the back of the airplane to visually inspect the engine nacelle for visual evidence of the leak. He was not able to visually confirm evidence of an engine oil leak on the right engine. The Captain transferred aircraft control to me while she troubleshot the SATCOM radios, looked for HF phone patch options, and conducted the radio relay with Aircraft Y. After the crew attempted several more SATCOM calls, the crew contacted Aircraft Y that was slightly ahead of us on a similar route to request a relay to Dispatch via their SATCOM. Aircraft Y relayed our situation of loss of engine oil quantity and decreasing engine oil pressure on the right engine, and intentions to likely divert into ZZZZ to Dispatch, and solicited Dispatch recommendations. We received a response back from Aircraft Y that Dispatch’s recommendation was also a divert to ZZZZ. By this point, the aircraft was beginning to coast out over the [body of water]. The crew decided to turn back for a divert into ZZZZ. The Captain had to [advise ATC] to ZZZZ in order to break into very busy radio chatter in order to get ZZZZ Control’s attention and receive priority handling. Once the crew turned back toward ZZZZ, ATC cleared them direct to ZZZ [VOR]. With the FO (First Officer) as the pilot flying and the Captain pilot monitoring and the right engine oil pressure in the yellow at 19 - 17 psi, the crew performed the Loss of Oil Pressure Right Checklist as a precautionary shutdown even though there was no EICAS warning. The crew completed the checklist and executed the VNAV Engine Out page and requested a drift-down descent to FL240. The crew also diverted the FMS to ZZZZ. The crew set up the aircraft to jettison fuel to the normal landing weight, approximately 23 - 25K, and received approval from ZZZZ to jettison fuel from ZZZ1 [VOR]. ATC then changed the approval to jettison fuel from ZZZ [VOR] at approximately FL220. The fuel dumping took about 5 - 6 minutes, and the crew completed the Fuel Jettison Checklist. The Captain requested vectors for the ILS XXC at ZZZZ, and we were told to expect that. ATC at ZZZZ responded that we would be given vectors for ILS XXL. The Captain set up the FMS, briefed the approach, and flaps 20 autoland for ILS XXL at ZZZZ. The Captain briefed via the QRH, including the non-normal landing data. While on vectors, the Captain [requested priority handling] and requested fire truck support on landing. The Captain took the controls back and flew the vectors for the ILS XXL approach. The crew received numerous heading changes and step-downs during vectors for the approach. The crew completed the Approach, and Before Landing Checklists while on vectors. The Captain executed an uneventful single-engine autoland to Runway XXL at ZZZZ. The wind was 280 at 9 kt. on landing. The Captain cleared the runway at high speed Taxiway 1. After the uneventful landing and roll-out, taxied to the assigned Gate XX. After the crew shut down the remaining engine at the gate and opened the crew door, chaos ensued with [people] and representatives asking numerous questions ranging from what happened and why we were there to what kind of cargo we were carrying. The Captain got on the phone with the Duty Officer to let the company know what had happened since we’re unable to make contact via SATCOM, which still was not working on the ground. The Captain was giving the DO (Duty Officer) a situational report as well as determining our reporting requirements. Someone from the ground personnel requested that a crewmember come outside to look at the main gear. Upon arriving at the left main gear, the #5 main gear was smoking. I immediately cleared the area to the side of the gear and requested the authorities contact the fire trucks to respond. I directed that the Fire Department set up cooling fans on the smoking gear. As I went down to find the #5 brake was smoking, the EICAS for brake temperatures annunciated in the flight deck. The Captain sent a representative down to ensure everyone was clear of the hot brakes. The Captain came down, while on the phone with the DO, to check that aircraft was chocked so she could release the brakes. The Fire Department asked us if they could put water on the brakes to cool them. After consulting with Maintenance Control to confirm, we communicated that was not advisable. Two cooling fans were focused on the hot brakes, but the fuse plug melted on #5. The questions from the authorities continued with significant language barriers, i.e., the meaning of corrosive and hazardous cargo, as well as requests for overfly permits, cargo airbills, etc. Calls continued to the DO, Dispatch, and Maintenance Control as we waited for the brakes to cool. Upon completion of answering most of the questions, the Captain powered down the airplane and we deplaned approximately 3 hours after landing. The crew went through Immigration, Customs, and out to the hotel. We met the Company Representative at the hotel. Crew debriefed after checking into the hotel. Cause: The malfunction was a mechanical failure, but both the Captain and I were fatigued due to trip revisions and swapping from night schedule to day schedule with two back-to-back min crew rest periods prior to the flight. Suggestions: The mechanical issue may or may not be preventable based upon what is determined to be the cause of the oil leak. The eventual outcome of a successful divert and single-engine landing was due to experienced pilots working together as team to bring the airplane in safely. Good crew coordination skills and training helped bring a successful result. Malfunctions like this without the ability to coordinate with Dispatch due to communication failure of the SATCOM require the teamwork of two experienced pilots to bring it to a successful conclusion."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Aircraft right engine oil showing 0 and pressure was decreasing. Crew [advised ATC] but did not take priority. Dumped 25K of fuel... diverted to ZZZZ. I was advised by the crew that [they advised ATC] and dumped fuel only after landing when Captain called Maintenance Control first."
      },
      {
        "number": 3,
        "text": "At XD:38, in cruise FL280, the secondary engine display automatically appeared on the MFD (Multi-Function Display). The FO (First Officer) noticed the right engine oil quantity indication was showing white box “3,” which is an extremely low oil quantity. No EICAS indications and oil temperature and pressure were both indicating normal. The FO and I discussed that in light of the lack of other abnormal indications, it might just be a sensor issue. Decided to call Dispatch just in case it wasn’t a sensor indication in order to get Maintenance patched in for a preliminary plan, so attempted a SATCOM call. Despite multiple SATCOM attempts to Dispatch and then Maintenance Control on both SATCOM 1 and 2, was unable to make a successful phone call due to “Fail: Connection” message on SATCOM page. No SATCOM or DATALINK EICAS alerts were displayed. The oil quantity continued to drop to 0 on the secondary engine page. After about 5 minutes of right oil quantity continuing to decrease to 0, the right oil pressure started falling on the secondary engine display. More SATCOM calls to Dispatch and Maintenance Control were attempted, but all attempts were unsuccessful. I then attempted to troubleshoot the SATCOM problem using QRH and the COMM suite “MASTER, MANAGER, SATCOM” but no abnormalities were noted, including NO “no SATCOM link” messages. However, a “SATCOM established” message did exist. As a last ditch attempt to reach the company, I looked for a frequency for an HF phone patch to Dispatch, but none were listed for [the area]. Found plenty for [other areas], but unable to find an applicable frequency in either the manual or the FOM for our area. Discussed possible divert options in the region with the FO (First Officer). When the oil quantity dropped, we were approaching ZZZZ. We actually discussed holding over ZZZZ for a possible divert, but decided to continue our route and continued monitoring and evaluating the situation in case we could make it to our destination or find a more suitable divert airfield. [A few places] were all briefly considered. However in a divert situation, we felt if we could get the airplane to [the location] that would be our best option. In case we needed to shut down the engine, I asked the FO to locate, review, and we discussed the “ENG OIL PRESS R” non-normal ECL - electronic checklist. After some thought and discussion, I decided to exercise Captain’s authority in an attempt to stabilize the dropping oil pressure by reducing the thrust on the right engine. The first two steps on the aforementioned checklist are “A/T ARM switch, affected side, confirm OFF” and “thrust lever, affected side, confirm idle.” Using the prescribed procedure I selected the R ATS OFF, and reduced thrust marginally on the R engine, not to idle at this time. Fortunately we had a Loadmaster jumpseating with us and I summoned him to the cockpit, explained the situation, and asked if he would go back into the cargo area and see if he could visually identify evidence of an oil leak anywhere on the right cowling or wing. He did not see any evidence of an oil leak from the overwing windows. Meanwhile, I continued to periodically reduce the thrust on the right engine closer to idle in an attempt to slow the oil pressure drop, as the pressure periodically would stabilize a few minutes and then continue a further decrease. This was over 30 - 40 minutes. As things were starting to get critical, in accordance with the FOM recommendation, I chose to transfer aircraft control to the FO. After several more failed SATCOM attempts, FO suggested asking Aircraft Y, who departed ZZZZ1 about 15 minutes in front of us, if they could do a SATCOM relay to Dispatch, to which they agreed. I relayed that we had a 0 oil quantity indication and dropping oil pressure and was considering diverting to ZZZZ. After a few minutes, we received response back from Dispatch via Aircraft Y relay that a divert to ZZZZ was “Dispatch’s recommendation.” By now we were just about coasting out over [a body of water], with the oil pressure continuing to drop. Attempted to contact ZZZZ Control, who never responded to our calls due to frequency congestion until I called with a [request for priority handling]. I then requested and received a divert to ZZZZ. We were then cleared direct ZZZ [VOR] with a left turn and were about 65 miles north. Once established, we performed a precautionary right engine shutdown using the “ENG OIL PRESS R” non- normal ECL. Oil pressure was in the caution band at 19 psi and the lowest I recall was 17 psi before shutdown. I diverted the FMS to ZZZZ, executed the VNAV engine out page, requested a descent to FL240 - we were cruising at FL280 - and we evaluated the need for a fuel jettison. We determined that we needed to dump approximately 25,000 lb. of fuel to reduce to MAX LNDG GROSS WEIGHT. I then asked ATC permission for a fuel jettison and they directed us to the ZZZ1 [VOR]. ATC then revised their clearance and asked us to intercept the ZZZ [VOR] for the fuel dump. We estimated it would be 7 minutes or so to dump the 25,000 lb. of fuel to get to max gross landing weight. I executed the “FUEL JETTISON” non-normal ECL utilizing the “FUEL TO REMAIN” is acceptable option. The fuel jettison was completed after 5 or 6 minutes while were descending via ATC instructions from FL240 to FL200. I requested an ILS for Runway XXC, but was told to expect Runway XXL for our landing runway, which was equally as long as [Runway] XXC. I inserted the ILS XXL in the FMS, briefed a flaps 20 - also discussed flaps 30 - autoland and possible go- around, and reviewed the QRH landing data as directed by the previous QRH checklist. I called for the Checklist and took back control of the aircraft as pilot flying, with the FO as pilot monitoring. In the terminal area, we [advised ATC] and requested the assistance of fire trucks on landing. ATC gave us multiple vectors of 10 degrees left and step-down altitudes. Performed normal checklists and callouts as appropriate for the approach, confirmed the runway in sight, and the airplane performed a single engine autoland with CAT III FLARE and ROLLOUT PFD (Primary Flight Display) indications. Airfield wind was 280/9. After landing, disconnected ABS and AFS (Automatic Flight System) and cleared the runway at the exit high speed taxiway. We had a very long taxi over to Gate XX from [Runway] XXL. After being marshaled into the stand, we shut down the left operating engine and performed the doors procedure and Shutdown Checklist and left the APU running as no ground power was available. Immediately after [Door] 1L was open, a number of people came onboard from our handler per Dispatch, as well as others. We were immediate barraged with questions about DGs (Dangerous Goods), overflight clearance, what kind of cargo we were carrying, whether it was a military flight, and so on. Basically utter chaos. I immediately called the DO (Duty Officer) to give and receive a representative and ensure we complied with the Company’s required reports. The DO immediately patched a 777 Chief Pilot on the line. While I was fielding questions from them and from the handlers, someone from outside came to ask the FO to go outside and look at the brakes. The #5 brake was smoking and he immediately cleared the area and asked for the fire trucks to be called. He then returned to the cockpit and asked me to come outside and assess the situation and by then, EICAS was indicating a hot brake at 5.5 BTI on the GEAR synoptic page. I was still on the phone, so went outside while on the phone and saw a smoking brake on #5 wheel, while being queried by the 777 Chief Pilot about whether or not an EICAS had appeared before we shut down the engine. I went downstairs to ensure there were chocks installed - no one ever told us they were in place - and returned to the cockpit and released the parking brake. The FO came back and relayed the fire department was asking about using water on the hot brake. I immediately called Maintenance Control to query and was advised conditioned air and or fans were recommended, no water, which I relayed to the FO and the fire department. At some point even though they had two small fans on the brakes, the #5 tire fuse plug melted. After more phone calls to Maintenance Control, Dispatch, and DO, we came up with a plan for write-ups, required reports, securing the airplane, and staying in ZZZZ. I secured the airplane using the “Electrical Power Down” Checklist in the QRH. After securing the aircraft door, I ensured the stairs were removed and the handling agent assured me they would provide security as directed by Dispatch and Corporate Security. Company security, as well as the DO, Dispatch, and Maintenance Control were all completely fantastic. However, Flight Management’s interest in getting immediate statements on what happened has been most frustrating as I’ve had multiple follow-ups with the DO and Maintenance Control to ensure all the write-ups were correct and all the required reports have been accomplished. I hadn’t even had a free moment to fully process the event nor debrief with the FO, who did a fantastic job! Cause: Mechanical failure. Also, while fatigue did NOT cause this event, both the FO and I were extremely tired after multiple trip revisions followed by two consecutive minimum crew rests after completely swapping of our schedule in relation to our body clocks from the original planned fight time of the ZZZZ3 - ZZZZ1 preceding live leg. Fatigue contributed to a more methodical, prudent, and thorough analysis of the situation and the actual execution of the divert because we wanted to ensure we had fully considered all options. Mentally, as the situation unfolded while I obviously accepted and understood the situation, it was surreal that it was really happening. Fortunately, training and experience helped us execute to the highest level with a successful outcome. Suggestions: This is why we spend time in the simulator and why there are two professional pilots on the fight deck. Everything built by humans has a chance of failure. Fortunately, such failures rarely happen. But when it does, nothing can replace training and experience. We used excellent leadership, teamwork, use of resources, pacing, and situational awareness/decision making skills. In regards to the hot brake, perhaps I should have used more reverse on the left engine. However, I was concerned about the asymmetrical thrust, and stopping distance was not an issue. The long taxi time with multiple stops didn’t help the brake situation. Because of the right crosswind on landing, the airplane did touch down on the left main truck in a slight crab due to the crosswind, which may have been a contributing factor. The best way to make events like this successful is continued professionalism, training, study, and experience. With all the talk of reduced crew operations, I frankly couldn’t imagine handling a scenario like this on my own if only one pilot were on the fight deck. The situation was extremely demanding despite the length of time we had to assess and execute the situation."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAircraft X ZZZZ divert sequence of events: XA:16 block out, XA:32 takeoff, XD:38 oil quantity notification. Oil pressure deteriorated over 30 - 40 minutes. XE:38 approximate fuel jettison. XF:16 block in at ZZZZ. Captain’s leg from ZZZZ1 to ZZZZ2. At about XD:38, the secondary engine display popped up on the MFD (Multi-function Flight Display). I first noticed that the right oil quantity was highlighted in a white box showing 3 while the left engine oil quantity showed 18. Oil temp and oil pressure were normal at this time. The crew discussed that this may be a sensor issue with no secondary indications and that we should call Maintenance Control. The crew attempted to make multiple satellite calls. None of the SATCOM calls would go through. Each time the display would read SAT-1 /2 FAIL: CONNECTION. We did not get any EICAS for SATVOICE LOST on any of the attempted SATCOM calls. While the crew monitored the secondary engine display indications, right oil quantity continued to drop to 0. About 5 minutes after secondary engine display right oil quantity displayed 0, right engine oil pressure started decreasing. First indication, was the right engine oil pressure was 57 psi, while left engine oil pressure was 69 psi. The crew continued to try SATCOM calls to Dispatch and Maintenance Control while they tried to troubleshoot SATCOM with no indication of a malfunction displayed in the EICAS. The crew considered making a phone patch to Dispatch, but the crew could not find HF coverage of this area in the FOM. The crew started discussing divert options in this area. At this point the aircraft was approaching ZZZZ from the southeast. We had just passed a few countries, both which were declined by the crew as good options for a divert. We discussed pressing across [a body of water] to reach a more suitable divert closer to our destination with better security outlook, but with the engine oil pressure decreasing, we felt it was not the best option. We discussed possibly holding over ZZZZ. The crew also identified the potential requirement to jettison gas to normal landing weight prior to a divert into ZZZZ. The crew opened the Loss of Oil Pressure Right Non-normal Checklist to review it in case we had to perform a precautionary shutdown. In an attempt to maintain the right engine oil pressure as long as possible, the Captain elected to exercise Captain’s authority and disconnected the right autothrottle and slightly reduced the power to see if the right engine oil pressure would stabilize and stop decreasing. The right engine oil pressure continued to decrease over a period of approximately 30 minutes from 57 psi to 52 psi to 44 psi to 40 psi to 34 psi to 25 psi to 19 psi. Each time the oil pressure would decrease, then stabilize and increase slightly for a couple minutes, then it would decrease again. The crew directed the Jumpseat Loadmaster to the back of the airplane to visually inspect the engine nacelle for visual evidence of the leak. He was not able to visually confirm evidence of an engine oil leak on the right engine. The Captain transferred aircraft control to me while she troubleshot the SATCOM radios, looked for HF phone patch options, and conducted the radio relay with Aircraft Y. After the crew attempted several more SATCOM calls, the crew contacted Aircraft Y that was slightly ahead of us on a similar route to request a relay to Dispatch via their SATCOM. Aircraft Y relayed our situation of loss of engine oil quantity and decreasing engine oil pressure on the right engine, and intentions to likely divert into ZZZZ to Dispatch, and solicited Dispatch recommendations. We received a response back from Aircraft Y that Dispatch’s recommendation was also a divert to ZZZZ. By this point, the aircraft was beginning to coast out over the [body of water]. The crew decided to turn back for a divert into ZZZZ. The Captain had to [advise ATC] to ZZZZ in order to break into very busy radio chatter in order to get ZZZZ Control’s attention and receive priority handling. Once the crew turned back toward ZZZZ, ATC cleared them direct to ZZZ [VOR]. With the FO (First Officer) as the pilot flying and the Captain pilot monitoring and the right engine oil pressure in the yellow at 19 - 17 psi, the crew performed the Loss of Oil Pressure Right Checklist as a precautionary shutdown even though there was no EICAS warning. The crew completed the checklist and executed the VNAV Engine Out page and requested a drift-down descent to FL240. The crew also diverted the FMS to ZZZZ. The crew set up the aircraft to jettison fuel to the normal landing weight, approximately 23 - 25K, and received approval from ZZZZ to jettison fuel from ZZZ1 [VOR]. ATC then changed the approval to jettison fuel from ZZZ [VOR] at approximately FL220. The fuel dumping took about 5 - 6 minutes, and the crew completed the Fuel Jettison Checklist. The Captain requested vectors for the ILS XXC at ZZZZ, and we were told to expect that. ATC at ZZZZ responded that we would be given vectors for ILS XXL. The Captain set up the FMS, briefed the approach, and flaps 20 autoland for ILS XXL at ZZZZ. The Captain briefed via the QRH, including the non-normal landing data. While on vectors, the Captain [requested priority handling] and requested fire truck support on landing. The Captain took the controls back and flew the vectors for the ILS XXL approach. The crew received numerous heading changes and step-downs during vectors for the approach. The crew completed the Approach, and Before Landing Checklists while on vectors. The Captain executed an uneventful single-engine autoland to Runway XXL at ZZZZ. The wind was 280 at 9 kt. on landing. The Captain cleared the runway at high speed Taxiway 1. After the uneventful landing and roll-out, taxied to the assigned Gate XX. After the crew shut down the remaining engine at the gate and opened the crew door, chaos ensued with [people] and representatives asking numerous questions ranging from what happened and why we were there to what kind of cargo we were carrying. The Captain got on the phone with the Duty Officer to let the company know what had happened since we’re unable to make contact via SATCOM, which still was not working on the ground. The Captain was giving the DO (Duty Officer) a situational report as well as determining our reporting requirements. Someone from the ground personnel requested that a crewmember come outside to look at the main gear. Upon arriving at the left main gear, the #5 main gear was smoking. I immediately cleared the area to the side of the gear and requested the authorities contact the fire trucks to respond. I directed that the Fire Department set up cooling fans on the smoking gear. As I went down to find the #5 brake was smoking, the EICAS for brake temperatures annunciated in the flight deck. The Captain sent a representative down to ensure everyone was clear of the hot brakes. The Captain came down, while on the phone with the DO, to check that aircraft was chocked so she could release the brakes. The Fire Department asked us if they could put water on the brakes to cool them. After consulting with Maintenance Control to confirm, we communicated that was not advisable. Two cooling fans were focused on the hot brakes, but the fuse plug melted on #5. The questions from the authorities continued with significant language barriers, i.e., the meaning of corrosive and hazardous cargo, as well as requests for overfly permits, cargo airbills, etc. Calls continued to the DO, Dispatch, and Maintenance Control as we waited for the brakes to cool. Upon completion of answering most of the questions, the Captain powered down the airplane and we deplaned approximately 3 hours after landing. The crew went through Immigration, Customs, and out to the hotel. We met the Company Representative at the hotel. Crew debriefed after checking into the hotel. Cause: The malfunction was a mechanical failure, but both the Captain and I were fatigued due to trip revisions and swapping from night schedule to day schedule with two back-to-back min crew rest periods prior to the flight. Suggestions: The mechanical issue may or may not be preventable based upon what is determined to be the cause of the oil leak. The eventual outcome of a successful divert and single-engine landing was due to experienced pilots working together as team to bring the airplane in safely. Good crew coordination skills and training helped bring a successful result. Malfunctions like this without the ability to coordinate with Dispatch due to communication failure of the SATCOM require the teamwork of two experienced pilots to bring it to a successful conclusion.\n\nNarrative 2\nAircraft right engine oil showing 0 and pressure was decreasing. Crew [advised ATC] but did not take priority. Dumped 25K of fuel... diverted to ZZZZ. I was advised by the crew that [they advised ATC] and dumped fuel only after landing when Captain called Maintenance Control first.\n\nNarrative 3\nAt XD:38, in cruise FL280, the secondary engine display automatically appeared on the MFD (Multi-Function Display). The FO (First Officer) noticed the right engine oil quantity indication was showing white box “3,” which is an extremely low oil quantity. No EICAS indications and oil temperature and pressure were both indicating normal. The FO and I discussed that in light of the lack of other abnormal indications, it might just be a sensor issue. Decided to call Dispatch just in case it wasn’t a sensor indication in order to get Maintenance patched in for a preliminary plan, so attempted a SATCOM call. Despite multiple SATCOM attempts to Dispatch and then Maintenance Control on both SATCOM 1 and 2, was unable to make a successful phone call due to “Fail: Connection” message on SATCOM page. No SATCOM or DATALINK EICAS alerts were displayed. The oil quantity continued to drop to 0 on the secondary engine page. After about 5 minutes of right oil quantity continuing to decrease to 0, the right oil pressure started falling on the secondary engine display. More SATCOM calls to Dispatch and Maintenance Control were attempted, but all attempts were unsuccessful. I then attempted to troubleshoot the SATCOM problem using QRH and the COMM suite “MASTER, MANAGER, SATCOM” but no abnormalities were noted, including NO “no SATCOM link” messages. However, a “SATCOM established” message did exist. As a last ditch attempt to reach the company, I looked for a frequency for an HF phone patch to Dispatch, but none were listed for [the area]. Found plenty for [other areas], but unable to find an applicable frequency in either the manual or the FOM for our area. Discussed possible divert options in the region with the FO (First Officer). When the oil quantity dropped, we were approaching ZZZZ. We actually discussed holding over ZZZZ for a possible divert, but decided to continue our route and continued monitoring and evaluating the situation in case we could make it to our destination or find a more suitable divert airfield. [A few places] were all briefly considered. However in a divert situation, we felt if we could get the airplane to [the location] that would be our best option. In case we needed to shut down the engine, I asked the FO to locate, review, and we discussed the “ENG OIL PRESS R” non-normal ECL - electronic checklist. After some thought and discussion, I decided to exercise Captain’s authority in an attempt to stabilize the dropping oil pressure by reducing the thrust on the right engine. The first two steps on the aforementioned checklist are “A/T ARM switch, affected side, confirm OFF” and “thrust lever, affected side, confirm idle.” Using the prescribed procedure I selected the R ATS OFF, and reduced thrust marginally on the R engine, not to idle at this time. Fortunately we had a Loadmaster jumpseating with us and I summoned him to the cockpit, explained the situation, and asked if he would go back into the cargo area and see if he could visually identify evidence of an oil leak anywhere on the right cowling or wing. He did not see any evidence of an oil leak from the overwing windows. Meanwhile, I continued to periodically reduce the thrust on the right engine closer to idle in an attempt to slow the oil pressure drop, as the pressure periodically would stabilize a few minutes and then continue a further decrease. This was over 30 - 40 minutes. As things were starting to get critical, in accordance with the FOM recommendation, I chose to transfer aircraft control to the FO. After several more failed SATCOM attempts, FO suggested asking Aircraft Y, who departed ZZZZ1 about 15 minutes in front of us, if they could do a SATCOM relay to Dispatch, to which they agreed. I relayed that we had a 0 oil quantity indication and dropping oil pressure and was considering diverting to ZZZZ. After a few minutes, we received response back from Dispatch via Aircraft Y relay that a divert to ZZZZ was “Dispatch’s recommendation.” By now we were just about coasting out over [a body of water], with the oil pressure continuing to drop. Attempted to contact ZZZZ Control, who never responded to our calls due to frequency congestion until I called with a [request for priority handling]. I then requested and received a divert to ZZZZ. We were then cleared direct ZZZ [VOR] with a left turn and were about 65 miles north. Once established, we performed a precautionary right engine shutdown using the “ENG OIL PRESS R” non- normal ECL. Oil pressure was in the caution band at 19 psi and the lowest I recall was 17 psi before shutdown. I diverted the FMS to ZZZZ, executed the VNAV engine out page, requested a descent to FL240 - we were cruising at FL280 - and we evaluated the need for a fuel jettison. We determined that we needed to dump approximately 25,000 lb. of fuel to reduce to MAX LNDG GROSS WEIGHT. I then asked ATC permission for a fuel jettison and they directed us to the ZZZ1 [VOR]. ATC then revised their clearance and asked us to intercept the ZZZ [VOR] for the fuel dump. We estimated it would be 7 minutes or so to dump the 25,000 lb. of fuel to get to max gross landing weight. I executed the “FUEL JETTISON” non-normal ECL utilizing the “FUEL TO REMAIN” is acceptable option. The fuel jettison was completed after 5 or 6 minutes while were descending via ATC instructions from FL240 to FL200. I requested an ILS for Runway XXC, but was told to expect Runway XXL for our landing runway, which was equally as long as [Runway] XXC. I inserted the ILS XXL in the FMS, briefed a flaps 20 - also discussed flaps 30 - autoland and possible go- around, and reviewed the QRH landing data as directed by the previous QRH checklist. I called for the Checklist and took back control of the aircraft as pilot flying, with the FO as pilot monitoring. In the terminal area, we [advised ATC] and requested the assistance of fire trucks on landing. ATC gave us multiple vectors of 10 degrees left and step-down altitudes. Performed normal checklists and callouts as appropriate for the approach, confirmed the runway in sight, and the airplane performed a single engine autoland with CAT III FLARE and ROLLOUT PFD (Primary Flight Display) indications. Airfield wind was 280/9. After landing, disconnected ABS and AFS (Automatic Flight System) and cleared the runway at the exit high speed taxiway. We had a very long taxi over to Gate XX from [Runway] XXL. After being marshaled into the stand, we shut down the left operating engine and performed the doors procedure and Shutdown Checklist and left the APU running as no ground power was available. Immediately after [Door] 1L was open, a number of people came onboard from our handler per Dispatch, as well as others. We were immediate barraged with questions about DGs (Dangerous Goods), overflight clearance, what kind of cargo we were carrying, whether it was a military flight, and so on. Basically utter chaos. I immediately called the DO (Duty Officer) to give and receive a representative and ensure we complied with the Company’s required reports. The DO immediately patched a 777 Chief Pilot on the line. While I was fielding questions from them and from the handlers, someone from outside came to ask the FO to go outside and look at the brakes. The #5 brake was smoking and he immediately cleared the area and asked for the fire trucks to be called. He then returned to the cockpit and asked me to come outside and assess the situation and by then, EICAS was indicating a hot brake at 5.5 BTI on the GEAR synoptic page. I was still on the phone, so went outside while on the phone and saw a smoking brake on #5 wheel, while being queried by the 777 Chief Pilot about whether or not an EICAS had appeared before we shut down the engine. I went downstairs to ensure there were chocks installed - no one ever told us they were in place - and returned to the cockpit and released the parking brake. The FO came back and relayed the fire department was asking about using water on the hot brake. I immediately called Maintenance Control to query and was advised conditioned air and or fans were recommended, no water, which I relayed to the FO and the fire department. At some point even though they had two small fans on the brakes, the #5 tire fuse plug melted. After more phone calls to Maintenance Control, Dispatch, and DO, we came up with a plan for write-ups, required reports, securing the airplane, and staying in ZZZZ. I secured the airplane using the “Electrical Power Down” Checklist in the QRH. After securing the aircraft door, I ensured the stairs were removed and the handling agent assured me they would provide security as directed by Dispatch and Corporate Security. Company security, as well as the DO, Dispatch, and Maintenance Control were all completely fantastic. However, Flight Management’s interest in getting immediate statements on what happened has been most frustrating as I’ve had multiple follow-ups with the DO and Maintenance Control to ensure all the write-ups were correct and all the required reports have been accomplished. I hadn’t even had a free moment to fully process the event nor debrief with the FO, who did a fantastic job! Cause: Mechanical failure. Also, while fatigue did NOT cause this event, both the FO and I were extremely tired after multiple trip revisions followed by two consecutive minimum crew rests after completely swapping of our schedule in relation to our body clocks from the original planned fight time of the ZZZZ3 - ZZZZ1 preceding live leg. Fatigue contributed to a more methodical, prudent, and thorough analysis of the situation and the actual execution of the divert because we wanted to ensure we had fully considered all options. Mentally, as the situation unfolded while I obviously accepted and understood the situation, it was surreal that it was really happening. Fortunately, training and experience helped us execute to the highest level with a successful outcome. Suggestions: This is why we spend time in the simulator and why there are two professional pilots on the fight deck. Everything built by humans has a chance of failure. Fortunately, such failures rarely happen. But when it does, nothing can replace training and experience. We used excellent leadership, teamwork, use of resources, pacing, and situational awareness/decision making skills. In regards to the hot brake, perhaps I should have used more reverse on the left engine. However, I was concerned about the asymmetrical thrust, and stopping distance was not an issue. The long taxi time with multiple stops didn’t help the brake situation. Because of the right crosswind on landing, the airplane did touch down on the left main truck in a slight crab due to the crosswind, which may have been a contributing factor. The best way to make events like this successful is continued professionalism, training, study, and experience. With all the talk of reduced crew operations, I frankly couldn’t imagine handling a scenario like this on my own if only one pilot were on the fight deck. The situation was extremely demanding despite the length of time we had to assess and execute the situation.",
    "synopsis": "B777 flight crew and Dispatcher reported failure of the SATCOM system and loss of engine oil quantity resulted in a diversion.",
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    "title": "ASRS 2083422 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B777 flight crew and Dispatcher reported failure of the SATCOM system and loss of engine oil quantity resulted in a diversion.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
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  {
    "accessionNumber": "2078449",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After a long day of delays into and out of ZZZ, we were on approach at approximately XA00am for runway 6L into CLE. PIC was PF and I was PM. PF loaded and briefed the ILS 6L. I recall when PF briefed company page taking note of the second caution about unusually low fix altitudes as he read it as I had never seen that before. This was my first flight into CLE with about 160 hours in the plane mostly in the northeast. About 20 nm east of the field approach cleared us for the visual approach to 6L. PF turned us onto a downwind and continued a descent to 3000 that had been previously set from a clearance. He activated vectors to final and began calling for flaps 1, then flaps 2. PF turned right base and in the turn bugged 2000 for the FAF BOEEE and began a descent in FLCH while calling for flaps 3. While manipulating the flaps approach handed me off to tower and I made the appropriate radio calls. While talking to ATC, I believe the combination of the moment resulting from the flaps 3 change while FLCH descent was beginning led to more of a descent rate than expected. PF noticed this, and I believe selected FPA (Flight Path Angle) to adjust descent but the combination of descent rate and proximity to a tower led to an obstacle alert. There are numerous towers around that area. Looking at the track, we were actually on track to intercept around FUZED which has a segment leading up to it with an MSA of 3800 ft. and after a segment with MSA of 2900 ft. due to a tower around FUZED at 1649 ft. which is likely the tower eliciting the caution. I don’t think either of us realized we were that far out due to the FMS having vectors to final loaded and degradation in our situational awareness. Once I audibly called “tower straight ahead” and pointed PF disconnected autopilot, reduced the descent rate, leveled off around 2300- 2400, and turned further right away from the tower and to intercept final approach course while calling for gear down, flaps 5, speed Vapp, and landing checklist. Tower also at that time offered 6R instead of 6L and PF requested we accept. I queried if PF wanted me to load anything in and he said he was okay to fly visual. As we approached final approach course I confirmed he was landing on 6R as I was concerned workload and lack of an approach could lead to further problems. He confirmed, and then asked me to load it in for him which I quickly did for lateral and vertical guidance. We were initially around I think a 1 1/4 dots low on GS once loaded in and upon looking outside had I believe 3 red on the VGSI. I called out “low” and PF responded “correcting,” and quickly did so requiring no further action. We were configured at 1000 ft. and stable at 500 ft. without any excessive inputs but due to task saturation of loading the approach late I was distracted and missed the 1000 ft. call out and I think due to fatigue made the 500 ft. stable call out late (~400) but was monitoring the approach closely at that point as I recognized our slips in situational awareness on the approach and was ready to call go around if PF had not corrected and maintained lateral and vertical guidance. Suggestions: I need to constantly be vigilant assessing my fitness for duty and not allow external factors to impact my decision. Again, I did think I was FFD (fit for duty) at outset, but in hindsight maybe I wasn’t. I am still learning at what point I need to call it. I need to grow in my confidence in speaking up, and challenge any decisions being made or actions requested of me that I think increase risk. I need to be more vigilant reviewing approach charts at unfamiliar airports, and take more time to understand why for example a caution note may be in the company pages. While the caution didn’t directly speak to this situation, it could have clued me into looking more closely. Operations might consider adding to the caution note something regarding multiple intermediate segments in unusually close proximity to FAF with significantly higher MSAs due to towers in the area. Scheduling might consider the long-term ramifications of excessive hold times and issues with hotels, and implementing alternate strategies to ensure lower wait times and better assistance to crews during IROPS (Irregular Operations). Again, my responsibility to assess FFD and not let this influence me, but can still subconsciously impact decision making I think."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "It was XA00 am and we were on approach into Cleveland cleared visual 6L. We were pretty tired due to the delays and both the FO (First Officer) and I agreed we were tired but focused on the approach. We were on a base to final turn just outside the final approach fix. When we received our visual clearance, we were at 3000 ft. The chart page states that we needed to configure early due to the low terrain. We were at flaps 2 at started descending 2000 ft. As stated we were outside the final approach fix which is at 2000 ft. I selected flaps 3 gear down. At this time the plane started to descend pretty steeply. I TCS’d it and increased power while trying to select altitude to level off. That is when we got a prox terrain caution. I immediately kicked off the autopilot and leveled off and increased power. There didn’t seem to be a tower or anything out there that triggered it but we leveled off. ATC didn’t say anything either. We think it had to do with the excessive descent rate that triggered the caution as the plane started a pretty steep descent. We continued the approach and received a side step to 6r. The flight concluded without any issues. Looking back the fix before the final showed 2300 ft. We were an out 2500 ft when the caution went off. Looking back, we could have stayed higher on the approach, however I was focused on configuring and making sure we were stable as it was a tight intercept. Fatigue was definitely a large factor to this. As stated we fixed the issue and maintained a safe and stable approach. Next time I will configure once we’re established on the approach."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter a long day of delays into and out of ZZZ, we were on approach at approximately XA00am for runway 6L into CLE. PIC was PF and I was PM. PF loaded and briefed the ILS 6L. I recall when PF briefed company page taking note of the second caution about unusually low fix altitudes as he read it as I had never seen that before. This was my first flight into CLE with about 160 hours in the plane mostly in the northeast. About 20 nm east of the field approach cleared us for the visual approach to 6L. PF turned us onto a downwind and continued a descent to 3000 that had been previously set from a clearance. He activated vectors to final and began calling for flaps 1, then flaps 2. PF turned right base and in the turn bugged 2000 for the FAF BOEEE and began a descent in FLCH while calling for flaps 3. While manipulating the flaps approach handed me off to tower and I made the appropriate radio calls. While talking to ATC, I believe the combination of the moment resulting from the flaps 3 change while FLCH descent was beginning led to more of a descent rate than expected. PF noticed this, and I believe selected FPA (Flight Path Angle) to adjust descent but the combination of descent rate and proximity to a tower led to an obstacle alert. There are numerous towers around that area. Looking at the track, we were actually on track to intercept around FUZED which has a segment leading up to it with an MSA of 3800 ft. and after a segment with MSA of 2900 ft. due to a tower around FUZED at 1649 ft. which is likely the tower eliciting the caution. I don’t think either of us realized we were that far out due to the FMS having vectors to final loaded and degradation in our situational awareness. Once I audibly called “tower straight ahead” and pointed PF disconnected autopilot, reduced the descent rate, leveled off around 2300- 2400, and turned further right away from the tower and to intercept final approach course while calling for gear down, flaps 5, speed Vapp, and landing checklist. Tower also at that time offered 6R instead of 6L and PF requested we accept. I queried if PF wanted me to load anything in and he said he was okay to fly visual. As we approached final approach course I confirmed he was landing on 6R as I was concerned workload and lack of an approach could lead to further problems. He confirmed, and then asked me to load it in for him which I quickly did for lateral and vertical guidance. We were initially around I think a 1 1/4 dots low on GS once loaded in and upon looking outside had I believe 3 red on the VGSI. I called out “low” and PF responded “correcting,” and quickly did so requiring no further action. We were configured at 1000 ft. and stable at 500 ft. without any excessive inputs but due to task saturation of loading the approach late I was distracted and missed the 1000 ft. call out and I think due to fatigue made the 500 ft. stable call out late (~400) but was monitoring the approach closely at that point as I recognized our slips in situational awareness on the approach and was ready to call go around if PF had not corrected and maintained lateral and vertical guidance. Suggestions: I need to constantly be vigilant assessing my fitness for duty and not allow external factors to impact my decision. Again, I did think I was FFD (fit for duty) at outset, but in hindsight maybe I wasn’t. I am still learning at what point I need to call it. I need to grow in my confidence in speaking up, and challenge any decisions being made or actions requested of me that I think increase risk. I need to be more vigilant reviewing approach charts at unfamiliar airports, and take more time to understand why for example a caution note may be in the company pages. While the caution didn’t directly speak to this situation, it could have clued me into looking more closely. Operations might consider adding to the caution note something regarding multiple intermediate segments in unusually close proximity to FAF with significantly higher MSAs due to towers in the area. Scheduling might consider the long-term ramifications of excessive hold times and issues with hotels, and implementing alternate strategies to ensure lower wait times and better assistance to crews during IROPS (Irregular Operations). Again, my responsibility to assess FFD and not let this influence me, but can still subconsciously impact decision making I think.\n\nNarrative 2\nIt was XA00 am and we were on approach into Cleveland cleared visual 6L. We were pretty tired due to the delays and both the FO (First Officer) and I agreed we were tired but focused on the approach. We were on a base to final turn just outside the final approach fix. When we received our visual clearance, we were at 3000 ft. The chart page states that we needed to configure early due to the low terrain. We were at flaps 2 at started descending 2000 ft. As stated we were outside the final approach fix which is at 2000 ft. I selected flaps 3 gear down. At this time the plane started to descend pretty steeply. I TCS’d it and increased power while trying to select altitude to level off. That is when we got a prox terrain caution. I immediately kicked off the autopilot and leveled off and increased power. There didn’t seem to be a tower or anything out there that triggered it but we leveled off. ATC didn’t say anything either. We think it had to do with the excessive descent rate that triggered the caution as the plane started a pretty steep descent. We continued the approach and received a side step to 6r. The flight concluded without any issues. Looking back the fix before the final showed 2300 ft. We were an out 2500 ft when the caution went off. Looking back, we could have stayed higher on the approach, however I was focused on configuring and making sure we were stable as it was a tight intercept. Fatigue was definitely a large factor to this. As stated we fixed the issue and maintained a safe and stable approach. Next time I will configure once we’re established on the approach.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported a terrain obstacle alert while descending on the initial approach at night on a visual approach. The crew leveled out, then stabilized late on the approach, and continued the visual approach to landing.",
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      },
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    "title": "ASRS 2078449 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported a terrain obstacle alert while descending on the initial approach at night on a visual approach. The crew leveled out, then stabilized late on the approach, and continued the visual approach to landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue",
      "Procedures"
    ],
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        },
        "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter a long day of delays into and out of ZZZ, we were on approach at approximately XA00am for runway 6L into CLE. PIC was PF and I was PM. PF loaded and briefed the ILS 6L. I recall when PF briefed company page taking note of the second caution about unusually low fix altitudes as he read it as I had never seen that before. This was my first flight into CLE with about 160 hours in the plane mostly in the northeast. About 20 nm east of the field approach cleared us for the visual approach to 6L. PF turned us onto a downwind and continued a descent to 3000 that had been previously set from a clearance. He activated vectors to final and began calling for flaps 1, then flaps 2. PF turned right base and in the turn bugged 2000 for the FAF BOEEE and began a descent in FLCH while calling for flaps 3. While manipulating the flaps approach handed me off to tower and I made the appropriate radio calls. While talking to ATC, I believe the combination of the moment resulting from the flaps 3 change while FLCH descent was beginning led to more of a descent rate than expected. PF noticed this, and I believe selected FPA (Flight Path Angle) to adjust descent but the combination of descent rate and proximity to a tower led to an obstacle alert. There are numerous towers around that area. Looking at the track, we were actually on track to intercept around FUZED which has a segment leading up to it with an MSA of 3800 ft. and after a segment with MSA of 2900 ft. due to a tower around FUZED at 1649 ft. which is likely the tower eliciting the caution. I don’t think either of us realized we were that far out due to the FMS having vectors to final loaded and degradation in our situational awareness. Once I audibly called “tower straight ahead” and pointed PF disconnected autopilot, reduced the descent rate, leveled off around 2300- 2400, and turned further right away from the tower and to intercept final approach course while calling for gear down, flaps 5, speed Vapp, and landing checklist. Tower also at that time offered 6R instead of 6L and PF requested we accept. I queried if PF wanted me to load anything in and he said he was okay to fly visual. As we approached final approach course I confirmed he was landing on 6R as I was concerned workload and lack of an approach could lead to further problems. He confirmed, and then asked me to load it in for him which I quickly did for lateral and vertical guidance. We were initially around I think a 1 1/4 dots low on GS once loaded in and upon looking outside had I believe 3 red on the VGSI. I called out “low” and PF responded “correcting,” and quickly did so requiring no further action. We were configured at 1000 ft. and stable at 500 ft. without any excessive inputs but due to task saturation of loading the approach late I was distracted and missed the 1000 ft. call out and I think due to fatigue made the 500 ft. stable call out late (~400) but was monitoring the approach closely at that point as I recognized our slips in situational awareness on the approach and was ready to call go around if PF had not corrected and maintained lateral and vertical guidance. Suggestions: I need to constantly be vigilant assessing my fitness for duty and not allow external factors to impact my decision. Again, I did think I was FFD (fit for duty) at outset, but in hindsight maybe I wasn’t. I am still learning at what point I need to call it. I need to grow in my confidence in speaking up, and challenge any decisions being made or actions requested of me that I think increase risk. I need to be more vigilant reviewing approach charts at unfamiliar airports, and take more time to understand why for example a caution note may be in the company pages. While the caution didn’t directly speak to this situation, it could have clued me into looking more closely. Operations might consider adding to the caution note something regarding multiple intermediate segments in unusually close proximity to FAF with significantly higher MSAs due to towers in the area. Scheduling might consider the long-term ramifications of excessive hold times and issues with hotels, and implementing alternate strategies to ensure lower wait times and better assistance to crews during IROPS (Irregular Operations). Again, my responsibility to assess FFD and not let this influence me, but can still subconsciously impact decision making I think.\n\nNarrative 2\nIt was XA00 am and we were on approach into Cleveland cleared visual 6L. We were pretty tired due to the delays and both the FO (First Officer) and I agreed we were tired but focused on the approach. We were on a base to final turn just outside the final approach fix. When we received our visual clearance, we were at 3000 ft. The chart page states that we needed to configure early due to the low terrain. We were at flaps 2 at started descending 2000 ft. As stated we were outside the final approach fix which is at 2000 ft. I selected flaps 3 gear down. At this time the plane started to descend pretty steeply. I TCS’d it and increased power while trying to select altitude to level off. That is when we got a prox terrain caution. I immediately kicked off the autopilot and leveled off and increased power. There didn’t seem to be a tower or anything out there that triggered it but we leveled off. ATC didn’t say anything either. We think it had to do with the excessive descent rate that triggered the caution as the plane started a pretty steep descent. We continued the approach and received a side step to 6R. The flight concluded without any issues. Looking back the fix before the final showed 2300 ft. We were an out 2500 ft when the caution went off. Looking back, we could have stayed higher on the approach, however I was focused on configuring and making sure we were stable as it was a tight intercept. Fatigue was definitely a large factor to this. As stated we fixed the issue and maintained a safe and stable approach. Next time I will configure once we’re established on the approach.",
        "narratives": [
          {
            "number": 1,
            "text": "After a long day of delays into and out of ZZZ, we were on approach at approximately XA00am for runway 6L into CLE. PIC was PF and I was PM. PF loaded and briefed the ILS 6L. I recall when PF briefed company page taking note of the second caution about unusually low fix altitudes as he read it as I had never seen that before. This was my first flight into CLE with about 160 hours in the plane mostly in the northeast. About 20 nm east of the field approach cleared us for the visual approach to 6L. PF turned us onto a downwind and continued a descent to 3000 that had been previously set from a clearance. He activated vectors to final and began calling for flaps 1, then flaps 2. PF turned right base and in the turn bugged 2000 for the FAF BOEEE and began a descent in FLCH while calling for flaps 3. While manipulating the flaps approach handed me off to tower and I made the appropriate radio calls. While talking to ATC, I believe the combination of the moment resulting from the flaps 3 change while FLCH descent was beginning led to more of a descent rate than expected. PF noticed this, and I believe selected FPA (Flight Path Angle) to adjust descent but the combination of descent rate and proximity to a tower led to an obstacle alert. There are numerous towers around that area. Looking at the track, we were actually on track to intercept around FUZED which has a segment leading up to it with an MSA of 3800 ft. and after a segment with MSA of 2900 ft. due to a tower around FUZED at 1649 ft. which is likely the tower eliciting the caution. I don’t think either of us realized we were that far out due to the FMS having vectors to final loaded and degradation in our situational awareness. Once I audibly called “tower straight ahead” and pointed PF disconnected autopilot, reduced the descent rate, leveled off around 2300- 2400, and turned further right away from the tower and to intercept final approach course while calling for gear down, flaps 5, speed Vapp, and landing checklist. Tower also at that time offered 6R instead of 6L and PF requested we accept. I queried if PF wanted me to load anything in and he said he was okay to fly visual. As we approached final approach course I confirmed he was landing on 6R as I was concerned workload and lack of an approach could lead to further problems. He confirmed, and then asked me to load it in for him which I quickly did for lateral and vertical guidance. We were initially around I think a 1 1/4 dots low on GS once loaded in and upon looking outside had I believe 3 red on the VGSI. I called out “low” and PF responded “correcting,” and quickly did so requiring no further action. We were configured at 1000 ft. and stable at 500 ft. without any excessive inputs but due to task saturation of loading the approach late I was distracted and missed the 1000 ft. call out and I think due to fatigue made the 500 ft. stable call out late (~400) but was monitoring the approach closely at that point as I recognized our slips in situational awareness on the approach and was ready to call go around if PF had not corrected and maintained lateral and vertical guidance. Suggestions: I need to constantly be vigilant assessing my fitness for duty and not allow external factors to impact my decision. Again, I did think I was FFD (fit for duty) at outset, but in hindsight maybe I wasn’t. I am still learning at what point I need to call it. I need to grow in my confidence in speaking up, and challenge any decisions being made or actions requested of me that I think increase risk. I need to be more vigilant reviewing approach charts at unfamiliar airports, and take more time to understand why for example a caution note may be in the company pages. While the caution didn’t directly speak to this situation, it could have clued me into looking more closely. Operations might consider adding to the caution note something regarding multiple intermediate segments in unusually close proximity to FAF with significantly higher MSAs due to towers in the area. Scheduling might consider the long-term ramifications of excessive hold times and issues with hotels, and implementing alternate strategies to ensure lower wait times and better assistance to crews during IROPS (Irregular Operations). Again, my responsibility to assess FFD and not let this influence me, but can still subconsciously impact decision making I think."
          },
          {
            "number": 2,
            "text": "It was XA00 am and we were on approach into Cleveland cleared visual 6L. We were pretty tired due to the delays and both the FO (First Officer) and I agreed we were tired but focused on the approach. We were on a base to final turn just outside the final approach fix. When we received our visual clearance, we were at 3000 ft. The chart page states that we needed to configure early due to the low terrain. We were at flaps 2 at started descending 2000 ft. As stated we were outside the final approach fix which is at 2000 ft. I selected flaps 3 gear down. At this time the plane started to descend pretty steeply. I TCS’d it and increased power while trying to select altitude to level off. That is when we got a prox terrain caution. I immediately kicked off the autopilot and leveled off and increased power. There didn’t seem to be a tower or anything out there that triggered it but we leveled off. ATC didn’t say anything either. We think it had to do with the excessive descent rate that triggered the caution as the plane started a pretty steep descent. We continued the approach and received a side step to 6R. The flight concluded without any issues. Looking back the fix before the final showed 2300 ft. We were an out 2500 ft when the caution went off. Looking back, we could have stayed higher on the approach, however I was focused on configuring and making sure we were stable as it was a tight intercept. Fatigue was definitely a large factor to this. As stated we fixed the issue and maintained a safe and stable approach. Next time I will configure once we’re established on the approach."
          }
        ],
        "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported a terrain obstacle alert while descending on the initial approach at night on a visual approach. The crew leveled out, then stabilized late on the approach, and continued the visual approach to landing.",
        "aircraft": [
          "Commercial Fixed Wing"
        ],
        "flightPhase": [
          "Initial Approach"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2078444",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "It was the go home leg of a three day trip. I was PF and originally entered the flight plan departing runway XXR and the ZZZZZ departure. As we taxied to the runway we were cleared to runway XXL instead as a new ATIS was released and construction work began on XXR. While the CA taxied I updated the departure to runway XXL, but in a rush to reset the flight plan I did not re-enter the ZZZZZ RNAV SID. Once reaching XXL we were cleared for takeoff. On climb out I called FMS NAV at 400 feet and instead of indicating a left turn to 139 degrees the flight director started indicated a right turn direct towards ZZZZZ intersection farther along our cleared route. As the FD started indicating the right turn we had a brief terrain caution alert and we realized our mistake. The CA advised ATC immediately and they gave us a vector to correct the situation. Fortunately there was no conflicting traffic, we were light and had setup a no flex takeoff making for a rapid climb. Suggestions: Don’t ever let yourself feel rushed. Always confirm your flight partner acknowledges changes made in the MCDU. Don’t be afraid to call out fatigued."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Departing ZZZ at night, we expected [Runway] XXR for departure, but on taxi out changed to XXL because of construction. I was taxiing and heads up because of the multiple runway crossings while FO changed the runway in the MCDU. I saw XXL as the runway but did not check to see that the SID was still there. It must not have been inputted again. We ran the change items and were ready to line up and wait immediately. During takeoff I was pilot monitoring. The FO called “FMS NAV” at the appropriate time and I selected NAV, however the SID (ZZZZZ off XXL) was not in the box. It should have been a left turn but our course was pointed towards ZZZZZ which was right. The FO began I right turn. I realized something was wrong but not what. I said fly straight and then turn left while I was trying to put the ZZZZZ [SID] in the box. I then checked on with departure and told them we made a mistake but were in a left turn. They gave us a 090 heading to fly and then direct to ZZZZZ1. ATC asked us if we needed assistance. I explained that the SID dropped out and we turned the wrong way. At some point during the confusion we got a GPWS terrain caution “terrain terrain” along with a “appch 2 not avail” EICAS message. It stopped before we could respond, I think as we were turning back left. I don’t know how close we were to buildings or terrain. The flight continued without further incident. I need to make sure during a runway change on taxi out that the SID is still entered in the mcdu. It is easy to forget to input again when changing runways, and easy to forget to verify when I’m busy taxiing. Contributing to this was my fatigue. The night before I was reassigned to a deadhead that arrived in ZZZ1 at XA:30AM. I was sent to 2 different hotels that did not actually have rooms for me, then scheduling told me to take a rideshare to a hotel 25 minutes away and that I had to put it on my own credit card. I did not get into bed until after XD:30AM. I thought I got enough rest but I was most likely stressed and fatigued. In hindsight it might have been prudent for me to call in fatigued."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nIt was the go home leg of a three day trip. I was PF and originally entered the flight plan departing runway XXR and the ZZZZZ departure. As we taxied to the runway we were cleared to runway XXL instead as a new ATIS was released and construction work began on XXR. While the CA taxied I updated the departure to runway XXL, but in a rush to reset the flight plan I did not re-enter the ZZZZZ RNAV SID. Once reaching XXL we were cleared for takeoff. On climb out I called FMS NAV at 400 feet and instead of indicating a left turn to 139 degrees the flight director started indicated a right turn direct towards ZZZZZ intersection farther along our cleared route. As the FD started indicating the right turn we had a brief terrain caution alert and we realized our mistake. The CA advised ATC immediately and they gave us a vector to correct the situation. Fortunately there was no conflicting traffic, we were light and had setup a no flex takeoff making for a rapid climb. Suggestions: Don’t ever let yourself feel rushed. Always confirm your flight partner acknowledges changes made in the MCDU. Don’t be afraid to call out fatigued.\n\nNarrative 2\nDeparting ZZZ at night, we expected [Runway] XXR for departure, but on taxi out changed to XXL because of construction. I was taxiing and heads up because of the multiple runway crossings while FO changed the runway in the MCDU. I saw XXL as the runway but did not check to see that the SID was still there. It must not have been inputted again. We ran the change items and were ready to line up and wait immediately. During takeoff I was pilot monitoring. The FO called “FMS NAV” at the appropriate time and I selected NAV, however the SID (ZZZZZ off XXL) was not in the box. It should have been a left turn but our course was pointed towards ZZZZZ which was right. The FO began I right turn. I realized something was wrong but not what. I said fly straight and then turn left while I was trying to put the ZZZZZ [SID] in the box. I then checked on with departure and told them we made a mistake but were in a left turn. They gave us a 090 heading to fly and then direct to ZZZZZ1. ATC asked us if we needed assistance. I explained that the SID dropped out and we turned the wrong way. At some point during the confusion we got a GPWS terrain caution “terrain terrain” along with a “appch 2 not avail” EICAS message. It stopped before we could respond, I think as we were turning back left. I don’t know how close we were to buildings or terrain. The flight continued without further incident. I need to make sure during a runway change on taxi out that the SID is still entered in the mcdu. It is easy to forget to input again when changing runways, and easy to forget to verify when I’m busy taxiing. Contributing to this was my fatigue. The night before I was reassigned to a deadhead that arrived in ZZZ1 at XA:30AM. I was sent to 2 different hotels that did not actually have rooms for me, then scheduling told me to take a rideshare to a hotel 25 minutes away and that I had to put it on my own credit card. I did not get into bed until after XD:30AM. I thought I got enough rest but I was most likely stressed and fatigued. In hindsight it might have been prudent for me to call in fatigued.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier pilot crew reported a track deviation, clearance deviation, caution terrain warning and improper loading of the SID in the FMC. The pilots both reported several runway changes and fatigue as contributing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=27",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
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      {
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        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2078444 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier pilot crew reported a track deviation, clearance deviation, caution terrain warning and improper loading of the SID in the FMC. The pilots both reported several runway changes and fatigue as contributing.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2076486",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Cleared for the RNAV [Runway] XX cross ZZZZZ (IAF) at 2000 ft. Captain set the altitude bug to 100 ft. and descended in green FLCH with GP armed. We both thought that VNAV was armed and missed the fact that the vertical mode was green. We descended below 2000 ft. to 1700 ft. and quickly corrected back up to 2000 ft. The Captain began correcting when Tower gave us a low altitude warning. Landed uneventfully afterwards. At the time I was focused on ensuring we had the correct approach loaded, as ATC gave us a different IAF that made us reprogram the approach. I should have verified the FMA was set correctly once the FMS was fixed. Being tired after a 12 hour 4 leg day with thunderstorms and a delay was a factor in why this slip up occurred."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Cleared for RNAV [Runway] XX. LNAV engaged, APP armed. Altitude selected to minimums (first mistake). We were in green FLCH when I thought I had engaged VNAV which would have caught our final altitude of 2000 ft. (second mistake). Since we weren’t in VNAV the aircraft descended below 2000 ft. We arrested the descent at 1700 ft. and immediately corrected back to 2000 ft. about the time we received a low altitude warning from Tower. After correcting we landed without incident. These mistakes on my part were due entirely to the fact that I was tired after almost 12 hours of duty, four legs of flying, dealing with thunderstorms and other issues. I was not as sharp as I needed to be."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nCleared for the RNAV [Runway] XX cross ZZZZZ (IAF) at 2000 ft. Captain set the altitude bug to 100 ft. and descended in green FLCH with GP armed. We both thought that VNAV was armed and missed the fact that the vertical mode was green. We descended below 2000 ft. to 1700 ft. and quickly corrected back up to 2000 ft. The Captain began correcting when Tower gave us a low altitude warning. Landed uneventfully afterwards. At the time I was focused on ensuring we had the correct approach loaded, as ATC gave us a different IAF that made us reprogram the approach. I should have verified the FMA was set correctly once the FMS was fixed. Being tired after a 12 hour 4 leg day with thunderstorms and a delay was a factor in why this slip up occurred.\n\nNarrative 2\nCleared for RNAV [Runway] XX. LNAV engaged, APP armed. Altitude selected to minimums (first mistake). We were in green FLCH when I thought I had engaged VNAV which would have caught our final altitude of 2000 ft. (second mistake). Since we weren’t in VNAV the aircraft descended below 2000 ft. We arrested the descent at 1700 ft. and immediately corrected back to 2000 ft. about the time we received a low altitude warning from Tower. After correcting we landed without incident. These mistakes on my part were due entirely to the fact that I was tired after almost 12 hours of duty, four legs of flying, dealing with thunderstorms and other issues. I was not as sharp as I needed to be.",
    "synopsis": "An Air Carrier Flight Crew reported they descended below glide path on approach and received a low altitude warning from ATC.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=30",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2076486 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "An Air Carrier Flight Crew reported they descended below glide path on approach and received a low altitude warning from ATC.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2069056",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ, I was pilot monitoring and the First Officer was pilot flying. The flight went well until the approach. We flew the ZZZZZ arrival with transition to XXL. The weather was perfect. We had flaps set to 20 and ZZZ gave us a left turn for a base. He finished configuring, and I recall telling him to be careful with his airspeed, as he slowed down, he set REF+5 a bit early. ATC asked if we had the airport in sight and we did. They cleared us to turn left to a certain heading and cleared us for the visual approach. We were at 3000ft and close to ZZZZZ1. I saw the glide slope go by and we were too high. Things went extremely fast and a lot was going on, I cannot remember very much of what happened in what order. But because he was high, I told the First Officer “I recommend you hand-fly, we are high”, so he did. He disconnected the autopilot and flew manually. He might have been in a bit of a turn from the final intercept heading, I am not sure. To avoid him descending too fast, I gave him VS 1000 fpm since we were inside the FAF. Between that and switching to tower/running landing checklist, I was heads down. I looked up and all of a sudden see that he’s about to line up with XXR instead of XXL. I told him that, and he was a bit slow to correct, so I momentarily grabbed the yoke and encouraged the left turn. He corrected. Between focusing on the runway alignment outside and still trying to run the checklist, check in with tower, I did not notice he was getting low. We got the “glide slope” aural warning and he corrected. Then ATC also gave us a “low altitude alert” a little bit later, as we were correcting altitude. This all happened very quickly, because I remember being back on glide slope and all being normal between 700 and 500ft AGL. It is beyond me why I did not call for a go-around. It all went so fast, so much happened in such a short amount of time, I don’t remember at what altitudes things happened. Our day started really poorly, with a late inbound and isle chair waiting to deplane. We had to move quickly, I tried to slow things down, not to feel rushed. But quickly, I felt pressure to move faster after push, for an inbound mainline that we were blocking. I think it kind of set the tone for the rest of the turn. On another note, I keep getting switched from late nights to early mornings back and forth, and having started very early, my focus was probably not the best. I should have been paying more attention during the localizer capture moment, and when things went wrong, I should have either called for a go-around or taken the controls. We debriefed it once at the gate. I should have asked for a go around. I think I got caught in the moment. I normally have no issues calling for one or executing one. I could have also taken control of the aircraft and done the go-around myself, when I noticed the wrong runway alignment or the glide slope."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ, I was pilot monitoring and the First Officer was pilot flying. The flight went well until the approach. We flew the ZZZZZ arrival with transition to XXL. The weather was perfect. We had flaps set to 20 and ZZZ gave us a left turn for a base. He finished configuring, and I recall telling him to be careful with his airspeed, as he slowed down, he set REF+5 a bit early. ATC asked if we had the airport in sight and we did. They cleared us to turn left to a certain heading and cleared us for the visual approach. We were at 3000ft and close to ZZZZZ1. I saw the glide slope go by and we were too high. Things went extremely fast and a lot was going on, I cannot remember very much of what happened in what order. But because he was high, I told the First Officer “I recommend you hand-fly, we are high”, so he did. He disconnected the autopilot and flew manually. He might have been in a bit of a turn from the final intercept heading, I am not sure. To avoid him descending too fast, I gave him VS 1000 fpm since we were inside the FAF. Between that and switching to tower/running landing checklist, I was heads down. I looked up and all of a sudden see that he’s about to line up with XXR instead of XXL. I told him that, and he was a bit slow to correct, so I momentarily grabbed the yoke and encouraged the left turn. He corrected. Between focusing on the runway alignment outside and still trying to run the checklist, check in with tower, I did not notice he was getting low. We got the “glide slope” aural warning and he corrected. Then ATC also gave us a “low altitude alert” a little bit later, as we were correcting altitude. This all happened very quickly, because I remember being back on glide slope and all being normal between 700 and 500ft AGL. It is beyond me why I did not call for a go-around. It all went so fast, so much happened in such a short amount of time, I don’t remember at what altitudes things happened. Our day started really poorly, with a late inbound and isle chair waiting to deplane. We had to move quickly, I tried to slow things down, not to feel rushed. But quickly, I felt pressure to move faster after push, for an inbound mainline that we were blocking. I think it kind of set the tone for the rest of the turn. On another note, I keep getting switched from late nights to early mornings back and forth, and having started very early, my focus was probably not the best. I should have been paying more attention during the localizer capture moment, and when things went wrong, I should have either called for a go-around or taken the controls. We debriefed it once at the gate. I should have asked for a go around. I think I got caught in the moment. I normally have no issues calling for one or executing one. I could have also taken control of the aircraft and done the go-around myself, when I noticed the wrong runway alignment or the glide slope.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier Captain reported low altitude alert on approach. Flight crew corrected and continued approach.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=33",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 33,
      "pageEnd": 34,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 33,
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      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2069056 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier Captain reported low altitude alert on approach. Flight crew corrected and continued approach.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
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  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2061250",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Parked",
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Prior to this event, operations were normal and rest was managed well on this trip pairing. Today we experienced problem after problem that constantly developed threats that we had to tirelessly mitigate, which caused a great amount of mental exhaustion along with physical. I started the day at XA00 local time to be report for our XB04 local time transport to the airport. While completing my preflight duties, I observed zero items with the aircraft logbook that were of concern or could cause a delay. Upon reaching [the] departure gate, the Gate Agent stated something completely out of the ordinary, which put the Captain and I on alert. The Gate Agent stated “you should do a thorough walk- around because the previous crew from the night before reported a hard landing.” I was confused as to why we were hearing this from a Customer Service Representative. Regardless, there was nothing in the logbook, but given the report we had to investigate by contacting Maintenance that then required a maintenance inspection. This station utilizes contract maintenance that is only available after XC00 local time. Due to the snow storm that ZZZZ was experiencing that reported it would take about 30 minutes for contract maintenance to reach our aircraft. Just this started our delay. Upon reaching the aircraft visually, I observed that the flaps were left extended overnight, all tires appeared to have low tire pressure, one of our hydraulics quantities was at Refill (RF), both engines had multiple inches of snow and ice blocking the intakes, as well as both N1 fans being frozen completely and unable to move. While experiencing coordinating more maintenance this required multiple trips to and from the flight deck to the outside of the aircraft in sub- zero temperatures, falling snow, and a snow covered icy ramp. After waiting over 1.5 hours, maintenance was complete, then it took an additional 30 minutes roughly to obtain our Maintenance Release. After this, we were ready to push, but the ground had left and there was not a tug connected to the aircraft that caused even further delay. After some time, we acquired a push that was only able to push about 3/4 of the way due to the tug slipping with the aircraft connected. We set the parking brake as instructed and completed the push in the position we stopped in. Both engines were then started and given the snow storm conditions, the de ice pad became full which caused us to wait even longer. All of the constant changes and trapping of potential threats was becoming mentally fatiguing. Finally, we were cleared to the de ice pad and expected to then make a normal departure. Towards the end of the final application of anti-ice fluid, ground personnel called us to notify that one of their trucks slowly collided with the aircraft. Due to this, we had to return to the gate for another maintenance inspection. Now we hit the Long Tarmac Delay point, required more fuel, and the Ground Crew took a while to direct us into the gate. At this point, multiple hours had elapsed with high workload. We prepared the aircraft again, pushed back and the tug had to stop again due to braking action. After starting both engines, with the parking brake set, we began to slide on the apron. Due to this, we shut down in position and waited about 20 minutes for snow removal equipment to clear a safe path for us to then taxi to de-ice that added even more time to the multi hour delay. Following this we made a slow taxi across the airport and made a normal departure and operated the flight to ZZZ. By the end of all of this it was my best judgment to call fatigued due to the multiple hours at a high workload."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nPrior to this event, operations were normal and rest was managed well on this trip pairing. Today we experienced problem after problem that constantly developed threats that we had to tirelessly mitigate, which caused a great amount of mental exhaustion along with physical. I started the day at XA00 local time to be report for our XB04 local time transport to the airport. While completing my preflight duties, I observed zero items with the aircraft logbook that were of concern or could cause a delay. Upon reaching [the] departure gate, the Gate Agent stated something completely out of the ordinary, which put the Captain and I on alert. The Gate Agent stated “you should do a thorough walk- around because the previous crew from the night before reported a hard landing.” I was confused as to why we were hearing this from a Customer Service Representative. Regardless, there was nothing in the logbook, but given the report we had to investigate by contacting Maintenance that then required a maintenance inspection. This station utilizes contract maintenance that is only available after XC00 local time. Due to the snow storm that ZZZZ was experiencing that reported it would take about 30 minutes for contract maintenance to reach our aircraft. Just this started our delay. Upon reaching the aircraft visually, I observed that the flaps were left extended overnight, all tires appeared to have low tire pressure, one of our hydraulics quantities was at Refill (RF), both engines had multiple inches of snow and ice blocking the intakes, as well as both N1 fans being frozen completely and unable to move. While experiencing coordinating more maintenance this required multiple trips to and from the flight deck to the outside of the aircraft in sub- zero temperatures, falling snow, and a snow covered icy ramp. After waiting over 1.5 hours, maintenance was complete, then it took an additional 30 minutes roughly to obtain our Maintenance Release. After this, we were ready to push, but the ground had left and there was not a tug connected to the aircraft that caused even further delay. After some time, we acquired a push that was only able to push about 3/4 of the way due to the tug slipping with the aircraft connected. We set the parking brake as instructed and completed the push in the position we stopped in. Both engines were then started and given the snow storm conditions, the de ice pad became full which caused us to wait even longer. All of the constant changes and trapping of potential threats was becoming mentally fatiguing. Finally, we were cleared to the de ice pad and expected to then make a normal departure. Towards the end of the final application of anti-ice fluid, ground personnel called us to notify that one of their trucks slowly collided with the aircraft. Due to this, we had to return to the gate for another maintenance inspection. Now we hit the Long Tarmac Delay point, required more fuel, and the Ground Crew took a while to direct us into the gate. At this point, multiple hours had elapsed with high workload. We prepared the aircraft again, pushed back and the tug had to stop again due to braking action. After starting both engines, with the parking brake set, we began to slide on the apron. Due to this, we shut down in position and waited about 20 minutes for snow removal equipment to clear a safe path for us to then taxi to de-ice that added even more time to the multi hour delay. Following this we made a slow taxi across the airport and made a normal departure and operated the flight to ZZZ. By the end of all of this it was my best judgment to call fatigued due to the multiple hours at a high workload.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier pilot reported during push back the tug slid temporarily out of control on an icy ramp. Later on at the deicer pad a deicing truck collided with the aircraft.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=35",
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    "title": "ASRS 2061250 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier pilot reported during push back the tug slid temporarily out of control on an icy ramp. Later on at the deicer pad a deicing truck collided with the aircraft.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
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      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2060416",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "For this flight I had accepted an extension of my flight duty period since I had already timed out coming into ZZZ1 from ZZZZ. I had 14 hours of duty time already but when I accepted the extension I assess myself to see if I was fit for duty at that moment and I was feeling fine, therefore I accepted to continue and extend. Now after 2 hours and 20 mins into flight, we were Northeast of the airport on our approach to ZZZ to do the ILS XXL, we were at 3000 ft as assigned and on a heading of 220 to intercept the localizer. Since it was VMC and we had the field insight, ATC cleared us for the visual Runway XXL. The heading that it was giving to us of 220 gave a weird intercept angle right on the FAF ZZZZZ. We noticed we were going to be high by the time we were going to intercept and we were too close to the FAF, so me as the pilot flying decided to finish configuring and start my descent early to 2700 ft to comply for the FAF altitude. As we intercepted the localizer and already being fully configured, I was surprised that the GS never captured so I continued my descent thinking that I was still high and I was basically looking outside as we were in visual conditions at nighttime, but unfortunately I didn’t pay close attention to my altitude. Because of this I was 150 ft lower that I should’ve been between ZZZZZ and the second fix ZZZZZ1 and that is why I wasn’t able to capture the glide slope. Naturally, the plane noticed it, and gave us the GPWS aural “Glide slope” twice. That’s when I stopped my descent and since it was visual conditions, not in IMC and was confident on my skill to correct and land safely, I stated “continuing”. It was a successful landing with no damage to the aircraft or passenger/crew injuries. Suggestions: Because of how long of a day it was for me of work/duty, at the end of the flight I started to feel tired earlier than anticipated, therefore my lack of situational awareness and decision making decreased and unfortunately the event happened. What I could’ve done to prevent this from happening again was before accepting the extension, I should’ve assessed myself at that precise moment AND assessed myself on how would my body and mind feel to fly AFTER one, two, or three hours of flight time has passed. This could’ve possibly prevented myself to accept the Flight Duty Period (FDP) extension. Also, during the approach and after the GPWS aural came on, I should’ve done a go-around and try again. My First Officer should’ve also helped me out in monitoring my altitude and say something about it and that could’ve also helped prevent me going lower than I should’ve. I should’ve also looked inside more at the instruments and trust them since it was nighttime and I was more susceptible of having night optical illusions making me feel that I was higher than I was. Definitely this was a learning experience for both me and the First Officer and this will help us reduce/eliminate the risk of safety."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "On Day 0 I was stationed as ready reserve at ZZZ1 from XA:00pm until XW:00am. At approximately XF:30pm, I was notified that I will be working Aircraft X from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. This flight was delayed prior due to a scheduling conflict. After a second crew swap, an inbound flight was assigned to fly Aircraft X. At approximately XI:40pm the flight had finally departed. During the approach phase of the flight, we transitioned from the “ZZZZZ Arrival” into the Visual Runway XXL approach. As a crew we had briefed the approach and backed up the approach with the ILS. After being vectored to a heading of 220 we were cleared for the “Visual Runway XXL”. Upon initiating the turn, the approach mode button was activated. However, the initial heading directed by ATC had brought us slightly past the FAF which didn’t allow the plane to capture the glide slope. Since the lower altitude was not reset, the Pilot flying (PF) had false information which caused us to trend 150 ft lower. On short final the plane received two Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) alerts. The plane landed without a non-event. Suggestions: The error that I had made as PM was that I didn’t make the appropriate callouts on the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) at the right times. I could have lessened my distraction by staying inside and providing better guidance to my pilot flying. Ultimately, to correct this error from happening again. I should have been more alert from the altitude deviation and have been more assertive in calling out the deviation. Last but not least I could called for a go- around. From this flight, I have learned plenty lessons and have learned ways to become a better pilot monitor."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nFor this flight I had accepted an extension of my flight duty period since I had already timed out coming into ZZZ1 from ZZZZ. I had 14 hours of duty time already but when I accepted the extension I assess myself to see if I was fit for duty at that moment and I was feeling fine, therefore I accepted to continue and extend. Now after 2 hours and 20 mins into flight, we were Northeast of the airport on our approach to ZZZ to do the ILS XXL, we were at 3000 ft as assigned and on a heading of 220 to intercept the localizer. Since it was VMC and we had the field insight, ATC cleared us for the visual Runway XXL. The heading that it was giving to us of 220 gave a weird intercept angle right on the FAF ZZZZZ. We noticed we were going to be high by the time we were going to intercept and we were too close to the FAF, so me as the pilot flying decided to finish configuring and start my descent early to 2700 ft to comply for the FAF altitude. As we intercepted the localizer and already being fully configured, I was surprised that the GS never captured so I continued my descent thinking that I was still high and I was basically looking outside as we were in visual conditions at nighttime, but unfortunately I didn’t pay close attention to my altitude. Because of this I was 150 ft lower that I should’ve been between ZZZZZ and the second fix ZZZZZ1 and that is why I wasn’t able to capture the glide slope. Naturally, the plane noticed it, and gave us the GPWS aural “Glide slope” twice. That’s when I stopped my descent and since it was visual conditions, not in IMC and was confident on my skill to correct and land safely, I stated “continuing”. It was a successful landing with no damage to the aircraft or passenger/crew injuries. Suggestions: Because of how long of a day it was for me of work/duty, at the end of the flight I started to feel tired earlier than anticipated, therefore my lack of situational awareness and decision making decreased and unfortunately the event happened. What I could’ve done to prevent this from happening again was before accepting the extension, I should’ve assessed myself at that precise moment AND assessed myself on how would my body and mind feel to fly AFTER one, two, or three hours of flight time has passed. This could’ve possibly prevented myself to accept the Flight Duty Period (FDP) extension. Also, during the approach and after the GPWS aural came on, I should’ve done a go-around and try again. My First Officer should’ve also helped me out in monitoring my altitude and say something about it and that could’ve also helped prevent me going lower than I should’ve. I should’ve also looked inside more at the instruments and trust them since it was nighttime and I was more susceptible of having night optical illusions making me feel that I was higher than I was. Definitely this was a learning experience for both me and the First Officer and this will help us reduce/eliminate the risk of safety.\n\nNarrative 2\nOn Day 0 I was stationed as ready reserve at ZZZ1 from XA:00pm until XW:00am. At approximately XF:30pm, I was notified that I will be working Aircraft X from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. This flight was delayed prior due to a scheduling conflict. After a second crew swap, an inbound flight was assigned to fly Aircraft X. At approximately XI:40pm the flight had finally departed. During the approach phase of the flight, we transitioned from the “ZZZZZ Arrival” into the Visual Runway XXL approach. As a crew we had briefed the approach and backed up the approach with the ILS. After being vectored to a heading of 220 we were cleared for the “Visual Runway XXL”. Upon initiating the turn, the approach mode button was activated. However, the initial heading directed by ATC had brought us slightly past the FAF which didn’t allow the plane to capture the glide slope. Since the lower altitude was not reset, the Pilot flying (PF) had false information which caused us to trend 150 ft lower. On short final the plane received two Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) alerts. The plane landed without a non-event. Suggestions: The error that I had made as PM was that I didn’t make the appropriate callouts on the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) at the right times. I could have lessened my distraction by staying inside and providing better guidance to my pilot flying. Ultimately, to correct this error from happening again. I should have been more alert from the altitude deviation and have been more assertive in calling out the deviation. Last but not least I could called for a go- around. From this flight, I have learned plenty lessons and have learned ways to become a better pilot monitor.",
    "synopsis": "Embraer 175 crew reported an unstabilized approach at night with below glide slope warnings. The Captain made pitch corrections, then landed safely.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=38",
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    "title": "ASRS 2060416 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Embraer 175 crew reported an unstabilized approach at night with below glide slope warnings. The Captain made pitch corrections, then landed safely.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
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      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2032850",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Bank angle. On departure out of ZZZ, Departure control gave us a right turn to heading 360 with the autopilot off. The PF banked to somewhere around 30 degrees and triggered the bank angle GPWS. The PF immediately recovered. Fatigue was a factor on the last leg of a long day."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nBank angle. On departure out of ZZZ, Departure control gave us a right turn to heading 360 with the autopilot off. The PF banked to somewhere around 30 degrees and triggered the bank angle GPWS. The PF immediately recovered. Fatigue was a factor on the last leg of a long day.",
    "synopsis": "B737 Captain reported during departure the pilot flying exceeded allowable bank angle triggering a bank angle warning. Flight crew returned to normal bank.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=41",
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      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "Bank-angle warning after a long duty day",
    "summary": "During departure, the pilot flying banked the B737 enough to trigger a bank-angle warning and immediately recovered. The captain identified fatigue on the last leg of a long day as a factor.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
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      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
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    "aiThemes": [
      "Fatigue",
      "Situational awareness"
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  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2032683",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B777-200"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was the RFO (Relief Flight Officer) in the center seat. The Captain was PF (Pilot Flying) and FO (First Officer) was PM (Pilot Monitoring). We were slightly high on base during vectors. PM stated “Captain we will need boards and flaps to get down”. PF complied. We intercepted LOC and PM called it out. However, we never captured GS. As RFO I articulated “we are high, no GS” this was echoed by RFO2 stating “you’re in ALT”. The PM was also aware and told the Captain “if we are not going to be stable at 1k, we will need to go around.” PF said “ok” and with AP (Autopilot) already off, decreased pitch slightly as an attempted capture GS. At that point no action was taken for several seconds except that slight descent and we were well above GS unable to make a safe landing (4 white PAPI and well above GS). The PM directed a go around around moments later at 1300ft. TOGA was not pushed and no words were spoken by PF. But the aircraft pitched up as Captain flying said something quietly. At this point the PM noticed the PF seemed to be low SA (Situational Awareness) after making callouts for the Captain that he missed. A moment later the FO stated “I have the aircraft” and started to execute the go around. This was the right call since we had hardly climbed and there were no commands from the Captain. I began filling in additional missed call outs as well as the FO. No thrust set call was made because TOGA had not been pushed. The FO was now doing double duty essentially. I did not see the thrust ref FMA or magenta reference on n1, so I began to fixate on the throttle position and speed. We got slow and I said “we are slow, add power.” The FO turned off FDs at some point. A few seconds later RFO 2 said set climb attitude since the aircraft was now at 5NL. Next, we worked as a team to confirm heading and ALT by ATC. I noticed we were off and told FO “ 20 right for heading.” He has his hands full from the non standard go around, but immediately corrected the heading deviation. The Captain wanted to fly but we agreed the FO keep the aircraft and make the landing. At some point TOGA was pushed. The Captain believes he hit it at some point he admitted in debrief. I don’t know when, but I believe this is what caused the 5NL attitude because of when we expected the go around and what we had set in the MCP. That is why I believe the FO had to turn off the FDs. Cause: Breakdown in crew communication (captain to FO) Solution: Brief go around procedures."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Captain and FO (First Officer) had the last rest. The other RFO and I swapped out with the flying crew to go change in the supernumerary at approximately top of descent, after having briefed the change over. We had loaded the ZZZZZ arrival and ILS YYR. The other RFO and I returned to the flying crew half way down the arrival. The FO mentioned a runway change back to XXL. On vectors to final and descending through approximate 8- 10000, the FO verbalized to the CA (Captain) that we were high and suggest speed brakes to help descend. The CA was noticeably flustered, nervous, and seemed to shake slightly. We were at about 4,000 ft. on a base leg for about a 7-8 NM final. The CA disconnected the AP (Autopilot) and continued a descent to join final and cross the final approach fix a few hundred feet high. The vertical FMA went to ALT and the CA leveled at 1,800 ft. We were at 3 white and a red on the PAPI, but leveling at 1800 ft. resulted in the G/S indicator rapidly indicating we were again high. I announced that “we are in ALT mode and not descending”. The CA again initiated a descent. The FO at that time announced “if we are not stable by 1,000 ft., we are going around.” At 1,300 ft. and still high/unstable, the FO announced “let’s go around.” The CA mostly leveled the airplane, but I did not notice the TO/GA button pushed and 10-15 seconds into the GA (Go Around), we were not climbing significantly. The FO was coaching the CA through GA call outs to get the aircraft flight path under control, getting flaps to 20 and calling positive rate. Without significant response by the CA, the FO declared, “I have the airplane” and took the controls. The FO had his hands full with a slow airplane from being level at 1,300 ft. The other RFO called “Push the throttle up!” The CA may have pushed the TOGA button after the FO took the controls, causing more confusion. At the same time I noticed our attitude 5 deg nose low and banked slightly left. I called “Set a climb attitude!” And the FO immediately pitched to resume a climb. The Tower assigned a climb to 4,000 ft. Our heading on departed drifted left 15-20 degree, the other RFO called this out for a correction, and the FO corrected. After stabilizing at 4,000 ft., I called for getting the AP on and in proper FMA’s, which the FO did. Approach gave us vectors for the approach. On downwind, the CA said “Okay, I’ll take the airplane back.” The FO stated “I think I should take this landing.” The CA did not argue the point. The FO made an uneventful landing and the CA taxied back to the gate. Cause: The captain had mentioned he had not slept well on the flight and had not eaten much on the flight. It’s possible that or some other medical issue could have played a factor in this crew member’s breakdown in performance. He didn’t seem the same as he was on departure. Solution: Good CRM can bring things back under control when things get undesirable in the flight deck. Sim training for go around at 1,000 ft. would be a huge help to the pilot group. We are most likely to GA at or above 1,000 ft. and those becoming a handful quickly."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was the RFO (Relief Flight Officer) in the center seat. The Captain was PF (Pilot Flying) and FO (First Officer) was PM (Pilot Monitoring). We were slightly high on base during vectors. PM stated “Captain we will need boards and flaps to get down”. PF complied. We intercepted LOC and PM called it out. However, we never captured GS. As RFO I articulated “we are high, no GS” this was echoed by RFO2 stating “you’re in ALT”. The PM was also aware and told the Captain “if we are not going to be stable at 1k, we will need to go around.” PF said “ok” and with AP (Autopilot) already off, decreased pitch slightly as an attempted capture GS. At that point no action was taken for several seconds except that slight descent and we were well above GS unable to make a safe landing (4 white PAPI and well above GS). The PM directed a go around around moments later at 1300ft. TOGA was not pushed and no words were spoken by PF. But the aircraft pitched up as Captain flying said something quietly. At this point the PM noticed the PF seemed to be low SA (Situational Awareness) after making callouts for the Captain that he missed. A moment later the FO stated “I have the aircraft” and started to execute the go around. This was the right call since we had hardly climbed and there were no commands from the Captain. I began filling in additional missed call outs as well as the FO. No thrust set call was made because TOGA had not been pushed. The FO was now doing double duty essentially. I did not see the thrust ref FMA or magenta reference on n1, so I began to fixate on the throttle position and speed. We got slow and I said “we are slow, add power.” The FO turned off FDs at some point. A few seconds later RFO 2 said set climb attitude since the aircraft was now at 5NL. Next, we worked as a team to confirm heading and ALT by ATC. I noticed we were off and told FO “ 20 right for heading.” He has his hands full from the non standard go around, but immediately corrected the heading deviation. The Captain wanted to fly but we agreed the FO keep the aircraft and make the landing. At some point TOGA was pushed. The Captain believes he hit it at some point he admitted in debrief. I don’t know when, but I believe this is what caused the 5NL attitude because of when we expected the go around and what we had set in the MCP. That is why I believe the FO had to turn off the FDs. Cause: Breakdown in crew communication (captain to FO) Solution: Brief go around procedures.\n\nNarrative 2\nCaptain and FO (First Officer) had the last rest. The other RFO and I swapped out with the flying crew to go change in the supernumerary at approximately top of descent, after having briefed the change over. We had loaded the ZZZZZ arrival and ILS YYR. The other RFO and I returned to the flying crew half way down the arrival. The FO mentioned a runway change back to XXL. On vectors to final and descending through approximate 8- 10000, the FO verbalized to the CA (Captain) that we were high and suggest speed brakes to help descend. The CA was noticeably flustered, nervous, and seemed to shake slightly. We were at about 4,000 ft. on a base leg for about a 7-8 NM final. The CA disconnected the AP (Autopilot) and continued a descent to join final and cross the final approach fix a few hundred feet high. The vertical FMA went to ALT and the CA leveled at 1,800 ft. We were at 3 white and a red on the PAPI, but leveling at 1800 ft. resulted in the G/S indicator rapidly indicating we were again high. I announced that “we are in ALT mode and not descending”. The CA again initiated a descent. The FO at that time announced “if we are not stable by 1,000 ft., we are going around.” At 1,300 ft. and still high/unstable, the FO announced “let’s go around.” The CA mostly leveled the airplane, but I did not notice the TO/GA button pushed and 10-15 seconds into the GA (Go Around), we were not climbing significantly. The FO was coaching the CA through GA call outs to get the aircraft flight path under control, getting flaps to 20 and calling positive rate. Without significant response by the CA, the FO declared, “I have the airplane” and took the controls. The FO had his hands full with a slow airplane from being level at 1,300 ft. The other RFO called “Push the throttle up!” The CA may have pushed the TOGA button after the FO took the controls, causing more confusion. At the same time I noticed our attitude 5 deg nose low and banked slightly left. I called “Set a climb attitude!” And the FO immediately pitched to resume a climb. The Tower assigned a climb to 4,000 ft. Our heading on departed drifted left 15-20 degree, the other RFO called this out for a correction, and the FO corrected. After stabilizing at 4,000 ft., I called for getting the AP on and in proper FMA’s, which the FO did. Approach gave us vectors for the approach. On downwind, the CA said “Okay, I’ll take the airplane back.” The FO stated “I think I should take this landing.” The CA did not argue the point. The FO made an uneventful landing and the CA taxied back to the gate. Cause: The captain had mentioned he had not slept well on the flight and had not eaten much on the flight. It’s possible that or some other medical issue could have played a factor in this crew member’s breakdown in performance. He didn’t seem the same as he was on departure. Solution: Good CRM can bring things back under control when things get undesirable in the flight deck. Sim training for go around at 1,000 ft. would be a huge help to the pilot group. We are most likely to GA at or above 1,000 ft. and those becoming a handful quickly.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier B777 flight crew reported lack of response from flying pilot on unstable approach resulted in Pilot Monitoring taking control of the aircraft for a go around and subsequent landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=43",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 43,
      "pageEnd": 46,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=43",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 43,
        "pageEnd": 46,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2032683 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier B777 flight crew reported lack of response from flying pilot on unstable approach resulted in Pilot Monitoring taking control of the aircraft for a go around and subsequent landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2029683",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "A319"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Pushed out and got an ADR2 fault. Reset off gate with maintenance control. Continued taxi. Number X for Runway XXR, I set the parking brake and watched the triple indicator cycle. Looked at FO (First Officer) and felt the jet lurch forward and stop at slow speed. I check parking brake and ECAM. I then cycled the parking brake a few times and noticed that the time from my actuation of the switch to parking brake on ECAM was 8 seconds (about 4 times longer than usual). I repeated this several times and opted to return to a gate for maintenance to evaluate. I requested a tow in as I was unsure if the entire brake system was compromised and in their interest of safety went with the most conservative course of action. We blocked in and were met by three technicians and a supervisor. I was able duplicate the gripe for all of them. The jet was taken out of service. I have no theories as to why this happened. I do know that my poor night's sleep and fatigue level caused me to be slower to notice the trend in regards to a creep forward of the jet after the parking brake switch was engaged but prior to the actuators grabbing. I have filed a fatigue report as I called in fatigued after gate return. I do not have a solution or way to mitigate this type of systems failure."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nPushed out and got an ADR2 fault. Reset off gate with maintenance control. Continued taxi. Number X for Runway XXR, I set the parking brake and watched the triple indicator cycle. Looked at FO (First Officer) and felt the jet lurch forward and stop at slow speed. I check parking brake and ECAM. I then cycled the parking brake a few times and noticed that the time from my actuation of the switch to parking brake on ECAM was 8 seconds (about 4 times longer than usual). I repeated this several times and opted to return to a gate for maintenance to evaluate. I requested a tow in as I was unsure if the entire brake system was compromised and in their interest of safety went with the most conservative course of action. We blocked in and were met by three technicians and a supervisor. I was able duplicate the gripe for all of them. The jet was taken out of service. I have no theories as to why this happened. I do know that my poor night's sleep and fatigue level caused me to be slower to notice the trend in regards to a creep forward of the jet after the parking brake switch was engaged but prior to the actuators grabbing. I have filed a fatigue report as I called in fatigued after gate return. I do not have a solution or way to mitigate this type of systems failure.",
    "synopsis": "Airbus 319 Captain reported a malfunction of the parking brake during taxi. The aircraft failed to stop when the parking brake was set. The Captain returned to the gate and the aircraft was taken out of service.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=47",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 47,
      "pageEnd": 48,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=47",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 47,
        "pageEnd": 48,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "Delayed parking-brake response leads to a gate return",
    "summary": "An A319 captain noticed the aircraft creep forward after setting the parking brake and found that the brake indication took about eight seconds to respond. The crew requested a tow back, maintenance removed the aircraft from service, and the captain said poor sleep had slowed recognition of the problem.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Equipment",
      "Fatigue"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2025353",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "MD-11"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On Descent into ZZZ on our 6 hour ZZZ1-ZZZ flight, Captain's airspeed became unreliable causing multiple systems to fail. Due to severe weather at ZZZ airport our arrival was changed by ATC while we were already on it descending through 15000 feet with intended ILS approach to runway XXR. During this change the Captain's Airspeed Indicator failure occurred. Captain flying, I (First Officer) executed QRH for Airspeed Unreliable. After failing to restore captain's airspeed indicator we diverted to ZZZ2 where the weather was VMC. Executed ILS approach in visual conditions to runway XXL, landed and taxiied to parking where maintenance determined that there was significant water in the Captains pitot-static system. On descent into ZZZ we were assigned the ZZZZZ RNAV arrival and rwy XXR. We setup and briefed an approach to that runway via that arrival. Captain entered ILS XXL in secondary flight plan. We had been tracking a major weather system that was moving West to East and that was forecast to be over ZZZ at the time of our arrival. We had briefed this weather prior to the flight and noted our alternate fuel plus 10000 lbs contingency gave us options even beyond our filed alternate of ZZZ2. Captain suggested ZZZ3, for example. Also, this plane had autoland -MEL'd., so we were even more prepared to divert if conditions required. During the last hour of flight we skirted severe turbulence and precipitation that was associated with this weather system, and at top of descent we planned for an anti-ice on descent through the weather, which was now painting large swaths of yellow and red, between us and the field, with some magenta on the weather radar display. During our initial descent we were advised of heavy precipitation on the arrival and asked if we needed a deviation. We declined at that time. Further into the descent (approximately 30 miles from the field and descending through 15000 feet, we observed large areas of red between us and the field. The controller suggested that previous aircraft had changed from the ZZZZZ or other arrivals to the ZZZZZ1 RNAV arrival. We asked for that and were assigned direct ZZZZZ2. We put ZZZZZ2 in the fix page and Captain turned towards it. We were advised we could divert as far left of our track to ZZZZZ2 as was required to avoid weather, so Captain chose a heading to the North and East of the weather that kept us clear of the red areas on our radar display. As I was head down programming the arrival, the autopilot disconnected. I looked up and observed several amber Level 2 alerts on the system display. Select Elevator Feel Manual, etc. I had not completed the reroute, so prior to acting on the alerts I inserted direct ZZZZZ2 in the Control Display Panel. At that point I was not aware of the unreliable airspeed. I pulled out the QRH and began looking at flight control checklists when Captain said \"Airspeed Unreliable.\" I turned to that checklist and began reading and acting on it. As we did that we entered some light to moderate turbulence. We were advised that the ZZZZZ1 arrival was not available to us. I [advised ATC] that we had some failed instruments. They queried if we were [requesting priority handling] and needed assistance. I said \"negative, just advisory, we have a failed airspeed indicator.\" We were assigned 10000 feet, and we descended and maintained that altitude with Captain flying. I worked through the Airspeed Unreliable checklist, but omitted an important step that would have restored the captain's instrument display. The captain asked for me to ask for a left 360, present position to give us time to work through the checklist. The radio was quite busy, and I was unable to make this request before the captain looked left (East) towards ZZZ2 and observed VMC conditions to the horizon. Captain asked to proceed to ZZZ2, and advised ATC that we were required to maintain VFR conditions and requested direct to ZZZ2. There were many other planes in the ZZZ vicinity, and the weather was changing rapidly and unpredictably, with runway assignments changing as well. We turned towards ZZZ2, asked for direct ZZZZZ3 on the ILS XXL approach, executed the approach and landing, and taxiied to the gate. As the PM it was my duty to accurately execute the QRH. I omitted a critical step on page X of the QRH. This would have restored the captain's instruments and allowed us to proceed to our filed destination. I believe I followed the wrong thread, or I confused the Static Air Switch items on pages Y and X. I was task saturated with ATC, helping captain maintain a course and airspeed, and with reading the checklist. My own inexperience with the plane was a factor, as well. In the moment, the following were contributing factors (in no particular order): (1) the startle factor. I believe that the Captain thought I had disengaged the autopilot somehow. Because, very coincidentally, as I was reprogramming the arrival, his airspeed indication failed. (2) We were pre-determined to divert to ZZZ2 based on our knowledge of the incoming weather. (3) I am new to the airplane and my systems knowledge is not completely consolidated. (4) I was not assertive enough: I should have asserted that I take the controls so that the captain could review my QRH work. (5) The Airspeed Unreliable checklist is very long with many branches that require the pilot monitoring to effectively render the flying pilot as a \"single pilot\", man-handling a defective airplane with ambiguous instruments, in IMC, while the PM chases wordy and complex decision threads with many wordy notes and references to rarely used switches. (6) Our aircraft does not have AUX CADC switch(es) installed. So that portion of the checklist that refers to them is a time-consuming distraction. (7) Negative training in the sim: At my airline and at previous carriers that I recently flew at, we were never allowed to restore the inoperative system until we had executed the memory item: 4/10 degrees pitch up, 90% N1, etc. Often the exercise was terminated prior to successful restoration of the instruments, leaving me with an ambiguity as to how the situation would resolve. (8) Fatigue. We started work at XA:00 and this was 7 hours after that. (9) rapidly changing ATC instructions when we were already task saturated with maintaining the flight path and completing the QRH. (10) Weather. It appeared to be deteriorating from bad to worse. (11) This plane had autoland -MEL'd., so we were already prepared to divert if conditions required. Suggestions: (1) Captains should delegate flying to the FO when situation awareness and systems knowledge are critical to the outcome of the flight. (2) The QRH checklists with multiple threads / decision trees should be color coded. Each thread/ branch with its own color. Important steps should be in bold to separate them from the various notes that are relevant, but not essential to the safe outcome of the flight. Diverting to ZZZ2 was an avoidable consequence, my inexperience, combined with the other major factors noted above resulted in the diversion. On the other hand, in the moment, we justifiably concluded that it was the safest course to proceed to our filed alternate, which was not far away. I did not advocate further troubleshooting for the reasons discussed above: (1) much traffic in ZZZ airspace, (2) deteriorating weather, (3) ambiguous system failure, (4) QRH directive to maintain VMC, (5) captain's very justifiable decision to divert to our previously briefed, nearby filed alternate. (1) Instrument failure due to water in the pitot static system. (2) Incorrect application/ execution of QRH resulting in avoidable diversion. (3) Overly complex QRH procedure requiring too much attention from crew to execute correctly and in a timely manner when faced with other primary attention requirements (flight path/ weather/ ATC)."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "On descent to 10,000 feet, passing approximately 16000 ft, the F/O (First Officer) (PM) was heads down inputting our second cleared arrival for ZZZ. The auto pilot clicked off. The Captain (Pilot Flying) attempted to re engage the auto pilot to no avail. It was then I noticed the IAS (airspeed comparison alert) and scanned my airspeed, the standby and the FO's airspeeds, noticing that mine was 20-25 knots slower than the other two. The FO was done with the arrival and looking up to get situated again (he's been on the line for about X months). I called for the Airspeed Unreliable checklist, which with everything going on he didn't hear right away. He opened his QRH and started to go into the checklist for some of the alerts that were being displayed. I ran the first 4 steps of the checklist (as displayed) and then again got his attention and directed him to the proper checklist. That checklist is very convoluted just reading it in the crew room later, but with the arrival, weather, and inexperience in the plane, he missed some steps on the checklist. One of the notes in the checklist was to if possible find VMC. Looking east, towards our alternate of ZZZ2, it was VMC the whole way, so with the nasty weather still in ZZZ, we decided to proceed to the alternate. Somehow the Captain's pitot static system had water introduced into it which affected the system. I've flown through heavy rain plenty of times before and not had this happen. And we flew normally for the first 5 1/2 hours of the flight. It was a normal descent, but somehow under that descent angle, that heavy rain, and those winds, the water got into the Captain's system. I don't know that the water in the system could have been prevented, but the mis read checklist could have been prevented by me giving the plane to the FO to fly, while I, with more experience in the plane, accomplished the checklist."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn Descent into ZZZ on our 6 hour ZZZ1-ZZZ flight, Captain's airspeed became unreliable causing multiple systems to fail. Due to severe weather at ZZZ airport our arrival was changed by ATC while we were already on it descending through 15000 feet with intended ILS approach to runway XXR. During this change the Captain's Airspeed Indicator failure occurred. Captain flying, I (First Officer) executed QRH for Airspeed Unreliable. After failing to restore captain's airspeed indicator we diverted to ZZZ2 where the weather was VMC. Executed ILS approach in visual conditions to runway XXL, landed and taxiied to parking where maintenance determined that there was significant water in the Captains pitot-static system. On descent into ZZZ we were assigned the ZZZZZ RNAV arrival and rwy XXR. We setup and briefed an approach to that runway via that arrival. Captain entered ILS XXL in secondary flight plan. We had been tracking a major weather system that was moving West to East and that was forecast to be over ZZZ at the time of our arrival. We had briefed this weather prior to the flight and noted our alternate fuel plus 10000 lbs contingency gave us options even beyond our filed alternate of ZZZ2. Captain suggested ZZZ3, for example. Also, this plane had autoland -MEL'd., so we were even more prepared to divert if conditions required. During the last hour of flight we skirted severe turbulence and precipitation that was associated with this weather system, and at top of descent we planned for an anti-ice on descent through the weather, which was now painting large swaths of yellow and red, between us and the field, with some magenta on the weather radar display. During our initial descent we were advised of heavy precipitation on the arrival and asked if we needed a deviation. We declined at that time. Further into the descent (approximately 30 miles from the field and descending through 15000 feet, we observed large areas of red between us and the field. The controller suggested that previous aircraft had changed from the ZZZZZ or other arrivals to the ZZZZZ1 RNAV arrival. We asked for that and were assigned direct ZZZZZ2. We put ZZZZZ2 in the fix page and Captain turned towards it. We were advised we could divert as far left of our track to ZZZZZ2 as was required to avoid weather, so Captain chose a heading to the North and East of the weather that kept us clear of the red areas on our radar display. As I was head down programming the arrival, the autopilot disconnected. I looked up and observed several amber Level 2 alerts on the system display. Select Elevator Feel Manual, etc. I had not completed the reroute, so prior to acting on the alerts I inserted direct ZZZZZ2 in the Control Display Panel. At that point I was not aware of the unreliable airspeed. I pulled out the QRH and began looking at flight control checklists when Captain said \"Airspeed Unreliable.\" I turned to that checklist and began reading and acting on it. As we did that we entered some light to moderate turbulence. We were advised that the ZZZZZ1 arrival was not available to us. I [advised ATC] that we had some failed instruments. They queried if we were [requesting priority handling] and needed assistance. I said \"negative, just advisory, we have a failed airspeed indicator.\" We were assigned 10000 feet, and we descended and maintained that altitude with Captain flying. I worked through the Airspeed Unreliable checklist, but omitted an important step that would have restored the captain's instrument display. The captain asked for me to ask for a left 360, present position to give us time to work through the checklist. The radio was quite busy, and I was unable to make this request before the captain looked left (East) towards ZZZ2 and observed VMC conditions to the horizon. Captain asked to proceed to ZZZ2, and advised ATC that we were required to maintain VFR conditions and requested direct to ZZZ2. There were many other planes in the ZZZ vicinity, and the weather was changing rapidly and unpredictably, with runway assignments changing as well. We turned towards ZZZ2, asked for direct ZZZZZ3 on the ILS XXL approach, executed the approach and landing, and taxiied to the gate. As the PM it was my duty to accurately execute the QRH. I omitted a critical step on page X of the QRH. This would have restored the captain's instruments and allowed us to proceed to our filed destination. I believe I followed the wrong thread, or I confused the Static Air Switch items on pages Y and X. I was task saturated with ATC, helping captain maintain a course and airspeed, and with reading the checklist. My own inexperience with the plane was a factor, as well. In the moment, the following were contributing factors (in no particular order): (1) the startle factor. I believe that the Captain thought I had disengaged the autopilot somehow. Because, very coincidentally, as I was reprogramming the arrival, his airspeed indication failed. (2) We were pre-determined to divert to ZZZ2 based on our knowledge of the incoming weather. (3) I am new to the airplane and my systems knowledge is not completely consolidated. (4) I was not assertive enough: I should have asserted that I take the controls so that the captain could review my QRH work. (5) The Airspeed Unreliable checklist is very long with many branches that require the pilot monitoring to effectively render the flying pilot as a \"single pilot\", man-handling a defective airplane with ambiguous instruments, in IMC, while the PM chases wordy and complex decision threads with many wordy notes and references to rarely used switches. (6) Our aircraft does not have AUX CADC switch(es) installed. So that portion of the checklist that refers to them is a time-consuming distraction. (7) Negative training in the sim: At my airline and at previous carriers that I recently flew at, we were never allowed to restore the inoperative system until we had executed the memory item: 4/10 degrees pitch up, 90% N1, etc. Often the exercise was terminated prior to successful restoration of the instruments, leaving me with an ambiguity as to how the situation would resolve. (8) Fatigue. We started work at XA:00 and this was 7 hours after that. (9) rapidly changing ATC instructions when we were already task saturated with maintaining the flight path and completing the QRH. (10) Weather. It appeared to be deteriorating from bad to worse. (11) This plane had autoland -MEL'd., so we were already prepared to divert if conditions required. Suggestions: (1) Captains should delegate flying to the FO when situation awareness and systems knowledge are critical to the outcome of the flight. (2) The QRH checklists with multiple threads / decision trees should be color coded. Each thread/ branch with its own color. Important steps should be in bold to separate them from the various notes that are relevant, but not essential to the safe outcome of the flight. Diverting to ZZZ2 was an avoidable consequence, my inexperience, combined with the other major factors noted above resulted in the diversion. On the other hand, in the moment, we justifiably concluded that it was the safest course to proceed to our filed alternate, which was not far away. I did not advocate further troubleshooting for the reasons discussed above: (1) much traffic in ZZZ airspace, (2) deteriorating weather, (3) ambiguous system failure, (4) QRH directive to maintain VMC, (5) captain's very justifiable decision to divert to our previously briefed, nearby filed alternate. (1) Instrument failure due to water in the pitot static system. (2) Incorrect application/ execution of QRH resulting in avoidable diversion. (3) Overly complex QRH procedure requiring too much attention from crew to execute correctly and in a timely manner when faced with other primary attention requirements (flight path/ weather/ ATC).\n\nNarrative 2\nOn descent to 10,000 feet, passing approximately 16000 ft, the F/O (First Officer) (PM) was heads down inputting our second cleared arrival for ZZZ. The auto pilot clicked off. The Captain (Pilot Flying) attempted to re engage the auto pilot to no avail. It was then I noticed the IAS (airspeed comparison alert) and scanned my airspeed, the standby and the FO's airspeeds, noticing that mine was 20-25 knots slower than the other two. The FO was done with the arrival and looking up to get situated again (he's been on the line for about X months). I called for the Airspeed Unreliable checklist, which with everything going on he didn't hear right away. He opened his QRH and started to go into the checklist for some of the alerts that were being displayed. I ran the first 4 steps of the checklist (as displayed) and then again got his attention and directed him to the proper checklist. That checklist is very convoluted just reading it in the crew room later, but with the arrival, weather, and inexperience in the plane, he missed some steps on the checklist. One of the notes in the checklist was to if possible find VMC. Looking east, towards our alternate of ZZZ2, it was VMC the whole way, so with the nasty weather still in ZZZ, we decided to proceed to the alternate. Somehow the Captain's pitot static system had water introduced into it which affected the system. I've flown through heavy rain plenty of times before and not had this happen. And we flew normally for the first 5 1/2 hours of the flight. It was a normal descent, but somehow under that descent angle, that heavy rain, and those winds, the water got into the Captain's system. I don't know that the water in the system could have been prevented, but the mis read checklist could have been prevented by me giving the plane to the FO to fly, while I, with more experience in the plane, accomplished the checklist.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported unreliable airspeed indicator during descent in severe weather. Diverted to alternate airport in VMC and landed uneventfully.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=49",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 49,
      "pageEnd": 52,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=49",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 49,
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        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2025353 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported unreliable airspeed indicator during descent in severe weather. Diverted to alternate airport in VMC and landed uneventfully.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2017012",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On Day 0, at approximately XA:50 we were in a right base for the visual approach to Runway XX into ZZZ. Due to heavy thunderstorm activity, just off to the north end of the approach course we briefed the approach deciding that we were going to intercept the approach course inside the final approach fix. We were clear down to 3,000 feet initially been told cleared for the visual. Then the First Officer (FO) and I determined if we went down to 2,000 feet, it would keep us clear of the weather after the north, and at the correct altitude inside the marker for a stable approach. As the Pilot Monitoring (PM) I asked the Tower If we could come down to 2,000 feet and he said that we could that there was no obstacles or terrain. We were visual, so I could see there was nothing between us, and where we were going to intercept. As we leveled off at 2,000 feet shortly after that, we received a caution obstacle and climbed slightly for situational awareness and due to our training. I went back and reviewed the VFR low altitude charts. There were a couple of towers, but they were off to the north of us. There was a much smaller tower in front of us, but we were well above it to my understanding. We continued and shot the approach landing without further incident. Suggestions - Moving forward I will stay at the altitude until I we are established inbound on the final approach course. I believe the weather caused us to deviate slightly to ensure a safe approach. Other factors that played out here was fatigue setting in from a very long day after commuting."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Operating Aircraft X ZZZ1-ZZZ Day 0. I was Pilot Flying (PF). Coming into ZZZ just before nightfall, we were worried about a line of severe storms just north of the FAF for the RNAV XX. With the crossing runway closure, we would have to fly north of the field towards the storm line, then turn south for the approach. Conditions were visual with ~12 kts winds out of the southeast. When about 5 miles WNW of the field, we decided to intercept the final approach course by pointing the aircraft at the FAF and then turning final just inside of it. We had already been cleared the visual, and ATC had last instructed us to maintain 3,100 ft. We decided to descend in order to ensure that we were properly stable and did not wind up high when turning final. We checked our approach charts and saw no obstacles charted between our location and the final approach course. We also did not see any obstacles visually. I had terrain mode on my side and it appeared safe on the MFD. We then asked ZZZ tower if there were any uncharted obstacles and if it was safe to descend to 2,000 ft. at our current location. He said that was safe and reiterated that we were cleared the visual. Upon reaching 2,000 ft., we received an obstacle caution. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and climbed back to 3,100 ft. The landing and approach from that point on was normal. Cause - This was classic get-there-itis on my part. The desire to maintain distance from the storm created an external pressure to get in to ZZZ before the storm arrived at the field and led to a poor decision on my part to descend. While we did check with ATC to ensure what we were doing provided adequate obstacle clearance, we should have stayed at 3,000 ft. until intercepting the final approach course. An additional factor that was not a cause but certainly did not contribute to good decision-making was that it was leg 4 at XA:30 and the van the day before in ZZZ2 departed at XB:00, so there was certainly some minor fatigue, although I did not feel that it impaired my flying abilities in any way that was unsafe. Suggestions - I'm not sure there is any further training that could be done to prevent this from happening. It just boils down to a poor decision on my part due to external pressures. The flight was already delayed due to a plane swap in ZZZ1 after the radar altimeter glitched on the previous leg in from ZZZ3. With storms rolling into the route, we were forced to pick our way through the storms and race along the front side of them into ZZZ. The flight would have been uneventful but for the decision to descend early when intercepting the approach, and after the caution was received, we reacted promptly and correctly, then debriefed it on the ground."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn Day 0, at approximately XA:50 we were in a right base for the visual approach to Runway XX into ZZZ. Due to heavy thunderstorm activity, just off to the north end of the approach course we briefed the approach deciding that we were going to intercept the approach course inside the final approach fix. We were clear down to 3,000 feet initially been told cleared for the visual. Then the First Officer (FO) and I determined if we went down to 2,000 feet, it would keep us clear of the weather after the north, and at the correct altitude inside the marker for a stable approach. As the Pilot Monitoring (PM) I asked the Tower If we could come down to 2,000 feet and he said that we could that there was no obstacles or terrain. We were visual, so I could see there was nothing between us, and where we were going to intercept. As we leveled off at 2,000 feet shortly after that, we received a caution obstacle and climbed slightly for situational awareness and due to our training. I went back and reviewed the VFR low altitude charts. There were a couple of towers, but they were off to the north of us. There was a much smaller tower in front of us, but we were well above it to my understanding. We continued and shot the approach landing without further incident. Suggestions - Moving forward I will stay at the altitude until I we are established inbound on the final approach course. I believe the weather caused us to deviate slightly to ensure a safe approach. Other factors that played out here was fatigue setting in from a very long day after commuting.\n\nNarrative 2\nOperating Aircraft X ZZZ1-ZZZ Day 0. I was Pilot Flying (PF). Coming into ZZZ just before nightfall, we were worried about a line of severe storms just north of the FAF for the RNAV XX. With the crossing runway closure, we would have to fly north of the field towards the storm line, then turn south for the approach. Conditions were visual with ~12 kts winds out of the southeast. When about 5 miles WNW of the field, we decided to intercept the final approach course by pointing the aircraft at the FAF and then turning final just inside of it. We had already been cleared the visual, and ATC had last instructed us to maintain 3,100 ft. We decided to descend in order to ensure that we were properly stable and did not wind up high when turning final. We checked our approach charts and saw no obstacles charted between our location and the final approach course. We also did not see any obstacles visually. I had terrain mode on my side and it appeared safe on the MFD. We then asked ZZZ tower if there were any uncharted obstacles and if it was safe to descend to 2,000 ft. at our current location. He said that was safe and reiterated that we were cleared the visual. Upon reaching 2,000 ft., we received an obstacle caution. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and climbed back to 3,100 ft. The landing and approach from that point on was normal. Cause - This was classic get-there-itis on my part. The desire to maintain distance from the storm created an external pressure to get in to ZZZ before the storm arrived at the field and led to a poor decision on my part to descend. While we did check with ATC to ensure what we were doing provided adequate obstacle clearance, we should have stayed at 3,000 ft. until intercepting the final approach course. An additional factor that was not a cause but certainly did not contribute to good decision-making was that it was leg 4 at XA:30 and the van the day before in ZZZ2 departed at XB:00, so there was certainly some minor fatigue, although I did not feel that it impaired my flying abilities in any way that was unsafe. Suggestions - I'm not sure there is any further training that could be done to prevent this from happening. It just boils down to a poor decision on my part due to external pressures. The flight was already delayed due to a plane swap in ZZZ1 after the radar altimeter glitched on the previous leg in from ZZZ3. With storms rolling into the route, we were forced to pick our way through the storms and race along the front side of them into ZZZ. The flight would have been uneventful but for the decision to descend early when intercepting the approach, and after the caution was received, we reacted promptly and correctly, then debriefed it on the ground.",
    "synopsis": "CRJ-900 air carrier crew reported a terrain obstacle alert on a visual approach at night when they descended to FAF altitude on a non-published portion of the approach. The flight crew climbed to correct altitude and continued the approach to a landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=53",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 53,
      "pageEnd": 55,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=53",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 53,
        "pageEnd": 55,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2017012 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "CRJ-900 air carrier crew reported a terrain obstacle alert on a visual approach at night when they descended to FAF altitude on a non-published portion of the approach. The flight crew climbed to correct altitude and continued the approach to a landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2014154",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Today was an incredibly long day. I had just finished a two-day the previous day out of ZZZ, where we were delayed getting back into ZZZ by almost 5 hours due to weather. So I was hoping for a simple day trip to ZZZZ today. That simply was not the case. I arrived at the airport for our report time at XA:50. I was able to meet with the CA (Captain) and discuss the upcoming day and flight. We met the previous crew of our aircraft on the jet bridge who went into great detail about the current MEL items on that specific aircraft. After discussing the situation with the crew and Dispatch, the CA and I both felt that it was the best course to not take this aircraft to ZZZZ due to the MEL items on the aircraft. We then waited another 3 or so hours for the next aircraft to become available. The CA and I boarded the new aircraft to find that there was an inbound write-up on the aircraft in regards to the brake pressure accumulator not being able to hold pressure and had lost about 800 psi in about 30 minutes. Maintenance personnel then boarded that flight and performed a test on the aircraft to see what the issue was and if it could be deferred or if the issue was more complex. The test took roughly 45 minutes to see if the brake pressure would hold or not. Maintenance informed the CA and I that the aircraft did not pass the test and would need to be taken out of service. The time now is roughly XG:30. The CA and I have been at the airport roughly 6 hours and are now looking for our 3rd aircraft to take to ZZZZ. However duty period was now an issue. We later received a phone call from Scheduling who informed us that we will now be going to ZZZ1 because we would not be legal to operate the previous flight to ZZZZ and back to ZZZ2. The CA and I again boarded our new flight to ZZZ1. We got everything ready to only have the Ramp close for about 30 minutes due to the storms in the area. Once the storms cleared we were able to push back from gate. However, due to the construction behind the gate, the Tow Driver needed to tow us in a specific area to clear the construction. We informed the driver of where to go but he was very confused and it was clear that he may not have gotten the proper training for towing in this area with the construction. Due to this confusion we ended up breaking the shear pin on the push. So we had to get Maintenance to come out and verify everything was ok before continuing on with the pushback. Once given the ok to go from Maintenance, we were able to push back to the proper area and commence the flight. The time now is roughly XJ:15 and we were on our way for departure after 8.5 hours of delays and changes. There were still so many storms in the direction of which we were going but ZZZ2 was clear. We departed with no issues. We performed the after-takeoff check and continued our climb to 10,000 ft. It was around 8,000 ft. that the CA decided to put the autopilot on by pressing Command A. The autopilot engaged. I was the pilot monitoring and received a clearance to continue climb to 18,000 ft. At that moment within 30 - 60 seconds of the autopilot being on, there was a sudden violent jolt and pitch down of the aircraft. The autopilot remained engaged. The CA and I looked at each other trying to understand what just happened. The aircraft then did the same jolt and pitch down. The CA then clicked off the autopilot. We told ATC that we want to remain at 10,000 ft. and that we had a flight control issue. The CA and I then tried Command B autopilot. It appeared to be working normally. We then tried Command A autopilot and again within 30 - 60 seconds the jolt and nose down pitch occurred. We then saw the stab out of trim light appear. We ran through the checklist and decided that it was best to go back to ZZZ2 at that time. We advised ATC and got vectors back to ZZZ2. We notified Dispatch, the FAs (Flight Attendant), and customers. We did a great job using CRM to really divide and conquer at this time. We would meet back and regroup with each other. We ran the overweight checklist and proceeded to land at ZZZ2 with no issues. ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) verified the aircraft was ok on the taxiway before proceeding to the gate."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Our showtime for the original pairing was XA:50. We were assigned an aircraft that was removed from ETOPS operations due to an APU issue. I discussed this with Dispatch and requested either an airplane with an APU that was not degraded and certified to operate over water or in ETOPS or a route of flight that was mainly over land and closer to acceptable divert airports. Even though this flight was not ETOPS I do not operate our aircraft over water more than a distance that would provide for a safe and quick diversion in the event of system failures. The Dispatcher agreed to re-route our flight. Soon after discussing this aircraft and flight plan, we were assigned another aircraft. We were not told why this decision was made. The next aircraft was wrought with even more serious issues. In addition to having a cowl anti-ice valve wired in the open position, which required reference to flight manual procedures and information, it led to another MEL item that further complicated the flight crew duties including more referencing of the flight manual and MEL procedures. Bleed air and minimum power settings. as well as split throttle positions, on an approach are serious systems that require lots of attention. Had this flight been further complicated by other system failures not anticipated, we would have been up against an enormous amount of work just to get the aircraft on the ground safely. In addition to that, there were numerous areas of thunderstorm activity on and around our route of flight. We refused the aircraft. The next aircraft they gave us came in with a write-up of brake accumulator pressure bleeding down rapidly while parked. AMTs performed a required test on the brake system and it failed. This evolution took about an hour and further delayed our operation and the aircraft was eventually taken out of service. Following this evolution, the crew desk advised us that we would not be able to complete our one-day trip without going over our Part 117 limits of a 14-hour duty day. Thus, as is allowed by the [agreement] for irregular operations, we were reassigned to a two-day trip that was about to depart. That crew was reassigned to take our two-leg turn to ZZZZ. We spoke briefly with the swap crew on the jet bridge and began setting up the cockpit for our one-leg, first-day flight to ZZZ. The second day would have us flying a leg ZZZ - ZZZ1 followed by a deadhead back to ZZZ2, flying into our day off. This was the first time we had released the parking brake on what was a very long day. During the pushback, we received instructions to position the aircraft away from construction on the ramp with the jet facing north toward the concourse. The push crew was not familiar with these instructions and had not been trained on the pushback necessary for the construction being done south of the concourse on Taxiway 1. The Tug Driver removed the tow bar pin after we set the brake, but the Ramp Controller informed us that we were not positioned correctly. We then had the Tug Driver hook up the tow bar again to reposition us correctly. This led to the shear pin being broken when the tow bar was reattached and we released the parking brake for repositioning. Following SOP, we were informed that the nose gear had to be inspected. The ground crew then reattached another tow bar and repositioned the aircraft at the gate and station maintenance personnel performed a successful inspection. We pushed back successfully and taxied for takeoff on Runway XX at ZZZ2. After an uneventful departure, we were climbing through about 8,000 ft. to level off at our assigned altitude of 10,000 ft. I engaged autopilot A/CMD and we experienced an abrupt jolt of the control column followed by two more. I immediately disengaged the autopilot and we began to look for an indication of any system malfunction. There were no abnormal signs or indications, including hydraulic pressure or fluid. We discussed the possibility that we had flown through another aircraft’s wake and I engaged the autopilot again, followed by the same abrupt jolts. I disengaged the autopilot again and hand-flew the jet, leveling off at 10,000 ft. This time I noticed a flash of the STAB OUT OF TRIM light on the forward instrument panel. We also noticed lots of autotrimming of the trim wheel. The trimming was not indicative of a runaway trim condition. Autopilot B was engaged and it operated normally. The First Officer immediately referenced the flight manual for the associated light. We reviewed the checklist and performed the steps called for. We discussed our options and decided to return to ZZZ2 as the safest and most prudent course of action. We also decided to advise ATC as an extra precaution and to obtain priority handling from ATC. Dispatch was notified, crew and passengers were briefed, and we made a slow approach back toward ZZZ2 about 30 minutes after takeoff. Landing performance data was requested and received from Dispatch. We reviewed the overweight landing checklist, briefed, and flew an uneventful approach and landing to Runway XY at ZZZ2. We were followed by numerous emergency vehicles on rollout. We spoke with the Fire Commander via VHF radio and he informed us that there were no external signs of damage or overheating of the brakes. We taxied back to the gate, shut down normally, performed all checklists, and debriefed thoroughly. We sent write-ups for the system malfunction as well as the overweight landing. Together we also debriefed the Chief Pilot. He called us again a short time later and we answered questions for a human factors review. He called one last time later and informed us that we were released from duty for the remainder of the day and night."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nToday was an incredibly long day. I had just finished a two-day the previous day out of ZZZ, where we were delayed getting back into ZZZ by almost 5 hours due to weather. So I was hoping for a simple day trip to ZZZZ today. That simply was not the case. I arrived at the airport for our report time at XA:50. I was able to meet with the CA (Captain) and discuss the upcoming day and flight. We met the previous crew of our aircraft on the jet bridge who went into great detail about the current MEL items on that specific aircraft. After discussing the situation with the crew and Dispatch, the CA and I both felt that it was the best course to not take this aircraft to ZZZZ due to the MEL items on the aircraft. We then waited another 3 or so hours for the next aircraft to become available. The CA and I boarded the new aircraft to find that there was an inbound write-up on the aircraft in regards to the brake pressure accumulator not being able to hold pressure and had lost about 800 psi in about 30 minutes. Maintenance personnel then boarded that flight and performed a test on the aircraft to see what the issue was and if it could be deferred or if the issue was more complex. The test took roughly 45 minutes to see if the brake pressure would hold or not. Maintenance informed the CA and I that the aircraft did not pass the test and would need to be taken out of service. The time now is roughly XG:30. The CA and I have been at the airport roughly 6 hours and are now looking for our 3rd aircraft to take to ZZZZ. However duty period was now an issue. We later received a phone call from Scheduling who informed us that we will now be going to ZZZ1 because we would not be legal to operate the previous flight to ZZZZ and back to ZZZ2. The CA and I again boarded our new flight to ZZZ1. We got everything ready to only have the Ramp close for about 30 minutes due to the storms in the area. Once the storms cleared we were able to push back from gate. However, due to the construction behind the gate, the Tow Driver needed to tow us in a specific area to clear the construction. We informed the driver of where to go but he was very confused and it was clear that he may not have gotten the proper training for towing in this area with the construction. Due to this confusion we ended up breaking the shear pin on the push. So we had to get Maintenance to come out and verify everything was ok before continuing on with the pushback. Once given the ok to go from Maintenance, we were able to push back to the proper area and commence the flight. The time now is roughly XJ:15 and we were on our way for departure after 8.5 hours of delays and changes. There were still so many storms in the direction of which we were going but ZZZ2 was clear. We departed with no issues. We performed the after-takeoff check and continued our climb to 10,000 ft. It was around 8,000 ft. that the CA decided to put the autopilot on by pressing Command A. The autopilot engaged. I was the pilot monitoring and received a clearance to continue climb to 18,000 ft. At that moment within 30 - 60 seconds of the autopilot being on, there was a sudden violent jolt and pitch down of the aircraft. The autopilot remained engaged. The CA and I looked at each other trying to understand what just happened. The aircraft then did the same jolt and pitch down. The CA then clicked off the autopilot. We told ATC that we want to remain at 10,000 ft. and that we had a flight control issue. The CA and I then tried Command B autopilot. It appeared to be working normally. We then tried Command A autopilot and again within 30 - 60 seconds the jolt and nose down pitch occurred. We then saw the stab out of trim light appear. We ran through the checklist and decided that it was best to go back to ZZZ2 at that time. We advised ATC and got vectors back to ZZZ2. We notified Dispatch, the FAs (Flight Attendant), and customers. We did a great job using CRM to really divide and conquer at this time. We would meet back and regroup with each other. We ran the overweight checklist and proceeded to land at ZZZ2 with no issues. ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) verified the aircraft was ok on the taxiway before proceeding to the gate.\n\nNarrative 2\nOur showtime for the original pairing was XA:50. We were assigned an aircraft that was removed from ETOPS operations due to an APU issue. I discussed this with Dispatch and requested either an airplane with an APU that was not degraded and certified to operate over water or in ETOPS or a route of flight that was mainly over land and closer to acceptable divert airports. Even though this flight was not ETOPS I do not operate our aircraft over water more than a distance that would provide for a safe and quick diversion in the event of system failures. The Dispatcher agreed to re-route our flight. Soon after discussing this aircraft and flight plan, we were assigned another aircraft. We were not told why this decision was made. The next aircraft was wrought with even more serious issues. In addition to having a cowl anti-ice valve wired in the open position, which required reference to flight manual procedures and information, it led to another MEL item that further complicated the flight crew duties including more referencing of the flight manual and MEL procedures. Bleed air and minimum power settings. as well as split throttle positions, on an approach are serious systems that require lots of attention. Had this flight been further complicated by other system failures not anticipated, we would have been up against an enormous amount of work just to get the aircraft on the ground safely. In addition to that, there were numerous areas of thunderstorm activity on and around our route of flight. We refused the aircraft. The next aircraft they gave us came in with a write-up of brake accumulator pressure bleeding down rapidly while parked. AMTs performed a required test on the brake system and it failed. This evolution took about an hour and further delayed our operation and the aircraft was eventually taken out of service. Following this evolution, the crew desk advised us that we would not be able to complete our one-day trip without going over our Part 117 limits of a 14-hour duty day. Thus, as is allowed by the [agreement] for irregular operations, we were reassigned to a two-day trip that was about to depart. That crew was reassigned to take our two-leg turn to ZZZZ. We spoke briefly with the swap crew on the jet bridge and began setting up the cockpit for our one-leg, first-day flight to ZZZ. The second day would have us flying a leg ZZZ - ZZZ1 followed by a deadhead back to ZZZ2, flying into our day off. This was the first time we had released the parking brake on what was a very long day. During the pushback, we received instructions to position the aircraft away from construction on the ramp with the jet facing north toward the concourse. The push crew was not familiar with these instructions and had not been trained on the pushback necessary for the construction being done south of the concourse on Taxiway 1. The Tug Driver removed the tow bar pin after we set the brake, but the Ramp Controller informed us that we were not positioned correctly. We then had the Tug Driver hook up the tow bar again to reposition us correctly. This led to the shear pin being broken when the tow bar was reattached and we released the parking brake for repositioning. Following SOP, we were informed that the nose gear had to be inspected. The ground crew then reattached another tow bar and repositioned the aircraft at the gate and station maintenance personnel performed a successful inspection. We pushed back successfully and taxied for takeoff on Runway XX at ZZZ2. After an uneventful departure, we were climbing through about 8,000 ft. to level off at our assigned altitude of 10,000 ft. I engaged autopilot A/CMD and we experienced an abrupt jolt of the control column followed by two more. I immediately disengaged the autopilot and we began to look for an indication of any system malfunction. There were no abnormal signs or indications, including hydraulic pressure or fluid. We discussed the possibility that we had flown through another aircraft’s wake and I engaged the autopilot again, followed by the same abrupt jolts. I disengaged the autopilot again and hand-flew the jet, leveling off at 10,000 ft. This time I noticed a flash of the STAB OUT OF TRIM light on the forward instrument panel. We also noticed lots of autotrimming of the trim wheel. The trimming was not indicative of a runaway trim condition. Autopilot B was engaged and it operated normally. The First Officer immediately referenced the flight manual for the associated light. We reviewed the checklist and performed the steps called for. We discussed our options and decided to return to ZZZ2 as the safest and most prudent course of action. We also decided to advise ATC as an extra precaution and to obtain priority handling from ATC. Dispatch was notified, crew and passengers were briefed, and we made a slow approach back toward ZZZ2 about 30 minutes after takeoff. Landing performance data was requested and received from Dispatch. We reviewed the overweight landing checklist, briefed, and flew an uneventful approach and landing to Runway XY at ZZZ2. We were followed by numerous emergency vehicles on rollout. We spoke with the Fire Commander via VHF radio and he informed us that there were no external signs of damage or overheating of the brakes. We taxied back to the gate, shut down normally, performed all checklists, and debriefed thoroughly. We sent write-ups for the system malfunction as well as the overweight landing. Together we also debriefed the Chief Pilot. He called us again a short time later and we answered questions for a human factors review. He called one last time later and informed us that we were released from duty for the remainder of the day and night.",
    "synopsis": "B737 flight crew reported experiencing an abrupt pitch down event when engaging the autopilot system, resulting in an immediate return to the departure airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=56",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 56,
      "pageEnd": 59,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=56",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 56,
        "pageEnd": 59,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2014154 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B737 flight crew reported experiencing an abrupt pitch down event when engaging the autopilot system, resulting in an immediate return to the departure airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2008451",
    "date": "2023-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were operating leg 3 of 4. I was on day 4 of a busy 4 day Pilot Monitoring (PM) trip, while the Captain had just joined the trip after some time off. While taxiing out in ZZZ we were asked to load performance numbers for an intersection departure. With the aircraft at a stop, I loaded the new intersection, and we ran the Departure Plan Checklist, verifying the flaps were set in the correct position (Flaps 1). We then lined up on the runway and started our takeoff role, with me acting as Pilot Flying (PF). there was a strong gusty crosswind and turbulent conditions in ZZZ. After rotation, I called for \"landing gear up\" and the Captain responded with \"positive rate - Landing gear up\". I then noticed an unexpected change in performance and the aircraft's handling, and that the low-speed awareness ques where rising and I had lost my Flap 1 maneuvering que and my V2 + 15 \"shark tooth\". I lowered the nose to gain airspeed and said, \"something doesn't feel right\". at around 1,000 ft. AGL we noticed that the landing gear was still down, and the Captain had accidentally retracted the flaps instead of the landing gear. We correctly configured the aircraft and continued to climb without any further incident, and never exceeded any structural limitations. While discussing this later, the Captain believed he had been so focused on setting the right flap setting during the Departure Plan Checklist that he sub- consciously grabbed the flap lever instead of the landing gear. I could have been more attentive as to the configuration of the aircraft. Also, we were both starting to feel tired, on top of a long taxi out with multiple changes. I had also been flying a MAX for most of the trip, and assumed the extra noise with the gear down was just because the -700 is a lot louder than the MAX."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were operating leg 3 of 4. I was on day 4 of a busy 4 day Pilot Monitoring (PM) trip, while the Captain had just joined the trip after some time off. While taxiing out in ZZZ we were asked to load performance numbers for an intersection departure. With the aircraft at a stop, I loaded the new intersection, and we ran the Departure Plan Checklist, verifying the flaps were set in the correct position (Flaps 1). We then lined up on the runway and started our takeoff role, with me acting as Pilot Flying (PF). there was a strong gusty crosswind and turbulent conditions in ZZZ. After rotation, I called for \"landing gear up\" and the Captain responded with \"positive rate - Landing gear up\". I then noticed an unexpected change in performance and the aircraft's handling, and that the low-speed awareness ques where rising and I had lost my Flap 1 maneuvering que and my V2 + 15 \"shark tooth\". I lowered the nose to gain airspeed and said, \"something doesn't feel right\". at around 1,000 ft. AGL we noticed that the landing gear was still down, and the Captain had accidentally retracted the flaps instead of the landing gear. We correctly configured the aircraft and continued to climb without any further incident, and never exceeded any structural limitations. While discussing this later, the Captain believed he had been so focused on setting the right flap setting during the Departure Plan Checklist that he sub- consciously grabbed the flap lever instead of the landing gear. I could have been more attentive as to the configuration of the aircraft. Also, we were both starting to feel tired, on top of a long taxi out with multiple changes. I had also been flying a MAX for most of the trip, and assumed the extra noise with the gear down was just because the -700 is a lot louder than the MAX.",
    "synopsis": "B737-700 flight crew reported improper clean up sequence during departure climb resulting in momentary aircraft performance issues.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=60",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 60,
      "pageEnd": 61,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=60",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 60,
        "pageEnd": 61,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2008451 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B737-700 flight crew reported improper clean up sequence during departure climb resulting in momentary aircraft performance issues.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2006676",
    "date": "2023-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During the approach phase of flight to the river visual approach to [Runway] 19 at DCA, ATC issued a vector to intercept the approach in the vicinity of the GRAYZ intersection on the LNAV approach overlay. We had briefed the approach to include landing data and runway exit strategy and agreed that a flaps 40 setting would be the most effective. This leg was the third and final flight leg of the day. Prior flight legs had included significant weather mitigation and planning on our part as a crew, and I was, by this time, moderately fatigued. The altitude was approximately 2,000 [ft.] MSL, as I remember, which was issued to us by ATC. The aircraft was being operated using the autopilot, auto- throttles, and ATC had slowed us to 160 KTS for spacing. Because of the issued speed, the aircraft was configured with the landing gear down, flaps 15 for the speed, and subsequent approach. As we began to approach the intercept point, I realized that the intercept angle to capture was going to cause an overshoot, a subsequent overfly of the river to the opposite side, and in proximity of the restricted airspace. I dis-engaged the autopilot and manually flew a course to intercept the LNAV overlay of the river, ensuring no overflight of restrictive airspace. Once on the LNAV course and in the center of the river, I reached over and re-engaged the autopilot, or thus I thought I had. My hands were on the control column and when I selected the autopilot, it felt as the autopilot had engaged. The Pilot Monitoring did not alert me to the fact that the autopilot had not engaged. I was feeling time-compressed to get all the required tasks completed before landing and wanted the flight path to continue a descent using VNAV on the arrival. I reached up and set a lower altitude on the MCP panel. I felt the aircraft start a left descending turn, which I expected as we were following a left turn in the river. As the pitch attitude of the aircraft decreased, we received a GPWS Obstacle Alert (probably the Washington Monument in the distance). I immediately responded by manually correcting the flight path and then realized that automation had not been activated. I stabilized the flight profile and began using the river terrain features and requested flaps 30 and Landing Checklist. The aircraft was still in the center of the river, but now not on vertical profile slightly high. The time and approach compression was significant. As I began to turn final and line up on the runway, approximately 800 [ft.] MSL, the Pilot Monitoring queried me if I wanted flaps 40. I said yes, and flaps 40 was selected. I was above the PAPI and used normal maneuvering to re- align myself to a normal landing profile. I landed well within calculated Touchdown Zone and taxied to the gate. At no time were any aircraft limitations exceeded nor any airspace vertically or laterally exceeded, nor ATC clearances exceeded."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Captain was PF (Pilot Flying) into DCA on the River Visual Runway 19. ATC gave us a heading 130 to fly and then clearance for the River Visual Runway 19. With the heading we were given, we agreed to go direct GREYZ. Because of that heading, 130, it was evident that the autopilot probably was not going to anticipate the turn enough, leading to a possible overshoot of the runway and getting close to the Prohibited Area, P56B. The Captain chose to disconnect the autopilot to lead the turn. He then tried to reengage the autopilot, while I thought he was still hand flying. The autopilot did not actually engage, and our descent rate increased. Right as I was about to call out, \"sink rate,\" the GPWS called out, \"sink rate,\" instead. The Captain realized the autopilot was not engaged and corrected the flight path. At that point, we were descending at about 2,000 FPM and about 1,500 [ft.] AGL. He recovered nicely, However, it put us below stabilized criteria and we selected flaps 40 below 1,000 [ft.] AGL. We should have gone around due to the unstabilized approach. We ended up running the Before Landing Checklist late as well. We landed normally and continued to the gate. It was a quick set of events, and we were both busy getting the aircraft back where we wanted it, but ultimately, we should have gone around."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring the approach phase of flight to the river visual approach to [Runway] 19 at DCA, ATC issued a vector to intercept the approach in the vicinity of the GRAYZ intersection on the LNAV approach overlay. We had briefed the approach to include landing data and runway exit strategy and agreed that a flaps 40 setting would be the most effective. This leg was the third and final flight leg of the day. Prior flight legs had included significant weather mitigation and planning on our part as a crew, and I was, by this time, moderately fatigued. The altitude was approximately 2,000 [ft.] MSL, as I remember, which was issued to us by ATC. The aircraft was being operated using the autopilot, auto- throttles, and ATC had slowed us to 160 KTS for spacing. Because of the issued speed, the aircraft was configured with the landing gear down, flaps 15 for the speed, and subsequent approach. As we began to approach the intercept point, I realized that the intercept angle to capture was going to cause an overshoot, a subsequent overfly of the river to the opposite side, and in proximity of the restricted airspace. I dis-engaged the autopilot and manually flew a course to intercept the LNAV overlay of the river, ensuring no overflight of restrictive airspace. Once on the LNAV course and in the center of the river, I reached over and re-engaged the autopilot, or thus I thought I had. My hands were on the control column and when I selected the autopilot, it felt as the autopilot had engaged. The Pilot Monitoring did not alert me to the fact that the autopilot had not engaged. I was feeling time-compressed to get all the required tasks completed before landing and wanted the flight path to continue a descent using VNAV on the arrival. I reached up and set a lower altitude on the MCP panel. I felt the aircraft start a left descending turn, which I expected as we were following a left turn in the river. As the pitch attitude of the aircraft decreased, we received a GPWS Obstacle Alert (probably the Washington Monument in the distance). I immediately responded by manually correcting the flight path and then realized that automation had not been activated. I stabilized the flight profile and began using the river terrain features and requested flaps 30 and Landing Checklist. The aircraft was still in the center of the river, but now not on vertical profile slightly high. The time and approach compression was significant. As I began to turn final and line up on the runway, approximately 800 [ft.] MSL, the Pilot Monitoring queried me if I wanted flaps 40. I said yes, and flaps 40 was selected. I was above the PAPI and used normal maneuvering to re- align myself to a normal landing profile. I landed well within calculated Touchdown Zone and taxied to the gate. At no time were any aircraft limitations exceeded nor any airspace vertically or laterally exceeded, nor ATC clearances exceeded.\n\nNarrative 2\nCaptain was PF (Pilot Flying) into DCA on the River Visual Runway 19. ATC gave us a heading 130 to fly and then clearance for the River Visual Runway 19. With the heading we were given, we agreed to go direct GREYZ. Because of that heading, 130, it was evident that the autopilot probably was not going to anticipate the turn enough, leading to a possible overshoot of the runway and getting close to the Prohibited Area, P56B. The Captain chose to disconnect the autopilot to lead the turn. He then tried to reengage the autopilot, while I thought he was still hand flying. The autopilot did not actually engage, and our descent rate increased. Right as I was about to call out, \"sink rate,\" the GPWS called out, \"sink rate,\" instead. The Captain realized the autopilot was not engaged and corrected the flight path. At that point, we were descending at about 2,000 FPM and about 1,500 [ft.] AGL. He recovered nicely, However, it put us below stabilized criteria and we selected flaps 40 below 1,000 [ft.] AGL. We should have gone around due to the unstabilized approach. We ended up running the Before Landing Checklist late as well. We landed normally and continued to the gate. It was a quick set of events, and we were both busy getting the aircraft back where we wanted it, but ultimately, we should have gone around.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported flying an unstabilized approach on a charted visual approach and elected to continue to land rather than go around.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=62",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 62,
      "pageEnd": 64,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=62",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 62,
        "pageEnd": 64,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2006676 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported flying an unstabilized approach on a charted visual approach and elected to continue to land rather than go around.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2002849",
    "date": "2023-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "B787-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "At approximately 2.5 hours into Flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1, while en route and past our critical point, the right engine experienced a sudden loss of oil pressure, necessitating the activation of the appropriate checklist procedures. Consequently, the affected engine was promptly shut down in accordance with Standard operating procedures. Following the engine shutdown, the flight crew determined that the safest course of action would be to divert to ZZZ2. The flight proceeded to ZZZ2, where an uneventful single-engine landing was executed successfully, mitigating any potential risks associated with the in-flight engine failure. Upon arrival at ZZZ2, the Maintenance Team conducted a thorough inspection of the right engine to ascertain the root cause of the oil pressure loss. Initial findings indicate excessive contaminates in the engine chip detector resulting in total oil pressure loss in the right engine. As a consequence of the inflight [problem] and the subsequent stress endured by the crew, a decision was made to preventatively address crew fatigue. Considering the incident and the need for additional rest and recuperation, the crew was deemed unable to continue the flight to ZZZ1. This decision was taken in accordance with safety regulations and in the best interest of the crew and passengers. Unfortunately, upon landing the crew desk ordered us to continue to fly to ZZZ1 after this incident. Conclusion: Flight experienced a right engine oil pressure loss approximately 2.5 hours into the flight. The crew successfully executed the appropriate shutdown procedures, ensuring the safety of all onboard. An uneventful single-engine landing was accomplished at ZZZ2. The investigation into the root cause of the engine failure is underway. The crew's inability to continue the flight to ZZZ due to the stress and fatigue resulting from the inflight situation was a necessary precaution taken to prioritize safety."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Engine failure over Ocean. Diversion to ZZZ2. At ZZZ2 this flight crew was scheduled to quick turn with different aircraft and continue flying to ZZZ1. Crew desk did not understand why we would not want to do this. The crew desk then asked if I wanted to call in fatigued and I agreed. Flight Operations Duty Manager agreed that we should not fly to ZZZ1, and to let the crew desk know what time we would be rested and available, which I did."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAt approximately 2.5 hours into Flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1, while en route and past our critical point, the right engine experienced a sudden loss of oil pressure, necessitating the activation of the appropriate checklist procedures. Consequently, the affected engine was promptly shut down in accordance with Standard operating procedures. Following the engine shutdown, the flight crew determined that the safest course of action would be to divert to ZZZ2. The flight proceeded to ZZZ2, where an uneventful single-engine landing was executed successfully, mitigating any potential risks associated with the in-flight engine failure. Upon arrival at ZZZ2, the Maintenance Team conducted a thorough inspection of the right engine to ascertain the root cause of the oil pressure loss. Initial findings indicate excessive contaminates in the engine chip detector resulting in total oil pressure loss in the right engine. As a consequence of the inflight [problem] and the subsequent stress endured by the crew, a decision was made to preventatively address crew fatigue. Considering the incident and the need for additional rest and recuperation, the crew was deemed unable to continue the flight to ZZZ1. This decision was taken in accordance with safety regulations and in the best interest of the crew and passengers. Unfortunately, upon landing the crew desk ordered us to continue to fly to ZZZ1 after this incident. Conclusion: Flight experienced a right engine oil pressure loss approximately 2.5 hours into the flight. The crew successfully executed the appropriate shutdown procedures, ensuring the safety of all onboard. An uneventful single-engine landing was accomplished at ZZZ2. The investigation into the root cause of the engine failure is underway. The crew's inability to continue the flight to ZZZ due to the stress and fatigue resulting from the inflight situation was a necessary precaution taken to prioritize safety.\n\nNarrative 2\nEngine failure over Ocean. Diversion to ZZZ2. At ZZZ2 this flight crew was scheduled to quick turn with different aircraft and continue flying to ZZZ1. Crew desk did not understand why we would not want to do this. The crew desk then asked if I wanted to call in fatigued and I agreed. Flight Operations Duty Manager agreed that we should not fly to ZZZ1, and to let the crew desk know what time we would be rested and available, which I did.",
    "synopsis": "B787 flight crew reported calling out for fatigue after loss of oil pressure in the right engine. The flight crew performed an in flight shut down of the affected engine and diverted to make a precautionary landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=65",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 65,
      "pageEnd": 67,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=65",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 65,
        "pageEnd": 67,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2002849 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B787 flight crew reported calling out for fatigue after loss of oil pressure in the right engine. The flight crew performed an in flight shut down of the affected engine and diverted to make a precautionary landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1999496",
    "date": "2023-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "A320"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were in ZZZ to ZZZ1 taxing out it was raining and overcast 1,700 ft. and rain. After three reroutes we then was cleared for position and hold. We aligned on Runway X be ready for immediate departure traffic 2 miles out. Aligned, I held the brakes powered up the engines to approximately 40% N1 FF approximately 1400 pounds, feeling the aircraft rumble/ shake engines stabilized are ready to go. Once cleared for Takeoff I then stood up engines throttles to the 12 o'clock position stable released brakes with aircraft moving then smoothly advanced to FLEX detent. Once in detent with engines powered up I could not keep aircraft on center line and was veering quickly to the right. Giving the engines No 2 sec more to catch up, veering uncontrollably to the right off center line. I rejected the takeoff, full reverse manual brakes and placing my hand on the tiller to align back to center line. This exacerbated the loss of nose control, nose wheel skidding on the wet runway left then right then to a slight left. I then once again hit the brakes to a quick total stop. All then cooled down on runway with reversers stowed. We then taxied off on the second left taxiway. This event on the runway was approximately 850 ft. total airspeed was not even alive for the First Officer (FO) \"call\" We both examined all engine gauges all was normal and sat for a moment to review what just went on called the flight staff on all call. They were all OK and passengers too then several passengers wanted to get off jet as we were think if it would it be prudent to go to gate for maintenance review. This was then with no hesitation of us to go back to the gate and deplane jet and allow maintenance to figure out what was the cause of engine issue. The use of the tiller exacerbated the loss of control of aircraft steering below VMC ground on a wet runway. The use of the brakes to a stop is when we truly regained total control of the Jet. Once we returned to gate is when we then realized the event and how my adrenaline was running. The station manager even noticed how our demeanor was and asked how we felt. I was reluctant to say then it hit me I need to wind the clock and slow down I then called myself off of the flight, fatigued not safe. I as Captain felt not safe to continue flying this day. Take the event in to adjust there was no hull loss nor any soul lost and the next day I flew as Captain ZZZ to ZZZ2 with no further issues."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were in ZZZ to ZZZ1 taxing out it was raining and overcast 1,700 ft. and rain. After three reroutes we then was cleared for position and hold. We aligned on Runway X be ready for immediate departure traffic 2 miles out. Aligned, I held the brakes powered up the engines to approximately 40% N1 FF approximately 1400 pounds, feeling the aircraft rumble/ shake engines stabilized are ready to go. Once cleared for Takeoff I then stood up engines throttles to the 12 o'clock position stable released brakes with aircraft moving then smoothly advanced to FLEX detent. Once in detent with engines powered up I could not keep aircraft on center line and was veering quickly to the right. Giving the engines No 2 sec more to catch up, veering uncontrollably to the right off center line. I rejected the takeoff, full reverse manual brakes and placing my hand on the tiller to align back to center line. This exacerbated the loss of nose control, nose wheel skidding on the wet runway left then right then to a slight left. I then once again hit the brakes to a quick total stop. All then cooled down on runway with reversers stowed. We then taxied off on the second left taxiway. This event on the runway was approximately 850 ft. total airspeed was not even alive for the First Officer (FO) \"call\" We both examined all engine gauges all was normal and sat for a moment to review what just went on called the flight staff on all call. They were all OK and passengers too then several passengers wanted to get off jet as we were think if it would it be prudent to go to gate for maintenance review. This was then with no hesitation of us to go back to the gate and deplane jet and allow maintenance to figure out what was the cause of engine issue. The use of the tiller exacerbated the loss of control of aircraft steering below VMC ground on a wet runway. The use of the brakes to a stop is when we truly regained total control of the Jet. Once we returned to gate is when we then realized the event and how my adrenaline was running. The station manager even noticed how our demeanor was and asked how we felt. I was reluctant to say then it hit me I need to wind the clock and slow down I then called myself off of the flight, fatigued not safe. I as Captain felt not safe to continue flying this day. Take the event in to adjust there was no hull loss nor any soul lost and the next day I flew as Captain ZZZ to ZZZ2 with no further issues.",
    "synopsis": "A320 Captain reported a loss of directional control resulted in a rejected takeoff. The flight crew elected to return to the gate for maintenance action and to deplane several passengers who did not want to continue on the flight.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=68",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 68,
      "pageEnd": 69,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=68",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 68,
        "pageEnd": 69,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1999496 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "A320 Captain reported a loss of directional control resulted in a rejected takeoff. The flight crew elected to return to the gate for maintenance action and to deplane several passengers who did not want to continue on the flight.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1983222",
    "date": "2023-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Shortly after completing the after takeoff checklist I noticed that fuel was flowing from the left fuel tank at a very alarming rate. We thought that there was a fuel leak because of the rapid fuel flow out of the left tank. The First Officer (FO) continued to fly the aircraft while I ran the Engine Fuel Leak QRH. We briefly discussed continuing straight to ZZZ1 but the weather was better in ZZZ and the rate of fuel loss out of the left side was very concerning to us. While I ran the QRH the FO [requested priority handling] and requested vectors back to ZZZ. The rapid loss led us to confirm a fuel leak in the QRH which led us to shutting down the number one engine. We continued to an uneventful single engine landing in ZZZ. After securing the engine we became aware the cross feed valve was open. I know I pointed at it in the QRH and verified it closed. I did not see a dim blue light and did not expect it to be open, because the only time it is open is when I open it. While we did discuss the issue at hand before delving into the QRC we felt a great urgency to act quickly due to the very rapid loss of fuel. A longer safety pause would have been more appropriate. The FO did a great job flying the plane and handling the radios but the approach environment is very distracting. I left the checklist to get ATC SOB count after we [requested priority handling], and again to talk to the Flight Attendants (FAs) when they felt the plane turning around. Better managing distractions during critical junctures of the checklist would have gone a long way. I feel like I have good working knowledge of the 737 fuel systems, and know that one pump can overpower the others and the high power setting and fuel flow was the reason why the draw on the left side was so alarming. In retrospect there were a number of opportunities to trap this error before becoming an undesirable aircraft state. Fatigue may have been a contributing factor as this incident occurred on daylight savings day. I had a hard time falling asleep and woke up at XA:30 AM body time. My watch estimated my sleep for the night as 4 hours 13 minutes. I was tired that day and using caffeine to get me home. I have learned a lot from previous company guidance on this issue and never wanted to be the one to go down this rabbit hole. Look out for tunnel vision, confirmation bias, don't rush!"
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Shortly after completing the after takeoff checklist the Captain noticed that fuel was depleting from the left fuel tank at an alarming rate. After a quick discussion we agreed that a fuel leak was suspected. I continued flying the aircraft and took over radio duties while the Captain ran the QRH for fuel leak. I [requested priority handling] and requested radar vectors back to ZZZ after a quick discussion with the Captain as the weather was significantly better there than ZZZ1. The checklist lead us to shut down the left engine and we prepared for a single-engine approach and landing. While on downwind our jump seater noticed that our cross feed valve was in the open position and neither the Captain nor I had caught it. We were so busy and inundated with task-saturation that a step was missed in the QRH. I think we were pretty shocked to see how fast our fuel was depleting from the left side and that caused us to rush the checklist and miss key steps. The volume of radio calls and vectors kept me from doing a great job of backing up the Captain while they ran the checklist. Fatigue was definitely a contributing factor as we had an early van in ZZZ2 on the morning of daylight savings. This is a prime example of needing to slow down and take a better assessment of the situation before rushing to conclusions."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nShortly after completing the after takeoff checklist I noticed that fuel was flowing from the left fuel tank at a very alarming rate. We thought that there was a fuel leak because of the rapid fuel flow out of the left tank. The First Officer (FO) continued to fly the aircraft while I ran the Engine Fuel Leak QRH. We briefly discussed continuing straight to ZZZ1 but the weather was better in ZZZ and the rate of fuel loss out of the left side was very concerning to us. While I ran the QRH the FO [requested priority handling] and requested vectors back to ZZZ. The rapid loss led us to confirm a fuel leak in the QRH which led us to shutting down the number one engine. We continued to an uneventful single engine landing in ZZZ. After securing the engine we became aware the cross feed valve was open. I know I pointed at it in the QRH and verified it closed. I did not see a dim blue light and did not expect it to be open, because the only time it is open is when I open it. While we did discuss the issue at hand before delving into the QRC we felt a great urgency to act quickly due to the very rapid loss of fuel. A longer safety pause would have been more appropriate. The FO did a great job flying the plane and handling the radios but the approach environment is very distracting. I left the checklist to get ATC SOB count after we [requested priority handling], and again to talk to the Flight Attendants (FAs) when they felt the plane turning around. Better managing distractions during critical junctures of the checklist would have gone a long way. I feel like I have good working knowledge of the 737 fuel systems, and know that one pump can overpower the others and the high power setting and fuel flow was the reason why the draw on the left side was so alarming. In retrospect there were a number of opportunities to trap this error before becoming an undesirable aircraft state. Fatigue may have been a contributing factor as this incident occurred on daylight savings day. I had a hard time falling asleep and woke up at XA:30 AM body time. My watch estimated my sleep for the night as 4 hours 13 minutes. I was tired that day and using caffeine to get me home. I have learned a lot from previous company guidance on this issue and never wanted to be the one to go down this rabbit hole. Look out for tunnel vision, confirmation bias, don't rush!\n\nNarrative 2\nShortly after completing the after takeoff checklist the Captain noticed that fuel was depleting from the left fuel tank at an alarming rate. After a quick discussion we agreed that a fuel leak was suspected. I continued flying the aircraft and took over radio duties while the Captain ran the QRH for fuel leak. I [requested priority handling] and requested radar vectors back to ZZZ after a quick discussion with the Captain as the weather was significantly better there than ZZZ1. The checklist lead us to shut down the left engine and we prepared for a single-engine approach and landing. While on downwind our jump seater noticed that our cross feed valve was in the open position and neither the Captain nor I had caught it. We were so busy and inundated with task-saturation that a step was missed in the QRH. I think we were pretty shocked to see how fast our fuel was depleting from the left side and that caused us to rush the checklist and miss key steps. The volume of radio calls and vectors kept me from doing a great job of backing up the Captain while they ran the checklist. Fatigue was definitely a contributing factor as we had an early van in ZZZ2 on the morning of daylight savings. This is a prime example of needing to slow down and take a better assessment of the situation before rushing to conclusions.",
    "synopsis": "B737 Flight Crew reported a suspected Fuel Leak after takeoff. The Flight Crew ran the QRH and checklists and then requested vectors to return to the departure airport. The suspected Fuel Leak continued to worsen, so the Flight Crew requested priority handling and performed an in flight shut down. When complying with the inflight shutdown QRH, it was discovered that the Cross Feed Valve was still open. The flight crew continued to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing at departure airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=70",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 70,
      "pageEnd": 73,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=70",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 70,
        "pageEnd": 73,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      },
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=65",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 65,
        "pageEnd": 68,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1983222 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B737 Flight Crew reported a suspected Fuel Leak after takeoff. The Flight Crew ran the QRH and checklists and then requested vectors to return to the departure airport. The suspected Fuel Leak continued to worsen, so the Flight Crew requested priority handling and performed an in flight shut down. When complying with the inflight shutdown QRH, it was discovered that the Cross Feed Valve was still open. The flight crew continued to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing at departure airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue",
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    },
    "sourceVariants": [
      {
        "source": {
          "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=65",
          "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
          "pageStart": 65,
          "pageEnd": 68,
          "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
          "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
          "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
          "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
        },
        "narrative": "Narrative 1\nShortly after completing the after takeoff checklist I noticed that fuel was flowing from the left fuel tank at a very alarming rate. We thought that there was a fuel leak because of the rapid fuel flow out of the left tank. The First Officer (FO) continued to fly the aircraft while I ran the Engine Fuel Leak QRH. We briefly discussed continuing straight to ZZZ1 but the weather was better in ZZZ and the rate of fuel loss out of the left side was very concerning to us. While I ran the QRH the FO [requested priority handling] and requested vectors back to ZZZ. The rapid loss led us to confirm a fuel leak in the QRH which led us to shutting down the number one engine. We continued to an uneventful single engine landing in ZZZ. After securing the engine we became aware the cross feed valve was open. I know I pointed at it in the QRH and verified it closed. I did not see a dim blue light and did not expect it to be open, because the only time it is open is when I open it. While we did discuss the issue at hand before delving into the QRC we felt a great urgency to act quickly due to the very rapid loss of fuel. A longer safety pause would have been more appropriate. The FO did a great job flying the plane and handling the radios but the approach environment is very distracting. I left the checklist to get ATC SOB count after we [requested priority handling], and again to talk to the Flight Attendants (FAs) when they felt the plane turning around. Better managing distractions during critical junctures of the checklist would have gone a long way. I feel like I have good working knowledge of the 737 fuel systems, and know that one pump can overpower the others and the high power setting and fuel flow was the reason why the draw on the left side was so alarming. In retrospect there were a number of opportunities to trap this error before becoming an undesirable aircraft state. Fatigue may have been a contributing factor as this incident occurred on daylight savings day. I had a hard time falling asleep and woke up at XA:30 AM body time. My watch estimated my sleep for the night as 4 hours 13 minutes. I was tired that day and using caffeine to get me home. I have learned a lot from previous company guidance on this issue and never wanted to be the one to go down this rabbit hole. Look out for tunnel vision, confirmation bias, don't rush!\n\nNarrative 2\nShortly after completing the after takeoff checklist the Captain noticed that fuel was depleting from the left fuel tank at an alarming rate. After a quick discussion we agreed that a fuel leak was suspected. I continued flying the aircraft and took over radio duties while the Captain ran the QRH for fuel leak. I [requested priority handling] and requested radar vectors back to ZZZ after a quick discussion with the Captain as the weather was significantly better there than ZZZ1. The checklist lead us to shut down the left engine and we prepared for a single-engine approach and landing. While on downwind our jump seater noticed that our cross feed valve was in the open position and neither the Captain nor I had caught it. We were so busy and inundated with task-saturation that a step was missed in the QRH. I think we were pretty shocked to see how fast our fuel was depleting from the left side and that caused us to rush the checklist and miss key steps. The volume of radio calls and vectors kept me from doing a great job of backing up the Captain while they ran the checklist. Fatigue was definitely a contributing factor as we had an early van in ZZZ2 on the morning of daylight savings. This is a prime example of needing to slow down and take a better assessment of the situation before rushing to conclusions.",
        "narratives": [
          {
            "number": 1,
            "text": "Shortly after completing the after takeoff checklist I noticed that fuel was flowing from the left fuel tank at a very alarming rate. We thought that there was a fuel leak because of the rapid fuel flow out of the left tank. The First Officer (FO) continued to fly the aircraft while I ran the Engine Fuel Leak QRH. We briefly discussed continuing straight to ZZZ1 but the weather was better in ZZZ and the rate of fuel loss out of the left side was very concerning to us. While I ran the QRH the FO [requested priority handling] and requested vectors back to ZZZ. The rapid loss led us to confirm a fuel leak in the QRH which led us to shutting down the number one engine. We continued to an uneventful single engine landing in ZZZ. After securing the engine we became aware the cross feed valve was open. I know I pointed at it in the QRH and verified it closed. I did not see a dim blue light and did not expect it to be open, because the only time it is open is when I open it. While we did discuss the issue at hand before delving into the QRC we felt a great urgency to act quickly due to the very rapid loss of fuel. A longer safety pause would have been more appropriate. The FO did a great job flying the plane and handling the radios but the approach environment is very distracting. I left the checklist to get ATC SOB count after we [requested priority handling], and again to talk to the Flight Attendants (FAs) when they felt the plane turning around. Better managing distractions during critical junctures of the checklist would have gone a long way. I feel like I have good working knowledge of the 737 fuel systems, and know that one pump can overpower the others and the high power setting and fuel flow was the reason why the draw on the left side was so alarming. In retrospect there were a number of opportunities to trap this error before becoming an undesirable aircraft state. Fatigue may have been a contributing factor as this incident occurred on daylight savings day. I had a hard time falling asleep and woke up at XA:30 AM body time. My watch estimated my sleep for the night as 4 hours 13 minutes. I was tired that day and using caffeine to get me home. I have learned a lot from previous company guidance on this issue and never wanted to be the one to go down this rabbit hole. Look out for tunnel vision, confirmation bias, don't rush!"
          },
          {
            "number": 2,
            "text": "Shortly after completing the after takeoff checklist the Captain noticed that fuel was depleting from the left fuel tank at an alarming rate. After a quick discussion we agreed that a fuel leak was suspected. I continued flying the aircraft and took over radio duties while the Captain ran the QRH for fuel leak. I [requested priority handling] and requested radar vectors back to ZZZ after a quick discussion with the Captain as the weather was significantly better there than ZZZ1. The checklist lead us to shut down the left engine and we prepared for a single-engine approach and landing. While on downwind our jump seater noticed that our cross feed valve was in the open position and neither the Captain nor I had caught it. We were so busy and inundated with task-saturation that a step was missed in the QRH. I think we were pretty shocked to see how fast our fuel was depleting from the left side and that caused us to rush the checklist and miss key steps. The volume of radio calls and vectors kept me from doing a great job of backing up the Captain while they ran the checklist. Fatigue was definitely a contributing factor as we had an early van in ZZZ2 on the morning of daylight savings. This is a prime example of needing to slow down and take a better assessment of the situation before rushing to conclusions."
          }
        ],
        "synopsis": "B737 Flight Crew reported a suspected Fuel Leak after takeoff. The Flight Crew ran the QRH and checklists and then requested vectors to return to the departure airport. The suspected Fuel Leak continued to worsen, so the Flight Crew requested priority handling and performed an in flight shut down. When complying with the inflight shutdown QRH, it was discovered that the Cross Feed Valve was still open. The flight crew continued to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing at departure airport.",
        "aircraft": [
          "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
        ],
        "flightPhase": [
          "Climb"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1972074",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After pushback from ZZZ, we performed the Control Check, and the First Officer (FO) noted that the Elevator Control felt \"stiff\". I performed the check and also noticed the stiffness, but there was no restriction or problem with movement. We discussed our options and I decided since there was no binding or restricted movement, we should be good to continue. On departure at 800 ft. AGL, the FO performed the thrust cutback as per the noise abatement procedure. When I went to lower the pitch, the yoke felt stuck. It took an unusual amount of force to free the yoke and lower the nose. We leveled off at 13,000 ft. and ran the Jammed or Restricted Flight Controls QRH. Upon completion of the QRH, we decided it was best to divert to ZZZ1. I coordinated with Dispatch and told him our problem and the plan to divert to ZZZ1, and he agreed that was the best course of action. The FO coordinated our divert with Approach. We did not [request priority handling] as the aircraft was flying normally. I briefed the Flight Attendants and Passengers and called ZZZ1 Station Operations to ensure they were in the loop. The FO calculated the landing data and we realized we would have to make an overweight landing, as we weighed 133,500 pounds. He referenced the overweight landing section in the manual and we decided to land on XXR at ZZZ1 since it was the longest runway. We looked at brake cooling but it was not a factor. We configured normally, landed and taxied to the gate without incident. All in all, this was a fairly straightforward diversion, but after pulling into the gate, coordinating with Maintenance, Dispatch, Company Operations Chief Pilot, and Crew Scheduling, and making the appropriate write-ups, I found myself drained. I was very grateful we did not have to continue with our flying and instead got to deadhead home."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "On takeoff, as the Captain lowered the nose to accelerate, he experienced a very brief \"hanging up\" in the elevator controls. It was easily overpowered and the decision to make a precautionary overweight landing in ZZZ1 was made. During the previous landing I noticed a very slight roughness in the elevator during flare, but it was not a feeling that was out of the ordinary enough to cause concern of a potential malfunction. During the Flight Control Check, there was a slight roughness in the elevator, but again it didn't seem anything more than what would be experienced during normal operations. It was very subtle and noted by both of us as being within normal limits from past experience. I noticed the \"hang up\" that the Captain experienced on takeoff and it had amplified enough to cause us both concern and initiate a divert."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter pushback from ZZZ, we performed the Control Check, and the First Officer (FO) noted that the Elevator Control felt \"stiff\". I performed the check and also noticed the stiffness, but there was no restriction or problem with movement. We discussed our options and I decided since there was no binding or restricted movement, we should be good to continue. On departure at 800 ft. AGL, the FO performed the thrust cutback as per the noise abatement procedure. When I went to lower the pitch, the yoke felt stuck. It took an unusual amount of force to free the yoke and lower the nose. We leveled off at 13,000 ft. and ran the Jammed or Restricted Flight Controls QRH. Upon completion of the QRH, we decided it was best to divert to ZZZ1. I coordinated with Dispatch and told him our problem and the plan to divert to ZZZ1, and he agreed that was the best course of action. The FO coordinated our divert with Approach. We did not [request priority handling] as the aircraft was flying normally. I briefed the Flight Attendants and Passengers and called ZZZ1 Station Operations to ensure they were in the loop. The FO calculated the landing data and we realized we would have to make an overweight landing, as we weighed 133,500 pounds. He referenced the overweight landing section in the manual and we decided to land on XXR at ZZZ1 since it was the longest runway. We looked at brake cooling but it was not a factor. We configured normally, landed and taxied to the gate without incident. All in all, this was a fairly straightforward diversion, but after pulling into the gate, coordinating with Maintenance, Dispatch, Company Operations Chief Pilot, and Crew Scheduling, and making the appropriate write-ups, I found myself drained. I was very grateful we did not have to continue with our flying and instead got to deadhead home.\n\nNarrative 2\nOn takeoff, as the Captain lowered the nose to accelerate, he experienced a very brief \"hanging up\" in the elevator controls. It was easily overpowered and the decision to make a precautionary overweight landing in ZZZ1 was made. During the previous landing I noticed a very slight roughness in the elevator during flare, but it was not a feeling that was out of the ordinary enough to cause concern of a potential malfunction. During the Flight Control Check, there was a slight roughness in the elevator, but again it didn't seem anything more than what would be experienced during normal operations. It was very subtle and noted by both of us as being within normal limits from past experience. I noticed the \"hang up\" that the Captain experienced on takeoff and it had amplified enough to cause us both concern and initiate a divert.",
    "synopsis": "B737 flight crew reported after takeoff the elevator control system felt stiff. The pilots elected to divert to a nearby airport for maintenance action. An overweight landing was successfully accomplished.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=74",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 74,
      "pageEnd": 76,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=74",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 74,
        "pageEnd": 76,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1972074 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B737 flight crew reported after takeoff the elevator control system felt stiff. The pilots elected to divert to a nearby airport for maintenance action. An overweight landing was successfully accomplished.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1971851",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "B767-300 and 300 ER"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "The following is to report unintended aircraft movement during push back. I was the Captain conducting First Officer (FO) new hire and had a new hire occupying the observer seat for familiarization. Work load management was high and leading factors include; fatigue, 2nd leg of an all-night duty period, MEL procedures, and training environment. During push back the ground crew completed the push advised me to set the parking brake and we are cleared to start both engines. I set the parking brake and told the FO to start the right engine. During the start the observing crew member asked if I could explain the start process, to which I only explained our definition of max motoring prior to fuel selection. Also, my attention was focused outside of the aircraft and compliance with verification of proper mode annunciation by EICAS and discrete light. After the right engine was started normally, the ground crew advised the aircraft was rolling and to set the parking brake. I immediately stepped on the brakes, set the parking brake and verified EICAS that the brake was set. I verified with ground crew if there were any injuries, contact with equipment or any damage. The ground crew was all safe and uninjured, no damage or contact with equipment took place. The aircraft was pushed to a dark unlit area on blacktop, it is unsure how much speed the aircraft picked up, but was not enough to make contact with the tug or tow bar parked directly in front. After the aircraft was briefly inspected by local maintenance, the left engine was started and we completed the flight without further issue. My apologies were given to the ground and well done for advising of the aircraft movement. I sincerely apologize to the company and to the crew members aboard for the potential harm or damage that could have resulted. Please contact me with further questions."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nThe following is to report unintended aircraft movement during push back. I was the Captain conducting First Officer (FO) new hire and had a new hire occupying the observer seat for familiarization. Work load management was high and leading factors include; fatigue, 2nd leg of an all-night duty period, MEL procedures, and training environment. During push back the ground crew completed the push advised me to set the parking brake and we are cleared to start both engines. I set the parking brake and told the FO to start the right engine. During the start the observing crew member asked if I could explain the start process, to which I only explained our definition of max motoring prior to fuel selection. Also, my attention was focused outside of the aircraft and compliance with verification of proper mode annunciation by EICAS and discrete light. After the right engine was started normally, the ground crew advised the aircraft was rolling and to set the parking brake. I immediately stepped on the brakes, set the parking brake and verified EICAS that the brake was set. I verified with ground crew if there were any injuries, contact with equipment or any damage. The ground crew was all safe and uninjured, no damage or contact with equipment took place. The aircraft was pushed to a dark unlit area on blacktop, it is unsure how much speed the aircraft picked up, but was not enough to make contact with the tug or tow bar parked directly in front. After the aircraft was briefly inspected by local maintenance, the left engine was started and we completed the flight without further issue. My apologies were given to the ground and well done for advising of the aircraft movement. I sincerely apologize to the company and to the crew members aboard for the potential harm or damage that could have resulted. Please contact me with further questions.",
    "synopsis": "B767 Captain reported uncommanded aircraft movement during push back not noticed by flight crew until advised by ground crew. Captain set the parking brake to stop aircraft movement.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=77",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 77,
      "pageEnd": 78,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=77",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 77,
        "pageEnd": 78,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1971851 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B767 Captain reported uncommanded aircraft movement during push back not noticed by flight crew until advised by ground crew. Captain set the parking brake to stop aircraft movement.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1967403",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "This was our second long day of sitting on the aircraft waiting for fuel to be loaded. Our first day ended when the airfield closed, because we delayed several hours due to insufficient support for two aircraft and a single fuel truck in operation. From the time we completed our aircraft preflight procedures and briefing, approximately 2 hours had passed. I was the Pilot Flying (PF) in the right seat and the Captain (CA) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) in the left seat. There were two additional First Officers (FO) seated in the observer seats. The company pages for Ellsworth AFB states that for departures \"expect taxi clearance to runway via Taxiway Delta and back taxi.\" There is further information provided for the arrivals section that states this is due to pavement degradation. This expected clearance is exactly what the company aircraft in front of us received the day prior, and is what we briefed. When we received our taxi clearance we were simply told to taxi via \"Alpha Bravo.\" As we commenced our taxi there was a marshaller positioned directly in front of us, and he signaled for us to taxi straight ahead, then directed us for an immediate right turn towards DELTA Taxiway. As we were nearing the runway, the FO in the left observer seat reminded me to turn left onto Alpha, which the entire crew agreed with. As we turned down the taxiway, it appeared to be very close to some blast fences on the right, so with the CA's concurrence I opted to taxi left of the center line so we had ample wingtip clearance on the right side. This area where we were taxiing was a large (vacant) parking ramp. This Taxiway Alpha has a slight right turn, then a left turn back to parallel the runway. As we made this right turn (approximately 45 deg) I immediately realized something was wrong. The taxiway had a dead end directly in front of us, and the blue taxiway lights were now on our left side. I quickly came to a stop and we queried Ground Control, while referencing our taxi diagram. The crew thought that perhaps the blue taxiway lights were center line taxi lights, and the Ground Control commented that those lights \"used to be green.\" The crew further interpreted this to be center line taxi lights, so we again continued to taxi to the left to intercept what we thought was center line taxi lights. We again realized this was not the case, and these recessed lights denoted the right side of the taxiway. We crossed over the recessed taxi edge lights onto the appropriate taxiway, and continued our taxi to Runway 31 without any further issues. At no time did the aircraft ever leave a hard surface or an area in which was not intended for aircraft travel, it was simply an area that was not specifically marked as the Alpha Taxiway. Where we were actually located was on a back alleyway for the hardstand parking locations of the ramp. Several factors played into this event, including the following; The long delay due to fueling issues, and duration from the time we briefed. Expectation bias originating from the company airport page and the marshaller/equipment in front of us. Poor taxi diagram available for the airfield which appears to identify two parallel Alpha taxiway lines, which is actually the taxi width line on the ramp area. Incorrect information from ground control concerning taxiway edge lights and colors versus taxiway center line lights, which did not exist. Poor ramp lighting and non standard airport markings. Even though we briefed what was expected and all monitoring pilots had taxi diagrams open and followed along the taxi route, we were still easily confused due to the information we had available. I believe that instead of \"expecting\" a clearance to back taxi on the runway, this should be standard operating procedure at this airport. There are far too many hazards and traps with the limited information on this airfield and non standard markings."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "PM (Pilot Monitoring) briefed taxi route per company page; via Delta and back-taxi to departure Runway 31. We were cleared by ATC to taxi via Alpha, Bravo. Upon signaling marshaller, we were directed onto Delta, the marshaller and a piece of equipment blocking a straight-out taxi. Prior to entering taxiway Delta I advised a left turn was necessary to enter taxiway Alpha \"Outer\" there being two taxi lines depicted on the airport chart. A turn was made and we followed taxiway Alpha \"Outer\" realizing, as we neared the curve in the taxiway that something was amiss. We stopped the aircraft, queried ATC, and were assured our taxi path was correct. Being situated behind the Captain (4th Observer) I did not have a good view of the taxiway ahead and to the right of the aircraft, however, I could see out the left window clearly. The Captain and I observed a wide swath of taxiway left of the aircraft, and the PM maneuvered accordingly. We joined taxiway Bravo at the runway end, and departed Runway 31. The non-standard markings, poor airfield and taxiway lighting, and operations of a military airfield were contributing factors. The marshaller put us on the wrong path initially by blocking a straight-out taxi. The two taxi \"lanes\" for taxiway Alpha are misleading. There is no Jepp AMM (Airport Moving Map) for RCA making Ownship position a guesstimate. It seemed once we made the turn that we were taxing on the \"Outer\" taxi lane for taxiway Alpha. ATC never stopped or queried us, and when we queried ATC we were given inaccurate information back. Additionally, we had observed a military aircraft take that path in advance of our departure, making it seem there were two, legitimate, taxi lines for taxiway Alpha. The company page could clarify the taxiway Alpha markings. Not being familiar with military airfields it looked as if there were two taxi lines for taxiway Alpha. Further, we could have pressed ATC for the suggested route of taxiway Delta with the back-taxi to the runway."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nThis was our second long day of sitting on the aircraft waiting for fuel to be loaded. Our first day ended when the airfield closed, because we delayed several hours due to insufficient support for two aircraft and a single fuel truck in operation. From the time we completed our aircraft preflight procedures and briefing, approximately 2 hours had passed. I was the Pilot Flying (PF) in the right seat and the Captain (CA) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) in the left seat. There were two additional First Officers (FO) seated in the observer seats. The company pages for Ellsworth AFB states that for departures \"expect taxi clearance to runway via Taxiway Delta and back taxi.\" There is further information provided for the arrivals section that states this is due to pavement degradation. This expected clearance is exactly what the company aircraft in front of us received the day prior, and is what we briefed. When we received our taxi clearance we were simply told to taxi via \"Alpha Bravo.\" As we commenced our taxi there was a marshaller positioned directly in front of us, and he signaled for us to taxi straight ahead, then directed us for an immediate right turn towards DELTA Taxiway. As we were nearing the runway, the FO in the left observer seat reminded me to turn left onto Alpha, which the entire crew agreed with. As we turned down the taxiway, it appeared to be very close to some blast fences on the right, so with the CA's concurrence I opted to taxi left of the center line so we had ample wingtip clearance on the right side. This area where we were taxiing was a large (vacant) parking ramp. This Taxiway Alpha has a slight right turn, then a left turn back to parallel the runway. As we made this right turn (approximately 45 deg) I immediately realized something was wrong. The taxiway had a dead end directly in front of us, and the blue taxiway lights were now on our left side. I quickly came to a stop and we queried Ground Control, while referencing our taxi diagram. The crew thought that perhaps the blue taxiway lights were center line taxi lights, and the Ground Control commented that those lights \"used to be green.\" The crew further interpreted this to be center line taxi lights, so we again continued to taxi to the left to intercept what we thought was center line taxi lights. We again realized this was not the case, and these recessed lights denoted the right side of the taxiway. We crossed over the recessed taxi edge lights onto the appropriate taxiway, and continued our taxi to Runway 31 without any further issues. At no time did the aircraft ever leave a hard surface or an area in which was not intended for aircraft travel, it was simply an area that was not specifically marked as the Alpha Taxiway. Where we were actually located was on a back alleyway for the hardstand parking locations of the ramp. Several factors played into this event, including the following; The long delay due to fueling issues, and duration from the time we briefed. Expectation bias originating from the company airport page and the marshaller/equipment in front of us. Poor taxi diagram available for the airfield which appears to identify two parallel Alpha taxiway lines, which is actually the taxi width line on the ramp area. Incorrect information from ground control concerning taxiway edge lights and colors versus taxiway center line lights, which did not exist. Poor ramp lighting and non standard airport markings. Even though we briefed what was expected and all monitoring pilots had taxi diagrams open and followed along the taxi route, we were still easily confused due to the information we had available. I believe that instead of \"expecting\" a clearance to back taxi on the runway, this should be standard operating procedure at this airport. There are far too many hazards and traps with the limited information on this airfield and non standard markings.\n\nNarrative 2\nPM (Pilot Monitoring) briefed taxi route per company page; via Delta and back-taxi to departure Runway 31. We were cleared by ATC to taxi via Alpha, Bravo. Upon signaling marshaller, we were directed onto Delta, the marshaller and a piece of equipment blocking a straight-out taxi. Prior to entering taxiway Delta I advised a left turn was necessary to enter taxiway Alpha \"Outer\" there being two taxi lines depicted on the airport chart. A turn was made and we followed taxiway Alpha \"Outer\" realizing, as we neared the curve in the taxiway that something was amiss. We stopped the aircraft, queried ATC, and were assured our taxi path was correct. Being situated behind the Captain (4th Observer) I did not have a good view of the taxiway ahead and to the right of the aircraft, however, I could see out the left window clearly. The Captain and I observed a wide swath of taxiway left of the aircraft, and the PM maneuvered accordingly. We joined taxiway Bravo at the runway end, and departed Runway 31. The non-standard markings, poor airfield and taxiway lighting, and operations of a military airfield were contributing factors. The marshaller put us on the wrong path initially by blocking a straight-out taxi. The two taxi \"lanes\" for taxiway Alpha are misleading. There is no Jepp AMM (Airport Moving Map) for RCA making Ownship position a guesstimate. It seemed once we made the turn that we were taxing on the \"Outer\" taxi lane for taxiway Alpha. ATC never stopped or queried us, and when we queried ATC we were given inaccurate information back. Additionally, we had observed a military aircraft take that path in advance of our departure, making it seem there were two, legitimate, taxi lines for taxiway Alpha. The company page could clarify the taxiway Alpha markings. Not being familiar with military airfields it looked as if there were two taxi lines for taxiway Alpha. Further, we could have pressed ATC for the suggested route of taxiway Delta with the back-taxi to the runway.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier First Officers reported difficulty locating the correct taxiway to the runway at RCA airport. The pilots stated their EFB does not contain complete airport information, and cited poor taxiway lighting, initial confusing marshaller signals and inadequate help from ATC as additional contributing factors.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=79",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
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      "pageEnd": 82,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=79",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 79,
        "pageEnd": 82,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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      },
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=106",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 106,
        "pageEnd": 109,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1967403 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier First Officers reported difficulty locating the correct taxiway to the runway at RCA airport. The pilots stated their EFB does not contain complete airport information, and cited poor taxiway lighting, initial confusing marshaller signals and inadequate help from ATC as additional contributing factors.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue",
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    },
    "sourceVariants": [
      {
        "source": {
          "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=106",
          "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
          "pageStart": 106,
          "pageEnd": 109,
          "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
          "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
          "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
          "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
        },
        "narrative": "Narrative 1\nThis was our second long day of sitting on the aircraft waiting for fuel to be loaded. Our first day ended when the airfield closed, because we delayed several hours due to insufficient support for two aircraft and a single fuel truck in operation. From the time we completed our aircraft preflight procedures and briefing, approximately 2 hours had passed. I was the Pilot Flying (PF) in the right seat and the Captain (CA) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) in the left seat. There were two additional First Officers (FO) seated in the observer seats. The company pages for Ellsworth AFB states that for departures \"expect taxi clearance to runway via Taxiway Delta and back taxi.\" There is further information provided for the arrivals section that states this is due to pavement degradation. This expected clearance is exactly what the company aircraft in front of us received the day prior, and is what we briefed. When we received our taxi clearance we were simply told to taxi via \"Alpha Bravo.\" As we commenced our taxi there was a marshaller positioned directly in front of us, and he signaled for us to taxi straight ahead, then directed us for an immediate right turn towards DELTA Taxiway. As we were nearing the runway, the FO in the left observer seat reminded me to turn left onto Alpha, which the entire crew agreed with. As we turned down the taxiway, it appeared to be very close to some blast fences on the right, so with the CA's concurrence I opted to taxi left of the center line so we had ample wingtip clearance on the right side. This area where we were taxiing was a large (vacant) parking ramp. This Taxiway Alpha has a slight right turn, then a left turn back to parallel the runway. As we made this right turn (approximately 45 deg) I immediately realized something was wrong. The taxiway had a dead end directly in front of us, and the blue taxiway lights were now on our left side. I quickly came to a stop and we queried Ground Control, while referencing our taxi diagram. The crew thought that perhaps the blue taxiway lights were center line taxi lights, and the Ground Control commented that those lights \"used to be green.\" The crew further interpreted this to be center line taxi lights, so we again continued to taxi to the left to intercept what we thought was center line taxi lights. We again realized this was not the case, and these recessed lights denoted the right side of the taxiway. We crossed over the recessed taxi edge lights onto the appropriate taxiway, and continued our taxi to Runway 31 without any further issues. At no time did the aircraft ever leave a hard surface or an area in which was not intended for aircraft travel, it was simply an area that was not specifically marked as the Alpha Taxiway. Where we were actually located was on a back alleyway for the hardstand parking locations of the ramp. Several factors played into this event, including the following; The long delay due to fueling issues, and duration from the time we briefed. Expectation bias originating from the company airport page and the marshaller/equipment in front of us. Poor taxi diagram available for the airfield which appears to identify two parallel Alpha taxiway lines, which is actually the taxi width line on the ramp area. Incorrect information from ground control concerning taxiway edge lights and colors versus taxiway center line lights, which did not exist. Poor ramp lighting and non standard airport markings. Even though we briefed what was expected and all monitoring pilots had taxi diagrams open and followed along the taxi route, we were still easily confused due to the information we had available. I believe that instead of \"expecting\" a clearance to back taxi on the runway, this should be standard operating procedure at this airport. There are far too many hazards and traps with the limited information on this airfield and non standard markings.\n\nNarrative 2\nPM (Pilot Monitoring) briefed taxi route per company page; via Delta and back-taxi to departure Runway 31. We were cleared by ATC to taxi via Alpha, Bravo. Upon signaling marshaller, we were directed onto Delta, the marshaller and a piece of equipment blocking a straight-out taxi. Prior to entering taxiway Delta I advised a left turn was necessary to enter taxiway Alpha \"Outer\" there being two taxi lines depicted on the airport chart. A turn was made and we followed taxiway Alpha \"Outer\" realizing, as we neared the curve in the taxiway that something was amiss. We stopped the aircraft, queried ATC, and were assured our taxi path was correct. Being situated behind the Captain (4th Observer) I did not have a good view of the taxiway ahead and to the right of the aircraft, however, I could see out the left window clearly. The Captain and I observed a wide swath of taxiway left of the aircraft, and the PM maneuvered accordingly. We joined taxiway Bravo at the runway end, and departed Runway 31. The non-standard markings, poor airfield and taxiway lighting, and operations of a military airfield were contributing factors. The marshaller put us on the wrong path initially by blocking a straight-out taxi. The two taxi \"lanes\" for taxiway Alpha are misleading. There is no Jepp AMM (Airport Moving Map) for RCA making Ownship position a guesstimate. It seemed once we made the turn that we were taxing on the \"Outer\" taxi lane for taxiway Alpha. ATC never stopped or queried us, and when we queried ATC we were given inaccurate information back. Additionally, we had observed a military aircraft take that path in advance of our departure, making it seem there were two, legitimate, taxi lines for taxiway Alpha. The company page could clarify the taxiway Alpha markings. Not being familiar with military airfields it looked as if there were two taxi lines for taxiway Alpha. Further, we could have pressed ATC for the suggested route of taxiway Delta with the back-taxi to the runway.",
        "narratives": [
          {
            "number": 1,
            "text": "This was our second long day of sitting on the aircraft waiting for fuel to be loaded. Our first day ended when the airfield closed, because we delayed several hours due to insufficient support for two aircraft and a single fuel truck in operation. From the time we completed our aircraft preflight procedures and briefing, approximately 2 hours had passed. I was the Pilot Flying (PF) in the right seat and the Captain (CA) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) in the left seat. There were two additional First Officers (FO) seated in the observer seats. The company pages for Ellsworth AFB states that for departures \"expect taxi clearance to runway via Taxiway Delta and back taxi.\" There is further information provided for the arrivals section that states this is due to pavement degradation. This expected clearance is exactly what the company aircraft in front of us received the day prior, and is what we briefed. When we received our taxi clearance we were simply told to taxi via \"Alpha Bravo.\" As we commenced our taxi there was a marshaller positioned directly in front of us, and he signaled for us to taxi straight ahead, then directed us for an immediate right turn towards DELTA Taxiway. As we were nearing the runway, the FO in the left observer seat reminded me to turn left onto Alpha, which the entire crew agreed with. As we turned down the taxiway, it appeared to be very close to some blast fences on the right, so with the CA's concurrence I opted to taxi left of the center line so we had ample wingtip clearance on the right side. This area where we were taxiing was a large (vacant) parking ramp. This Taxiway Alpha has a slight right turn, then a left turn back to parallel the runway. As we made this right turn (approximately 45 deg) I immediately realized something was wrong. The taxiway had a dead end directly in front of us, and the blue taxiway lights were now on our left side. I quickly came to a stop and we queried Ground Control, while referencing our taxi diagram. The crew thought that perhaps the blue taxiway lights were center line taxi lights, and the Ground Control commented that those lights \"used to be green.\" The crew further interpreted this to be center line taxi lights, so we again continued to taxi to the left to intercept what we thought was center line taxi lights. We again realized this was not the case, and these recessed lights denoted the right side of the taxiway. We crossed over the recessed taxi edge lights onto the appropriate taxiway, and continued our taxi to Runway 31 without any further issues. At no time did the aircraft ever leave a hard surface or an area in which was not intended for aircraft travel, it was simply an area that was not specifically marked as the Alpha Taxiway. Where we were actually located was on a back alleyway for the hardstand parking locations of the ramp. Several factors played into this event, including the following; The long delay due to fueling issues, and duration from the time we briefed. Expectation bias originating from the company airport page and the marshaller/equipment in front of us. Poor taxi diagram available for the airfield which appears to identify two parallel Alpha taxiway lines, which is actually the taxi width line on the ramp area. Incorrect information from ground control concerning taxiway edge lights and colors versus taxiway center line lights, which did not exist. Poor ramp lighting and non standard airport markings. Even though we briefed what was expected and all monitoring pilots had taxi diagrams open and followed along the taxi route, we were still easily confused due to the information we had available. I believe that instead of \"expecting\" a clearance to back taxi on the runway, this should be standard operating procedure at this airport. There are far too many hazards and traps with the limited information on this airfield and non standard markings."
          },
          {
            "number": 2,
            "text": "PM (Pilot Monitoring) briefed taxi route per company page; via Delta and back-taxi to departure Runway 31. We were cleared by ATC to taxi via Alpha, Bravo. Upon signaling marshaller, we were directed onto Delta, the marshaller and a piece of equipment blocking a straight-out taxi. Prior to entering taxiway Delta I advised a left turn was necessary to enter taxiway Alpha \"Outer\" there being two taxi lines depicted on the airport chart. A turn was made and we followed taxiway Alpha \"Outer\" realizing, as we neared the curve in the taxiway that something was amiss. We stopped the aircraft, queried ATC, and were assured our taxi path was correct. Being situated behind the Captain (4th Observer) I did not have a good view of the taxiway ahead and to the right of the aircraft, however, I could see out the left window clearly. The Captain and I observed a wide swath of taxiway left of the aircraft, and the PM maneuvered accordingly. We joined taxiway Bravo at the runway end, and departed Runway 31. The non-standard markings, poor airfield and taxiway lighting, and operations of a military airfield were contributing factors. The marshaller put us on the wrong path initially by blocking a straight-out taxi. The two taxi \"lanes\" for taxiway Alpha are misleading. There is no Jepp AMM (Airport Moving Map) for RCA making Ownship position a guesstimate. It seemed once we made the turn that we were taxing on the \"Outer\" taxi lane for taxiway Alpha. ATC never stopped or queried us, and when we queried ATC we were given inaccurate information back. Additionally, we had observed a military aircraft take that path in advance of our departure, making it seem there were two, legitimate, taxi lines for taxiway Alpha. The company page could clarify the taxiway Alpha markings. Not being familiar with military airfields it looked as if there were two taxi lines for taxiway Alpha. Further, we could have pressed ATC for the suggested route of taxiway Delta with the back-taxi to the runway."
          }
        ],
        "synopsis": "Air carrier First Officers reported difficulty locating the correct taxiway to the runway at RCA airport. The pilots stated their EFB does not contain complete airport information, and cited poor taxiway lighting, initial confusing marshaller signals and inadequate help from ATC as additional contributing factors.",
        "aircraft": [
          "Commercial Fixed Wing"
        ],
        "flightPhase": [
          "Taxi"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1966915",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During my approach on the ILS X into ZZZ, I initiated a go-around just passed or around ZZZZZ FAF due to what I believe was a wind-shear downdraft. The ZZZ1 area was covered with moderate turbulence and thunderstorms were moving through the sector. Prior to the approach I briefed the PM on a possible wind-shear escape maneuver should the possibility arise. The ATIS was not reporting wind-shear and it seemed the other traffic ahead of us were getting into ZZZ just fine. We had just flown in on the ZZZZZ1 arrival with very strong moderate turbulence all the way in. As we were cleared for the approach I selected flaps and gear down on normal schedule and complied with the speed restrictions given to us by ATC. As we turned final I could see an ominous looking cloud that appeared to be moving across the path to the runway at the FAF ZZZZZ. In a break in the cloud I could visually see the runway lights off and on. I prepared for the possibility that the cloud would emanate some turbulence. As we passed through it on the backside of it I felt the airplane get rolled to the right and I felt the plane being pushed down. We did not receive any wind-shear warnings or cautions aurally. I counteracted as it was being forced down and then I felt the airspeed dropping rapidly. I felt as if a downdraft was causing us to be pushed down at an uncontrollable rate. At that point I knew we needed to apply power and climbout of it. I initiated a go-around thinking it was wind-shear pushing us down. I also heard a 'caution obstacle\" message. Initially, as I added power it seemed like we were not able to climb immediately. The go around was not perfect but we quickly became busy as I felt we had a terrain issue along with the wind shear. Then we cleared the wind shear and we started climbing rapidly and our speed quickly became very high and we were very close to our go around altitude of 2000 already. The PM informed the Tower that we were going around for wind shear in which they provided a heading and altitude of 2000. I knew we were about to blow through that altitude so I had him ask for a higher altitude. We over flew the altitude by around 300 ft. The Tower did not want to give us higher as they \"did not control that airspace\". Eventually we went over to Approach and they provided us 4000 ft. I received a high speed message during the event, as the flaps were still extended and in transition and sometime during all this I asked for the gear to be retracted and then flaps 2 which was out of order. I also called for FL 210 but the cockpit became very busy quickly and we did not get it set right away as the aural high speed message was going off along with trying to listen to ATC. I became concerned with the high speed and trying to comply with the ATC altitude. We eventually cleaned up the plane and reengaged automation. The event certainly shook both of us up; however after we had the aircraft under normal flying conditions we briefed the passengers of what happened, loaded another approach, and returned for a second and successful landing. I should have done better with my call outs and procedures. I should have at least called TOGA, and once clear of the shear: flaps 2, (positive rate) gear up, and FLCH 210. Adding the amount of power I did felt right as we seemed to be rolling and descending in the wrong direction and I felt we needed to climb immediately. However, I was also distracted trying to keep us from climbing too far above our target altitude and got behind on the recovery."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I do want to preface this account by saying my memory of the events is not very clear, and after the moment we began the go-around, the exact timing and what happened became a blur of events. I was PM on Aircraft X from ZZZ2 to ZZZ. We had started our day at XA:30pm and dealt with delays getting in to ZZZ2 due to thunderstorms. Both our flights from ZZZ to ZZZ2 and from ZZZ2 to ZZZ were filled with multiple areas of convective activity and associated turbulence. As we approached ZZZ, the field had some thunderstorms in the area but the latest ATIS was showing a good prognosis with winds dying down to something like 160 at 7 kts or so. Approach had vectored us around at 4,000 or so and the entire time at that altitude we were dealing with moderate turbulence. The Captain (CA) had to override the auto throttles during this time to keep the speed under control. I do recall the CA briefed the wind shear escape maneuver before we set up for the approach as well. Eventually we got vectored southwest and then set up on final for the ILS X. We were told to slow to 160 kts till ZZZZZ and cleared for the approach. Shortly before the FAF, the CA had given me the proper commands to fully configure the plane and we were stabilized at about 1,700 feet. I'm not really sure when the CA switched to green needles, or when the Autopilot (AP) was kicked off as the approach does require it (I believe it was right before we passed the FAF). As we neared ZZZZZ, we could see the runway and lights below several scattered cloud layers. There was an almost a U shaped thin cloud in front of us that rose a couple hundred feet on both sides of the aircraft. We passed right through the middle of this cloud and it was about this time that the approach completely fell apart. I recall seeing the speed start to bleed off pretty quickly, almost 10 kts past our speed. The CA responded by moving the throttles forward quite aggressively and the speed started to come back. However it felt like we were dropping aggressively and the plane had started a slight roll (10 degrees or so) to the right. I don't recall if this happened before or after the CA told me were going around; but we got an obstacle alert. The CA told me we were going around but didn't state the correct phrase (Go-Around, TOGA, Flaps 2). He did hit the TOGA button though and we began to get speed and altitude back. I remember trying to look at the EICAS and verify TOGA set but the screen was really dark and I couldn't verify it immediately. I do recall seeing something resembling \"obstacle proximity\" on my Primary Flight Display (PFD) in red, and I think we got 1 aural \"OBSTACLE\" alert, but the whole moment happened very quickly. I do remember that I eventually stated TOGA set after I was able to verify despite it being so dark. The last thing I remember about looking at the glide slope was that we were about a 1/2 to 3/4 dot low during the time the speed bled off abruptly. I was completely unsure as to what we were dealing with since we didn't get a single wind shear alert, and Tower had not told us about any wind shear reports. The glide slope alert never went off either. Either way the go around was done incorrectly. As the CA hit TOGA and I tried to verify TOGA set, we neglected to move flaps to position 2 right away. I recall telling Tower we were going around and they told us to climb to 2,000 feet and fly heading 040. I think I missed a call, but with the alerts going off, it was extremely hard to focus on one thing at a time. The Captain asked for FLCH 210 and it was really hard to verify the correct button in the dark cockpit but I think I hit it and had 210 dialed in. At this point, the airplane was rocketing upwards and the speed was the only thing I remember going up a lot. The Captain told me gear up and I didn't even think to verify the flaps were at 2 before doing that. As a result we had the landing gear aural alert going off. Then CA told me to bring flaps to 2 and I did. Around this time the airspeed had climbed significantly and the last number I remember was 240 and we started getting high speed (not sure if this was before or after flaps moved to 2). After I had verified the instructions from ATC, the CA told me we needed higher and I told ATC that. They told me they can't do that as they don't control that airspace. The CA also told me we needed to turn to the left to get out of whatever we were dealing with. I don't think I was able to pass that on as Tower was giving us a new frequency and asking if it was wind shear. We did blow through 2,000 and leveled at 2,200 I believe and then got cleared up to 3,000. Before switching I heard the Tower Controller tell the plane behind us that they were getting wind shear alerts for Runway X gain of 20 kts and another plane called up and said they gained 20 (not sure if it was arrival or departure). Eventually the CA called flaps up, and then said incrementally but I had mistakenly moved them up all the way. I then moved them back to position 1 and then up. Either way it was clear we had over-sped them. We cleaned up, switched over to Approach and got vectored around. We then shot the second attempt on the same approach with no issue. Once we landed the CA called Maintenance to inform them of the over speed event and write up the plane which had finished for the night. Overall we were completely caught off guard by this event as it was not expected and the weather conditions had been improving in the area as well. Both me and the CA were pretty shaken up by the event as the obstacle alert is something that neither of us ever expected to see, even with a wind shear event. It is also important to note that I don't believe ATC ever gave us a warning or talking to for exceeding our altitude of 2,000 feet on the go-around. While it's hard to remember the correct details, I think we responded appropriately by a go-around. However we should have done a wind shear escape procedure even though it was never annunciation. Secondly, even though we elected to do a go-around, we didn't use the correct callouts and as a result of that, ATC calls during the event, the obstacle alert, and other distractions; we caused the flap over speed. The go-around was also abnormal to me since we weren't below 1,000 feet and were pretty limited with the altitude available to climb. I think better CRM would have resulted in a correct go-around procedure or wind shear escape procedure as the whole event could be characterized with \"tunnel vision\" on my part as well. I also should have the corrected the Captain from the moment we elected to go-around by taking control of the situation and configuring the airplane even if the Captain was distracted and didn't verbally tell me. ATC didn't help the situation as they did not immediately clear us to 3,000 feet and I was concerned with the 200 feet above assigned altitude that we had deviated from. This distracted me as well with helping to configure the aircraft. Overall, my lack of following the SOP in regards to callouts and actions exaggerated an already difficult situation."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring my approach on the ILS X into ZZZ, I initiated a go-around just passed or around ZZZZZ FAF due to what I believe was a wind-shear downdraft. The ZZZ1 area was covered with moderate turbulence and thunderstorms were moving through the sector. Prior to the approach I briefed the PM on a possible wind-shear escape maneuver should the possibility arise. The ATIS was not reporting wind-shear and it seemed the other traffic ahead of us were getting into ZZZ just fine. We had just flown in on the ZZZZZ1 arrival with very strong moderate turbulence all the way in. As we were cleared for the approach I selected flaps and gear down on normal schedule and complied with the speed restrictions given to us by ATC. As we turned final I could see an ominous looking cloud that appeared to be moving across the path to the runway at the FAF ZZZZZ. In a break in the cloud I could visually see the runway lights off and on. I prepared for the possibility that the cloud would emanate some turbulence. As we passed through it on the backside of it I felt the airplane get rolled to the right and I felt the plane being pushed down. We did not receive any wind-shear warnings or cautions aurally. I counteracted as it was being forced down and then I felt the airspeed dropping rapidly. I felt as if a downdraft was causing us to be pushed down at an uncontrollable rate. At that point I knew we needed to apply power and climbout of it. I initiated a go-around thinking it was wind-shear pushing us down. I also heard a 'caution obstacle\" message. Initially, as I added power it seemed like we were not able to climb immediately. The go around was not perfect but we quickly became busy as I felt we had a terrain issue along with the wind shear. Then we cleared the wind shear and we started climbing rapidly and our speed quickly became very high and we were very close to our go around altitude of 2000 already. The PM informed the Tower that we were going around for wind shear in which they provided a heading and altitude of 2000. I knew we were about to blow through that altitude so I had him ask for a higher altitude. We over flew the altitude by around 300 ft. The Tower did not want to give us higher as they \"did not control that airspace\". Eventually we went over to Approach and they provided us 4000 ft. I received a high speed message during the event, as the flaps were still extended and in transition and sometime during all this I asked for the gear to be retracted and then flaps 2 which was out of order. I also called for FL 210 but the cockpit became very busy quickly and we did not get it set right away as the aural high speed message was going off along with trying to listen to ATC. I became concerned with the high speed and trying to comply with the ATC altitude. We eventually cleaned up the plane and reengaged automation. The event certainly shook both of us up; however after we had the aircraft under normal flying conditions we briefed the passengers of what happened, loaded another approach, and returned for a second and successful landing. I should have done better with my call outs and procedures. I should have at least called TOGA, and once clear of the shear: flaps 2, (positive rate) gear up, and FLCH 210. Adding the amount of power I did felt right as we seemed to be rolling and descending in the wrong direction and I felt we needed to climb immediately. However, I was also distracted trying to keep us from climbing too far above our target altitude and got behind on the recovery.\n\nNarrative 2\nI do want to preface this account by saying my memory of the events is not very clear, and after the moment we began the go-around, the exact timing and what happened became a blur of events. I was PM on Aircraft X from ZZZ2 to ZZZ. We had started our day at XA:30pm and dealt with delays getting in to ZZZ2 due to thunderstorms. Both our flights from ZZZ to ZZZ2 and from ZZZ2 to ZZZ were filled with multiple areas of convective activity and associated turbulence. As we approached ZZZ, the field had some thunderstorms in the area but the latest ATIS was showing a good prognosis with winds dying down to something like 160 at 7 kts or so. Approach had vectored us around at 4,000 or so and the entire time at that altitude we were dealing with moderate turbulence. The Captain (CA) had to override the auto throttles during this time to keep the speed under control. I do recall the CA briefed the wind shear escape maneuver before we set up for the approach as well. Eventually we got vectored southwest and then set up on final for the ILS X. We were told to slow to 160 kts till ZZZZZ and cleared for the approach. Shortly before the FAF, the CA had given me the proper commands to fully configure the plane and we were stabilized at about 1,700 feet. I'm not really sure when the CA switched to green needles, or when the Autopilot (AP) was kicked off as the approach does require it (I believe it was right before we passed the FAF). As we neared ZZZZZ, we could see the runway and lights below several scattered cloud layers. There was an almost a U shaped thin cloud in front of us that rose a couple hundred feet on both sides of the aircraft. We passed right through the middle of this cloud and it was about this time that the approach completely fell apart. I recall seeing the speed start to bleed off pretty quickly, almost 10 kts past our speed. The CA responded by moving the throttles forward quite aggressively and the speed started to come back. However it felt like we were dropping aggressively and the plane had started a slight roll (10 degrees or so) to the right. I don't recall if this happened before or after the CA told me were going around; but we got an obstacle alert. The CA told me we were going around but didn't state the correct phrase (Go-Around, TOGA, Flaps 2). He did hit the TOGA button though and we began to get speed and altitude back. I remember trying to look at the EICAS and verify TOGA set but the screen was really dark and I couldn't verify it immediately. I do recall seeing something resembling \"obstacle proximity\" on my Primary Flight Display (PFD) in red, and I think we got 1 aural \"OBSTACLE\" alert, but the whole moment happened very quickly. I do remember that I eventually stated TOGA set after I was able to verify despite it being so dark. The last thing I remember about looking at the glide slope was that we were about a 1/2 to 3/4 dot low during the time the speed bled off abruptly. I was completely unsure as to what we were dealing with since we didn't get a single wind shear alert, and Tower had not told us about any wind shear reports. The glide slope alert never went off either. Either way the go around was done incorrectly. As the CA hit TOGA and I tried to verify TOGA set, we neglected to move flaps to position 2 right away. I recall telling Tower we were going around and they told us to climb to 2,000 feet and fly heading 040. I think I missed a call, but with the alerts going off, it was extremely hard to focus on one thing at a time. The Captain asked for FLCH 210 and it was really hard to verify the correct button in the dark cockpit but I think I hit it and had 210 dialed in. At this point, the airplane was rocketing upwards and the speed was the only thing I remember going up a lot. The Captain told me gear up and I didn't even think to verify the flaps were at 2 before doing that. As a result we had the landing gear aural alert going off. Then CA told me to bring flaps to 2 and I did. Around this time the airspeed had climbed significantly and the last number I remember was 240 and we started getting high speed (not sure if this was before or after flaps moved to 2). After I had verified the instructions from ATC, the CA told me we needed higher and I told ATC that. They told me they can't do that as they don't control that airspace. The CA also told me we needed to turn to the left to get out of whatever we were dealing with. I don't think I was able to pass that on as Tower was giving us a new frequency and asking if it was wind shear. We did blow through 2,000 and leveled at 2,200 I believe and then got cleared up to 3,000. Before switching I heard the Tower Controller tell the plane behind us that they were getting wind shear alerts for Runway X gain of 20 kts and another plane called up and said they gained 20 (not sure if it was arrival or departure). Eventually the CA called flaps up, and then said incrementally but I had mistakenly moved them up all the way. I then moved them back to position 1 and then up. Either way it was clear we had over-sped them. We cleaned up, switched over to Approach and got vectored around. We then shot the second attempt on the same approach with no issue. Once we landed the CA called Maintenance to inform them of the over speed event and write up the plane which had finished for the night. Overall we were completely caught off guard by this event as it was not expected and the weather conditions had been improving in the area as well. Both me and the CA were pretty shaken up by the event as the obstacle alert is something that neither of us ever expected to see, even with a wind shear event. It is also important to note that I don't believe ATC ever gave us a warning or talking to for exceeding our altitude of 2,000 feet on the go-around. While it's hard to remember the correct details, I think we responded appropriately by a go-around. However we should have done a wind shear escape procedure even though it was never annunciation. Secondly, even though we elected to do a go-around, we didn't use the correct callouts and as a result of that, ATC calls during the event, the obstacle alert, and other distractions; we caused the flap over speed. The go-around was also abnormal to me since we weren't below 1,000 feet and were pretty limited with the altitude available to climb. I think better CRM would have resulted in a correct go-around procedure or wind shear escape procedure as the whole event could be characterized with \"tunnel vision\" on my part as well. I also should have the corrected the Captain from the moment we elected to go-around by taking control of the situation and configuring the airplane even if the Captain was distracted and didn't verbally tell me. ATC didn't help the situation as they did not immediately clear us to 3,000 feet and I was concerned with the 200 feet above assigned altitude that we had deviated from. This distracted me as well with helping to configure the aircraft. Overall, my lack of following the SOP in regards to callouts and actions exaggerated an already difficult situation.",
    "synopsis": "EMB-170 Flight Crew reported a wind shear event during final approach in turbulent conditions. The Flight Crew executed a successful wind shear recovery procedure which caused momentary airspeed and altitude deviations.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=83",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 83,
      "pageEnd": 86,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=83",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 83,
        "pageEnd": 86,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1966915 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "EMB-170 Flight Crew reported a wind shear event during final approach in turbulent conditions. The Flight Crew executed a successful wind shear recovery procedure which caused momentary airspeed and altitude deviations.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1964518",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700",
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were taxiing west via [Taxiway] XX to [Runway] XXL during early morning - probably some early morning tiredness - in complete darkness following Aircraft Y. We switched to Tower after [Taxiway] XY and assumed - expectation bias - that Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were the only two aircraft on frequency. Airport was not very busy. Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff and as they powered up we were told to \"line up and wait, Runway XXL.\" We completed the before-takeoff checklist and as we turned south on [Taxiway] XZ to cross [the Runway] XXL hold-short line - I was FO (First Officer) - I said, \"Final's Clear.\" However, we did note and talk about that there was an aircraft on final. We assumed - incorrectly, expectation bias - that this aircraft was on approach to [Runway] XXR. I assumed this, since we never heard Tower say something to the effect of, \"Aircraft X, Aircraft Y on five-mile final.\" I'm also unsure if there were any transmissions between Tower and Aircraft Y that we heard, until we were taking the runway. Lastly, if I remember correctly, ATIS was reporting [Runway] XXL departures and [Runway] XXR arrivals - not that this means that an aircraft couldn't land on [Runway] XXL, but it added to expectation bias. As we continued south on [Taxiway] XZ the lights appeared to be trending toward our runway. At the point we started to question if this aircraft was landing on our runway, we heard Aircraft Y transmit, \"OK Tower, what do you want us to do?\" Tower then stated, \"Aircraft X, continue across to exit runway... Aircraft Y, go around.\" At this point, Aircraft Y was probably on a one-mile final. I don't recall exactly the amount of time that elapsed between us clearing onto [Taxiway] XA. However, it seemed to be about six to nine seconds. I could see the large Aircraft Y go around at about 100 ft. above where we just were. I think that we should have stopped the aircraft and asked Tower to clarify if the aircraft on final was landing on [Runway] XXR or XXL. Due to darkness and the fact that I don't normally fly at night nor do I get the sight picture of taking the runway with an aircraft landing on that same runway, it is difficult to visually confirm if they were landing on [Runway] XXL or XXR. Stopping the aircraft would also give us more time for this situation to play out and to communicate. It was just a compressed timeline and our brains could not take it all in during that short period. We never saw or realized the lights of Aircraft Y, until we were approaching the hold-short lines and by then it was taking us by surprise. We did not realize any aircraft was on final until that point. On the ATC side, I would like to understand their procedures. After some research, I am curious if Tower is allowed to issue line up and wait, LUAW, clearances during night and periods of low visibility. Additionally, I thought if they instructed an aircraft to LUAW, they had to add, \"...aircraft on XX-mile final..\" I never heard if Tower - we were not on frequency yet - issued Aircraft Y a \"continue\" or a \"cleared to land\" clearance. I'd be curious to get those transcripts. I'm also wondering if any air/ground/runway collision avoidance systems in the Tower were activated? Or was the Aircraft Y crew the last link in the chain that prevented this? Was there another controller in the Tower that saw this happening? Why did they issue us a LUAW with an aircraft on such short final for the same runway? Why did we even need to LUAW - there were no delays or backups? Did Aircraft Y sidestep? I have noticed an increase in new controllers - was this a new controller? Maybe they lost situational awareness on how far from landing Aircraft Y was. I really have more questions, since this could have turned out disastrous and my guess is this isn't the first time it has happened. My trust in ATC was somewhat high for Tower controllers. I've heard plenty of new Ground controllers struggling lately, but I assumed the Tower controllers were on a higher level for a place like ZZZ. This has really opened my eyes to how the next aviation accident may play out and serves as significant lesson learned for me."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were cleared for \"line up and wait\" on [Runway] XXL with an aircraft on about a two- mile final for the same runway. When given the clearance, we both acknowledged the runway and noted the aircraft on final. Due to the dark and angle of the aircraft, we thought he was lined up on [Runway] XXL. Aircraft Y queried Tower as to what they wanted him to do. At that point Tower realized they put us in position incorrectly and asked us to expedite across the runway. When we got on the runway we also recognized the mistake. I tried to expedite across but the engines were at idle thrust and did not spool up in time. Tower sent Aircraft Y around when they were about 1/2 mile out. Suggestion: Better communication and coordination between Approach and Tower when landing aircraft on [Runway] XXL during an early morning push."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were taxiing west via [Taxiway] XX to [Runway] XXL during early morning - probably some early morning tiredness - in complete darkness following Aircraft Y. We switched to Tower after [Taxiway] XY and assumed - expectation bias - that Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were the only two aircraft on frequency. Airport was not very busy. Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff and as they powered up we were told to \"line up and wait, Runway XXL.\" We completed the before-takeoff checklist and as we turned south on [Taxiway] XZ to cross [the Runway] XXL hold-short line - I was FO (First Officer) - I said, \"Final's Clear.\" However, we did note and talk about that there was an aircraft on final. We assumed - incorrectly, expectation bias - that this aircraft was on approach to [Runway] XXR. I assumed this, since we never heard Tower say something to the effect of, \"Aircraft X, Aircraft Y on five-mile final.\" I'm also unsure if there were any transmissions between Tower and Aircraft Y that we heard, until we were taking the runway. Lastly, if I remember correctly, ATIS was reporting [Runway] XXL departures and [Runway] XXR arrivals - not that this means that an aircraft couldn't land on [Runway] XXL, but it added to expectation bias. As we continued south on [Taxiway] XZ the lights appeared to be trending toward our runway. At the point we started to question if this aircraft was landing on our runway, we heard Aircraft Y transmit, \"OK Tower, what do you want us to do?\" Tower then stated, \"Aircraft X, continue across to exit runway... Aircraft Y, go around.\" At this point, Aircraft Y was probably on a one-mile final. I don't recall exactly the amount of time that elapsed between us clearing onto [Taxiway] XA. However, it seemed to be about six to nine seconds. I could see the large Aircraft Y go around at about 100 ft. above where we just were. I think that we should have stopped the aircraft and asked Tower to clarify if the aircraft on final was landing on [Runway] XXR or XXL. Due to darkness and the fact that I don't normally fly at night nor do I get the sight picture of taking the runway with an aircraft landing on that same runway, it is difficult to visually confirm if they were landing on [Runway] XXL or XXR. Stopping the aircraft would also give us more time for this situation to play out and to communicate. It was just a compressed timeline and our brains could not take it all in during that short period. We never saw or realized the lights of Aircraft Y, until we were approaching the hold-short lines and by then it was taking us by surprise. We did not realize any aircraft was on final until that point. On the ATC side, I would like to understand their procedures. After some research, I am curious if Tower is allowed to issue line up and wait, LUAW, clearances during night and periods of low visibility. Additionally, I thought if they instructed an aircraft to LUAW, they had to add, \"...aircraft on XX-mile final..\" I never heard if Tower - we were not on frequency yet - issued Aircraft Y a \"continue\" or a \"cleared to land\" clearance. I'd be curious to get those transcripts. I'm also wondering if any air/ground/runway collision avoidance systems in the Tower were activated? Or was the Aircraft Y crew the last link in the chain that prevented this? Was there another controller in the Tower that saw this happening? Why did they issue us a LUAW with an aircraft on such short final for the same runway? Why did we even need to LUAW - there were no delays or backups? Did Aircraft Y sidestep? I have noticed an increase in new controllers - was this a new controller? Maybe they lost situational awareness on how far from landing Aircraft Y was. I really have more questions, since this could have turned out disastrous and my guess is this isn't the first time it has happened. My trust in ATC was somewhat high for Tower controllers. I've heard plenty of new Ground controllers struggling lately, but I assumed the Tower controllers were on a higher level for a place like ZZZ. This has really opened my eyes to how the next aviation accident may play out and serves as significant lesson learned for me.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were cleared for \"line up and wait\" on [Runway] XXL with an aircraft on about a two- mile final for the same runway. When given the clearance, we both acknowledged the runway and noted the aircraft on final. Due to the dark and angle of the aircraft, we thought he was lined up on [Runway] XXL. Aircraft Y queried Tower as to what they wanted him to do. At that point Tower realized they put us in position incorrectly and asked us to expedite across the runway. When we got on the runway we also recognized the mistake. I tried to expedite across but the engines were at idle thrust and did not spool up in time. Tower sent Aircraft Y around when they were about 1/2 mile out. Suggestion: Better communication and coordination between Approach and Tower when landing aircraft on [Runway] XXL during an early morning push.",
    "synopsis": "B737-700 flight crew reported being issued a line up and wait clearance from the Tower Controller while another air carrier was on short final for the same runway. The flight crew continued across the runway per ATC instructions and the other air carrier executed a go- around.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=87",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
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      "pageEnd": 89,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
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      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized.",
      "notes": "This accession has differing narrative text in another source collection. The first collection in the documented import order is displayed; all versions are preserved in the downloadable dataset and linked source PDFs."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=87",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 87,
        "pageEnd": 89,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized.",
        "notes": "This accession has differing narrative text in another source collection. The first collection in the documented import order is displayed; all versions are preserved in the downloadable dataset and linked source PDFs."
      },
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=113",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 113,
        "pageEnd": 115,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1964518 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B737-700 flight crew reported being issued a line up and wait clearance from the Tower Controller while another air carrier was on short final for the same runway. The flight crew continued across the runway per ATC instructions and the other air carrier executed a go- around.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue",
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    },
    "sourceVariants": [
      {
        "source": {
          "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=113",
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          "pageEnd": 115,
          "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
          "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
          "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
          "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
        },
        "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were taxiing west via [Taxiway] XX to [Runway] XXL during early morning ““ probably some early morning tiredness ““ in complete darkness following Aircraft Y. We switched to Tower after [Taxiway] XY and assumed ““ expectation bias ““ that Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were the only two aircraft on frequency. Airport was not very busy. Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff and as they powered up we were told to \"line up and wait, Runway XXL.\" We completed the before-takeoff checklist and as we turned south on [Taxiway] XZ to cross [the Runway] XXL hold-short line ““ I was FO (First Officer) ““ I said, \"Final's Clear.\" However, we did note and talk about that there was an aircraft on final. We assumed ““ incorrectly, expectation bias ““ that this aircraft was on approach to [Runway] XXR. I assumed this, since we never heard Tower say something to the effect of, \"Aircraft X, Aircraft Y on five-mile final.\" I'm also unsure if there were any transmissions between Tower and Aircraft Y that we heard, until we were taking the runway. Lastly, if I remember correctly, ATIS was reporting [Runway] XXL departures and [Runway] XXR arrivals ““ not that this means that an aircraft couldn't land on [Runway] XXL, but it added to expectation bias. As we continued south on [Taxiway] XZ the lights appeared to be trending toward our runway. At the point we started to question if this aircraft was landing on our runway, we heard Aircraft Y transmit, \"OK Tower, what do you want us to do?\" Tower then stated, \"Aircraft X, continue across to exit runway... Aircraft Y, go around.\" At this point, Aircraft Y was probably on a one-mile final. I don't recall exactly the amount of time that elapsed between us clearing onto [Taxiway] XA. However, it seemed to be about six to nine seconds. I could see the large Aircraft Y go around at about 100 ft. above where we just were. I think that we should have stopped the aircraft and asked Tower to clarify if the aircraft on final was landing on [Runway] XXR or XXL. Due to darkness and the fact that I don't normally fly at night nor do I get the sight picture of taking the runway with an aircraft landing on that same runway, it is difficult to visually confirm if they were landing on [Runway] XXL or XXR. Stopping the aircraft would also give us more time for this situation to play out and to communicate. It was just a compressed timeline and our brains could not take it all in during that short period. We never saw or realized the lights of Aircraft Y, until we were approaching the hold-short lines and by then it was taking us by surprise. We did not realize any aircraft was on final until that point. On the ATC side, I would like to understand their procedures. After some research, I am curious if Tower is allowed to issue line up and wait, LUAW, clearances during night and periods of low visibility. Additionally, I thought if they instructed an aircraft to LUAW, they had to add, \"...aircraft on XX-mile final..\" I never heard if Tower ““ we were not on frequency yet ““ issued Aircraft Y a \"continue\" or a \"cleared to land\" clearance. I'd be curious to get those transcripts. I'm also wondering if any air/ground/runway collision avoidance systems in the Tower were activated? Or was the Aircraft Y crew the last link in the chain that prevented this? Was there another controller in the Tower that saw this happening? Why did they issue us a LUAW with an aircraft on such short final for the same runway? Why did we even need to LUAW ““ there were no delays or backups? Did Aircraft Y sidestep? I have noticed an increase in new controllers - was this a new controller? Maybe they lost situational awareness on how far from landing Aircraft Y was. I really have more questions, since this could have turned out disastrous and my guess is this isn't the first time it has happened. My trust in ATC was somewhat high for Tower controllers. I've heard plenty of new Ground controllers struggling lately, but I assumed the Tower controllers were on a higher level for a place like ZZZ. This has really opened my eyes to how the next aviation accident may play out and serves as significant lesson learned for me.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were cleared for \"line up and wait\" on [Runway] XXL with an aircraft on about a two- mile final for the same runway. When given the clearance, we both acknowledged the runway and noted the aircraft on final. Due to the dark and angle of the aircraft, we thought he was lined up on [Runway] XXL. Aircraft Y queried Tower as to what they wanted him to do. At that point Tower realized they put us in position incorrectly and asked us to expedite across the runway. When we got on the runway we also recognized the mistake. I tried to expedite across but the engines were at idle thrust and did not spool up in time. Tower sent Aircraft Y around when they were about 1/2 mile out. Suggestion: Better communication and coordination between Approach and Tower when landing aircraft on [Runway] XXL during an early morning push.",
        "narratives": [
          {
            "number": 1,
            "text": "We were taxiing west via [Taxiway] XX to [Runway] XXL during early morning ““ probably some early morning tiredness ““ in complete darkness following Aircraft Y. We switched to Tower after [Taxiway] XY and assumed ““ expectation bias ““ that Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were the only two aircraft on frequency. Airport was not very busy. Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff and as they powered up we were told to \"line up and wait, Runway XXL.\" We completed the before-takeoff checklist and as we turned south on [Taxiway] XZ to cross [the Runway] XXL hold-short line ““ I was FO (First Officer) ““ I said, \"Final's Clear.\" However, we did note and talk about that there was an aircraft on final. We assumed ““ incorrectly, expectation bias ““ that this aircraft was on approach to [Runway] XXR. I assumed this, since we never heard Tower say something to the effect of, \"Aircraft X, Aircraft Y on five-mile final.\" I'm also unsure if there were any transmissions between Tower and Aircraft Y that we heard, until we were taking the runway. Lastly, if I remember correctly, ATIS was reporting [Runway] XXL departures and [Runway] XXR arrivals ““ not that this means that an aircraft couldn't land on [Runway] XXL, but it added to expectation bias. As we continued south on [Taxiway] XZ the lights appeared to be trending toward our runway. At the point we started to question if this aircraft was landing on our runway, we heard Aircraft Y transmit, \"OK Tower, what do you want us to do?\" Tower then stated, \"Aircraft X, continue across to exit runway... Aircraft Y, go around.\" At this point, Aircraft Y was probably on a one-mile final. I don't recall exactly the amount of time that elapsed between us clearing onto [Taxiway] XA. However, it seemed to be about six to nine seconds. I could see the large Aircraft Y go around at about 100 ft. above where we just were. I think that we should have stopped the aircraft and asked Tower to clarify if the aircraft on final was landing on [Runway] XXR or XXL. Due to darkness and the fact that I don't normally fly at night nor do I get the sight picture of taking the runway with an aircraft landing on that same runway, it is difficult to visually confirm if they were landing on [Runway] XXL or XXR. Stopping the aircraft would also give us more time for this situation to play out and to communicate. It was just a compressed timeline and our brains could not take it all in during that short period. We never saw or realized the lights of Aircraft Y, until we were approaching the hold-short lines and by then it was taking us by surprise. We did not realize any aircraft was on final until that point. On the ATC side, I would like to understand their procedures. After some research, I am curious if Tower is allowed to issue line up and wait, LUAW, clearances during night and periods of low visibility. Additionally, I thought if they instructed an aircraft to LUAW, they had to add, \"...aircraft on XX-mile final..\" I never heard if Tower ““ we were not on frequency yet ““ issued Aircraft Y a \"continue\" or a \"cleared to land\" clearance. I'd be curious to get those transcripts. I'm also wondering if any air/ground/runway collision avoidance systems in the Tower were activated? Or was the Aircraft Y crew the last link in the chain that prevented this? Was there another controller in the Tower that saw this happening? Why did they issue us a LUAW with an aircraft on such short final for the same runway? Why did we even need to LUAW ““ there were no delays or backups? Did Aircraft Y sidestep? I have noticed an increase in new controllers - was this a new controller? Maybe they lost situational awareness on how far from landing Aircraft Y was. I really have more questions, since this could have turned out disastrous and my guess is this isn't the first time it has happened. My trust in ATC was somewhat high for Tower controllers. I've heard plenty of new Ground controllers struggling lately, but I assumed the Tower controllers were on a higher level for a place like ZZZ. This has really opened my eyes to how the next aviation accident may play out and serves as significant lesson learned for me."
          },
          {
            "number": 2,
            "text": "We were cleared for \"line up and wait\" on [Runway] XXL with an aircraft on about a two- mile final for the same runway. When given the clearance, we both acknowledged the runway and noted the aircraft on final. Due to the dark and angle of the aircraft, we thought he was lined up on [Runway] XXL. Aircraft Y queried Tower as to what they wanted him to do. At that point Tower realized they put us in position incorrectly and asked us to expedite across the runway. When we got on the runway we also recognized the mistake. I tried to expedite across but the engines were at idle thrust and did not spool up in time. Tower sent Aircraft Y around when they were about 1/2 mile out. Suggestion: Better communication and coordination between Approach and Tower when landing aircraft on [Runway] XXL during an early morning push."
          }
        ],
        "synopsis": "B737-700 flight crew reported being issued a line up and wait clearance from the Tower Controller while another air carrier was on short final for the same runway. The flight crew continued across the runway per ATC instructions and the other air carrier executed a go- around.",
        "aircraft": [
          "B737-700",
          "Commercial Fixed Wing"
        ],
        "flightPhase": [
          "Taxi",
          "Landing"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1960483",
    "date": "2022-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Heavy Transport, Low Wing, 4 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Commenced approach during near blizzard conditions to ILSXXL. Winds gusting up to 36 kts. Reduced visibility due to blowing snow and low ceilings. Wind direction varying continually from west to north west. Steady wind and gusts varying continually. Runways suddenly opening and then closing. Runway surface conditions being reported as RCC, and or braking action, often times, in conflict with each other (for example, RCC of 4 combined with a braking action of medium, which actually equals an RCC of 3 according to our QRH). We had the required weather to commence the approach; however, we were near the cross wind limit of the aircraft due to RCC conditions. While on final approach, we were again receiving conflicting RCC, versus braking action reports for our runway, along with changing wind direction and gusting speeds. My First Officer and I became inadvertently distracted with the new winds, gusts, RCC, and braking action reports, as we were on the borderline of aircraft limitations. We determined the meteorological conditions exceeded aircraft limitations and needed to go missed approach. Subsequently during the distractions, we inadvertently were not fully configured with landing checklist complete by 1,000 ft. While executing a missed approach we simultaneously heard a momentary proximity alert. In hindsight, I as the Captain, should have not allowed myself, or my First Officer to become inadvertently distracted with the multiple inputs of varying information and changing weather conditions, and just discontinued the approach earlier. In hindsight, also, contributing factors were cumulative fatigue from an extended duty day. By the time this all occurred, we had already flown approximately over 8 hours and 13 duty hours , as a 2 pilot crew, from maintenance and weather delays."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Arriving in ZZZ we were cleared for ILS XXL. Winds were shifting from W to NW at 23 kts. and gusting up to 38 kts. When we began the approach the winds and RCC were within the aircraft limitations. On final approach the winds shifted and the Captain and I began calculating if we were still within aircraft limitations. We determined that the winds and RCC shifted to the degree that they were outside of the aircraft limitations and we decided to go around below 1,000 ft. AGL. However, because we were task saturated we inadvertently were unable to maintain a stable approach (not in the landing configuration with the landing checklist completed.) Accordingly, the decision to go around was made. We had a long duty day and had flown over 8 hours at the time and 13 hours. We had a maintenance delay in ZZZ1 as well as weather delays. These were all factors contributing to this incident. Next time a situation like this presents itself an earlier decision would be appropriate as opposed what had occurred."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nCommenced approach during near blizzard conditions to ILSXXL. Winds gusting up to 36 kts. Reduced visibility due to blowing snow and low ceilings. Wind direction varying continually from west to north west. Steady wind and gusts varying continually. Runways suddenly opening and then closing. Runway surface conditions being reported as RCC, and or braking action, often times, in conflict with each other (for example, RCC of 4 combined with a braking action of medium, which actually equals an RCC of 3 according to our QRH). We had the required weather to commence the approach; however, we were near the cross wind limit of the aircraft due to RCC conditions. While on final approach, we were again receiving conflicting RCC, versus braking action reports for our runway, along with changing wind direction and gusting speeds. My First Officer and I became inadvertently distracted with the new winds, gusts, RCC, and braking action reports, as we were on the borderline of aircraft limitations. We determined the meteorological conditions exceeded aircraft limitations and needed to go missed approach. Subsequently during the distractions, we inadvertently were not fully configured with landing checklist complete by 1,000 ft. While executing a missed approach we simultaneously heard a momentary proximity alert. In hindsight, I as the Captain, should have not allowed myself, or my First Officer to become inadvertently distracted with the multiple inputs of varying information and changing weather conditions, and just discontinued the approach earlier. In hindsight, also, contributing factors were cumulative fatigue from an extended duty day. By the time this all occurred, we had already flown approximately over 8 hours and 13 duty hours , as a 2 pilot crew, from maintenance and weather delays.\n\nNarrative 2\nArriving in ZZZ we were cleared for ILS XXL. Winds were shifting from W to NW at 23 kts. and gusting up to 38 kts. When we began the approach the winds and RCC were within the aircraft limitations. On final approach the winds shifted and the Captain and I began calculating if we were still within aircraft limitations. We determined that the winds and RCC shifted to the degree that they were outside of the aircraft limitations and we decided to go around below 1,000 ft. AGL. However, because we were task saturated we inadvertently were unable to maintain a stable approach (not in the landing configuration with the landing checklist completed.) Accordingly, the decision to go around was made. We had a long duty day and had flown over 8 hours at the time and 13 hours. We had a maintenance delay in ZZZ1 as well as weather delays. These were all factors contributing to this incident. Next time a situation like this presents itself an earlier decision would be appropriate as opposed what had occurred.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier flight crew reported an unstable approach accompanied by a terrain proximity alert during the missed approach. The pilots reported distractions, fatigue and poor weather as contributing to the event.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=90",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 90,
      "pageEnd": 92,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=90",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 90,
        "pageEnd": 92,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1960483 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air Carrier flight crew reported an unstable approach accompanied by a terrain proximity alert during the missed approach. The pilots reported distractions, fatigue and poor weather as contributing to the event.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1956915",
    "date": "2022-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "A320"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) 40 miles from ZZZZ at 20000 ft. Asked ATC for lower. Cleared to descend to 4,000 ft. and cleared for the VOR DME 1 Runway XX approach. We were at 16,000 ft. and approximately 10 miles from the VOR when I suggested gear down. Gear selected down at approximately 14,000 ft. and 240 kts. Managed descent to 1,600 ft. and armed the approach. Prior to making procedure turn inbound at 5,000 ft., I asked Approach for present heading for two miles. \"Cleared as requested\". FO (First Officer) selected heading but 1,600 ft. remained in FCU with V/S defaulted at 2,700 ft. per min. Speed was selected to 200 kts. I suggested turning left direct ZZZZ when it was obvious we were no longer high on the approach. I called out low altitude at approximately 2,200 ft. and asked PF (Pilot Flying) to climb back up to 2,500 ft. We received a \"TERRAIN AHEAD\" warning when we were close to 1,600 ft. Day Visual conditions and cleared for the visual at this point. Could see terrain at all times. Climbed back above 2,000 ft. and commenced approach. Stable and configured by 1,000 ft. We were kept very high by ATC. Bad descent planning and bad descent technique. First flight for the CA (Captain) for several months due to check pilot duties in the simulator. FO tired from early wake up call, and still new to Company. Ask ATC for lower sooner. Prepare and brief for slam dunk. Communicate better between pilots. Use better techniques for descending fast."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) 40 miles from ZZZZ at 20000 ft. Asked ATC for lower. Cleared to descend to 4,000 ft. and cleared for the VOR DME 1 Runway XX approach. We were at 16,000 ft. and approximately 10 miles from the VOR when I suggested gear down. Gear selected down at approximately 14,000 ft. and 240 kts. Managed descent to 1,600 ft. and armed the approach. Prior to making procedure turn inbound at 5,000 ft., I asked Approach for present heading for two miles. \"Cleared as requested\". FO (First Officer) selected heading but 1,600 ft. remained in FCU with V/S defaulted at 2,700 ft. per min. Speed was selected to 200 kts. I suggested turning left direct ZZZZ when it was obvious we were no longer high on the approach. I called out low altitude at approximately 2,200 ft. and asked PF (Pilot Flying) to climb back up to 2,500 ft. We received a \"TERRAIN AHEAD\" warning when we were close to 1,600 ft. Day Visual conditions and cleared for the visual at this point. Could see terrain at all times. Climbed back above 2,000 ft. and commenced approach. Stable and configured by 1,000 ft. We were kept very high by ATC. Bad descent planning and bad descent technique. First flight for the CA (Captain) for several months due to check pilot duties in the simulator. FO tired from early wake up call, and still new to Company. Ask ATC for lower sooner. Prepare and brief for slam dunk. Communicate better between pilots. Use better techniques for descending fast.",
    "synopsis": "An Air Carrier Captain reported while descending on an approach they received a Ground Proximity Warning and climbed back to the appropriate altitude.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=93",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 93,
      "pageEnd": 94,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=93",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 93,
        "pageEnd": 94,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "High approach becomes a low-altitude terrain warning",
    "summary": "After starting an approach high, an A320 crew continued a rapid descent and received a terrain warning. The crew climbed and resumed the approach; the captain described poor descent planning, a need for better communication, limited recent line flying, and a tired first officer.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Procedures",
      "Communication",
      "Fatigue"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1949576",
    "date": "2022-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On LDA Z Runway XX into ZZZ, we followed procedure down to minimums. Pilot Flying (PF) was set to appropriate Ground Based NAV source, Pilot Monitoring (PM) was set to appropriate Magenta NAV source. At 0.3 NM from FAF, FPA mode was selected per procedure. As we descended, PF noticed we were off course slightly (on Autopilot). PF decided to disengage autopilot to track course accurately as ZZZ is a busy airport with tight restrictions. PM task saturation increased and did not notice altitude selector was not set to missed approach altitude when visual was attained. Airplane Flight Director disengaged for cause unknown at the time which increased workload and scan on both pilots. The momentary distraction allowed us to descend more rapidly than desired toward the airport environment and we received a GPWS alert approaching obstacles in the city. Crew noted the alert, saw the obstacles and corrected with power and pitch changes back to stable flight. Tower noted altitude alert to which we replied correcting. Landed without further incident. Cause - PF was newer on the airplane and we had to fly a procedure that was not done commonly. PM had only done a few of them before as well so monitoring of the approach may have been slightly less proficient. Distraction caused by Flight Director allowed us to lose awareness on descent rate and obstacle closure rate. Crew was on final leg of a long 11 hour day which started at XA:30 AM so fatigue may have been apart Suggestions - More awareness can be given during LDA approaches especially to ZZZ. More proficiency can be attained by doing more LOC approaches out on the line. Long fatiguing day caused by delays earlier including go arounds and catering from previous flight. These are out of the power of the parties involved."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "On LDA Z XX approach into ZZZ, aircraft was not capturing LOC and maintained Roll mode. After selecting NAV aircraft stayed in Roll mode. I disconnected the autopilot to hand fly the approach. After descending into VMC conditions at 1,100 ft. I continued the approach visually. At 800 ft. ATC advised am altitude alert, I leveled off and continued the approach to a landing. Cause - Descended too fast while on a visual segment of the approach. Suggestions - Be more vigilant on altitude constraints after going visual on an instrument approach."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn LDA Z Runway XX into ZZZ, we followed procedure down to minimums. Pilot Flying (PF) was set to appropriate Ground Based NAV source, Pilot Monitoring (PM) was set to appropriate Magenta NAV source. At 0.3 NM from FAF, FPA mode was selected per procedure. As we descended, PF noticed we were off course slightly (on Autopilot). PF decided to disengage autopilot to track course accurately as ZZZ is a busy airport with tight restrictions. PM task saturation increased and did not notice altitude selector was not set to missed approach altitude when visual was attained. Airplane Flight Director disengaged for cause unknown at the time which increased workload and scan on both pilots. The momentary distraction allowed us to descend more rapidly than desired toward the airport environment and we received a GPWS alert approaching obstacles in the city. Crew noted the alert, saw the obstacles and corrected with power and pitch changes back to stable flight. Tower noted altitude alert to which we replied correcting. Landed without further incident. Cause - PF was newer on the airplane and we had to fly a procedure that was not done commonly. PM had only done a few of them before as well so monitoring of the approach may have been slightly less proficient. Distraction caused by Flight Director allowed us to lose awareness on descent rate and obstacle closure rate. Crew was on final leg of a long 11 hour day which started at XA:30 AM so fatigue may have been apart Suggestions - More awareness can be given during LDA approaches especially to ZZZ. More proficiency can be attained by doing more LOC approaches out on the line. Long fatiguing day caused by delays earlier including go arounds and catering from previous flight. These are out of the power of the parties involved.\n\nNarrative 2\nOn LDA Z XX approach into ZZZ, aircraft was not capturing LOC and maintained Roll mode. After selecting NAV aircraft stayed in Roll mode. I disconnected the autopilot to hand fly the approach. After descending into VMC conditions at 1,100 ft. I continued the approach visually. At 800 ft. ATC advised am altitude alert, I leveled off and continued the approach to a landing. Cause - Descended too fast while on a visual segment of the approach. Suggestions - Be more vigilant on altitude constraints after going visual on an instrument approach.",
    "synopsis": "EMB175 Flight Crew reported autoflight improperly set resulted in higher rate of descent and a low altitude alert on approach.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=95",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 95,
      "pageEnd": 97,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=95",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 95,
        "pageEnd": 97,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1949576 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "EMB175 Flight Crew reported autoflight improperly set resulted in higher rate of descent and a low altitude alert on approach.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1948969",
    "date": "2022-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Parked"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I arrived at the aircraft and met my third brand new First Officer (FO) in as many legs. The inbound aircraft was approximately :30 late and we were hoping to make up some time as I was just pushing my first flight of the day at (time), with anticipated weather, aircraft and Crew Member swaps downline, meals and fatigue to be factors later in the night. During the preflight, we realized we were over Allowable Takeoff Gross Weight (ATOG) and had to pull two revenue Passengers and plan a engine bleeds off takeoff, which caused some anxiety with the probationary First Officer. We had Company HAZMAT added to the flight and I signed the required paperwork, but in the hectic environment, forgot to amend the Release for the Operations Agent. On climbout, I noticed the call light was illuminated and I reviewed the ACARS messages. The light was for a Part 117 notification, but there was also a previously reviewed message from Dispatch reminding us to amend the release for the Hazmat with times and initials. The message was sent while we were at the gate. Neither the First Officer nor I remembered seeing the message prior to pushback. It was busy, but since I had a brand new FO again, I was trying to be methodical, slow down and cover everything. The Dispatcher, Ops Agent, freight and Ramp Agents all did their jobs and personally briefed me of the HAZMAT location. The mistake was totally on me."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI arrived at the aircraft and met my third brand new First Officer (FO) in as many legs. The inbound aircraft was approximately :30 late and we were hoping to make up some time as I was just pushing my first flight of the day at (time), with anticipated weather, aircraft and Crew Member swaps downline, meals and fatigue to be factors later in the night. During the preflight, we realized we were over Allowable Takeoff Gross Weight (ATOG) and had to pull two revenue Passengers and plan a engine bleeds off takeoff, which caused some anxiety with the probationary First Officer. We had Company HAZMAT added to the flight and I signed the required paperwork, but in the hectic environment, forgot to amend the Release for the Operations Agent. On climbout, I noticed the call light was illuminated and I reviewed the ACARS messages. The light was for a Part 117 notification, but there was also a previously reviewed message from Dispatch reminding us to amend the release for the Hazmat with times and initials. The message was sent while we were at the gate. Neither the First Officer nor I remembered seeing the message prior to pushback. It was busy, but since I had a brand new FO again, I was trying to be methodical, slow down and cover everything. The Dispatcher, Ops Agent, freight and Ramp Agents all did their jobs and personally briefed me of the HAZMAT location. The mistake was totally on me.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier Captain reported he failed to amend the flight release for added Hazmat prior to departure.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=98",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 98,
      "pageEnd": 99,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=98",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 98,
        "pageEnd": 99,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "Hazardous-materials release amendment missed in a busy preflight",
    "summary": "A B737 captain signed paperwork for hazardous materials but forgot to amend the flight release before departure. A late aircraft, weight restrictions, a new first officer, and concern about the rest of the duty day contributed to a busy preflight; the captain later noticed the dispatch reminder during climb.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Procedures",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1946064",
    "date": "2022-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "A321"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Night flight. Originally FO (First Officer) leg, switched to CA (Captain) arrival for CAT 3. Cat 3 ILS Runway XXR ZZZ, wet, greater than 6000 RVR. Assigned 210 4000 on downwind. 190 speed on base down to 3000. Intercept 3000 and 170 speed to FAF. This would keep us too high. CA told FO to let them know that we would would be too high and it likely wouldn't work out. Mentioned it twice, no calls to ATC were made to relay this. Got busy fast. Put In 1700 ft and 1000 fpm descent. Was too tight and fast and high. CA made the poor decision to continue to 1000 and then plan to likely go around. Verbalized this. At 1000 ft the plane tried to capture the glide slope. This caused an erratic aircraft behavior leading to turning off the AP and auto thrust. Attempted to stabilize before initiating GA. This went badly and we got nose down. CA and FO said GA around. TOGA was not set. Correct attitude not set. The thrust did not react as expected. CA was confused. We were fully configured for flaps full landing. We then got a PULL UP. FO repeated pull up. CA executed very slowly and incorrectly into a GA and attempted to continue to stabilize the aircraft in the climb out. FO got flaps to 1. Oversped flap 1. FO seemed confused. CA set flaps to zero to stop the overspeed. Attempted twice unsuccessfully to re engage automation. Once level at 4000, automation was successfully re engaged. Continue around to another CAT 3 ILS XXR. FO set up and checked but approach phase was not activated. On final when CA pushed speed, plane sped up, CA pulled speed and called for activate approach. FO no response. CA activated approach phase, checked all criteria, stable except speed. Crew discussed continuing and we continued. Speed came down and on speed by 600. Successful auto land and taxi in. Med Auto Brake. AP off at 50 kts. Taxi in to Gate XX then broken jetbridge required tow to XY. Crew discussed event. Neither CA nor FO knew what happened initially at 1000 ft. CA took responsibility for the subsequent events and told FO that CA would file required reports. CA put flap overspeed in logbook and met with Maintenance. FO has 6 months in the 320, CA has 7. Trip started early am day 1; ended after midnight day 2. A circadian issue that the CA discussed at home prior to the trip. Both pilots have [several] kids. CA has dying family member adding life stress [to] manage the hospice care daily."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nNight flight. Originally FO (First Officer) leg, switched to CA (Captain) arrival for CAT 3. Cat 3 ILS Runway XXR ZZZ, wet, greater than 6000 RVR. Assigned 210 4000 on downwind. 190 speed on base down to 3000. Intercept 3000 and 170 speed to FAF. This would keep us too high. CA told FO to let them know that we would would be too high and it likely wouldn't work out. Mentioned it twice, no calls to ATC were made to relay this. Got busy fast. Put In 1700 ft and 1000 fpm descent. Was too tight and fast and high. CA made the poor decision to continue to 1000 and then plan to likely go around. Verbalized this. At 1000 ft the plane tried to capture the glide slope. This caused an erratic aircraft behavior leading to turning off the AP and auto thrust. Attempted to stabilize before initiating GA. This went badly and we got nose down. CA and FO said GA around. TOGA was not set. Correct attitude not set. The thrust did not react as expected. CA was confused. We were fully configured for flaps full landing. We then got a PULL UP. FO repeated pull up. CA executed very slowly and incorrectly into a GA and attempted to continue to stabilize the aircraft in the climb out. FO got flaps to 1. Oversped flap 1. FO seemed confused. CA set flaps to zero to stop the overspeed. Attempted twice unsuccessfully to re engage automation. Once level at 4000, automation was successfully re engaged. Continue around to another CAT 3 ILS XXR. FO set up and checked but approach phase was not activated. On final when CA pushed speed, plane sped up, CA pulled speed and called for activate approach. FO no response. CA activated approach phase, checked all criteria, stable except speed. Crew discussed continuing and we continued. Speed came down and on speed by 600. Successful auto land and taxi in. Med Auto Brake. AP off at 50 kts. Taxi in to Gate XX then broken jetbridge required tow to XY. Crew discussed event. Neither CA nor FO knew what happened initially at 1000 ft. CA took responsibility for the subsequent events and told FO that CA would file required reports. CA put flap overspeed in logbook and met with Maintenance. FO has 6 months in the 320, CA has 7. Trip started early am day 1; ended after midnight day 2. A circadian issue that the CA discussed at home prior to the trip. Both pilots have [several] kids. CA has dying family member adding life stress [to] manage the hospice care daily.",
    "synopsis": "A321 pilot reported unstabilized approach.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=100",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 100,
      "pageEnd": 101,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=100",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 100,
        "pageEnd": 101,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1946064 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "A321 pilot reported unstabilized approach.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1945726",
    "date": "2022-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR",
      "Caravan Undifferentiated"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was CA (Captain) taxiing Aircraft X for departure from the ZZZ \"X\" gates to Runway XXL, when we narrowly avoided a collision with a Aircraft Y single engine turboprop. Conditions were the pre-dawn period of civil twilight, VMC, dry pavement, and extensive construction zone hazard lighting in the vicinity. CA was on day 5, segment 1, and feeling mildly fatigued. FO (First Officer) was on day 1, segment 1. Aircraft was configured normally with Engine 1 running and APU on. Navigation lights, red beacon, logo lights, and nose taxi light were illuminated. After clearing up a minor issue with the Ramp Controller reversing Taxiways XX and XY in our initial instructions, we had correctly taxied on XY and were holding short of Taxiway XZ. We checked in with Ground for taxi from this position. Ground cleared us to the effect, \"Aircraft Y, taxi to Runway XXL via X; you can go over to Tower.\" There was no mention of any traffic conflicts or sequence. After the FO read back this clearance, I looked left, right, and left again while giving the short taxi brief \"via X, no hotspots, clear left.\" FO responded with \"clear right\" and I turned on our nose taxi light and began to taxi along XX from XZ to make the right turn onto X. To the left, I was confronted with a vast expanse of blinking hazard lights within the temporary construction zones, as well as the normal runway and city lights against the gray twilight. I did not observe any aircraft movement on taxiway X itself at this time. To the right, I could clearly see all the way along our entire taxi route to the departure end of Runway XXL, and with no traffic ahead of us, I called for the FO to start engine number 2, so that the 2 minute warmup would be complete before we reached the runway. I remained \"heads up\" during the engine start and continued my normal visual scan, and still perceived no traffic from the left. Just as I called \"clear left for the right on X\" and was turning my vision back to the right for the turn, the FO spoke up with something akin to \"what about that guy? He's hauling... it doesn't look like he's going to stop.\" I looked back left and initially thought the FO was referring to a white panel van I could see speeding through the construction zone and was about to say \"he's no factor\", when I became aware of motion much closer coming from the left. I immediately stopped the aircraft and now fully observed a Aircraft Y single engine turboprop with navigation lights only (no forward taxi/landing lights illuminated) coming fast from left to right on [taxiway] X and about to hit us. I do not recall if I had our aircraft completely stopped before entering into [taxiway] X or not, but the Aircraft Y was coming close enough that I flashed my lights at him multiple times to make sure he didn't hit us. The Aircraft Y did not alter trajectory, and passed fast by our nose, uncomfortably close. They then continued taxiing rapidly towards the Company A ramp area. After a quick debrief of what just happened, we continued onto X, completed the engine start, taxi flows, taxi briefing, and taxi checklist, when I observed and commented we were still listening to Ground. When the FO switched us to Tower, I inquired, \"what was supposed to be our sequence reference that Aircraft Y,\" in case we had somehow missed a traffic call or misheard our taxi instructions from Ground. Tower seemed unconcerned and said, \"Oh, he's an inbound, you can keep going on XA and you'll be number 1 for departure.\" I replied, \"no, he cut us off back there,\" and Tower replied, \"Oh, okay, I'll let him know.\" The remainder of the flight was conducted without incident. Having no opportunity to debrief with ATC, I do not know if the causal factor was ATC creating a conflict by clearing us onto X in front of Aircraft Y, or if Aircraft Y had been issued instructions to yield to us and then didn't. In any case, procedural control was not sufficient to avoid an incident in this case, and an alert FO's visual scan (while also monitoring an engine start) is what prevented an accident. Contributing factors: Ambient lighting was poor because of time of day and non-standard, busy construction lighting Aircraft Y was taxiing extremely fast and with no forward (landing/taxi) lights Cognitive bias--expecting to see conflicts with large passenger aircraft or ground vehicles, not a small aircraft Expectation bias--did not expect traffic due to low overall ground traffic, no traffic to the right, and no traffic called out to us or heard talking on frequency Fatigue Task saturation Maybe tone down the amount of construction hazard lighting at ZZZ to not create a \"wall of light\" effect for taxiing aircraft."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "There was no taxiing incursion in the event. Yesterday morning, the Captain was taxiing on XY approaching Taxiway XX in ZZZ leaving the X gates. I contacted Ground approaching Taxiway XX and was told to taxi to XXL via X, monitor Tower, new departure frequency XXX.XX. I read back the instruction and was then heads down putting the new departure frequency in comm 2 standby. The Captain briefed the taxi and I agreed with the taxi he briefed. He then asked me to start engine #2 since there was nobody ahead of us for departure. I was then heads down for the engine start. When the Captain stated \"clear left\" I noticed that we were not clear left. I brought it to the Captains attention. He continued to taxi while looking for the aircraft. He did not see the Aircraft Y which only had its position lights on and blended in well with the construction zone in ZZZ. It became evident that neither aircraft was going to stop. I then stated again to the Captain about the opposing traffic moving at a high rate of speed. The Captain then saw the traffic right before I was about to step on the brakes to avoid a collision. He immediately stopped the aircraft and avoided the aircraft. The other aircraft still didn't see us and when they did they swerved off the centerline and their brakes. The aircraft continued to taxi in front of us. The Captain questioned Tower about our sequence and told them about the near incident. We continued the rest of the flight without incident. Suggestions: ADSB IN with taxi diagram display Lowered iPad mounts that do not block vision of flight crew"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was CA (Captain) taxiing Aircraft X for departure from the ZZZ \"X\" gates to Runway XXL, when we narrowly avoided a collision with a Aircraft Y single engine turboprop. Conditions were the pre-dawn period of civil twilight, VMC, dry pavement, and extensive construction zone hazard lighting in the vicinity. CA was on day 5, segment 1, and feeling mildly fatigued. FO (First Officer) was on day 1, segment 1. Aircraft was configured normally with Engine 1 running and APU on. Navigation lights, red beacon, logo lights, and nose taxi light were illuminated. After clearing up a minor issue with the Ramp Controller reversing Taxiways XX and XY in our initial instructions, we had correctly taxied on XY and were holding short of Taxiway XZ. We checked in with Ground for taxi from this position. Ground cleared us to the effect, \"Aircraft Y, taxi to Runway XXL via X; you can go over to Tower.\" There was no mention of any traffic conflicts or sequence. After the FO read back this clearance, I looked left, right, and left again while giving the short taxi brief \"via X, no hotspots, clear left.\" FO responded with \"clear right\" and I turned on our nose taxi light and began to taxi along XX from XZ to make the right turn onto X. To the left, I was confronted with a vast expanse of blinking hazard lights within the temporary construction zones, as well as the normal runway and city lights against the gray twilight. I did not observe any aircraft movement on taxiway X itself at this time. To the right, I could clearly see all the way along our entire taxi route to the departure end of Runway XXL, and with no traffic ahead of us, I called for the FO to start engine number 2, so that the 2 minute warmup would be complete before we reached the runway. I remained \"heads up\" during the engine start and continued my normal visual scan, and still perceived no traffic from the left. Just as I called \"clear left for the right on X\" and was turning my vision back to the right for the turn, the FO spoke up with something akin to \"what about that guy? He's hauling... it doesn't look like he's going to stop.\" I looked back left and initially thought the FO was referring to a white panel van I could see speeding through the construction zone and was about to say \"he's no factor\", when I became aware of motion much closer coming from the left. I immediately stopped the aircraft and now fully observed a Aircraft Y single engine turboprop with navigation lights only (no forward taxi/landing lights illuminated) coming fast from left to right on [taxiway] X and about to hit us. I do not recall if I had our aircraft completely stopped before entering into [taxiway] X or not, but the Aircraft Y was coming close enough that I flashed my lights at him multiple times to make sure he didn't hit us. The Aircraft Y did not alter trajectory, and passed fast by our nose, uncomfortably close. They then continued taxiing rapidly towards the Company A ramp area. After a quick debrief of what just happened, we continued onto X, completed the engine start, taxi flows, taxi briefing, and taxi checklist, when I observed and commented we were still listening to Ground. When the FO switched us to Tower, I inquired, \"what was supposed to be our sequence reference that Aircraft Y,\" in case we had somehow missed a traffic call or misheard our taxi instructions from Ground. Tower seemed unconcerned and said, \"Oh, he's an inbound, you can keep going on XA and you'll be number 1 for departure.\" I replied, \"no, he cut us off back there,\" and Tower replied, \"Oh, okay, I'll let him know.\" The remainder of the flight was conducted without incident. Having no opportunity to debrief with ATC, I do not know if the causal factor was ATC creating a conflict by clearing us onto X in front of Aircraft Y, or if Aircraft Y had been issued instructions to yield to us and then didn't. In any case, procedural control was not sufficient to avoid an incident in this case, and an alert FO's visual scan (while also monitoring an engine start) is what prevented an accident. Contributing factors: Ambient lighting was poor because of time of day and non-standard, busy construction lighting Aircraft Y was taxiing extremely fast and with no forward (landing/taxi) lights Cognitive bias--expecting to see conflicts with large passenger aircraft or ground vehicles, not a small aircraft Expectation bias--did not expect traffic due to low overall ground traffic, no traffic to the right, and no traffic called out to us or heard talking on frequency Fatigue Task saturation Maybe tone down the amount of construction hazard lighting at ZZZ to not create a \"wall of light\" effect for taxiing aircraft.\n\nNarrative 2\nThere was no taxiing incursion in the event. Yesterday morning, the Captain was taxiing on XY approaching Taxiway XX in ZZZ leaving the X gates. I contacted Ground approaching Taxiway XX and was told to taxi to XXL via X, monitor Tower, new departure frequency XXX.XX. I read back the instruction and was then heads down putting the new departure frequency in comm 2 standby. The Captain briefed the taxi and I agreed with the taxi he briefed. He then asked me to start engine #2 since there was nobody ahead of us for departure. I was then heads down for the engine start. When the Captain stated \"clear left\" I noticed that we were not clear left. I brought it to the Captains attention. He continued to taxi while looking for the aircraft. He did not see the Aircraft Y which only had its position lights on and blended in well with the construction zone in ZZZ. It became evident that neither aircraft was going to stop. I then stated again to the Captain about the opposing traffic moving at a high rate of speed. The Captain then saw the traffic right before I was about to step on the brakes to avoid a collision. He immediately stopped the aircraft and avoided the aircraft. The other aircraft still didn't see us and when they did they swerved off the centerline and their brakes. The aircraft continued to taxi in front of us. The Captain questioned Tower about our sequence and told them about the near incident. We continued the rest of the flight without incident. Suggestions: ADSB IN with taxi diagram display Lowered iPad mounts that do not block vision of flight crew",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported critical ground conflict during taxi out for departure, requiring braking to avoid a collision.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=102",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 102,
      "pageEnd": 105,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=102",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 102,
        "pageEnd": 105,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1945726 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported critical ground conflict during taxi out for departure, requiring braking to avoid a collision.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1942817",
    "date": "2022-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach",
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After two unsuccessful attempts to land at ZZZ1 Airport due to weather. We diverted to ZZZ where we setup for a visual approach to Runway X. We used the RNAV (GPS) Y Runway X approach to back up the visual approach as the ILS approach was out of service. On right downwind for Runway X ATC asked if we had the airport in sight which we did. They cleared us for the visual approach and we continued downwind. We turned about a 5 mile base leg and were descending to 6100. We received an obstacle alert and responded accordingly. This is when I realized that we were improperly conducting a visual approach into ZZZ. I had forgot that we needed to follow the approach guidance from an IAF or radar vectors for this airport. Both of us missed that point during the approach briefing. After adjusting our descent rate for the alert we continued the approach without further incident. After conducting two missed approaches from minimums and diverting with considerable weather in the area that we were constantly avoiding we were mentally fatigued and overlooked the safety alert airport requirements for approaches into ZZZ at night. I am familiar with this airport and its requirements as I have been here many times before. I think the contributing factors involved in our error were rushing during a diversion at night and task saturation that caused us to overlook the requirement. Also contributing was the late hour at the end of a long day and get-there-itis."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We departed the airport and knew we'd be dealing with weather both most of the way enroute, and at the destination, at night. After attempting an approach twice with hopes the clouds at minimums were transient, we diverted to our alternate. Enroute, while dodging storms at night, it became clear that there was a better alternate behind us, closer. We again coordinated with ATC to turn towards that airport. Due to its proximity and the nature of the irregular ops, we were somewhat task saturated for a bit. We felt good about our decision and focused on the flight path management in relation to the weather, as well as all the briefings, etc. During the approach to landing, cleared for a visual approach and in good VMC, I turned the plane to a base leg, and rolled the VS knob down because we had been high. While communicating with the Captain about my decision to turn now, and configuring, our flight path became low in relation to our vertical guidance. It was VMC and we had a clear view to the airport and runway. I was either slowing my descent or had leveled when an obstacle alert sounded. I clicked off AP, applied thrust and started a climb. The alert went away immediately, and the vertical guidance was realigned on the 3 degree glideslope soon after. We continued the approach and landed uneventfully, and during the debrief the Captain informed me of our mistake. Weather both enroute and at the original destination airport. Multiple missed approaches both ending in a hold. Intermittent icing, especially during high work load times. The entire flight was at night. Flying well in to the night."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter two unsuccessful attempts to land at ZZZ1 Airport due to weather. We diverted to ZZZ where we setup for a visual approach to Runway X. We used the RNAV (GPS) Y Runway X approach to back up the visual approach as the ILS approach was out of service. On right downwind for Runway X ATC asked if we had the airport in sight which we did. They cleared us for the visual approach and we continued downwind. We turned about a 5 mile base leg and were descending to 6100. We received an obstacle alert and responded accordingly. This is when I realized that we were improperly conducting a visual approach into ZZZ. I had forgot that we needed to follow the approach guidance from an IAF or radar vectors for this airport. Both of us missed that point during the approach briefing. After adjusting our descent rate for the alert we continued the approach without further incident. After conducting two missed approaches from minimums and diverting with considerable weather in the area that we were constantly avoiding we were mentally fatigued and overlooked the safety alert airport requirements for approaches into ZZZ at night. I am familiar with this airport and its requirements as I have been here many times before. I think the contributing factors involved in our error were rushing during a diversion at night and task saturation that caused us to overlook the requirement. Also contributing was the late hour at the end of a long day and get-there-itis.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe departed the airport and knew we'd be dealing with weather both most of the way enroute, and at the destination, at night. After attempting an approach twice with hopes the clouds at minimums were transient, we diverted to our alternate. Enroute, while dodging storms at night, it became clear that there was a better alternate behind us, closer. We again coordinated with ATC to turn towards that airport. Due to its proximity and the nature of the irregular ops, we were somewhat task saturated for a bit. We felt good about our decision and focused on the flight path management in relation to the weather, as well as all the briefings, etc. During the approach to landing, cleared for a visual approach and in good VMC, I turned the plane to a base leg, and rolled the VS knob down because we had been high. While communicating with the Captain about my decision to turn now, and configuring, our flight path became low in relation to our vertical guidance. It was VMC and we had a clear view to the airport and runway. I was either slowing my descent or had leveled when an obstacle alert sounded. I clicked off AP, applied thrust and started a climb. The alert went away immediately, and the vertical guidance was realigned on the 3 degree glideslope soon after. We continued the approach and landed uneventfully, and during the debrief the Captain informed me of our mistake. Weather both enroute and at the original destination airport. Multiple missed approaches both ending in a hold. Intermittent icing, especially during high work load times. The entire flight was at night. Flying well in to the night.",
    "synopsis": "CRJ-700 flight crew reported receiving an obstacle alert during a night visual approach. After responding accordingly to the alert, the flight crew followed the company approach guidance to a safe landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=106",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 106,
      "pageEnd": 108,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=106",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 106,
        "pageEnd": 108,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1942817 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "CRJ-700 flight crew reported receiving an obstacle alert during a night visual approach. After responding accordingly to the alert, the flight crew followed the company approach guidance to a safe landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
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      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1938052",
    "date": "2022-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While on approach, we were turned onto a base leg by ATC and given a clearance to turn, slow and descend to 8000 ft. I responded to ATC. However, the Captain was in the middle of finding out his HUD was inoperative. He made the turn but did not dial in the altitude in the MCP window. He realized that he had not put an altitude in the MCP panel and queried me what the altitude was. Unfortunately, I told him the wrong altitude of 7000 ft. We were both heads up at that time, looking for the proceeding aircraft turning final. Leveling off at 7000 ft., I had a feeling something was not right. At that point, ATC issued an Altitude Alert and told us to climb back to 8000 ft. We climbed back to 8000 ft., turned final and intercepted the localizer and landed. Several things where big contributors. I was tired. I had been working PM trips then switched to a early AM wakeup call. After the event, I called in fatigued. Possibly recognizing my night of poor rest, I should have called in fatigued earlier. Second the failure of us not following our standards in setting the MCP panel. I should have queried ATC again to verify our altitude when I realized the Captain did not know what it was. Last, the Captain was tasked saturated with dealing with the inoperative HUD. This definitely was an added distraction and we both should have been more aware of it interfering with tasks at hand."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While on downwind I was trying to get the HUD to work when we were given turn to base and descend clearance at the same time. I heard the turn while I was extending a line in the FMS for final and asked what the altitude was, my FO (First Officer) thought it was seven thousand but wasn’t sure. Typical approach in ZZZ was talking so much and so fast we couldn’t get a verification. I looked at the FAF fix and saw 7000 ft. and figured that was the clearance. Approach then called us and advised the clearance was 8000 ft. and climb back to 8000 ft. and we complied and continued the approach with no further incident. Distractions with the HUD, ZZZ Approach speaking so fast and so much were certainly additive conditions. Its very hard to continually track ZZZ and all of their clearances. Insist on verification of clearance. Take some of the load of the PF, like requiring the Pilot Monitoring to do all radio and FMS programing while below 10,000 ft., or all the time for that matter. That way, the Pilot Flying can concentrate on flying the aircraft and listen better to ATC clearances."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile on approach, we were turned onto a base leg by ATC and given a clearance to turn, slow and descend to 8000 ft. I responded to ATC. However, the Captain was in the middle of finding out his HUD was inoperative. He made the turn but did not dial in the altitude in the MCP window. He realized that he had not put an altitude in the MCP panel and queried me what the altitude was. Unfortunately, I told him the wrong altitude of 7000 ft. We were both heads up at that time, looking for the proceeding aircraft turning final. Leveling off at 7000 ft., I had a feeling something was not right. At that point, ATC issued an Altitude Alert and told us to climb back to 8000 ft. We climbed back to 8000 ft., turned final and intercepted the localizer and landed. Several things where big contributors. I was tired. I had been working PM trips then switched to a early AM wakeup call. After the event, I called in fatigued. Possibly recognizing my night of poor rest, I should have called in fatigued earlier. Second the failure of us not following our standards in setting the MCP panel. I should have queried ATC again to verify our altitude when I realized the Captain did not know what it was. Last, the Captain was tasked saturated with dealing with the inoperative HUD. This definitely was an added distraction and we both should have been more aware of it interfering with tasks at hand.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile on downwind I was trying to get the HUD to work when we were given turn to base and descend clearance at the same time. I heard the turn while I was extending a line in the FMS for final and asked what the altitude was, my FO (First Officer) thought it was seven thousand but wasn’t sure. Typical approach in ZZZ was talking so much and so fast we couldn’t get a verification. I looked at the FAF fix and saw 7000 ft. and figured that was the clearance. Approach then called us and advised the clearance was 8000 ft. and climb back to 8000 ft. and we complied and continued the approach with no further incident. Distractions with the HUD, ZZZ Approach speaking so fast and so much were certainly additive conditions. Its very hard to continually track ZZZ and all of their clearances. Insist on verification of clearance. Take some of the load of the PF, like requiring the Pilot Monitoring to do all radio and FMS programing while below 10,000 ft., or all the time for that matter. That way, the Pilot Flying can concentrate on flying the aircraft and listen better to ATC clearances.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier flight crew reported receiving an ATC low altitude alert during approach. The flight crew immediately climbed to assigned altitude and continued the approach.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=109",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
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      "notes": "This accession has differing narrative text in another source collection. The first collection in the documented import order is displayed; all versions are preserved in the downloadable dataset and linked source PDFs."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=109",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 109,
        "pageEnd": 111,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized.",
        "notes": "This accession has differing narrative text in another source collection. The first collection in the documented import order is displayed; all versions are preserved in the downloadable dataset and linked source PDFs."
      },
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=142",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 142,
        "pageEnd": 144,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
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    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1938052 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air Carrier flight crew reported receiving an ATC low altitude alert during approach. The flight crew immediately climbed to assigned altitude and continued the approach.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue",
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
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      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    },
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        },
        "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile on approach, we were turned onto a base leg by ATC and given a clearance to turn, slow and descend to 8000 ft. I responded to ATC. However, the Captain was in the middle of finding out his HUD was inoperative. He made the turn but did not dial in the altitude in the MCP window. He realized that he had not put an altitude in the MCP panel and queried me what the altitude was. Unfortunately, I told him the wrong altitude of 7000 ft. We were both heads up at that time, looking for the proceeding aircraft turning final. Leveling off at 7000 ft., I had a feeling something was not right. At that point, ATC issued an Altitude Alert and told us to climb back to 8000 ft. We climbed back to 8000 ft., turned final and intercepted the localizer and landed. Several things where big contributors. I was tired. I had been working PM trips then switched to a early AM wakeup call. After the event, I called in fatigued. Possibly recognizing my night of poor rest, I should have called in fatigued earlier. Second the failure of us not following our standards in setting the MCP panel. I should have queried ATC again to verify our altitude when I realized the Captain did not know what it was. Last, the Captain was tasked saturated with dealing with the inoperative HUD. This definitely was an added distraction and we both should have been more aware of it interfering with tasks at hand.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile on downwind I was trying to get the HUD to work when we were given turn to base and descend clearance at the same time. I heard the turn while I was extending a line in the FMS for final and asked what the altitude was, my FO (First Officer) thought it was seven thousand but wasn”™t sure. Typical approach in ZZZ was talking so much and so fast we couldn”™t get a verification. I looked at the FAF fix and saw 7000 ft. and figured that was the clearance. Approach then called us and advised the clearance was 8000 ft. and climb back to 8000 ft. and we complied and continued the approach with no further incident. Distractions with the HUD, ZZZ Approach speaking so fast and so much were certainly additive conditions. Its very hard to continually track ZZZ and all of their clearances. Insist on verification of clearance. Take some of the load of the PF, like requiring the Pilot Monitoring to do all radio and FMS programing while below 10,000 ft., or all the time for that matter. That way, the Pilot Flying can concentrate on flying the aircraft and listen better to ATC clearances.",
        "narratives": [
          {
            "number": 1,
            "text": "While on approach, we were turned onto a base leg by ATC and given a clearance to turn, slow and descend to 8000 ft. I responded to ATC. However, the Captain was in the middle of finding out his HUD was inoperative. He made the turn but did not dial in the altitude in the MCP window. He realized that he had not put an altitude in the MCP panel and queried me what the altitude was. Unfortunately, I told him the wrong altitude of 7000 ft. We were both heads up at that time, looking for the proceeding aircraft turning final. Leveling off at 7000 ft., I had a feeling something was not right. At that point, ATC issued an Altitude Alert and told us to climb back to 8000 ft. We climbed back to 8000 ft., turned final and intercepted the localizer and landed. Several things where big contributors. I was tired. I had been working PM trips then switched to a early AM wakeup call. After the event, I called in fatigued. Possibly recognizing my night of poor rest, I should have called in fatigued earlier. Second the failure of us not following our standards in setting the MCP panel. I should have queried ATC again to verify our altitude when I realized the Captain did not know what it was. Last, the Captain was tasked saturated with dealing with the inoperative HUD. This definitely was an added distraction and we both should have been more aware of it interfering with tasks at hand."
          },
          {
            "number": 2,
            "text": "While on downwind I was trying to get the HUD to work when we were given turn to base and descend clearance at the same time. I heard the turn while I was extending a line in the FMS for final and asked what the altitude was, my FO (First Officer) thought it was seven thousand but wasn”™t sure. Typical approach in ZZZ was talking so much and so fast we couldn”™t get a verification. I looked at the FAF fix and saw 7000 ft. and figured that was the clearance. Approach then called us and advised the clearance was 8000 ft. and climb back to 8000 ft. and we complied and continued the approach with no further incident. Distractions with the HUD, ZZZ Approach speaking so fast and so much were certainly additive conditions. Its very hard to continually track ZZZ and all of their clearances. Insist on verification of clearance. Take some of the load of the PF, like requiring the Pilot Monitoring to do all radio and FMS programing while below 10,000 ft., or all the time for that matter. That way, the Pilot Flying can concentrate on flying the aircraft and listen better to ATC clearances."
          }
        ],
        "synopsis": "Air Carrier flight crew reported receiving an ATC low altitude alert during approach. The flight crew immediately climbed to assigned altitude and continued the approach.",
        "aircraft": [
          "B737-800"
        ],
        "flightPhase": [
          "Initial Approach"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1932078",
    "date": "2022-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Having received a landing clearance the transition from ILS DME2 Runway 14 to a visual approach was continued. Captain was Flying Pilot. 1000 ft. stable call was made. At about 600 ft. I asked the FO (First Officer) \"Is that paint on the runway?\" Slight hesitation and I think the answer was something like \"not sure\" or \"that is a big paint spot\". 500 ft call was made. Landing was completed. At about 80 kts. the FO called out \"truck on runway\". I applied very heavy brakes slowing the aircraft quickly to about 20 kts. I exited the runway at Taxiway \"A\" continuing to the gate and parking the aircraft. At time of landing the sun was low in the sky and behind the aircraft, the truck was driving down the runway the same direction we were landing. The vehicle was on the center line of the runway, I think the term is \"Relative Movement\" since the vehicle was driving down the center line there was no movement of the vehicle relative to the windshield. This made it difficult to identify the object as a vehicle. The vehicle just blended into the background. The vehicle departed the runway northwest of Taxiway \"A\" to the north side of the runway. As we were taxiing to the gate the FO asked the Tower Controller if in fact he cleared us to land and the Controller stated \"Yes\". After we parked again the FO asked if a landing clearance was issued and the Controller stated \"Yes\". The Controller said he told the vehicle to clear the runway but said the vehicle driver must have missed the transmission. [A contributing factor was fatigue related to early] duty day and 10 hours behind the door the night before, and [an early] duty day on the day of the event. I think there was only one Controller on duty."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "During the approach, the CA (Captain) (PF (Pilot Flying)) ended up unexpectedly high on the visual approach (backed up by the ILS DME 2) once turning to final. He used gear extension, full speed brakes and manual flying to bring the aircraft to within stable limits by the 500 ft. callout, but our attention was focused on whether we would need to perform a Go-around or not. This channelized attention led to a later-than-normal completion of the before landing checklist. All this is to say the final moments of this approach were rushed and compressed. Shortly before reaching the flare, the CA asked, \"Is that something on the runway? Or is that just paint?\" We saw something yellow about halfway down the runway, slightly left of centerline, but at a distance of over 1NM it looked like a strip of yellow paint. We had been cleared to land and were the only aircraft talking with approach for several minutes at this sleepy airport. So cognitively I convinced myself it must be some type of paint indicating an area of a temporary repair or something non- standard that must be specific to Mexico (I am inexperienced with Mexico airports). I said, \"I think it's just paint\" as we entered the flare, and I cross-checked the yellow spot out front several times as I confirmed spoilers extending on touch-down. As the flare and touchdown were happening, the shape of the yellow appeared to be three dimensional rather than two dimensional like paint, and I quickly realized it was a vehicle stopped on the runway, approximately 20 feet to the left of centerline. I called out, \"That's a vehicle on the runway!\" to the CA rather than \"Go-Around\" since thrust reversers had already been selected. The CA came heavily on the brakes as I called Tower saying, \"Get that truck off the runway!\" Before my transmission was halfway over, the vehicle (ambulance style van), which was parked facing away from us, peeled out and quickly drove into the dirt/grass off the left of the runway. I do not think my transmission had anything to do with its movement unless the occupants were listening to our frequency. We were probably never closer than 1000 ft. to the vehicle, but if it had not moved we would likely have still been about 30 kts. by the time we overtook its position. It is unclear whether we could have gained enough separation to the right to avoid collision with the left engine had we deviated to the right of centerline without departing the runway surface to the right. When we cleared the runway at Taxiway A the vehicle was behind us, so I estimate its location to have been at approximately 4500 ft. from the approach end of Runway 14. Before shut down I debriefed with the Tower Controller. He confirmed we had been cleared to land but offered an excuse that he had told the vehicle to exit the runway but it had not complied. He promised to review the communications. The visibility was extremely clear and there are no obstructions to the Tower view of the runway area, and the Controller had never mentioned any traffic to us. The Tower Controller should not have cleared us to land with a vehicle on the runway, or should have canceled our clearance when it became apparent there would be a conflict. He likewise should have informed us of the traffic. The CA's steep approach compressing our timeline and focusing our attention was a contributing factor, but visually the yellow 'spot' truly looked two dimensional until the round out and flare for the distance we saw it at (I have excellent vision and do not need or wear glasses). Still, my cognitive disbelief that it *could* be a vehicle stopped me from directing a go-around at the last possible opportunity. But I believe our actions, perceptions and decisions were contributing rather than causal factors. Tower Controller should not give clearance to land with a vehicle on the runway. Tower Controller should cancel clearance or direct the go-around when a conflict is apparent. If I see anything that causes me confusion or still seems odd by the time of the flare I will direct or execute a go-around."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nHaving received a landing clearance the transition from ILS DME2 Runway 14 to a visual approach was continued. Captain was Flying Pilot. 1000 ft. stable call was made. At about 600 ft. I asked the FO (First Officer) \"Is that paint on the runway?\" Slight hesitation and I think the answer was something like \"not sure\" or \"that is a big paint spot\". 500 ft call was made. Landing was completed. At about 80 kts. the FO called out \"truck on runway\". I applied very heavy brakes slowing the aircraft quickly to about 20 kts. I exited the runway at Taxiway \"A\" continuing to the gate and parking the aircraft. At time of landing the sun was low in the sky and behind the aircraft, the truck was driving down the runway the same direction we were landing. The vehicle was on the center line of the runway, I think the term is \"Relative Movement\" since the vehicle was driving down the center line there was no movement of the vehicle relative to the windshield. This made it difficult to identify the object as a vehicle. The vehicle just blended into the background. The vehicle departed the runway northwest of Taxiway \"A\" to the north side of the runway. As we were taxiing to the gate the FO asked the Tower Controller if in fact he cleared us to land and the Controller stated \"Yes\". After we parked again the FO asked if a landing clearance was issued and the Controller stated \"Yes\". The Controller said he told the vehicle to clear the runway but said the vehicle driver must have missed the transmission. [A contributing factor was fatigue related to early] duty day and 10 hours behind the door the night before, and [an early] duty day on the day of the event. I think there was only one Controller on duty.\n\nNarrative 2\nDuring the approach, the CA (Captain) (PF (Pilot Flying)) ended up unexpectedly high on the visual approach (backed up by the ILS DME 2) once turning to final. He used gear extension, full speed brakes and manual flying to bring the aircraft to within stable limits by the 500 ft. callout, but our attention was focused on whether we would need to perform a Go-around or not. This channelized attention led to a later-than-normal completion of the before landing checklist. All this is to say the final moments of this approach were rushed and compressed. Shortly before reaching the flare, the CA asked, \"Is that something on the runway? Or is that just paint?\" We saw something yellow about halfway down the runway, slightly left of centerline, but at a distance of over 1NM it looked like a strip of yellow paint. We had been cleared to land and were the only aircraft talking with approach for several minutes at this sleepy airport. So cognitively I convinced myself it must be some type of paint indicating an area of a temporary repair or something non- standard that must be specific to Mexico (I am inexperienced with Mexico airports). I said, \"I think it's just paint\" as we entered the flare, and I cross-checked the yellow spot out front several times as I confirmed spoilers extending on touch-down. As the flare and touchdown were happening, the shape of the yellow appeared to be three dimensional rather than two dimensional like paint, and I quickly realized it was a vehicle stopped on the runway, approximately 20 feet to the left of centerline. I called out, \"That's a vehicle on the runway!\" to the CA rather than \"Go-Around\" since thrust reversers had already been selected. The CA came heavily on the brakes as I called Tower saying, \"Get that truck off the runway!\" Before my transmission was halfway over, the vehicle (ambulance style van), which was parked facing away from us, peeled out and quickly drove into the dirt/grass off the left of the runway. I do not think my transmission had anything to do with its movement unless the occupants were listening to our frequency. We were probably never closer than 1000 ft. to the vehicle, but if it had not moved we would likely have still been about 30 kts. by the time we overtook its position. It is unclear whether we could have gained enough separation to the right to avoid collision with the left engine had we deviated to the right of centerline without departing the runway surface to the right. When we cleared the runway at Taxiway A the vehicle was behind us, so I estimate its location to have been at approximately 4500 ft. from the approach end of Runway 14. Before shut down I debriefed with the Tower Controller. He confirmed we had been cleared to land but offered an excuse that he had told the vehicle to exit the runway but it had not complied. He promised to review the communications. The visibility was extremely clear and there are no obstructions to the Tower view of the runway area, and the Controller had never mentioned any traffic to us. The Tower Controller should not have cleared us to land with a vehicle on the runway, or should have canceled our clearance when it became apparent there would be a conflict. He likewise should have informed us of the traffic. The CA's steep approach compressing our timeline and focusing our attention was a contributing factor, but visually the yellow 'spot' truly looked two dimensional until the round out and flare for the distance we saw it at (I have excellent vision and do not need or wear glasses). Still, my cognitive disbelief that it *could* be a vehicle stopped me from directing a go-around at the last possible opportunity. But I believe our actions, perceptions and decisions were contributing rather than causal factors. Tower Controller should not give clearance to land with a vehicle on the runway. Tower Controller should cancel clearance or direct the go-around when a conflict is apparent. If I see anything that causes me confusion or still seems odd by the time of the flare I will direct or execute a go-around.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported heavy braking was required to avoid a collision with a truck on their runway at MSLP. The Tower Controller had instructed the truck to exit the runway but the truck failed to do so.",
    "source": {
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    "title": "ASRS 1932078 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported heavy braking was required to avoid a collision with a truck on their runway at MSLP. The Tower Controller had instructed the truck to exit the runway but the truck failed to do so.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
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      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1932036",
    "date": "2022-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Cleared to intercept LOC, while being vectored on final approach. The Flight Crew failed to do so, without notifying Approach. There was no loss of separation. ATC did accommodate the failed intercept with vectors that eventually lead to a stabilized approach and a safe landing. Distractions, threats, and task saturation that led the Flight Crew to prioritizing aviating over communication were the following: Non-Normal Fuel Imbalance that resulted in a return to departure airport situation, minutes after takeoff (1500 pounds). Running the QRH and troubleshooting for a possible fuel leak during most of the return to the field flight time. Becoming situationally aware, that landing immediately would result in max landing weight being exceeded, while simultaneously realizing that the Fuel Imbalance was no longer trending negatively. ATC's efforts to expeditiously vector Fight Crew to begin the approach, while being too high to safely do so. Notifying Flight Attendants, Passengers, and Dispatch of the issue and decision to return to the field. First flight of the day with a Cockpit Crew that had never flown together before. Fifth day of reserve with minimum sleep. The previous duty day ended hours after midnight with a \"Sound Check\" and Live DJ Wedding hotel event that ended at XA30 AM. This Crew Member estimated less than four hours of sleep. The Flight Crews thoroughly debriefed the event and came to the following conclusions: The above situation may have been mitigated, had the Flight Crew better coordinated with each other and ATC. The result may have been longer vectors, to provide more time to process the increased task loading and troubleshooting, once the Crew realized that the fuel imbalance trend had been reduced and eventually reversed. Taking a pause to communicate that the overweight landing was now a higher risk (versus the fuel imbalance) may have helped ATC to aid the Flight Crew with less expeditious vectoring and thereby avoid task saturation considering the high number of threats experience in the short flight back to the originating airport."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Encountered a sudden fuel imbalance annunciation showing 1,300 pounds difference shortly after takeoff. Made decision to return but got rushed after ATC cleared us direct to field. While running checklists and coordinating with Flight Attendants, the Captain flew through final. We immediately coordinated to get vectors and landed [uneventfully]."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nCleared to intercept LOC, while being vectored on final approach. The Flight Crew failed to do so, without notifying Approach. There was no loss of separation. ATC did accommodate the failed intercept with vectors that eventually lead to a stabilized approach and a safe landing. Distractions, threats, and task saturation that led the Flight Crew to prioritizing aviating over communication were the following: Non-Normal Fuel Imbalance that resulted in a return to departure airport situation, minutes after takeoff (1500 pounds). Running the QRH and troubleshooting for a possible fuel leak during most of the return to the field flight time. Becoming situationally aware, that landing immediately would result in max landing weight being exceeded, while simultaneously realizing that the Fuel Imbalance was no longer trending negatively. ATC's efforts to expeditiously vector Fight Crew to begin the approach, while being too high to safely do so. Notifying Flight Attendants, Passengers, and Dispatch of the issue and decision to return to the field. First flight of the day with a Cockpit Crew that had never flown together before. Fifth day of reserve with minimum sleep. The previous duty day ended hours after midnight with a \"Sound Check\" and Live DJ Wedding hotel event that ended at XA30 AM. This Crew Member estimated less than four hours of sleep. The Flight Crews thoroughly debriefed the event and came to the following conclusions: The above situation may have been mitigated, had the Flight Crew better coordinated with each other and ATC. The result may have been longer vectors, to provide more time to process the increased task loading and troubleshooting, once the Crew realized that the fuel imbalance trend had been reduced and eventually reversed. Taking a pause to communicate that the overweight landing was now a higher risk (versus the fuel imbalance) may have helped ATC to aid the Flight Crew with less expeditious vectoring and thereby avoid task saturation considering the high number of threats experience in the short flight back to the originating airport.\n\nNarrative 2\nEncountered a sudden fuel imbalance annunciation showing 1,300 pounds difference shortly after takeoff. Made decision to return but got rushed after ATC cleared us direct to field. While running checklists and coordinating with Flight Attendants, the Captain flew through final. We immediately coordinated to get vectors and landed [uneventfully].",
    "synopsis": "B737-700 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred while returning to departure airport following a fuel imbalance issue.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=115",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 115,
      "pageEnd": 117,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=115",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 115,
        "pageEnd": 117,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1932036 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B737-700 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred while returning to departure airport following a fuel imbalance issue.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1931686",
    "date": "2022-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We turned the engine bleeds off while taxiing into the gate from our first flight, to prevent a dual bleed light. The First Officer forgot to turn them back on after engine starting. We performed the appropriate checklists and the appropriate calls were made, but we forgot to visually check the bleed sources were in the correct position, when the Captain responded to the checklist. We climbed out as normal, but as we were performing the 10,000 ft. Checklist, the Cabin Pressure Warning horn and light went off. We leveled off at 10,000 ft., told ATC and immediately realized what we had done. We turned the bleeds on, went through the QRH to resolved the issue, and the cabin pressurized as normal. We notified ATC and the Flight Attendants, continued the climb and proceeded on course as intended. No others issues entailed during the flight. Threats to this situation were an extremely early report time and early morning awakening for both Crew Members. First Officer was new and Captain visually looked at bleeds during checklist and responded with what was \"expected\" but not as the bleeds actually were. Making sure that you respond to what you see not what you expect during checklist callouts And verifying bleed sources are in the correct position, after engine starting and shutting down the APU."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe turned the engine bleeds off while taxiing into the gate from our first flight, to prevent a dual bleed light. The First Officer forgot to turn them back on after engine starting. We performed the appropriate checklists and the appropriate calls were made, but we forgot to visually check the bleed sources were in the correct position, when the Captain responded to the checklist. We climbed out as normal, but as we were performing the 10,000 ft. Checklist, the Cabin Pressure Warning horn and light went off. We leveled off at 10,000 ft., told ATC and immediately realized what we had done. We turned the bleeds on, went through the QRH to resolved the issue, and the cabin pressurized as normal. We notified ATC and the Flight Attendants, continued the climb and proceeded on course as intended. No others issues entailed during the flight. Threats to this situation were an extremely early report time and early morning awakening for both Crew Members. First Officer was new and Captain visually looked at bleeds during checklist and responded with what was \"expected\" but not as the bleeds actually were. Making sure that you respond to what you see not what you expect during checklist callouts And verifying bleed sources are in the correct position, after engine starting and shutting down the APU.",
    "synopsis": "B737-700 First Officer reported the flight took off with the pneumatic bleed valves closed, resulting in failure to pressurize. The crew noticed and corrected the error.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=118",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 118,
      "pageEnd": 119,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=118",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 118,
        "pageEnd": 119,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "Missed bleed-air setting prevents cabin pressurization",
    "summary": "A B737 crew left the engine bleed valves closed after startup despite completing checklists. A cabin-pressure warning at 10,000 feet prompted them to level off, open the valves, and restore normal pressurization; the reporter cited early waking and checking what was expected rather than the actual switch positions.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Procedures",
      "Fatigue",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1928964",
    "date": "2022-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Parked"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Failed to shutdown both engines on Shutdown Flow. Captain called for shutdown checklist. First Officer read the checklist in its entirety. Crew realized both engines start levers were not placed to cutoff after checklist completion and then immediately placed both start levers to cutoff and verified the engines were shutting down. Cause - It was the end of nearly an 11 hour duty day. Taxing into [Gate] DXX a tug cut in front of the aircraft and the Captain needed to make an abrupt stop to avoid hitting the tug. I believe that distraction pulled some of our focus during our shutdown of the aircraft along with the longer busy duty day added to some fatigue. Suggestions - Turning up the dome light after parking at the gate. Following the shutdown flow especially after engine start levers cutoff verifying the engine shutdown by decrease in N1, EGT, N2 and fuel flow."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Crew failed to recognize engines not shut down during shut down flow and while completing shut down checklist until Crew recognized issue after checklist completion while putting personal equipment away. Cause - Long flight day dealing with weather delays starting in ZZZ1 and weather, turbulence and significant mountain wave ZZZ2/ZZZ. Mitigated all issues but felt the fatigue setting in. Entering alleyway to gate had a tug moving along ramp edge suddenly turn to cross ramp in front of jet. I had to lock brakes to stop quickly which became a mental distraction. Day flyer, flying a night trip and had turned down cockpit lighting prior to running checklist, as I would during daylight hours and did not turn on dome light until after checklist. Suggestions - Slow down the shut down checklist. Do not turn down flight deck lighting until getting to that item on checklist."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nFailed to shutdown both engines on Shutdown Flow. Captain called for shutdown checklist. First Officer read the checklist in its entirety. Crew realized both engines start levers were not placed to cutoff after checklist completion and then immediately placed both start levers to cutoff and verified the engines were shutting down. Cause - It was the end of nearly an 11 hour duty day. Taxing into [Gate] DXX a tug cut in front of the aircraft and the Captain needed to make an abrupt stop to avoid hitting the tug. I believe that distraction pulled some of our focus during our shutdown of the aircraft along with the longer busy duty day added to some fatigue. Suggestions - Turning up the dome light after parking at the gate. Following the shutdown flow especially after engine start levers cutoff verifying the engine shutdown by decrease in N1, EGT, N2 and fuel flow.\n\nNarrative 2\nCrew failed to recognize engines not shut down during shut down flow and while completing shut down checklist until Crew recognized issue after checklist completion while putting personal equipment away. Cause - Long flight day dealing with weather delays starting in ZZZ1 and weather, turbulence and significant mountain wave ZZZ2/ZZZ. Mitigated all issues but felt the fatigue setting in. Entering alleyway to gate had a tug moving along ramp edge suddenly turn to cross ramp in front of jet. I had to lock brakes to stop quickly which became a mental distraction. Day flyer, flying a night trip and had turned down cockpit lighting prior to running checklist, as I would during daylight hours and did not turn on dome light until after checklist. Suggestions - Slow down the shut down checklist. Do not turn down flight deck lighting until getting to that item on checklist.",
    "synopsis": "B737-800 flight crew reported they failed to shut down both engines during their shutdown flow. The crew stated distraction caused by a conflict with a tug contributed to the event. Fatigue was also cited as a factor.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=120",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 120,
      "pageEnd": 121,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=120",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 120,
        "pageEnd": 121,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1928964 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B737-800 flight crew reported they failed to shut down both engines during their shutdown flow. The crew stated distraction caused by a conflict with a tug contributed to the event. Fatigue was also cited as a factor.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1916238",
    "date": "2022-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach",
      "Initial Approach",
      "Landing",
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During visual approach to XXL, First Officer (FO) was pilot flying (PF) and I was pilot monitoring (PM). Both pilots were unfamiliar with simultaneous visual approach procedures into ZZZ1. We were cleared on the visual following traffic to the parallel. Due to heavy glare and haze, FO was unable to maintain visual with the runway and I opted to take controls since I could see the runway and traffic to follow. ATC had assigned a speed without specifying when to slow or when to contact Tower and we crossed the FAF at 170 kts. In the ensuing rush to contact Tower, finish configuring and run the before landing checklist, we ended up making our stabilized call at 500 ft. After touchdown and before rolling through XXR, I heard Tower clear an aircraft for takeoff on XXR and I came to a rapid stop short of XXR. Neither pilot had heard an ATC clearance to land and hold short of any runway or taxiway. We cleared the Runway at Taxiway 1 and taxied to the gate without further incident. Task saturation and tunnel vision led me to fail to call for or execute a go around when it was clearly called for. Unfamiliarity with the visual approach procedures at ZZZ1 and a long duty day were contributing factors to poor decision making and situational awareness. More detailed information on unique procedures into large airports to ensure pilot familiarity, better fatigue mitigation and a continued emphasis on executing a go around when an approach becomes unstable."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "After almost a 5 hour maintenance delay at ZZZ2, an integrated drive generator was deferred and we completed one of the two legs that were originally on our schedule before timing out. I was pilot flying (PF) this leg and elected not to brief the arrival into ZZZ1 on the ground due to lots of variables and abnormals for compliance with the MEL on the departure briefing. In the climb-out, I called for Autopilot on to start looking at the arrival and complete a brief then. Both the Captain and I were unfamiliar with ZZZ1. Once we reached cruise, we immediately got a descend via clearance on the ZZZZZ 4 arrival. I had not briefed yet because we were discussing the Visual as we were told to expect that. Being unfamiliar with this, we did not know how to correctly program the FMS. We spent a lot of time trying to figure this out while we were descending down. I eventually briefed the visual backed up with the ILS XXL as I normally would for a visual and briefed a threat to be the Visual procedure as we weren't sure what to expect or how that would go. Descent check was called for at about 13,000 ft. We ultimately ended up high and fast to join the intercept course to the XXL LOC. ATC asked a few times if we had the airport in sight, but it was evening and the sun was setting right in the direction the airport was. There was also a haze layer creating visual illusions and I could not find the runway. As we got closer, I could tell we were getting high and fast and needed to accept the visual to get configured and on glide path. The captain saw the runway and called it in sight and we attempted to slow and get set up. ATC had us at 210 kts. and 5000 ft., then eventually gave us 180 kts. or greater. We went flaps 8/20 and gear down with full boards to lose altitude. I still did not have the airport in sight looking right into the sun so we swapped controls and I transitioned to pilot monitoring (PM). ATC never handed us off to Tower so once inside the FAF we got fully configured by going flaps 30/45 in one call, and never completed the correct calls for check spoilers, flaps 45 before landing check. As flaps were in transit to 45, I called Tower for landing clearance. During their read back, we got a FLT SPOILER DEPLOY caution and retracted the spoilers. I read back landing clearance and we continued to land. During the roll-out, it appears Tower cleared someone on XR to takeoff before we crossed that intersection. Unsure if we missed a land and hold short clearance, the captain used the breaks to stop before the XR intersection. Tower proceeded to clear traffic to land behind us on XXL, give an aircraft a line up and wait clearance for XXL while we are stopped on the runway with no further instruction. We elected to taxi off and wait for further instructions, and the remainder of the taxi-in was uneventful. Both the captain and I were unfamiliar with ZZZ1, their arrivals and charted visuals. Fatigue definitely played a role as this was already into our 2 hour extension period from a reflow on a 13.5 hour duty day. The short flight was a threat and did not give us enough time to brief and prepare for the visual. Neither of us were fully clear on the procedures involved with the charted visuals and how the FMS should be set up/used. ATC was nearly pressuring us to report the airport in sight so they could clear us for the visual. At the time, accepting the visual seemed like the only way to get in a position to be stabilized on the approach course because ATC did not give us vectors or lower altitudes to help put us in position. The sun was setting and was shining right at us, and combined with the haze, it was very difficult to find the airport having not been familiar with the area. From the very beginning, we could have asked for delay vectors on the arrival to get caught up and try to understand the charted visual procedures. Then coming in closer, we could have asked for a slower speed to help create time and get configured with at least flaps 8 and 20. Without having the airport in sight, we also could have asked for the ILS but it seemed that everyone else was getting in with the visual so ATC kept asking if we had the airport in sight so they could send us on our way. Once cleared for the visual, it was apparent we were not in a good position but ATC cleared us anyway and we tried to make it work. At this point, it got really hectic and busy, we should have broken off the approach and came back around. We were not stabilized by 1000 ft. which should have been a mandatory go-around. I don't think I ever once considered doing a go-around because of task saturation and tunnel vision to keep the aircraft under control and clear of parallel traffic. I could have also asked the Tower Controller to say again with the landing clearance. Going back to liveATC, it appears the Tower Controller cleared someone to line up and wait on XXR and he told us that there was traffic in position and holding on the intersecting runway, current winds and cleared to land. The only part I heard was the landing clearance, but I was aware he said more. I just did not hear the other parts of the transmission due to the caution coming on at the same time. A little more direction/assistance from ATC would have helped tremendously, but they probably had no way of knowing we were unfamiliar with these procedures. It would also be helpful to have information on our company charts about these procedures, especially since ZZZ3 based crews rarely go to this area. Bottom line, we should have gone around at the latest at 1000 ft. when we were not stabilized."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring visual approach to XXL, First Officer (FO) was pilot flying (PF) and I was pilot monitoring (PM). Both pilots were unfamiliar with simultaneous visual approach procedures into ZZZ1. We were cleared on the visual following traffic to the parallel. Due to heavy glare and haze, FO was unable to maintain visual with the runway and I opted to take controls since I could see the runway and traffic to follow. ATC had assigned a speed without specifying when to slow or when to contact Tower and we crossed the FAF at 170 kts. In the ensuing rush to contact Tower, finish configuring and run the before landing checklist, we ended up making our stabilized call at 500 ft. After touchdown and before rolling through XXR, I heard Tower clear an aircraft for takeoff on XXR and I came to a rapid stop short of XXR. Neither pilot had heard an ATC clearance to land and hold short of any runway or taxiway. We cleared the Runway at Taxiway 1 and taxied to the gate without further incident. Task saturation and tunnel vision led me to fail to call for or execute a go around when it was clearly called for. Unfamiliarity with the visual approach procedures at ZZZ1 and a long duty day were contributing factors to poor decision making and situational awareness. More detailed information on unique procedures into large airports to ensure pilot familiarity, better fatigue mitigation and a continued emphasis on executing a go around when an approach becomes unstable.\n\nNarrative 2\nAfter almost a 5 hour maintenance delay at ZZZ2, an integrated drive generator was deferred and we completed one of the two legs that were originally on our schedule before timing out. I was pilot flying (PF) this leg and elected not to brief the arrival into ZZZ1 on the ground due to lots of variables and abnormals for compliance with the MEL on the departure briefing. In the climb-out, I called for Autopilot on to start looking at the arrival and complete a brief then. Both the Captain and I were unfamiliar with ZZZ1. Once we reached cruise, we immediately got a descend via clearance on the ZZZZZ 4 arrival. I had not briefed yet because we were discussing the Visual as we were told to expect that. Being unfamiliar with this, we did not know how to correctly program the FMS. We spent a lot of time trying to figure this out while we were descending down. I eventually briefed the visual backed up with the ILS XXL as I normally would for a visual and briefed a threat to be the Visual procedure as we weren't sure what to expect or how that would go. Descent check was called for at about 13,000 ft. We ultimately ended up high and fast to join the intercept course to the XXL LOC. ATC asked a few times if we had the airport in sight, but it was evening and the sun was setting right in the direction the airport was. There was also a haze layer creating visual illusions and I could not find the runway. As we got closer, I could tell we were getting high and fast and needed to accept the visual to get configured and on glide path. The captain saw the runway and called it in sight and we attempted to slow and get set up. ATC had us at 210 kts. and 5000 ft., then eventually gave us 180 kts. or greater. We went flaps 8/20 and gear down with full boards to lose altitude. I still did not have the airport in sight looking right into the sun so we swapped controls and I transitioned to pilot monitoring (PM). ATC never handed us off to Tower so once inside the FAF we got fully configured by going flaps 30/45 in one call, and never completed the correct calls for check spoilers, flaps 45 before landing check. As flaps were in transit to 45, I called Tower for landing clearance. During their read back, we got a FLT SPOILER DEPLOY caution and retracted the spoilers. I read back landing clearance and we continued to land. During the roll-out, it appears Tower cleared someone on XR to takeoff before we crossed that intersection. Unsure if we missed a land and hold short clearance, the captain used the breaks to stop before the XR intersection. Tower proceeded to clear traffic to land behind us on XXL, give an aircraft a line up and wait clearance for XXL while we are stopped on the runway with no further instruction. We elected to taxi off and wait for further instructions, and the remainder of the taxi-in was uneventful. Both the captain and I were unfamiliar with ZZZ1, their arrivals and charted visuals. Fatigue definitely played a role as this was already into our 2 hour extension period from a reflow on a 13.5 hour duty day. The short flight was a threat and did not give us enough time to brief and prepare for the visual. Neither of us were fully clear on the procedures involved with the charted visuals and how the FMS should be set up/used. ATC was nearly pressuring us to report the airport in sight so they could clear us for the visual. At the time, accepting the visual seemed like the only way to get in a position to be stabilized on the approach course because ATC did not give us vectors or lower altitudes to help put us in position. The sun was setting and was shining right at us, and combined with the haze, it was very difficult to find the airport having not been familiar with the area. From the very beginning, we could have asked for delay vectors on the arrival to get caught up and try to understand the charted visual procedures. Then coming in closer, we could have asked for a slower speed to help create time and get configured with at least flaps 8 and 20. Without having the airport in sight, we also could have asked for the ILS but it seemed that everyone else was getting in with the visual so ATC kept asking if we had the airport in sight so they could send us on our way. Once cleared for the visual, it was apparent we were not in a good position but ATC cleared us anyway and we tried to make it work. At this point, it got really hectic and busy, we should have broken off the approach and came back around. We were not stabilized by 1000 ft. which should have been a mandatory go-around. I don't think I ever once considered doing a go-around because of task saturation and tunnel vision to keep the aircraft under control and clear of parallel traffic. I could have also asked the Tower Controller to say again with the landing clearance. Going back to liveATC, it appears the Tower Controller cleared someone to line up and wait on XXR and he told us that there was traffic in position and holding on the intersecting runway, current winds and cleared to land. The only part I heard was the landing clearance, but I was aware he said more. I just did not hear the other parts of the transmission due to the caution coming on at the same time. A little more direction/assistance from ATC would have helped tremendously, but they probably had no way of knowing we were unfamiliar with these procedures. It would also be helpful to have information on our company charts about these procedures, especially since ZZZ3 based crews rarely go to this area. Bottom line, we should have gone around at the latest at 1000 ft. when we were not stabilized.",
    "synopsis": "CRJ200 flight crew reported multiple issues resulted in an unstable approach that would have required a go around. Instead, the crew continued the landing and were stable by 500 ft AGL.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=122",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 122,
      "pageEnd": 125,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=122",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 122,
        "pageEnd": 125,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1916238 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "CRJ200 flight crew reported multiple issues resulted in an unstable approach that would have required a go around. Instead, the crew continued the landing and were stable by 500 ft AGL.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1916153",
    "date": "2022-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Parked"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Reported to ZZZ, Date, XX:30, H3005. OAT at one time was discussed to be as high as 107 degrees F. Met FO (First Officer) at FPA (Flight Planning Area) and completed flight planning assignments. Proceeded to Gate XX and prepared aircraft for on-time departure of Aircraft X. Main cabin door and cargo door closed...was waiting for Final DG report. Called ZZZ Operations about Final DG...no report. Sent Load Planning a message and called Dispatch regarding no Final DG Report...Final DG report arrives about 15-20 minutes after doors closed. (Note: very hot on flight deck, estimate of 95 degrees F.) Push the aircraft, start both engines, and taxi to XXL/WW. Given instructions to line up and wait. Once on the active runway, Equipment Overheat EICAS message. Obtained clearance to taxi clear of Runway XXL. Initiated QRH procedures, switch to Standby, wait 5 minutes to determine if Overheat condition still present. Once switched to Standby, overheat annunciation inhibited for 5 minutes. After 5 minutes overheat still present. Contacted ZZZ Operations and asked for a gate return. Was told no wide body gates available, did you call Maintenance? Maintenance release sent. ZZZ Operations instructed me to contact ZZZ Maintenance. ZZZ Maintenance asked to confirm the operating configuration of the aircraft and I confirmed. ZZZ Maintenance asked me if I wanted to reset the system. I declined the request. I again asked ZZZ Operations for a gate, no gate available. (Note: flight deck temperature estimated in excess of 100 degrees F. QRH discussed failure of instruments, due to excessive heat. I was concern for safety of flight deck occupants and possible damage to the aircraft.) Contacted Dispatch and explained the situation. Dispatch called ZZZ Operations and eventually Gate XX was assigned for gate return. Shortly after parking at XX, ZZZ Tech Operations Personnel arrived on the flight deck and showed me an iPad picture of a closed E and E bay exhaust valve. Tech Operations indicated that the exhaust valve was not modulating open. Deplaned passengers from aircraft. At first, Tech Operations wanted to MEL the malfunctioning exhaust valve. I indicated I would not operate the aircraft with the MEL. Tech Operations then stated that they would replace the exhaust valve. Tech Operations indicated that the repair would be complete by XE:15pm. At approximately XE:30pm, I was notified of an aircraft swap. FO and I proceeded to the FPA, I reviewed and authorized a new release, and proceeded to Gate XY. At some point, I received a call from Crew Scheduling and was asked if the flight deck crew was willing to extend IAW FAR 117. The FO and I were willing to extend. CCO XH:28.pm. To continue, storm developed around ZZZ, with associated lightning...Ramp Closed. Ramp opened around XG:00pm. The flight began boarding. We started taking on the required fuel and I was confident the flight would takeoff prior to CCO Time. At approximately XG:50pm, I noticed that the cargo door was closed, but did not receive a DG report, main cabin door closed. I sent a message via Chat and asked about the DG report and asked to confirm that baggage loading was complete. After a several minutes it was reported that baggage cans from the previous flight were still on the previous aircraft and that baggage cans for that flight had not been loaded. ZZZ Operations announced that the flight was cancelled. Passengers deplaned. The FO and I left the aircraft at approximately XH:30. Crew Scheduling called and left a message that Aircraft X would operate/depart Date1, XR:30 am. I got home at approximately XJ:15am, Date1, and into bed at approximately XK:00 am. Prior to bed, I took 3 Bayer aspirins, as I had a significant headache. I estimate that I fell asleep at approximately XL:00 am. My alarm clock was set for XO:30 am. Once awake I determined that I was fatigued and was not fit for duty. I called Crew Scheduling and reported fatigued. The scheduler requested a time when I would be fit...I responded mid to late afternoon on Date1. I woke up at approximately XS:30 am, and called Crew Scheduling advising them that I was no longer fatigued. I would like to add that I believe my prolonged exposure to much higher-than-normal ambient temperatures added to my state of fatigue."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nReported to ZZZ, Date, XX:30, H3005. OAT at one time was discussed to be as high as 107 degrees F. Met FO (First Officer) at FPA (Flight Planning Area) and completed flight planning assignments. Proceeded to Gate XX and prepared aircraft for on-time departure of Aircraft X. Main cabin door and cargo door closed...was waiting for Final DG report. Called ZZZ Operations about Final DG...no report. Sent Load Planning a message and called Dispatch regarding no Final DG Report...Final DG report arrives about 15-20 minutes after doors closed. (Note: very hot on flight deck, estimate of 95 degrees F.) Push the aircraft, start both engines, and taxi to XXL/WW. Given instructions to line up and wait. Once on the active runway, Equipment Overheat EICAS message. Obtained clearance to taxi clear of Runway XXL. Initiated QRH procedures, switch to Standby, wait 5 minutes to determine if Overheat condition still present. Once switched to Standby, overheat annunciation inhibited for 5 minutes. After 5 minutes overheat still present. Contacted ZZZ Operations and asked for a gate return. Was told no wide body gates available, did you call Maintenance? Maintenance release sent. ZZZ Operations instructed me to contact ZZZ Maintenance. ZZZ Maintenance asked to confirm the operating configuration of the aircraft and I confirmed. ZZZ Maintenance asked me if I wanted to reset the system. I declined the request. I again asked ZZZ Operations for a gate, no gate available. (Note: flight deck temperature estimated in excess of 100 degrees F. QRH discussed failure of instruments, due to excessive heat. I was concern for safety of flight deck occupants and possible damage to the aircraft.) Contacted Dispatch and explained the situation. Dispatch called ZZZ Operations and eventually Gate XX was assigned for gate return. Shortly after parking at XX, ZZZ Tech Operations Personnel arrived on the flight deck and showed me an iPad picture of a closed E and E bay exhaust valve. Tech Operations indicated that the exhaust valve was not modulating open. Deplaned passengers from aircraft. At first, Tech Operations wanted to MEL the malfunctioning exhaust valve. I indicated I would not operate the aircraft with the MEL. Tech Operations then stated that they would replace the exhaust valve. Tech Operations indicated that the repair would be complete by XE:15pm. At approximately XE:30pm, I was notified of an aircraft swap. FO and I proceeded to the FPA, I reviewed and authorized a new release, and proceeded to Gate XY. At some point, I received a call from Crew Scheduling and was asked if the flight deck crew was willing to extend IAW FAR 117. The FO and I were willing to extend. CCO XH:28.pm. To continue, storm developed around ZZZ, with associated lightning...Ramp Closed. Ramp opened around XG:00pm. The flight began boarding. We started taking on the required fuel and I was confident the flight would takeoff prior to CCO Time. At approximately XG:50pm, I noticed that the cargo door was closed, but did not receive a DG report, main cabin door closed. I sent a message via Chat and asked about the DG report and asked to confirm that baggage loading was complete. After a several minutes it was reported that baggage cans from the previous flight were still on the previous aircraft and that baggage cans for that flight had not been loaded. ZZZ Operations announced that the flight was cancelled. Passengers deplaned. The FO and I left the aircraft at approximately XH:30. Crew Scheduling called and left a message that Aircraft X would operate/depart Date1, XR:30 am. I got home at approximately XJ:15am, Date1, and into bed at approximately XK:00 am. Prior to bed, I took 3 Bayer aspirins, as I had a significant headache. I estimate that I fell asleep at approximately XL:00 am. My alarm clock was set for XO:30 am. Once awake I determined that I was fatigued and was not fit for duty. I called Crew Scheduling and reported fatigued. The scheduler requested a time when I would be fit...I responded mid to late afternoon on Date1. I woke up at approximately XS:30 am, and called Crew Scheduling advising them that I was no longer fatigued. I would like to add that I believe my prolonged exposure to much higher-than-normal ambient temperatures added to my state of fatigue.",
    "synopsis": "B767 Captain reported numerous delays were caused by mechanical, communications and ground weather. The flight eventually cancelled and the Captain called out fatigued due to the situation.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=126",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 126,
      "pageEnd": 128,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=126",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 126,
        "pageEnd": 128,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1916153 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B767 Captain reported numerous delays were caused by mechanical, communications and ground weather. The flight eventually cancelled and the Captain called out fatigued due to the situation.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1915224",
    "date": "2022-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During push-back at ZZZ at XA:28 local time, the new ATIS stated conditions codes 5,5,5 100% wet for our departure runway. The Performance Data indicated dry conditions; so I (First Officer) contacted Operations to have them change the condition code to wet during push back. I also started the #1 engine, then requested a new performance data through ACARS. As the ground crew stopped the push back, the new performance data printed out and I began inputting the data into the FMS. Simultaneously, the Captain conducted a control check (as I monitored) and called for \"flaps 2, taxi\" to begin movement. I looked at the EICAS verified steering was disengaged and the Flaps were set to 2. I looked up and didn't see any ground crews. I then said, \"flaps set, steering engaged.\" The Captain then began to taxi forward. That's when I noticed the tug and ground crews directly under the airplane walking back. I immediately yelled \"STOP, STOP, STOP\" and applied brakes. The aircraft moved forward about 3-5 ft. before coming to a complete stop with equipment and personnel directly under the aircraft. The Captain acknowledged and set the parking brake. No ground personnel or equipment contacted the airplane. We then received a salute from ground personnel as they departed the area of operations. The Captain and I discussed the situation and continued the rest of the flight without incident. This event occurred early in the morning when both crew members were tired. Airfield conditions called for new performance data which caused a slight distraction for both crew members. The Captain has just over 80 hours as pilot in command (PIC) following a long break from the company. Distraction with the performance data, inexperience, and lack of situational awareness caused the Captain to lose focus and forget to wait for ground personnel to leave the area before conducting the control check and calling for taxi. As the First Officer (FO), I should have been more situational aware of what the Captain was doing and the location of ground personnel. Ensure Captains are adequately trained, comfortable, and ready prior to being released from IOE. After flying with the Captain for the entire sequence, it is my opinion that the Captain needed more time to develop flows, understand procedure, and become operationally proficient before being released to the line."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "VFR conditions, ATIS reporting wet runway conditions. Communication with Operations to change to wet for correct performance data numbers. Performance numbers came out during push causing a distraction. After engine start and tow-bar release aircraft moved approximately two feet before CRM and stopped the plane without contact, damage or injury. Stopped reviewed performance data, ran/ reran all flows and checklist at a thorough pace and continued. Early start in the dark, operations and communication with operations to correct the field conditions leading to an unnecessary interruption/ distraction causing an input change to the FMS that would have been best accomplished at the gate in the normal routine manner. Communication with Operations to ensure field conditions that the performance data will be calculated on the latest ATIS or official weather. This should be accomplished after obtaining weather information during the normal preflight sequence, especially in changing weather conditions. With the discovery of any unusual information the parking brake should be set, verify ground crew position and both pilots agree on the change. This is how I will approach this or a similar situation in the future."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring push-back at ZZZ at XA:28 local time, the new ATIS stated conditions codes 5,5,5 100% wet for our departure runway. The Performance Data indicated dry conditions; so I (First Officer) contacted Operations to have them change the condition code to wet during push back. I also started the #1 engine, then requested a new performance data through ACARS. As the ground crew stopped the push back, the new performance data printed out and I began inputting the data into the FMS. Simultaneously, the Captain conducted a control check (as I monitored) and called for \"flaps 2, taxi\" to begin movement. I looked at the EICAS verified steering was disengaged and the Flaps were set to 2. I looked up and didn't see any ground crews. I then said, \"flaps set, steering engaged.\" The Captain then began to taxi forward. That's when I noticed the tug and ground crews directly under the airplane walking back. I immediately yelled \"STOP, STOP, STOP\" and applied brakes. The aircraft moved forward about 3-5 ft. before coming to a complete stop with equipment and personnel directly under the aircraft. The Captain acknowledged and set the parking brake. No ground personnel or equipment contacted the airplane. We then received a salute from ground personnel as they departed the area of operations. The Captain and I discussed the situation and continued the rest of the flight without incident. This event occurred early in the morning when both crew members were tired. Airfield conditions called for new performance data which caused a slight distraction for both crew members. The Captain has just over 80 hours as pilot in command (PIC) following a long break from the company. Distraction with the performance data, inexperience, and lack of situational awareness caused the Captain to lose focus and forget to wait for ground personnel to leave the area before conducting the control check and calling for taxi. As the First Officer (FO), I should have been more situational aware of what the Captain was doing and the location of ground personnel. Ensure Captains are adequately trained, comfortable, and ready prior to being released from IOE. After flying with the Captain for the entire sequence, it is my opinion that the Captain needed more time to develop flows, understand procedure, and become operationally proficient before being released to the line.\n\nNarrative 2\nVFR conditions, ATIS reporting wet runway conditions. Communication with Operations to change to wet for correct performance data numbers. Performance numbers came out during push causing a distraction. After engine start and tow-bar release aircraft moved approximately two feet before CRM and stopped the plane without contact, damage or injury. Stopped reviewed performance data, ran/ reran all flows and checklist at a thorough pace and continued. Early start in the dark, operations and communication with operations to correct the field conditions leading to an unnecessary interruption/ distraction causing an input change to the FMS that would have been best accomplished at the gate in the normal routine manner. Communication with Operations to ensure field conditions that the performance data will be calculated on the latest ATIS or official weather. This should be accomplished after obtaining weather information during the normal preflight sequence, especially in changing weather conditions. With the discovery of any unusual information the parking brake should be set, verify ground crew position and both pilots agree on the change. This is how I will approach this or a similar situation in the future.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier Captain and First Officer reported a failure to use SOPs during push back and brake release. The Captain and First Officer failed to communicate and released brakes while the ground crew was still under the aircraft. There were no injuries or equipment contact.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=129",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 129,
      "pageEnd": 131,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=129",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 129,
        "pageEnd": 131,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1915224 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier Captain and First Officer reported a failure to use SOPs during push back and brake release. The Captain and First Officer failed to communicate and released brakes while the ground crew was still under the aircraft. There were no injuries or equipment contact.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1915174",
    "date": "2022-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "A321"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Parked"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Approaching the gate it was clear a serious fume event had/was taking place. Walking down the jet-bridge I almost immediately had a hard time breathing the air. Once I entered the cockpit, it was 100% clear it was fume event. I told the FAs (Flight Attendants) to deplane. Maintenance had NOT written up the issue much to my surprise. I immediately entered the fume event in the logbook. The air in the aircraft was so bad I had to depart to the gate area. Later I agreed to complete engine run ups and maintenance checks. The issue did not go away. Soon after I started to feel sick. I stated this to my FO (First Officer) and the FAs. Several hours later the flight cancelled and assumed I was going to the hotel. Scheduling demanded that I DH (Dead Head) back on a flight to ZZZ. I stated I needed a hotel room--I was told \"Sorry\". After hours of toxic air, maintenance run ups, and fume event reports, I was not feeling sick and fatigued but Scheduling would not grant my request for a hotel. I called out fatigued. I contacted [medical] after I called out due my stomach issues."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nApproaching the gate it was clear a serious fume event had/was taking place. Walking down the jet-bridge I almost immediately had a hard time breathing the air. Once I entered the cockpit, it was 100% clear it was fume event. I told the FAs (Flight Attendants) to deplane. Maintenance had NOT written up the issue much to my surprise. I immediately entered the fume event in the logbook. The air in the aircraft was so bad I had to depart to the gate area. Later I agreed to complete engine run ups and maintenance checks. The issue did not go away. Soon after I started to feel sick. I stated this to my FO (First Officer) and the FAs. Several hours later the flight cancelled and assumed I was going to the hotel. Scheduling demanded that I DH (Dead Head) back on a flight to ZZZ. I stated I needed a hotel room--I was told \"Sorry\". After hours of toxic air, maintenance run ups, and fume event reports, I was not feeling sick and fatigued but Scheduling would not grant my request for a hotel. I called out fatigued. I contacted [medical] after I called out due my stomach issues.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier Captain reported a fume event during gate preflight. After assisting maintenance with the engine run ups and maintenance checks which resulted in no improvements the flight was cancelled.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=132",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 132,
      "pageEnd": 133,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=132",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 132,
        "pageEnd": 133,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "Fumes persist through maintenance checks at the gate",
    "summary": "An A321 captain reported strong fumes, breathing difficulty, and later feeling sick while the aircraft was at the gate. The captain logged the problem, assisted with checks that did not resolve it, and called out fatigued after the flight was canceled and a hotel request was refused.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Equipment",
      "Fatigue"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1909487",
    "date": "2022-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-900"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "It had been a long day for us. We extended our duty, multiple passenger issues (including a full deplane and reboard hrs later), 5 releases, an over fuel, multiple Flight Attendants timed out because of legality issues, performance issues due to wind and temps in ZZZ, and multiple extensive ZZZ1 delays due to gate issues and WX. I have provided this information to give you a complete picture of our environment and mindset of that day. We were going to depart Runway XX in ZZZ. It was to be a bleeds off take off so the QRH was run. The takeoff roll was normal with thrust set and checked. The 100 knots call was made and then I noticed the EGT dial was full red. I brought it to the Captain's attention and he rejected. My best guess is that we were at 110 knots. The rejection was executed properly with all appropriate calls made. We ran the QRH and then QRH for the rejection and the exceedance. The trucks were also called. After consulting with [airport] response, the Flight Attendants, and the QRH, we determined it was safe to return to the gate. We parked at Gate X without further incident. I support my Captain's decision to reject because I feel it was truly in the interest of safety."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Departing ZZZ Runway XX. Bleeds off takeoff. Flaps 1. Approximately 163,000 pounds takeoff weight. Surface temps in ZZZ around 30C. Winds 120@10G20. Aircraft was properly configured. Bleeds Off Takeoff QRH was referenced by the FO (First Officer) and I double checked it. Takeoff thrust was 101.2% N1 I believe. Takeoff roll was normal...100 knot call out was made. Just past the 100 knot call the FO called the Engine 2 Exceedance. Engine 2 EGT dial was completely RED which sits just below the N1 Dial. I made the decision to abort the takeoff at around 110 knots. Stopped halfway down the runway. Determined we could clear the runway and turned off at the High-Speed [Taxiway] 1. We asked for the ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) to be dispatched. They reported no damage, no brake fire. Completed the RTO (Rejected Takeoff) QRC/QRH. The Engine Limit or Surge or Stall QRH. Referenced the Brake Cooling Charts for a 900ER and determined we could taxi to the gate. Arrived at the gate with no further incident. I do understand that above 100 knots, we should reject for loss of directional control, Fire, Engine Failure, PWS (Predictive Wind Shear). However in the moment, with a relatively heavy airplane, max performance, and the long runway I believed at that time it was safer to stop the airplane. A different airport with a different set of conditions I am not certain I would have. Also seeing a completely red EGT gauge just below the N1 gauge does lead to a definite startle factor in what exactly I am I looking at. The fact that it was a long day which included defueling the airplane, about the start the push only to be told by Dispatch not to push because flights we are diverting out of ZZZ1. Deboarding, Customer Service issues, Multiple FAs (Flight Attendants) timing out, our own CCO (Critical Crew Offtime) issues which included extending our CCO time, reboarding, 5 Dispatch releases...Not 100% certain that is all relevant but maybe in my mind it was a factor in just saying maybe we should just call it and not take this plane airborne. I dunno. But at the end of the day we made that decision. Nothing was broke or bent, no one was hurt but it did give me a sleepless night and something to think about."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nIt had been a long day for us. We extended our duty, multiple passenger issues (including a full deplane and reboard hrs later), 5 releases, an over fuel, multiple Flight Attendants timed out because of legality issues, performance issues due to wind and temps in ZZZ, and multiple extensive ZZZ1 delays due to gate issues and WX. I have provided this information to give you a complete picture of our environment and mindset of that day. We were going to depart Runway XX in ZZZ. It was to be a bleeds off take off so the QRH was run. The takeoff roll was normal with thrust set and checked. The 100 knots call was made and then I noticed the EGT dial was full red. I brought it to the Captain's attention and he rejected. My best guess is that we were at 110 knots. The rejection was executed properly with all appropriate calls made. We ran the QRH and then QRH for the rejection and the exceedance. The trucks were also called. After consulting with [airport] response, the Flight Attendants, and the QRH, we determined it was safe to return to the gate. We parked at Gate X without further incident. I support my Captain's decision to reject because I feel it was truly in the interest of safety.\n\nNarrative 2\nDeparting ZZZ Runway XX. Bleeds off takeoff. Flaps 1. Approximately 163,000 pounds takeoff weight. Surface temps in ZZZ around 30C. Winds 120@10G20. Aircraft was properly configured. Bleeds Off Takeoff QRH was referenced by the FO (First Officer) and I double checked it. Takeoff thrust was 101.2% N1 I believe. Takeoff roll was normal...100 knot call out was made. Just past the 100 knot call the FO called the Engine 2 Exceedance. Engine 2 EGT dial was completely RED which sits just below the N1 Dial. I made the decision to abort the takeoff at around 110 knots. Stopped halfway down the runway. Determined we could clear the runway and turned off at the High-Speed [Taxiway] 1. We asked for the ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) to be dispatched. They reported no damage, no brake fire. Completed the RTO (Rejected Takeoff) QRC/QRH. The Engine Limit or Surge or Stall QRH. Referenced the Brake Cooling Charts for a 900ER and determined we could taxi to the gate. Arrived at the gate with no further incident. I do understand that above 100 knots, we should reject for loss of directional control, Fire, Engine Failure, PWS (Predictive Wind Shear). However in the moment, with a relatively heavy airplane, max performance, and the long runway I believed at that time it was safer to stop the airplane. A different airport with a different set of conditions I am not certain I would have. Also seeing a completely red EGT gauge just below the N1 gauge does lead to a definite startle factor in what exactly I am I looking at. The fact that it was a long day which included defueling the airplane, about the start the push only to be told by Dispatch not to push because flights we are diverting out of ZZZ1. Deboarding, Customer Service issues, Multiple FAs (Flight Attendants) timing out, our own CCO (Critical Crew Offtime) issues which included extending our CCO time, reboarding, 5 Dispatch releases...Not 100% certain that is all relevant but maybe in my mind it was a factor in just saying maybe we should just call it and not take this plane airborne. I dunno. But at the end of the day we made that decision. Nothing was broke or bent, no one was hurt but it did give me a sleepless night and something to think about.",
    "synopsis": "Flight Crew reported a rejected take off was caused by Engine #2 EGT exceedance and returned to the gate for maintenance action.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=134",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 134,
      "pageEnd": 136,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=134",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 134,
        "pageEnd": 136,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1909487 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Flight Crew reported a rejected take off was caused by Engine #2 EGT exceedance and returned to the gate for maintenance action.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1909015",
    "date": "2022-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ, Aircraft X experienced an AVNX MAU (Master Avionics Unit) 2B failure approximately 250 miles from ZZZ. The aircraft was at FL310. Upon experiencing the failure, the Captain was the Pilot Flying and had me identify and cancel. I pulled out the QRH and went step by step through the procedure with the Captain. Upon completion of the checklist we determined that a [request for priority handling] was appropriate and to request Crash Fire Rescue. We notified dispatch, the Flight Attendants and the passengers of the situation. The failure of the MAU caused us to lose our inboard brakes, ground and terrain proximity warning and a number of other messages. Based on the loss of our inboard brakes and with an increased runway requirement we would need CFR on site. We also selected Runway XXR as winds were favorable and it was 10,006 ft. runway. This was adequate based on the QRH number assessment for landing. We ran the Landing Gear/ Brake Malfunction descent and landing checklist in accordance with the QRH. Upon landing we experienced decreased braking capability but sufficient enough to safely stop. While stopping I also had up the system page to additionally monitor brake temps. We safely landed without any deviations or damage. After clearing the runway, we were asked by ATC to quickly taxi across XXL. I told them we were unable and reminded the controller that we had to brakes that failed. I personally was not happy that the Controller lost situational awareness and asked us to do something that was potentially unsafe. He acknowledged and we waited for to clear XXL. Upon taxiing into the gate the aircraft got the Brake Overheat message. We once again identified and canceled and I read the QRH and we executed it. The Captain stopped the aircraft and we determined the best course of action was to have the aircraft tugged to the gate. We had Crash Fire Rescue Equipment inspect us multiple times upon landing to ensure there was no threat to our passengers or crews from the hot brakes. We subsequently were tugged into the gate and waited for maintenance to respond. Upon arrival to the gate, Maintenance wanted to have the aircraft shutdown and brought back on line to see if the fault would clear. At this point, I was frustrated and felt like a better assessment of the reliability of our systems needed to occur after the failure in flight. We already had MEL XX-XX-XX-X for the FADEC (Full Authority Digital Electronic Control) that required an alternate ignition operations procedure on it. In response to this, I could tell that stress had set in and I made the decision not to continue flying for the rest of the day. After flying in the military for XX years, I call it the rule of three. When three things happen bad in the aircraft.... It's time for me to do a personal assessment of where I am at IAW (in accordance with) the personal assessment checklist. I also started to talk myself into continuing for the day which is a dangerous attitude to have. Upon recognizing that the event caused more stress than everyday operation, I informed the Duty Pilot and scheduling that I was not going to continue. I also talked to the Chief Pilot. I am glad I did this. Looking back at yesterdays events, we had a lot of additional complexities that we do not encounter on a normal day. These system failures were not our fault, but the QRH was well written enough to get us safely on the ground. We had good CRM throughout the [incidents]. I think our crew did a phenomenal job identifying and mitigating threats both in and after the flight, and that is why I am sharing this. I am also happy that there were both union and company personnel who supported my decision based on my self assessment. This is a positive cultural aspect that I would like to highlight. [I would suggest to] continue to train emergency and QRH usage. Continue to ask crews to do self assessments... we are not all built the same way. Learn from these failures and validate QRH procedures."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ, Aircraft X experienced an AVNX MAU (Master Avionics Unit) 2B failure approximately 250 miles from ZZZ. The aircraft was at FL310. Upon experiencing the failure, the Captain was the Pilot Flying and had me identify and cancel. I pulled out the QRH and went step by step through the procedure with the Captain. Upon completion of the checklist we determined that a [request for priority handling] was appropriate and to request Crash Fire Rescue. We notified dispatch, the Flight Attendants and the passengers of the situation. The failure of the MAU caused us to lose our inboard brakes, ground and terrain proximity warning and a number of other messages. Based on the loss of our inboard brakes and with an increased runway requirement we would need CFR on site. We also selected Runway XXR as winds were favorable and it was 10,006 ft. runway. This was adequate based on the QRH number assessment for landing. We ran the Landing Gear/ Brake Malfunction descent and landing checklist in accordance with the QRH. Upon landing we experienced decreased braking capability but sufficient enough to safely stop. While stopping I also had up the system page to additionally monitor brake temps. We safely landed without any deviations or damage. After clearing the runway, we were asked by ATC to quickly taxi across XXL. I told them we were unable and reminded the controller that we had to brakes that failed. I personally was not happy that the Controller lost situational awareness and asked us to do something that was potentially unsafe. He acknowledged and we waited for to clear XXL. Upon taxiing into the gate the aircraft got the Brake Overheat message. We once again identified and canceled and I read the QRH and we executed it. The Captain stopped the aircraft and we determined the best course of action was to have the aircraft tugged to the gate. We had Crash Fire Rescue Equipment inspect us multiple times upon landing to ensure there was no threat to our passengers or crews from the hot brakes. We subsequently were tugged into the gate and waited for maintenance to respond. Upon arrival to the gate, Maintenance wanted to have the aircraft shutdown and brought back on line to see if the fault would clear. At this point, I was frustrated and felt like a better assessment of the reliability of our systems needed to occur after the failure in flight. We already had MEL XX-XX-XX-X for the FADEC (Full Authority Digital Electronic Control) that required an alternate ignition operations procedure on it. In response to this, I could tell that stress had set in and I made the decision not to continue flying for the rest of the day. After flying in the military for XX years, I call it the rule of three. When three things happen bad in the aircraft.... It's time for me to do a personal assessment of where I am at IAW (in accordance with) the personal assessment checklist. I also started to talk myself into continuing for the day which is a dangerous attitude to have. Upon recognizing that the event caused more stress than everyday operation, I informed the Duty Pilot and scheduling that I was not going to continue. I also talked to the Chief Pilot. I am glad I did this. Looking back at yesterdays events, we had a lot of additional complexities that we do not encounter on a normal day. These system failures were not our fault, but the QRH was well written enough to get us safely on the ground. We had good CRM throughout the [incidents]. I think our crew did a phenomenal job identifying and mitigating threats both in and after the flight, and that is why I am sharing this. I am also happy that there were both union and company personnel who supported my decision based on my self assessment. This is a positive cultural aspect that I would like to highlight. [I would suggest to] continue to train emergency and QRH usage. Continue to ask crews to do self assessments... we are not all built the same way. Learn from these failures and validate QRH procedures.",
    "synopsis": "EMB ERJ 170/175 First Officer reported the failure of MAU 2B in cruise. The Flight Crew made a precautionary landing at destination airport and the aircraft was towed to the gate.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=137",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 137,
      "pageEnd": 139,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=137",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 137,
        "pageEnd": 139,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1909015 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "EMB ERJ 170/175 First Officer reported the failure of MAU 2B in cruise. The Flight Crew made a precautionary landing at destination airport and the aircraft was towed to the gate.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1907448",
    "date": "2022-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was the Captain on Flight XXX ZZZ-ZZZ1 performing Line Check Airmen (LCA) duties with a new hire on date. This was an all-night flight which was leg five and a third duty period for the new hire. My new hire was Military background and had completed his OE early this year and basically sat for four months. He had been back for a three-day sim recently. He has a great attitude and is eager to learn, however the first few legs he was challenged with a lack of -121 experience and what I believe was a degradation or loss of good habit patterns from the sim phase. Leg three on day two was a short, challenging flight from ZZZ2-ZZZ3. He was stressed and challenged making many mistakes, but ultimately I could see improvement, despite being overwhelmed with the pace of our operations. Leg four was a long leg from ZZZ3-ZZZ that same day, and showed significant improvement. The approach and landing were approaching \"line standard\" and I was hopeful if not confident that we had gotten over the \"hump\". We had a long layover to ready for the all night flight back to ZZZ1. I had stated that typically, it's much easier to fly from ZZZ to ZZZ1, so we could have a good flight and finish required briefings. The day before Flight XXX I had two periods with naps, early afternoon and then again in the evening before report time. My student reported that he had napped, but said he wish he had drank more coffee when we were in the cockpit. When I awoke an hour prior to report, the operations flight plan was not present, so I readied myself to the duty day. In the 10-15 minutes prior to leaving the room there was still no operations flight plan, but I had checked the weather along the tracks as well as ZZZ1 (all good, and VFR). The hotel van was late by almost 10 minutes. We arrived to chaos at the gate area. ZZZ station was buying seven passengers off the full flight. I pulled up the operations flight plan and immediately called Dispatch to remove fuel and get the latest ZZZ4. I then directed my First Officer (FO) to the cockpit to get ready for the flight, telling him that he was responsible for the FMC and that I would do the exterior walk around to give him additional time. Dispatch, Station and Flight Attendant conversations dominated the next several minutes and I arrived at the cockpit from the walk around approx. 25 min prior to pushback. He had most of the programming done and it was all accurate. He had been slow but usually pretty accurate in previous flights. We discussed the upcoming flap 25, Bleeds Off take-off and I had him pull up the supplemental procedure and review it. We were able to get all the passengers on, and we briefed and did the preflight checklist. I had briefed that we would push back, start both engines and run the before takeoff checklist to completion before taxi. Additionally, he had briefed a flap 25 bleeds off, and we analyzed the data and discussed the winds (080/10) and temp (23C) as these were critical to taking the planned weight. The door closed and we worked a clearance with ZZZ5. My FO was seemingly having issues with radio calls, attempting to take calls for other aircraft. So I slowed him down and we received our clearance and expected altitude. Then we pushed back and I directed him to start both engines as briefed. The preflight had been hectic, with me being pulled in many directions. I had shielded him from as much of that as possible, by having him simply work on his cockpit set up. I am very aware that my error signature is when I am rushed, I make mistakes. As such, when the brakes are released, I stop rushing and slow down. I briefed my student the same thing and I make sure to slow my speech pattern and checklist response time. That is not unique to this day, it's every time. I had briefed him that we were going to take our time and we were not rushed. I have no memory or perception for us rushing after push this night. After the number two engine was started, he was sitting there, and I saw the packs were off. This was a common error he had had in previous legs, so I pointed to the packs. The pushback crew was at my ten o'clock position and I looked back at them. Then I glanced in and saw that the number one engine wasn't started and I verbalized \"Start Number One\". He responded, \"Oh you want me to start Number One? OK.\" I then turn my attention back to the crew as it was time for the salute. I look back in and the engine is at max motoring, at approx. 34 percent N2 with the Fuel Control Switch still in Cutoff. My FO mumbled something about 30 percent which I didn't hear. I asked him to repeat it and he did. It was something about a \"limit\", so I asked again and got a reply I didn't understand, so I slowed down again and said, \"I do not understand what you are telling me\". He was confused, and it turns out that he was mixing up previous airplane's limits. I prompted him to start the engine. We ran through the After Start Checklist with no issues that I'm aware of. No without moving the aircraft we began the before take-off checklist. The first step is \"Final Weights\" from the ACARS printout. The number he read made no sense. I was thinking about it as he went on, trying to understand when he backed up and corrected himself to a number that made more sense. I'm assuming a transpose error. Then he went on to the takeoff weights/speeds and really had troubles. He was going back and forth from the takeoff data message to the FMC. I stopped him, and we talked about him analyzing the data, and checking it with the FMC prior to the checklist initiation. He understood, and I stopped the before takeoff checklist and we started again from the beginning. I remember the first two steps clearly. I remember the trim step clearly. I remember the FMC step clearly as we had discussed the routing that was absent a SID. In the later moments and the hours since I have no memory of mention of flaps. We taxied to the runway, ensured the bleed panel was correctly configured including techniques, got the release from ZZZ5 and took the runway. As we were taking the runway, I was going to go over the flap 25 takeoff again and talk rotation rates and pitches and as I said, \"OK...a Flaps 25 takeoff...\" and as I glanced at the gauge, the flaps were set to flaps 5. He reselected flaps 25, stating \"You probably said 25...\" We then stopped on the runway and accomplished the before takeoff check in its entirety. I know the \"whys\". I don't know the \"how\" and it'll be a while to cement the \"what am I going to do next\". He's new, with no airline background. He sat for four months. In my opinion he's lost habit patterns and confidence. There were operational pressures out of the station, along with numerous distractions. I knew and briefed that we were rushed and that we would take a moment. We did. I slowed things down. We both had stated that we napped, but it was late; XAAM for him, XBAM for me. The single most disturbing thing I'm wrestling with it for 20+ years in the B737, I've been very careful with flaps. From day one in the left seat when we get to the step, I pause (so that I can clear any taxi conflicts and go heads down) point to the FOs Take-off Page in the FMC, then point to the flap gage. Then I reach over and wiggle the flap handle in the detent. I couldn't in the moment, nor can I understand how I would have missed the step in the checklist or worse, how I could have possible stated \"25 indicated\" without a visual conformation and a tactile one. And I have no memory of any part of that step. My best guess, which considering my actions that day are suspect, is that he became increasingly overwhelmed and as his errors started occurring, he didn't have the habit patterns or muscle memory or experience to dig himself out. He's new. He sat an unconscionable amount of time and is trying as hard has he can. But he told me that night, \"Chair flying can only go so far\" and he's right. He can't possibly recreate the distractions and unanticipated threats. I knew he was overwhelmed, he had been the whole trip, but the previous leg was so much better, maybe I have a bias that he was \"over the hump\". During engine start, I knew he was making errors, but I thought I was slowing down and trying to create an environment where he could catch himself up. And ultimately, I blame myself. Because in trying to be an above average instructor, I became a very substandard Captain. In discussing this with my best friend from military instructing days, himself a Captain at another carrier, we tried to find a \"what will we do next\". He suggested that I make a rule that when errors start piling up, stop instructing and just be a Captain. I liked it and vowed to add that to my personal checklist until I woke up this morning with the realization that had I done that, and not started to instruct him on the mechanics of the flaps 25 takeoff, I might not have glanced at the gauge. I might not have caught it. So I'm back to square one."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was the Captain on Flight XXX ZZZ-ZZZ1 performing Line Check Airmen (LCA) duties with a new hire on date. This was an all-night flight which was leg five and a third duty period for the new hire. My new hire was Military background and had completed his OE early this year and basically sat for four months. He had been back for a three-day sim recently. He has a great attitude and is eager to learn, however the first few legs he was challenged with a lack of -121 experience and what I believe was a degradation or loss of good habit patterns from the sim phase. Leg three on day two was a short, challenging flight from ZZZ2-ZZZ3. He was stressed and challenged making many mistakes, but ultimately I could see improvement, despite being overwhelmed with the pace of our operations. Leg four was a long leg from ZZZ3-ZZZ that same day, and showed significant improvement. The approach and landing were approaching \"line standard\" and I was hopeful if not confident that we had gotten over the \"hump\". We had a long layover to ready for the all night flight back to ZZZ1. I had stated that typically, it's much easier to fly from ZZZ to ZZZ1, so we could have a good flight and finish required briefings. The day before Flight XXX I had two periods with naps, early afternoon and then again in the evening before report time. My student reported that he had napped, but said he wish he had drank more coffee when we were in the cockpit. When I awoke an hour prior to report, the operations flight plan was not present, so I readied myself to the duty day. In the 10-15 minutes prior to leaving the room there was still no operations flight plan, but I had checked the weather along the tracks as well as ZZZ1 (all good, and VFR). The hotel van was late by almost 10 minutes. We arrived to chaos at the gate area. ZZZ station was buying seven passengers off the full flight. I pulled up the operations flight plan and immediately called Dispatch to remove fuel and get the latest ZZZ4. I then directed my First Officer (FO) to the cockpit to get ready for the flight, telling him that he was responsible for the FMC and that I would do the exterior walk around to give him additional time. Dispatch, Station and Flight Attendant conversations dominated the next several minutes and I arrived at the cockpit from the walk around approx. 25 min prior to pushback. He had most of the programming done and it was all accurate. He had been slow but usually pretty accurate in previous flights. We discussed the upcoming flap 25, Bleeds Off take-off and I had him pull up the supplemental procedure and review it. We were able to get all the passengers on, and we briefed and did the preflight checklist. I had briefed that we would push back, start both engines and run the before takeoff checklist to completion before taxi. Additionally, he had briefed a flap 25 bleeds off, and we analyzed the data and discussed the winds (080/10) and temp (23C) as these were critical to taking the planned weight. The door closed and we worked a clearance with ZZZ5. My FO was seemingly having issues with radio calls, attempting to take calls for other aircraft. So I slowed him down and we received our clearance and expected altitude. Then we pushed back and I directed him to start both engines as briefed. The preflight had been hectic, with me being pulled in many directions. I had shielded him from as much of that as possible, by having him simply work on his cockpit set up. I am very aware that my error signature is when I am rushed, I make mistakes. As such, when the brakes are released, I stop rushing and slow down. I briefed my student the same thing and I make sure to slow my speech pattern and checklist response time. That is not unique to this day, it's every time. I had briefed him that we were going to take our time and we were not rushed. I have no memory or perception for us rushing after push this night. After the number two engine was started, he was sitting there, and I saw the packs were off. This was a common error he had had in previous legs, so I pointed to the packs. The pushback crew was at my ten o'clock position and I looked back at them. Then I glanced in and saw that the number one engine wasn't started and I verbalized \"Start Number One\". He responded, \"Oh you want me to start Number One? OK.\" I then turn my attention back to the crew as it was time for the salute. I look back in and the engine is at max motoring, at approx. 34 percent N2 with the Fuel Control Switch still in Cutoff. My FO mumbled something about 30 percent which I didn't hear. I asked him to repeat it and he did. It was something about a \"limit\", so I asked again and got a reply I didn't understand, so I slowed down again and said, \"I do not understand what you are telling me\". He was confused, and it turns out that he was mixing up previous airplane's limits. I prompted him to start the engine. We ran through the After Start Checklist with no issues that I'm aware of. No without moving the aircraft we began the before take-off checklist. The first step is \"Final Weights\" from the ACARS printout. The number he read made no sense. I was thinking about it as he went on, trying to understand when he backed up and corrected himself to a number that made more sense. I'm assuming a transpose error. Then he went on to the takeoff weights/speeds and really had troubles. He was going back and forth from the takeoff data message to the FMC. I stopped him, and we talked about him analyzing the data, and checking it with the FMC prior to the checklist initiation. He understood, and I stopped the before takeoff checklist and we started again from the beginning. I remember the first two steps clearly. I remember the trim step clearly. I remember the FMC step clearly as we had discussed the routing that was absent a SID. In the later moments and the hours since I have no memory of mention of flaps. We taxied to the runway, ensured the bleed panel was correctly configured including techniques, got the release from ZZZ5 and took the runway. As we were taking the runway, I was going to go over the flap 25 takeoff again and talk rotation rates and pitches and as I said, \"OK...a Flaps 25 takeoff...\" and as I glanced at the gauge, the flaps were set to flaps 5. He reselected flaps 25, stating \"You probably said 25...\" We then stopped on the runway and accomplished the before takeoff check in its entirety. I know the \"whys\". I don't know the \"how\" and it'll be a while to cement the \"what am I going to do next\". He's new, with no airline background. He sat for four months. In my opinion he's lost habit patterns and confidence. There were operational pressures out of the station, along with numerous distractions. I knew and briefed that we were rushed and that we would take a moment. We did. I slowed things down. We both had stated that we napped, but it was late; XAAM for him, XBAM for me. The single most disturbing thing I'm wrestling with it for 20+ years in the B737, I've been very careful with flaps. From day one in the left seat when we get to the step, I pause (so that I can clear any taxi conflicts and go heads down) point to the FOs Take-off Page in the FMC, then point to the flap gage. Then I reach over and wiggle the flap handle in the detent. I couldn't in the moment, nor can I understand how I would have missed the step in the checklist or worse, how I could have possible stated \"25 indicated\" without a visual conformation and a tactile one. And I have no memory of any part of that step. My best guess, which considering my actions that day are suspect, is that he became increasingly overwhelmed and as his errors started occurring, he didn't have the habit patterns or muscle memory or experience to dig himself out. He's new. He sat an unconscionable amount of time and is trying as hard has he can. But he told me that night, \"Chair flying can only go so far\" and he's right. He can't possibly recreate the distractions and unanticipated threats. I knew he was overwhelmed, he had been the whole trip, but the previous leg was so much better, maybe I have a bias that he was \"over the hump\". During engine start, I knew he was making errors, but I thought I was slowing down and trying to create an environment where he could catch himself up. And ultimately, I blame myself. Because in trying to be an above average instructor, I became a very substandard Captain. In discussing this with my best friend from military instructing days, himself a Captain at another carrier, we tried to find a \"what will we do next\". He suggested that I make a rule that when errors start piling up, stop instructing and just be a Captain. I liked it and vowed to add that to my personal checklist until I woke up this morning with the realization that had I done that, and not started to instruct him on the mechanics of the flaps 25 takeoff, I might not have glanced at the gauge. I might not have caught it. So I'm back to square one.",
    "synopsis": "B737 Captain reported as they taxied onto the runway for departure the Captain noticed the First Officer set the flaps to the wrong position and a complete Before Take Off briefing had not been accomplished. The Captain reported the First Officer made many mistakes and lacked proficiency due to being a new student who had not flown for a long period of time.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=140",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 140,
      "pageEnd": 143,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=140",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 140,
        "pageEnd": 143,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1907448 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "B737 Captain reported as they taxied onto the runway for departure the Captain noticed the First Officer set the flaps to the wrong position and a complete Before Take Off briefing had not been accomplished. The Captain reported the First Officer made many mistakes and lacked proficiency due to being a new student who had not flown for a long period of time.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1907134",
    "date": "2022-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "A321"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After takeoff at approximately 600 AGL number 2 engine exhaust gas temperature rose to over 700 degrees. After thrust reduction, temp went to between 605 and 620. ECAM number 2 Engine over temp flashed while temp varied. As we climbed, temp decreased, we as a crew decided not to shut down engine since temp was slowly decreasing. Although we did decide to return to ZZZ overweight in concurrence with Dispatch. Followed QRH for overweight landing and non-normal landing procedures. Landed without further incident. I was on 10 days of flying without ability to go home, received my break at hotel. Had somewhat good sleep, but was getting quite burned out from being gone for so long. Became a little overwhelmed once ECAM started flashing to shut engine down. Communicated to First Officer I was no longer in the green and he assured me he was in the green. Once we decided to return to ZZZ and followed all QRH procedures I returned to the green and felt less stressed and communicated to my First Officer. Landed without incident."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter takeoff at approximately 600 AGL number 2 engine exhaust gas temperature rose to over 700 degrees. After thrust reduction, temp went to between 605 and 620. ECAM number 2 Engine over temp flashed while temp varied. As we climbed, temp decreased, we as a crew decided not to shut down engine since temp was slowly decreasing. Although we did decide to return to ZZZ overweight in concurrence with Dispatch. Followed QRH for overweight landing and non-normal landing procedures. Landed without further incident. I was on 10 days of flying without ability to go home, received my break at hotel. Had somewhat good sleep, but was getting quite burned out from being gone for so long. Became a little overwhelmed once ECAM started flashing to shut engine down. Communicated to First Officer I was no longer in the green and he assured me he was in the green. Once we decided to return to ZZZ and followed all QRH procedures I returned to the green and felt less stressed and communicated to my First Officer. Landed without incident.",
    "synopsis": "A321 Captain reported returning to departure airport after the #2 engine overheated in initial climb.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=144",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 144,
      "pageEnd": 145,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=144",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 144,
        "pageEnd": 145,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "Engine temperature warning during an extended trip",
    "summary": "An A321 crew returned to the departure airport after an engine overtemperature indication shortly after takeoff. The captain described feeling burned out after ten days away and initially overwhelmed, then feeling less stressed after coordinating with the first officer, deciding to return, and following the checklists.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Equipment",
      "Fatigue",
      "Communication"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1903368",
    "date": "2022-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We landed on XR and exited at XX. Instructed to join X and hold short of XL. Instructed First Officer (FO) to remain on Tower frequency until we were clear of all active runways. We were then cleared to cross XL, to join Y, \"keep it moving\" and to monitor ground on XXX.X. The FO assisted me in finding the turn onto Y and then checked off VHF #1 to call ramp. I was concentrating on a short distance in front of the airplane in anticipation of the left turn where Y meets XY. As I entered the turn I noticed a light gray object in the darkness above my point of focus. I quickly realized my entire windshield was filled with the image of a company Aircraft Y crossing in front of us from right to left. I applied the brakes and watched as the other airplane cleared our nose by a short distance. We did not receive any advisory about the conflicting traffic nor were we given any \"give way\" instructions. Nor did we hear any other airplane receive any such communications. Contributing factors in this incident include fatigue. We were at the end of a duty day that exceeded 11 hours and nearly 8 hours of flying. Also, the late hour (approximately XA:30 local) contributed to a lower level of alertness. Darkness. The incident occurred during hours of darkness and in an area of the airport that is not particularly well illuminated. Taxiway Geometry: The geometry of the intersection of Y and XY is such that the view of Taxiway XY from an airplane on Y is to the right side and not clearly visible. Experience level. The FO is a new hire pilot on his second OE trip. He has no prior 121 experience and this was his first entry into ZZZ. Ideally a real time ground aircraft display on the flight deck would have prevented this incident."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Our Aircraft X landed on Runway XR and cleared the runway. Tower instructed us to hold short XL on Taxiway X and we complied. We were then instructed to cross Runway XL and to join Taxiway Y and monitor ground. After clearing XL on Taxiway X we configured exterior lighting, looked both ways and stated \"cleared left / right\" then proceeded to join Taxiway Y. The Captain instructed me to call Ramp and he would monitor Ground. As soon as I put my head down to call Ramp, the Captain stopped the aircraft as a company Aircraft Y was overtaking us on the right from Taxiway XY onto Taxiway Y. I did not see this aircraft when stating \"cleared right\" after clearing Runway XL on Taxiway X as we joined Taxiway Y per the controller’s direction. The aircraft overtaking us from Taxiway XY onto Taxiway Y did not slow or give way despite our aircraft being established on Taxiway Y. Neither the Captain nor myself heard the controller tell us or the other aircraft to give way to one another. Airport Design. Taxiway Y flow is counter clockwise. The threats from merging taxiway traffic on the right side of the aircraft are difficult to detect as the view of the starboard merging taxiways are constantly shifting aft and right which becomes out of view for the right seat occupant. Low Light: The event occurred at night which limited the ability to detect other aircraft when combined with airport lighting. Experience Level: This was the second OE event for the First Officer with no prior 121 experience and his first event at ZZZ. Fatigue: Long duty day and nearly 8 hours of flying coupled with a local time of ~XA:30. The Ground Controller could have notified either aircraft to give way to the other aircraft and verified the command with a positive response. Neither occupant in our aircraft heard the controller give such instructions to either aircraft."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe landed on XR and exited at XX. Instructed to join X and hold short of XL. Instructed First Officer (FO) to remain on Tower frequency until we were clear of all active runways. We were then cleared to cross XL, to join Y, \"keep it moving\" and to monitor ground on XXX.X. The FO assisted me in finding the turn onto Y and then checked off VHF #1 to call ramp. I was concentrating on a short distance in front of the airplane in anticipation of the left turn where Y meets XY. As I entered the turn I noticed a light gray object in the darkness above my point of focus. I quickly realized my entire windshield was filled with the image of a company Aircraft Y crossing in front of us from right to left. I applied the brakes and watched as the other airplane cleared our nose by a short distance. We did not receive any advisory about the conflicting traffic nor were we given any \"give way\" instructions. Nor did we hear any other airplane receive any such communications. Contributing factors in this incident include fatigue. We were at the end of a duty day that exceeded 11 hours and nearly 8 hours of flying. Also, the late hour (approximately XA:30 local) contributed to a lower level of alertness. Darkness. The incident occurred during hours of darkness and in an area of the airport that is not particularly well illuminated. Taxiway Geometry: The geometry of the intersection of Y and XY is such that the view of Taxiway XY from an airplane on Y is to the right side and not clearly visible. Experience level. The FO is a new hire pilot on his second OE trip. He has no prior 121 experience and this was his first entry into ZZZ. Ideally a real time ground aircraft display on the flight deck would have prevented this incident.\n\nNarrative 2\nOur Aircraft X landed on Runway XR and cleared the runway. Tower instructed us to hold short XL on Taxiway X and we complied. We were then instructed to cross Runway XL and to join Taxiway Y and monitor ground. After clearing XL on Taxiway X we configured exterior lighting, looked both ways and stated \"cleared left / right\" then proceeded to join Taxiway Y. The Captain instructed me to call Ramp and he would monitor Ground. As soon as I put my head down to call Ramp, the Captain stopped the aircraft as a company Aircraft Y was overtaking us on the right from Taxiway XY onto Taxiway Y. I did not see this aircraft when stating \"cleared right\" after clearing Runway XL on Taxiway X as we joined Taxiway Y per the controller’s direction. The aircraft overtaking us from Taxiway XY onto Taxiway Y did not slow or give way despite our aircraft being established on Taxiway Y. Neither the Captain nor myself heard the controller tell us or the other aircraft to give way to one another. Airport Design. Taxiway Y flow is counter clockwise. The threats from merging taxiway traffic on the right side of the aircraft are difficult to detect as the view of the starboard merging taxiways are constantly shifting aft and right which becomes out of view for the right seat occupant. Low Light: The event occurred at night which limited the ability to detect other aircraft when combined with airport lighting. Experience Level: This was the second OE event for the First Officer with no prior 121 experience and his first event at ZZZ. Fatigue: Long duty day and nearly 8 hours of flying coupled with a local time of ~XA:30. The Ground Controller could have notified either aircraft to give way to the other aircraft and verified the command with a positive response. Neither occupant in our aircraft heard the controller give such instructions to either aircraft.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported the Captain had to suddenly brake to avoid another taxiing aircraft which passed in front of them.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=146",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 146,
      "pageEnd": 148,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=146",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 146,
        "pageEnd": 148,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1903368 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported the Captain had to suddenly brake to avoid another taxiing aircraft which passed in front of them.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1903211",
    "date": "2022-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During pushback the tug driver pushed our aircraft extremely close to other aircraft parked at neighboring gates. We were cleared to pushback to spot XX. During the pushback I (FO) was watching the right wing walker, and he was giving a wand up the whole time we were moving. After we pushed back and we started to move forward, the tow pulled us forward I was watching the wing to make sure we were clear of a fuel truck. As I turned my head forward I mentioned to the Captain that the nose was very close to the tail of a parked plane. He said that sometimes parking is tight and did not appear concerned. As we made the left turn, I kept my eye on the right wing walker and he continued to give a thumbs up as we continued the turn. I told Captain again that we were pretty close, but still had a thumbs up. As the tug driver turned hard to move us away from the parked airplane, the tow bar snapped. The tug driver stopped the tug and the ground crew came to assist him. We set the parking brake and the Captain called ops about the tow bar and having maintenance meet us to inspect the wheel. Shortly thereafter, I assume ground crew supervisors were called and started to gather around tug and the right wing. After about 15 minutes, We were given clearance to be towed back to the gate for maintenance to check things out. When the maintenance person boarded, she said we had had a near miss with the parked aircraft. I know it may be experienced based, but it is difficult to tell how close we actually were to the aircraft. Also, we were operating on min rest and had had a max crew day the day before."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring pushback the tug driver pushed our aircraft extremely close to other aircraft parked at neighboring gates. We were cleared to pushback to spot XX. During the pushback I (FO) was watching the right wing walker, and he was giving a wand up the whole time we were moving. After we pushed back and we started to move forward, the tow pulled us forward I was watching the wing to make sure we were clear of a fuel truck. As I turned my head forward I mentioned to the Captain that the nose was very close to the tail of a parked plane. He said that sometimes parking is tight and did not appear concerned. As we made the left turn, I kept my eye on the right wing walker and he continued to give a thumbs up as we continued the turn. I told Captain again that we were pretty close, but still had a thumbs up. As the tug driver turned hard to move us away from the parked airplane, the tow bar snapped. The tug driver stopped the tug and the ground crew came to assist him. We set the parking brake and the Captain called ops about the tow bar and having maintenance meet us to inspect the wheel. Shortly thereafter, I assume ground crew supervisors were called and started to gather around tug and the right wing. After about 15 minutes, We were given clearance to be towed back to the gate for maintenance to check things out. When the maintenance person boarded, she said we had had a near miss with the parked aircraft. I know it may be experienced based, but it is difficult to tell how close we actually were to the aircraft. Also, we were operating on min rest and had had a max crew day the day before.",
    "synopsis": "First Officer reported a near impact with an adjacent aircraft during pushback after the tug's tow bar snapped.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=149",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 149,
      "pageEnd": 150,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=149",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 149,
        "pageEnd": 150,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1903211 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "First Officer reported a near impact with an adjacent aircraft during pushback after the tug's tow bar snapped.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1901910",
    "date": "2022-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I'm involuntarily TDY'd to ZZZ, and had been on duty for 2 days at the time of the event. I have been commuting to ZZZ for [8 hour] airport standby (ready Reserve) for 17 days in the last 30 days, and I have been to my home for 2 days the entire month due to TDY. The night of the Date I was unable to get sufficient sleep, because my significant other (herein refereed to as SO). has been looking at houses with me over facetime and we have conflicting schedules. On the [following day] I was on airport standby with no calls for 8 hours. I was assigned a flight to ZZZ1 that was scheduled to depart 30 minutes after my shift ended. The flight landed and we got to the hotel by XA:00. I then had to find suitable dining accommodations. I was able to get to sleep by XS:00 for a XA:20 van after looking at homes with my SO whom I have barely seen for the last month. During flight, I began to notice error compiling due to fatigue. I immediately alerted the First Officer to my increasing levels of fatigue and asked him to keep a high level of vigilance as I began to feel I was making mistakes, and missing radio calls. As we were descending through 12,000 ft. back into ZZZ I realized we had also forgot to set local altimeter setting. We landed with no further incident. However as we arrived at the gate I have been assigned an additional 6 hours of flying to ZZZ2 and back. It was at this point I decided to remove myself from flying duties. We often hear about the \"swiss cheese model\" In aviation, where it is not just one issue that causes incidents in flight, however it is often multiple issues that overlap and fatigue is almost ALWAYS a major contributing factor. In this case, I was beginning to see the holes in our hypothetical model line up. Flying around 79 other people, there are no excuses for poor performance. I do not want fatigue hindering from performing not only my duty to the passengers and company, but preventing me from safely operating the aircraft is unacceptable. The root cause is accumulated fatigue due to poor staffing, forcing me to two-leg commute to an unintended, and unwanted base whilst also being asked to live out of a hotel room for 30 days. On standby I've had a constantly changing schedule that could be remedied with better staffing. After working a full day of standby being asked to work a flight thats 30 minutes after my shift ends for a short overnight, then having a flight day of 7.5 hours of flying is unrealistic."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI'm involuntarily TDY'd to ZZZ, and had been on duty for 2 days at the time of the event. I have been commuting to ZZZ for [8 hour] airport standby (ready Reserve) for 17 days in the last 30 days, and I have been to my home for 2 days the entire month due to TDY. The night of the Date I was unable to get sufficient sleep, because my significant other (herein refereed to as SO). has been looking at houses with me over facetime and we have conflicting schedules. On the [following day] I was on airport standby with no calls for 8 hours. I was assigned a flight to ZZZ1 that was scheduled to depart 30 minutes after my shift ended. The flight landed and we got to the hotel by XA:00. I then had to find suitable dining accommodations. I was able to get to sleep by XS:00 for a XA:20 van after looking at homes with my SO whom I have barely seen for the last month. During flight, I began to notice error compiling due to fatigue. I immediately alerted the First Officer to my increasing levels of fatigue and asked him to keep a high level of vigilance as I began to feel I was making mistakes, and missing radio calls. As we were descending through 12,000 ft. back into ZZZ I realized we had also forgot to set local altimeter setting. We landed with no further incident. However as we arrived at the gate I have been assigned an additional 6 hours of flying to ZZZ2 and back. It was at this point I decided to remove myself from flying duties. We often hear about the \"swiss cheese model\" In aviation, where it is not just one issue that causes incidents in flight, however it is often multiple issues that overlap and fatigue is almost ALWAYS a major contributing factor. In this case, I was beginning to see the holes in our hypothetical model line up. Flying around 79 other people, there are no excuses for poor performance. I do not want fatigue hindering from performing not only my duty to the passengers and company, but preventing me from safely operating the aircraft is unacceptable. The root cause is accumulated fatigue due to poor staffing, forcing me to two-leg commute to an unintended, and unwanted base whilst also being asked to live out of a hotel room for 30 days. On standby I've had a constantly changing schedule that could be remedied with better staffing. After working a full day of standby being asked to work a flight thats 30 minutes after my shift ends for a short overnight, then having a flight day of 7.5 hours of flying is unrealistic.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier Captain reported extreme fatigue due to the companies scheduling and personal activities. The Captain called in fatigued to the company and was removed from flying duties.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=151",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 151,
      "pageEnd": 152,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=151",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 151,
        "pageEnd": 152,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1901910 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier Captain reported extreme fatigue due to the companies scheduling and personal activities. The Captain called in fatigued to the company and was removed from flying duties.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1900157",
    "date": "2022-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While working Aircraft X ZZZ1 to ZZZ, we conducted a CAT II approach to [Runway] XXR in ZZZ and failed to realize that runway is not AMOC (Alternate Methods of Compliance) approved. There is a 5G NOTAM for ZZZ. Initially, we briefed and set up for ILS CAT I for Runway XXR. I was Pilot Flying. Upon check in with ZZZ Approach, we were assigned ILS XXL. We set up and briefed the approach for the ILS CAT I XXL. Upon check in with ZZZ Tower, we were told RVR was 5,000 [ft.] touchdown and greater than 6,000 rollout. However we did not have any runway environment in sight at minimums. We conducted a Go-Around. Upon checking in again with ZZZ Approach, we were now assigned ILS XXR. The Captain and I discussed our current fuel and determined we were well above Bingo and good for another approach. We then discussed doing a CAT II considering that we could not get the airport environment in sight at CAT I mins. We agreed that a CAT II sounded like a good idea and there was a CAT II approach for XXR. We sent for appropriate landing data but failed to notice the ACARS message about the runway AMOC status. Also, we had briefed the Release prior to the flight but failed to remember which runways were AMOC approved. We did run the \"CAT II APPROACH\" briefing items but the bullet point \"Review NOTAMs for inoperative ground components\" also failed to prompt me to remember the 5G NOTAM. We conducted the CAT II approach to Runway XXR and landed. There were no radio altimeter anomalies. The Captain had the runway environment in sight at 200 feet indicated. The approach and landing were stabilized and uneventful. This error was caused by my failure to verify the AMOC/5G status of the runways at ZZZ on the release and failure to notice the AMOC ACARS message. Contributing factors were the high workload experienced throughout the day which included delays, a return to gate, and a missed approach. In retrospect, I recognize the effects that a long and challenging day can have on state of mind and attentiveness to small details such as reviewing NOTAMs and AMOC status. The addition of 5G procedures in recent months presents another threat and opportunity to commit errors. To prevent this error in the future, I will include a review of the Remarks in addition to the NOTAMs section of the release in my preparation for a CAT II or RNP AR approach. I would also recommend the company add a bullet point to the company document CAT II and RNP AR approaches: \"verify runway is AMOC approved or that no 5G NOTAM [exists] for the airport.\" I would recommend a new revision of the company document that adds a bullet point to the CAT II and RNP AR approach sections saying: \"Verify runway is AMOC approved or that no 5G NOTAM exists for the airport/runway.\" I will also more carefully review the remarks and NOTAMs section of the release during my preparation for a CAT II or RNP approach."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "WX reporting minimums for CAT I at ZZZ. Issued [Runway] XXL ILS approach, ending with a go around due to no visual cues for the runway. ATC brought us around for XXR and we discussed to do a CAT II. Shot the CAT II seeing the runway lights at 200 ft. Issued standard SOP CAT II procedure; although the following day the First Officer brought to my attention ZZZ was not 5G AMOC (Alternate Method of Compliance) approved. In the moment, ending the day with 15 hour duty, with 8.9 hours of flight time, it didn't even cross my mind. Add a bullet point to the company document to check for 5G AMOC"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile working Aircraft X ZZZ1 to ZZZ, we conducted a CAT II approach to [Runway] XXR in ZZZ and failed to realize that runway is not AMOC (Alternate Methods of Compliance) approved. There is a 5G NOTAM for ZZZ. Initially, we briefed and set up for ILS CAT I for Runway XXR. I was Pilot Flying. Upon check in with ZZZ Approach, we were assigned ILS XXL. We set up and briefed the approach for the ILS CAT I XXL. Upon check in with ZZZ Tower, we were told RVR was 5,000 [ft.] touchdown and greater than 6,000 rollout. However we did not have any runway environment in sight at minimums. We conducted a Go-Around. Upon checking in again with ZZZ Approach, we were now assigned ILS XXR. The Captain and I discussed our current fuel and determined we were well above Bingo and good for another approach. We then discussed doing a CAT II considering that we could not get the airport environment in sight at CAT I mins. We agreed that a CAT II sounded like a good idea and there was a CAT II approach for XXR. We sent for appropriate landing data but failed to notice the ACARS message about the runway AMOC status. Also, we had briefed the Release prior to the flight but failed to remember which runways were AMOC approved. We did run the \"CAT II APPROACH\" briefing items but the bullet point \"Review NOTAMs for inoperative ground components\" also failed to prompt me to remember the 5G NOTAM. We conducted the CAT II approach to Runway XXR and landed. There were no radio altimeter anomalies. The Captain had the runway environment in sight at 200 feet indicated. The approach and landing were stabilized and uneventful. This error was caused by my failure to verify the AMOC/5G status of the runways at ZZZ on the release and failure to notice the AMOC ACARS message. Contributing factors were the high workload experienced throughout the day which included delays, a return to gate, and a missed approach. In retrospect, I recognize the effects that a long and challenging day can have on state of mind and attentiveness to small details such as reviewing NOTAMs and AMOC status. The addition of 5G procedures in recent months presents another threat and opportunity to commit errors. To prevent this error in the future, I will include a review of the Remarks in addition to the NOTAMs section of the release in my preparation for a CAT II or RNP AR approach. I would also recommend the company add a bullet point to the company document CAT II and RNP AR approaches: \"verify runway is AMOC approved or that no 5G NOTAM [exists] for the airport.\" I would recommend a new revision of the company document that adds a bullet point to the CAT II and RNP AR approach sections saying: \"Verify runway is AMOC approved or that no 5G NOTAM exists for the airport/runway.\" I will also more carefully review the remarks and NOTAMs section of the release during my preparation for a CAT II or RNP approach.\n\nNarrative 2\nWX reporting minimums for CAT I at ZZZ. Issued [Runway] XXL ILS approach, ending with a go around due to no visual cues for the runway. ATC brought us around for XXR and we discussed to do a CAT II. Shot the CAT II seeing the runway lights at 200 ft. Issued standard SOP CAT II procedure; although the following day the First Officer brought to my attention ZZZ was not 5G AMOC (Alternate Method of Compliance) approved. In the moment, ending the day with 15 hour duty, with 8.9 hours of flight time, it didn't even cross my mind. Add a bullet point to the company document to check for 5G AMOC",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported conducting a Category II approach to a runway that was not 5G AMOC approved. The pilots reported fatigue as a probable cause for the error.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=153",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 153,
      "pageEnd": 155,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=153",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 153,
        "pageEnd": 155,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1900157 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported conducting a Category II approach to a runway that was not 5G AMOC approved. The pilots reported fatigue as a probable cause for the error.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1895846",
    "date": "2022-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On approach to landing, pilot flying called for gear down. I hit chime and inadvertently selected flaps 30 and read off flaps 30 straight-in speed. Pilot flying then called for flaps 30 and I noted we were flaps 30 and again straight-in speed. We both expressed confusion as why I had already input flaps 30. Then, Captain called for “check spoilers, flaps 45, before landing check.” I checked spoilers 0, flaps 45, straight-in speed, and went to read the checklist and [my EFB] crashed. I attempted to restart and then did checklist from memory because it was taking a long [time] to reload. I correctly called the checklist, but we did not identify that the gear was still up. The gear warning subsequently sounded. We corrected and landed. This happened at the final approach fix, although we were visual. Possible causes could be my lack of good rest for the entire trip. Day 1 was extended and we received less than 12 hours between airport to airport. Day 2 was minimum rest airport to airport. Day 3 ended with adequate rest opportunity but I didn't sleep well due to getting up at XA:00. Also, this was the first trip I was using [the EFB software] for checklists and it hung multiple times when attempting to use the checklist. This caused more rushing and distraction when checklists were called for and being read. I was expecting gear down callout and ready for it. Possibly unrecognized fatigue caused me to go for the wrong control. Resting better would have helped avoid this event. I will no longer use [the EFB software] for checklists until it is more stable. We could have gone around, but there is some ambiguity in the decision process for going around. We recognized the error and corrected, returning to stable approach before 1,000 ft. HAT on a visual approach."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn approach to landing, pilot flying called for gear down. I hit chime and inadvertently selected flaps 30 and read off flaps 30 straight-in speed. Pilot flying then called for flaps 30 and I noted we were flaps 30 and again straight-in speed. We both expressed confusion as why I had already input flaps 30. Then, Captain called for “check spoilers, flaps 45, before landing check.” I checked spoilers 0, flaps 45, straight-in speed, and went to read the checklist and [my EFB] crashed. I attempted to restart and then did checklist from memory because it was taking a long [time] to reload. I correctly called the checklist, but we did not identify that the gear was still up. The gear warning subsequently sounded. We corrected and landed. This happened at the final approach fix, although we were visual. Possible causes could be my lack of good rest for the entire trip. Day 1 was extended and we received less than 12 hours between airport to airport. Day 2 was minimum rest airport to airport. Day 3 ended with adequate rest opportunity but I didn't sleep well due to getting up at XA:00. Also, this was the first trip I was using [the EFB software] for checklists and it hung multiple times when attempting to use the checklist. This caused more rushing and distraction when checklists were called for and being read. I was expecting gear down callout and ready for it. Possibly unrecognized fatigue caused me to go for the wrong control. Resting better would have helped avoid this event. I will no longer use [the EFB software] for checklists until it is more stable. We could have gone around, but there is some ambiguity in the decision process for going around. We recognized the error and corrected, returning to stable approach before 1,000 ft. HAT on a visual approach.",
    "synopsis": "CRJ900 First Officer reported incorrectly extending flaps instead of the landing gear as well as encountering issues with the EFB software making checklist usage difficult. Corrections were made to the aircraft’s configuration prior to 1,000 ft. and a normal landing was completed.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=156",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 156,
      "pageEnd": 157,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=156",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 156,
        "pageEnd": 157,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1895846 · Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
    "summary": "CRJ900 First Officer reported incorrectly extending flaps instead of the landing gear as well as encountering issues with the EFB software making checklist usage difficult. Corrections were made to the aircraft’s configuration prior to 1,000 ft. and a normal landing was completed.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1893402",
    "date": "2022-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 MAX 9"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Landing in ZZZ and we may have floated past the touchdown zone. It was in a MAX which I'm still relatively new to. I think I was a little behind in noticing how far we had floated. Likely some complacency with landing on XXR in ZZZ, as it's such a frequent approach for us. It was also a bit of a long day having coming up from ZZZ1 and we were close to 9 hours of block time."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Landing in ZZZ in the max which I have only flown a couple times previously I floated in my flare slightly longer than intended to avoid a hard landing at night in a less familiar sight picture. I may have landed slightly past the touchdown zone. Trusting my hud information and flight instruments and avoiding different control inputs based on different aircraft models, instead keeping steady back pressure and looking farther down the runway on flare."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nLanding in ZZZ and we may have floated past the touchdown zone. It was in a MAX which I'm still relatively new to. I think I was a little behind in noticing how far we had floated. Likely some complacency with landing on XXR in ZZZ, as it's such a frequent approach for us. It was also a bit of a long day having coming up from ZZZ1 and we were close to 9 hours of block time.\n\nNarrative 2\nLanding in ZZZ in the max which I have only flown a couple times previously I floated in my flare slightly longer than intended to avoid a hard landing at night in a less familiar sight picture. I may have landed slightly past the touchdown zone. Trusting my hud information and flight instruments and avoiding different control inputs based on different aircraft models, instead keeping steady back pressure and looking farther down the runway on flare.",
    "synopsis": "B737 MAX 9 flight crew reported being new to this generation aircraft type resulted in landing past touchdown zone.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=158",
      "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
      "pageStart": 158,
      "pageEnd": 159,
      "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/acr_fatg.pdf#page=158",
        "reportSet": "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue",
        "pageStart": 158,
        "pageEnd": 159,
        "fileName": "acr_fatg.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "b298c6b1d2032d4b18fe1ea119756e0f45c2e4c850ab2126bbb93f26b43cdd10",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Air Carrier Flight Crew Fatigue"
    ],
    "title": "Possible long landing in a less familiar aircraft",
    "summary": "A B737 MAX 9 crew reported floating in the flare and possibly touching down beyond the touchdown zone. The accounts describe limited experience in that model, an unfamiliar nighttime sight picture, and a long day as factors affecting recognition and control inputs.",
    "themes": [
      "Fatigue"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Fatigue",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2085398",
    "date": "2024-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "A300"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While navigating direct ZZZ [VOR] from ZZZZZ1 at FL300, ATC ZZZ Center notified us, Aircraft X, of two areas of convective activity along our route of flight to ZZZ. We requested and were approved a left 10-degree deviation for weather. Our heading, 180, kept us outside of 20 NM from thunderstorms. ATC cleared us “when able” direct ZZZZZ - fix on the ZZZZZ STAR into ZZZ. Once proceeding direct ZZZZZ, ATC cleared us to cross 70 NM north of ZZZZZ at FL280. Approximately 100 NM north of ZZZZZ, we commenced our descent to FL280 from FL300 at 280 KIAS in LEVEL/CHANGE - autothrottles maintain speed on pitch. While IMC, clear of any convective activity we encountered severe turbulence for approximately 30 seconds while descending through FL295 until FL285. We experienced a momentary downdraft with 2000 FPM rate-of-descent, displayed on the Vertical Speed Indicator, VSI, followed by a momentary updraft with approximately 500 FPM rate-of-climb, on the VSI. During this excessive altitude oscillation, the aircraft’s ATS (Autothrottle System) Arming Lever and the #2 Yaw Damper Arming Lever disengaged and were immediately manually reengaged and remained armed/engaged for the remainder of the flight. The Left ECAM also momentarily displayed YELLOW HYD SYS LO PR, but then extinguished without any corrective action. During level-off at FL280 the Autopilot #2, AP2, lever also disengaged, but was reengaged without issue for the remainder of the flight. We advised ATC that we were experiencing extreme/severe turbulence during the event. ATC then queried if there were any injuries or damage to the aircraft and we advised ATC there were no injuries or damage. Our filed route of flight was ZZZZZ1, RNAV SID from ZZZ1, to ZZZZZ2 for forecast thunderstorm development. Dispatcher annotated on the Flight Plan/Release, that “direct routing may be available after departure.” Based upon the northeasterly movement of the surrounding weather, ZZZ1 Center had us proceed behind, west, the majority of the convective activity and cleared us direct ZZZ [VOR] before reaching ZZZZZ1 on the SID. I think the flight crew, Dispatcher, and ATC properly managed the probable risks for the flight. Once we encountered the turbulence, we had few options but to continue to fly through it. The onset of the event happened so fast and was experienced so briefly, that other options for prevention were not available."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While encountering to ZZZ [VOR], ATC told us about some convective weather ahead. We chose to make a 10-degree left deviation in order to avoid it. This put us on a heading of 180 that would keep us further than 20 NM from both convective weather events. Once past the weather cells, ATC cleared us direct to ZZZZZ intersection and to cross 70 NM north of ZZZZZ at FL280. We began to descend to FL280 at 280 KIAS in LVL CHG. During the descent, close to level-off at FL280, we encountered severe turbulence. The turbulence lasted around 30 seconds. I watched the VSI go from a 2000 FPM descent and abruptly change to a 500 FPM climb. At that time the ATS (Autothrottle System) LEVER and Yaw Damper #2 and the Autopilot #2 turned off and we got a yellow hydraulic system LO PR ECAM message. We notified ATC of the severe turbulence event and told them there were no injuries or suspected aircraft damage. Cause: Weather/turbulence. Routing was good for flight. The weather/turbulence event was abrupt and couldn’t be recognized before it happened. We continued to fly through it once it happened because there were no other options."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile navigating direct ZZZ [VOR] from ZZZZZ1 at FL300, ATC ZZZ Center notified us, Aircraft X, of two areas of convective activity along our route of flight to ZZZ. We requested and were approved a left 10-degree deviation for weather. Our heading, 180, kept us outside of 20 NM from thunderstorms. ATC cleared us “when able” direct ZZZZZ - fix on the ZZZZZ STAR into ZZZ. Once proceeding direct ZZZZZ, ATC cleared us to cross 70 NM north of ZZZZZ at FL280. Approximately 100 NM north of ZZZZZ, we commenced our descent to FL280 from FL300 at 280 KIAS in LEVEL/CHANGE - autothrottles maintain speed on pitch. While IMC, clear of any convective activity we encountered severe turbulence for approximately 30 seconds while descending through FL295 until FL285. We experienced a momentary downdraft with 2000 FPM rate-of-descent, displayed on the Vertical Speed Indicator, VSI, followed by a momentary updraft with approximately 500 FPM rate-of-climb, on the VSI. During this excessive altitude oscillation, the aircraft’s ATS (Autothrottle System) Arming Lever and the #2 Yaw Damper Arming Lever disengaged and were immediately manually reengaged and remained armed/engaged for the remainder of the flight. The Left ECAM also momentarily displayed YELLOW HYD SYS LO PR, but then extinguished without any corrective action. During level-off at FL280 the Autopilot #2, AP2, lever also disengaged, but was reengaged without issue for the remainder of the flight. We advised ATC that we were experiencing extreme/severe turbulence during the event. ATC then queried if there were any injuries or damage to the aircraft and we advised ATC there were no injuries or damage. Our filed route of flight was ZZZZZ1, RNAV SID from ZZZ1, to ZZZZZ2 for forecast thunderstorm development. Dispatcher annotated on the Flight Plan/Release, that “direct routing may be available after departure.” Based upon the northeasterly movement of the surrounding weather, ZZZ1 Center had us proceed behind, west, the majority of the convective activity and cleared us direct ZZZ [VOR] before reaching ZZZZZ1 on the SID. I think the flight crew, Dispatcher, and ATC properly managed the probable risks for the flight. Once we encountered the turbulence, we had few options but to continue to fly through it. The onset of the event happened so fast and was experienced so briefly, that other options for prevention were not available.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile encountering to ZZZ [VOR], ATC told us about some convective weather ahead. We chose to make a 10-degree left deviation in order to avoid it. This put us on a heading of 180 that would keep us further than 20 NM from both convective weather events. Once past the weather cells, ATC cleared us direct to ZZZZZ intersection and to cross 70 NM north of ZZZZZ at FL280. We began to descend to FL280 at 280 KIAS in LVL CHG. During the descent, close to level-off at FL280, we encountered severe turbulence. The turbulence lasted around 30 seconds. I watched the VSI go from a 2000 FPM descent and abruptly change to a 500 FPM climb. At that time the ATS (Autothrottle System) LEVER and Yaw Damper #2 and the Autopilot #2 turned off and we got a yellow hydraulic system LO PR ECAM message. We notified ATC of the severe turbulence event and told them there were no injuries or suspected aircraft damage. Cause: Weather/turbulence. Routing was good for flight. The weather/turbulence event was abrupt and couldn’t be recognized before it happened. We continued to fly through it once it happened because there were no other options.",
    "synopsis": "A300 flight crew reported loss of aircraft control and autopilot disconnect while flying through severe turbulence during cruise descent. Flight crew regained control and continued flight.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=15",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 15,
      "pageEnd": 17,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=15",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 15,
        "pageEnd": 17,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2085398 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "A300 flight crew reported loss of aircraft control and autopilot disconnect while flying through severe turbulence during cruise descent. Flight crew regained control and continued flight.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2085091",
    "date": "2024-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Approaching ZZZ [airport] ZZZ Approach handed me over to ZZZ tower. Upon initial contact with ZZZ tower they requested that I enter a left downwind for runway XXL and report 3 miles southeast of the field. ATC issued several traffic advisories due to traffic in the immediate area. The weather was reporting winds out of the southeast with gusts up to 19 knots. Due to the gusty winds, I opted for a flaps 20 approach and landing. While configuring, I ran the checklists but became distracted with ATC communications and somehow missed landing gear extension. Approach was bumpy with fluctuating airspeeds requiring more power than normal. During the approach the gear up warning system did not activate. Everything seamed normal until flare and touchdown when I quickly became aware the gear was not extended. I secured the aircraft and waited for emergency services to arrive. As a result of this incident no injuries were sustained. In retrospect, I believe the contributing factors were the wind conditions requiring lower flap setting and higher power setting for the approach and landing, which may explain why the gear warning system did not activate. In addition with my distraction with ATC and traffic, I did not back up the landing checklist with a GUMPS check technic (GAS, UNDERCARRIAGE, MIXTURE, PROPELLER.) I allowed myself to deviate from the number one priority-FLY THE AIRPLANE. In other words aviate navigate communicate. Reflecting on the occurrence, I believe I selected the correct approach and landing configuration for the existing conditions, however, I allowed myself to become distracted with traffic and ATC communications causing me to deviate from the number one priority- FLY THE AIRPLANE. Besides going through all checklists in the future, I will also as a final safety check, conduct the GUMPS technic at a minimum of 1000 feet, 500 feet, and prior to touchdown. This is a humbling and painful experience, which I feel in the long run will make me a better pilot. A valuable lesson I will never forget. I will always apply the three basic rules of flying, Aviate Navigate, Communicate as well as the proven GUMPS technic."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nApproaching ZZZ [airport] ZZZ Approach handed me over to ZZZ tower. Upon initial contact with ZZZ tower they requested that I enter a left downwind for runway XXL and report 3 miles southeast of the field. ATC issued several traffic advisories due to traffic in the immediate area. The weather was reporting winds out of the southeast with gusts up to 19 knots. Due to the gusty winds, I opted for a flaps 20 approach and landing. While configuring, I ran the checklists but became distracted with ATC communications and somehow missed landing gear extension. Approach was bumpy with fluctuating airspeeds requiring more power than normal. During the approach the gear up warning system did not activate. Everything seamed normal until flare and touchdown when I quickly became aware the gear was not extended. I secured the aircraft and waited for emergency services to arrive. As a result of this incident no injuries were sustained. In retrospect, I believe the contributing factors were the wind conditions requiring lower flap setting and higher power setting for the approach and landing, which may explain why the gear warning system did not activate. In addition with my distraction with ATC and traffic, I did not back up the landing checklist with a GUMPS check technic (GAS, UNDERCARRIAGE, MIXTURE, PROPELLER.) I allowed myself to deviate from the number one priority-FLY THE AIRPLANE. In other words aviate navigate communicate. Reflecting on the occurrence, I believe I selected the correct approach and landing configuration for the existing conditions, however, I allowed myself to become distracted with traffic and ATC communications causing me to deviate from the number one priority- FLY THE AIRPLANE. Besides going through all checklists in the future, I will also as a final safety check, conduct the GUMPS technic at a minimum of 1000 feet, 500 feet, and prior to touchdown. This is a humbling and painful experience, which I feel in the long run will make me a better pilot. A valuable lesson I will never forget. I will always apply the three basic rules of flying, Aviate Navigate, Communicate as well as the proven GUMPS technic.",
    "synopsis": "General aviation pilot reported they failed to extend the landing gear resulting in a gear up landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=18",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 18,
      "pageEnd": 19,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=18",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 18,
        "pageEnd": 19,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2085091 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "General aviation pilot reported they failed to extend the landing gear resulting in a gear up landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2085028",
    "date": "2024-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear",
      "Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 2 Eng, Retractable Gear"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During a routine training flight in an Aircraft X with a private pilot student and myself, a Flight Instructor, a near mid-air collision (NMAC) situation occurred. The following details the chain of events, human performance considerations, contributing factors, discovery, corrective actions, and additional post-flight findings: Departing from BTL airspace, we leveled off at 3000 feet before ascending to 5500 feet MSL after exiting the lateral boundaries of the class D airspace. Moderate turbulence and wind speeds prompted our climb to 5500 feet MSL during the southbound departure. Upon entering our designated practice area, we made an entry call on the radio, announcing our altitude of 5500 feet MSL to alert other aircraft in the vicinity. I instructed the student to initiate a left climbing turn to a northerly heading to avoid cloud development and turbulence in the southeast. As the student began the turn, they spotted nearby traffic to the southeast (traffic heading westbound and our approx. heading of 150), and the SkyWatch system alerted us to the presence of the same altitude traffic. Although I hadn't initially sighted the traffic, I assumed control from the student and expedited the turn and climb away from the other aircraft. We continued our climb to 6500 feet MSL to maintain separation, with the other aircraft observed in a steep-banked left turn away from us. The decision to initiate a left climbing turn to avoid turbulence and cloud development was appropriate given the weather conditions. However, incomplete situational awareness led to potential conflict with nearby traffic. Moderate turbulence and wind speeds increased workload and distracted attention from scanning for traffic. Lack of visual confirmation of nearby traffic highlighted a lapse in situational awareness. Assuming control from the student and rapidly expediting the turn and climb away from the traffic demonstrated decisive action in mitigating the risk of a mid-air collision. Weather conditions prompted a decision to maneuver away from turbulence and cloud development, leading to potential conflict with nearby traffic. The other aircraft's failure to initiate communication to ease separation heightened the potential for a conflict. The presence of nearby traffic was initially spotted by the student pilot, and the SkyWatch system alerted us to the same altitude traffic. Visual confirmation of the other aircraft was made by the student pilot before I took control and expedited the turn and climb away from the potential conflict. Enhanced emphasis on situational awareness and scanning techniques will be incorporated into future flight training sessions to mitigate the risk of similar incidents. Review of procedures for communication and evasive action in the event of traffic conflicts will be conducted to ensure appropriate responses in similar situations. Continued reinforcement of the importance of effective communication and vigilance during flight operations will be emphasized to prevent future near mid-air collisions. Upon post-flight review, it was determined that the NMAC distance was approximately 6000-7000 feet horizontally and 50-100 feet vertically. While this distance may not strictly qualify as an NMAC, the evasive action taken was deemed necessary considering the potential hazards involved had there been any further delay in action."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring a routine training flight in an Aircraft X with a private pilot student and myself, a Flight Instructor, a near mid-air collision (NMAC) situation occurred. The following details the chain of events, human performance considerations, contributing factors, discovery, corrective actions, and additional post-flight findings: Departing from BTL airspace, we leveled off at 3000 feet before ascending to 5500 feet MSL after exiting the lateral boundaries of the class D airspace. Moderate turbulence and wind speeds prompted our climb to 5500 feet MSL during the southbound departure. Upon entering our designated practice area, we made an entry call on the radio, announcing our altitude of 5500 feet MSL to alert other aircraft in the vicinity. I instructed the student to initiate a left climbing turn to a northerly heading to avoid cloud development and turbulence in the southeast. As the student began the turn, they spotted nearby traffic to the southeast (traffic heading westbound and our approx. heading of 150), and the SkyWatch system alerted us to the presence of the same altitude traffic. Although I hadn't initially sighted the traffic, I assumed control from the student and expedited the turn and climb away from the other aircraft. We continued our climb to 6500 feet MSL to maintain separation, with the other aircraft observed in a steep-banked left turn away from us. The decision to initiate a left climbing turn to avoid turbulence and cloud development was appropriate given the weather conditions. However, incomplete situational awareness led to potential conflict with nearby traffic. Moderate turbulence and wind speeds increased workload and distracted attention from scanning for traffic. Lack of visual confirmation of nearby traffic highlighted a lapse in situational awareness. Assuming control from the student and rapidly expediting the turn and climb away from the traffic demonstrated decisive action in mitigating the risk of a mid-air collision. Weather conditions prompted a decision to maneuver away from turbulence and cloud development, leading to potential conflict with nearby traffic. The other aircraft's failure to initiate communication to ease separation heightened the potential for a conflict. The presence of nearby traffic was initially spotted by the student pilot, and the SkyWatch system alerted us to the same altitude traffic. Visual confirmation of the other aircraft was made by the student pilot before I took control and expedited the turn and climb away from the potential conflict. Enhanced emphasis on situational awareness and scanning techniques will be incorporated into future flight training sessions to mitigate the risk of similar incidents. Review of procedures for communication and evasive action in the event of traffic conflicts will be conducted to ensure appropriate responses in similar situations. Continued reinforcement of the importance of effective communication and vigilance during flight operations will be emphasized to prevent future near mid-air collisions. Upon post-flight review, it was determined that the NMAC distance was approximately 6000-7000 feet horizontally and 50-100 feet vertically. While this distance may not strictly qualify as an NMAC, the evasive action taken was deemed necessary considering the potential hazards involved had there been any further delay in action.",
    "synopsis": "Flight Instructor with student reported a NMAC while maneuvering in a practice area. Flight Instructor took evasive action to avoid a collision.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=20",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 20,
      "pageEnd": 22,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=20",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 20,
        "pageEnd": 22,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2085028 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Flight Instructor with student reported a NMAC while maneuvering in a practice area. Flight Instructor took evasive action to avoid a collision.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2084189",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were in cruise flight at 13000 ft, operating a Flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. There had been a lot of bad weather in the area all day. We passed through some clouds that appeared to have tops of about 15000 ft. The radar was not indicating anything but very light scattered precipitation. As we entered the clouds we encountered severe turbulence. The aircraft was thrown down about 400 feet instantly with about twenty degrees of bank to the left. Speed increased towards the red line, 320 knots, and I deployed the spoilers. As we tried to climb back to our assigned altitude of 13000 ft we were continually thrown back down in altitude. After about a minute, the turbulence subsided to light turbulence and we proceeded to climb back to our assigned altitude and on course. We reported the severe turbulence and the deviation to ATC and continued to our destination without further incident. Suggestion: Possibly request a deviation around clouds when widespread bad weather has been occurring in the area."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were in cruise flight at 13000 ft, operating a Flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. There had been a lot of bad weather in the area all day. We passed through some clouds that appeared to have tops of about 15000 ft. The radar was not indicating anything but very light scattered precipitation. As we entered the clouds we encountered severe turbulence. The aircraft was thrown down about 400 feet instantly with about twenty degrees of bank to the left. Speed increased towards the red line, 320 knots, and I deployed the spoilers. As we tried to climb back to our assigned altitude of 13000 ft we were continually thrown back down in altitude. After about a minute, the turbulence subsided to light turbulence and we proceeded to climb back to our assigned altitude and on course. We reported the severe turbulence and the deviation to ATC and continued to our destination without further incident. Suggestion: Possibly request a deviation around clouds when widespread bad weather has been occurring in the area.",
    "synopsis": "EMB-145 Captain reported entering an area of severe turbulence resulting in course and altitude deviations. The Captain regained control of the aircraft when the turbulence stopped, and they continued safely to destination.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=23",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 23,
      "pageEnd": 24,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=23",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 23,
        "pageEnd": 24,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "Severe turbulence despite light precipitation on radar",
    "summary": "An EMB-145 crew encountered severe turbulence after entering clouds during cruise at 13,000 feet. The aircraft dropped about 400 feet and repeatedly lost altitude before the turbulence eased; the crew regained its assigned altitude, reported the encounter to air traffic control, and continued to the destination.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Weather",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2079096",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "First officer was PF and after reaching cruise altitude FL350 for approximately 15 minutes, we had multiple IECAS messages including A-I ENG 1 FAIL, AC BUS 1 OFF, DC BUS 1 OFF, ICE DETECTOR 1 FAIL, IDG 1 OFF BUS, VHF 3 FAIL, ADS 1 FAIL, AVNX MAU 1B FAIL, AP FAIL, SPOILER FAULT, EMER LT ON, SLAT LO RATE, TAT 1 FAIL, CCD 2 FAULT. Additionally the following items were effected: ADS3 Reversion, EFIS SCREEN DU 1 and 4 fail, Autopilot fail, auto-throttle fail, MCDU 1 fail, CCD 2 fail, A-I MODE NOT AUTO. We had approximately 18 irregular conditions. After assessing that our remaining reliable flight instruments including the IESS were on my (Captain) side, I announced my flight controls and took the flight controls. As I continued to hand fly the aircraft the FO initiated QRH procedures for AC BUS 1 OFF, DC BUS 1 OFF. After that we told ZZZ center that we had an electrical failure and we were [requesting priority handling]. It appeared that we were experiencing conditions similar to an electrical emergency, but IDG 2 was working, the RAT had not deployed, and DU panel 5 was working. Wanting to start the APU, we requested FL 300. Reaching FL 300 we successfully started the APU, and continued to asses our multiple irregular conditions. We were unable to view the electrical synoptic page. The FO also completed QRH procedure for AVNX MAU 1B FAIL. Assessment included that with IDG 2 operating, normal electrical transfer of power to restore AC BUS 1 and DC BUS 1 should have occurred but this had not happened. This lead me to believe there was a fault in system 1. We notified the flight attendants and passengers that because of an electrical problem, we would likely be diverting to an alternate airport. The QRH warned us that flight in icing conditions required selecting ice protection mode selector to on which we did, and this also made staying clear of icing conditions or remaining in VMC a priority as we determined a suitable diversion airport. Most airports behind us had been experiencing IFR, rain and freezing rain. ATC assisted in finding a diversion airport. Initially ATC said that ZZZ was VFR so we requested diversion to ZZZ. We communicated to the FA’s and Passengers that due to an electrical issue, we would be diverting to ZZZ but then several minutes later ATC said ZZZ was marginal and reporting icing conditions. We asked about ZZZ1 and ATC said ZZZ1 was VFR and negative icing reports. We confirmed with ATC that we were [requesting priority handling] and requested CFR (crash fire rescue) for ZZZ1. We were cleared direct to ZZZ1 which the FO loaded into his and the only operable MCDU. The FO did all communications with #2 MCDU including trying to ACARS dispatch but that was inoperative. I concentrated on hand flying the aircraft in IMC conditions the entire descent. Finding a nearest suitable alternate was difficult since neither Nav Display worked and #1 MCDU was inoperative, so I used my tablet map for situational awareness. Via the intercom I told the FA’s that because of poor weather in ZZZ we would now be diverting to ZZZ1, landing in 20 minutes, they did not need to brace. I also made another announcement to the passengers that due to poor weather in ZZZ we would now be landing in ZZZ1 and please pay attention to the FA’s as they prepare the cabin for landing. An attempt was made to communicate to dispatch through different means but that was unsuccessful. We advised ATC to communicate to dispatch of our situation and diversion to ZZZ1. 10 minutes prior to landing we notified the FA’s that we would be landing in 10 minutes. We completed our primary QRH procedures setting up for full flap landing on runway XX at ZZZ1. After an uneventful landing we stopped on the runway and confirmed that we could safely taxi clear of the runway. After stopping on the taxiway we confirmed that we could safely taxi to the gate. We taxied to gate and deplaned our passengers. CFR confirmed that everything was OK. I contacted dispatch, Maintenance control, and Chief Pilot. I also wanted to take a moment to mention what a great job my supporting crewmembers did. First Officer is still a low time First Officer, but he did an extraordinary job in this [priority] situation. Flight attendants, with their many, many years of experience helped keep the passengers safe and calm in the [priority handling] diversion."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "[Report narrative contained no additional information]"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nFirst officer was PF and after reaching cruise altitude FL350 for approximately 15 minutes, we had multiple IECAS messages including A-I ENG 1 FAIL, AC BUS 1 OFF, DC BUS 1 OFF, ICE DETECTOR 1 FAIL, IDG 1 OFF BUS, VHF 3 FAIL, ADS 1 FAIL, AVNX MAU 1B FAIL, AP FAIL, SPOILER FAULT, EMER LT ON, SLAT LO RATE, TAT 1 FAIL, CCD 2 FAULT. Additionally the following items were effected: ADS3 Reversion, EFIS SCREEN DU 1 and 4 fail, Autopilot fail, auto-throttle fail, MCDU 1 fail, CCD 2 fail, A-I MODE NOT AUTO. We had approximately 18 irregular conditions. After assessing that our remaining reliable flight instruments including the IESS were on my (Captain) side, I announced my flight controls and took the flight controls. As I continued to hand fly the aircraft the FO initiated QRH procedures for AC BUS 1 OFF, DC BUS 1 OFF. After that we told ZZZ center that we had an electrical failure and we were [requesting priority handling]. It appeared that we were experiencing conditions similar to an electrical emergency, but IDG 2 was working, the RAT had not deployed, and DU panel 5 was working. Wanting to start the APU, we requested FL 300. Reaching FL 300 we successfully started the APU, and continued to asses our multiple irregular conditions. We were unable to view the electrical synoptic page. The FO also completed QRH procedure for AVNX MAU 1B FAIL. Assessment included that with IDG 2 operating, normal electrical transfer of power to restore AC BUS 1 and DC BUS 1 should have occurred but this had not happened. This lead me to believe there was a fault in system 1. We notified the flight attendants and passengers that because of an electrical problem, we would likely be diverting to an alternate airport. The QRH warned us that flight in icing conditions required selecting ice protection mode selector to on which we did, and this also made staying clear of icing conditions or remaining in VMC a priority as we determined a suitable diversion airport. Most airports behind us had been experiencing IFR, rain and freezing rain. ATC assisted in finding a diversion airport. Initially ATC said that ZZZ was VFR so we requested diversion to ZZZ. We communicated to the FA’s and Passengers that due to an electrical issue, we would be diverting to ZZZ but then several minutes later ATC said ZZZ was marginal and reporting icing conditions. We asked about ZZZ1 and ATC said ZZZ1 was VFR and negative icing reports. We confirmed with ATC that we were [requesting priority handling] and requested CFR (crash fire rescue) for ZZZ1. We were cleared direct to ZZZ1 which the FO loaded into his and the only operable MCDU. The FO did all communications with #2 MCDU including trying to ACARS dispatch but that was inoperative. I concentrated on hand flying the aircraft in IMC conditions the entire descent. Finding a nearest suitable alternate was difficult since neither Nav Display worked and #1 MCDU was inoperative, so I used my tablet map for situational awareness. Via the intercom I told the FA’s that because of poor weather in ZZZ we would now be diverting to ZZZ1, landing in 20 minutes, they did not need to brace. I also made another announcement to the passengers that due to poor weather in ZZZ we would now be landing in ZZZ1 and please pay attention to the FA’s as they prepare the cabin for landing. An attempt was made to communicate to dispatch through different means but that was unsuccessful. We advised ATC to communicate to dispatch of our situation and diversion to ZZZ1. 10 minutes prior to landing we notified the FA’s that we would be landing in 10 minutes. We completed our primary QRH procedures setting up for full flap landing on runway XX at ZZZ1. After an uneventful landing we stopped on the runway and confirmed that we could safely taxi clear of the runway. After stopping on the taxiway we confirmed that we could safely taxi to the gate. We taxied to gate and deplaned our passengers. CFR confirmed that everything was OK. I contacted dispatch, Maintenance control, and Chief Pilot. I also wanted to take a moment to mention what a great job my supporting crewmembers did. First Officer is still a low time First Officer, but he did an extraordinary job in this [priority] situation. Flight attendants, with their many, many years of experience helped keep the passengers safe and calm in the [priority handling] diversion.\n\nNarrative 2\n[Report narrative contained no additional information]",
    "synopsis": "EMB-170 flight crew reported an electrical system failure in cruise affecting multiple aircraft systems. Flight crew diverted and landed safely.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=25",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 25,
      "pageEnd": 27,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=25",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 25,
        "pageEnd": 27,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2079096 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "EMB-170 flight crew reported an electrical system failure in cruise affecting multiple aircraft systems. Flight crew diverted and landed safely.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2078892",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were dispatched to MYR when the weather was forecasted to be the worst at MYR. It had remarks on the release that the wind gusts could exceed our cross wind component. We looked through the FOM and SOP for the wind shear guidance on cross wind winds but couldn’t find the tables for dry runway, wet runway, braking action less than good that used to be in the SOP so we felt pressured to go. The severe weather at the time of departure was south and west of MYR so again we had no reason to delay the flight. We knew there was going to be turbulence along the route so we made the FA’s remain seated. We were in heavy rain and moderate turbulence for the last 15 minutes of the descent into the MYR area. We were set up for [Runway] 36 and getting vectors to the southeast for a right downwind when we heard another company aircraft go missed approach and get vectored back around. The controller asked him the reason for the go around and all he said was they were unstable. While both of us were getting vectored to final the controller advised that the wind was favoring runway 18 , that they had 2 minutes of steady wind favoring 18. We ran the numbers again and found we couldn’t do 36 so we asked for 18. The other aircraft continued for 36. They made it in but didn’t give a pirep . While getting vectored for 18 ATC told us there was extreme precipitation 4 miles to the west and 6 miles to the north of the FAF so we asked for a turn just outside the FAF. We were configured at the marker. At 800 ft we got the wind shear warning and did the escape maneuver and encountered severe turbulence. When I thought we were out of the windshear I asked for recover flaps 2 positive rate gear up. FLch 210 then we hit the wind shift at 2000 ft msl and our airspeed went up 100knts to 285knts the FMS guidance went up to 40 degrees pitch up but to get the 210 knots but I kept the nose about 20 degrees we were in severe turbulence until we got east of the airport by 5 miles or so. We then diverted to ZZZ and landed safely without any injuries. I wrote the airplane up for the severe turbulence and airspeed exceedance. When I was checking the weather before departure I don’t recall seeing any weather with tops above FL210 when we landed in ZZZ I checked the weather and saw radar tops were FL340 to FL400 in the MYR area also I was told that passengers who had their cell phones on were receiving emergency alerts for a tornado warning in the MYR area. I think the dispatcher following the flight could have warned us about the weather. Do dispatchers know there is a difference between summertime and wintertime storms due to the sinking of the troposphere? A wintertime storm above 30,000 ft is equivalent to a 45,000 storm? On the flight back from ZZZ to MYR the dispatcher wanted to file us straight through a line of fl340 to fl400 cells. I had to make him plan a different route to avoid all the weather with higher tops."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Flap overspeed on climb out. Wind shear events resulting in flap overspeed. 800 AGL - severe turbulence and windshear. Preformed windshear events in order. Then once recovering from windshear, flaps 2 gear up. Then 50 knots gust around 2.5 thousand feet resulting in flap overspeed and in addition exceeding of 250knots under 10k feet. Pilot flying captain reduced thrust out of max thrust and Flch 210 was bugged. Approach was not attempted again and diversion was made to ZZZ. Pilots should attempt to recognize the importance of speed management and importance during windshear events and the likelihood of overspending due to gusts. Reducing power earlier once out of windshear event could have helped with speed management in addition reducing flaps on F bug speed will help with overspeed mitigation."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were dispatched to MYR when the weather was forecasted to be the worst at MYR. It had remarks on the release that the wind gusts could exceed our cross wind component. We looked through the FOM and SOP for the wind shear guidance on cross wind winds but couldn’t find the tables for dry runway, wet runway, braking action less than good that used to be in the SOP so we felt pressured to go. The severe weather at the time of departure was south and west of MYR so again we had no reason to delay the flight. We knew there was going to be turbulence along the route so we made the FA’s remain seated. We were in heavy rain and moderate turbulence for the last 15 minutes of the descent into the MYR area. We were set up for [Runway] 36 and getting vectors to the southeast for a right downwind when we heard another company aircraft go missed approach and get vectored back around. The controller asked him the reason for the go around and all he said was they were unstable. While both of us were getting vectored to final the controller advised that the wind was favoring runway 18 , that they had 2 minutes of steady wind favoring 18. We ran the numbers again and found we couldn’t do 36 so we asked for 18. The other aircraft continued for 36. They made it in but didn’t give a pirep . While getting vectored for 18 ATC told us there was extreme precipitation 4 miles to the west and 6 miles to the north of the FAF so we asked for a turn just outside the FAF. We were configured at the marker. At 800 ft we got the wind shear warning and did the escape maneuver and encountered severe turbulence. When I thought we were out of the windshear I asked for recover flaps 2 positive rate gear up. FLch 210 then we hit the wind shift at 2000 ft msl and our airspeed went up 100knts to 285knts the FMS guidance went up to 40 degrees pitch up but to get the 210 knots but I kept the nose about 20 degrees we were in severe turbulence until we got east of the airport by 5 miles or so. We then diverted to ZZZ and landed safely without any injuries. I wrote the airplane up for the severe turbulence and airspeed exceedance. When I was checking the weather before departure I don’t recall seeing any weather with tops above FL210 when we landed in ZZZ I checked the weather and saw radar tops were FL340 to FL400 in the MYR area also I was told that passengers who had their cell phones on were receiving emergency alerts for a tornado warning in the MYR area. I think the dispatcher following the flight could have warned us about the weather. Do dispatchers know there is a difference between summertime and wintertime storms due to the sinking of the troposphere? A wintertime storm above 30,000 ft is equivalent to a 45,000 storm? On the flight back from ZZZ to MYR the dispatcher wanted to file us straight through a line of fl340 to fl400 cells. I had to make him plan a different route to avoid all the weather with higher tops.\n\nNarrative 2\nFlap overspeed on climb out. Wind shear events resulting in flap overspeed. 800 AGL - severe turbulence and windshear. Preformed windshear events in order. Then once recovering from windshear, flaps 2 gear up. Then 50 knots gust around 2.5 thousand feet resulting in flap overspeed and in addition exceeding of 250knots under 10k feet. Pilot flying captain reduced thrust out of max thrust and Flch 210 was bugged. Approach was not attempted again and diversion was made to ZZZ. Pilots should attempt to recognize the importance of speed management and importance during windshear events and the likelihood of overspending due to gusts. Reducing power earlier once out of windshear event could have helped with speed management in addition reducing flaps on F bug speed will help with overspeed mitigation.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported airspeed exceedance due to wind shear and severe turbulence on final approach. Flight crew completed a go-around, diverted and landed safely.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=28",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 28,
      "pageEnd": 30,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=28",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 28,
        "pageEnd": 30,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2078892 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported airspeed exceedance due to wind shear and severe turbulence on final approach. Flight crew completed a go-around, diverted and landed safely.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2077952",
    "date": "2023-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 as pilot monitoring we were descending through 5000 ft direct ZZZZZ (FAF). We received clearance for visual approach runway XX. We were close to the airport and realized we were high and fast. We turned away to the West to lose altitude and speed. AP (autopilot) and AT (autothrottles) were turned off. Started turn to airport in order to not overshoot localizer. We then put the gear down to help slow. While in turn back to final approach course we slowed to put out flaps 1. Continuing turn to final about 1300 ft., I stated “watch your speed.” I also stated “watch your speed” again as the speed was dropping closer to stall around 1200 ft. We were still in the turn and we hit gusts of wind and our speed dropped quickly, we got a stick shaker briefly for a second or two with very quick recovery. Within a few seconds called for go-around, which we executed. During the go-around we realized the speed brakes were not stowed. We cleaned up the aircraft and were vectored to land runway XYL. We landed safely. Suggestion: Always stay situationally aware. Take whatever actions necessary in order to execute a stable approach. Don’t rush an approach. It is already a task saturated phase of flight and rushing the event can add tasks that weren’t anticipated."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nFlight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 as pilot monitoring we were descending through 5000 ft direct ZZZZZ (FAF). We received clearance for visual approach runway XX. We were close to the airport and realized we were high and fast. We turned away to the West to lose altitude and speed. AP (autopilot) and AT (autothrottles) were turned off. Started turn to airport in order to not overshoot localizer. We then put the gear down to help slow. While in turn back to final approach course we slowed to put out flaps 1. Continuing turn to final about 1300 ft., I stated “watch your speed.” I also stated “watch your speed” again as the speed was dropping closer to stall around 1200 ft. We were still in the turn and we hit gusts of wind and our speed dropped quickly, we got a stick shaker briefly for a second or two with very quick recovery. Within a few seconds called for go-around, which we executed. During the go-around we realized the speed brakes were not stowed. We cleaned up the aircraft and were vectored to land runway XYL. We landed safely. Suggestion: Always stay situationally aware. Take whatever actions necessary in order to execute a stable approach. Don’t rush an approach. It is already a task saturated phase of flight and rushing the event can add tasks that weren’t anticipated.",
    "synopsis": "EMB170 First Officer reported a loss of airspeed resulting in an unstable approach in gusty wind conditions. The crew performed a go around and landed safely on a different runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=31",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 31,
      "pageEnd": 32,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=31",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 31,
        "pageEnd": 32,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
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    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2077952 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "EMB170 First Officer reported a loss of airspeed resulting in an unstable approach in gusty wind conditions. The crew performed a go around and landed safely on a different runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2077850",
    "date": "2023-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During our 3rd leg of the day from ZZZ1 to ZZZ we encountered a microburst while on the missed approach for Runway XXL in ZZZ. The following is a narrative of this event. I was the pilot flying and the FO (First Officer) was pilot monitoring. Momentarily after being given the approach clearance for Runway XXL into ZZZ and being told to switch to Tower, a microburst alert came across for the Approach frequency for Runway XXL. The First Officer on my command immediately canceled the approach clearance. We were given a heading of 220 and instructions to climb to 5000 ft. The heading didn’t turn us away from the weather and then subsequently flew us through the weather. I asked the FO to get a heading away from the weather to avoid the microburst. However, he was unable to get a word in with ATC as he tried to call them at least 4 times and due to the fact that we were in IMC conditions in one of the world’s busiest airspace and surrounded by weather, I was reluctant to turn more than a few degrees without permission. After initiating the go- around as instructed we initiated the climb and go-around procedures. I selected the heading of 220, dialed in 5000 ft., selected flight level change speed 210. We were already at flaps 2 so we went to flaps 1 and while climbing through 3800 ft. the plane encountered a microburst and lost all lift. I announced windshear and commanded max thrust and pushed the nose forward to gain airspeed and prevent a full stall. I will note we never received an annunciated winds shear alert nor did we get a shaker or a pusher indication. I will also note the exact altitude loss and airspeed loss is unknown. I estimate the altitude loss was around 2000 ft. and the airspeed loss was around 50 kt. Once I recovered to the point where the plane regained lift, we initiated a climb back to our assigned altitude of 5000 ft. and entered a severe updraft that made us blow through 5000 ft. up to 8000 ft. before I was able to regain control of the aircraft. Once control was regained I commanded the FO to “recover.” It took several minutes for the FD (Flight Director) to become useful again. The FO during the windshear recovery and on my command informed ATC as to the fact that we were recovering from windshear. Once we were at a safe altitude and I was able to get the autopilot on, I made an announcement on the radio to help articulate how bad the microburst and windshear were in hopes of stopping other planes from flying through it. In closing, this situation could have been minimized had the ATC controller turned us away from the weather on the missed. We were able to recover control of the aircraft with no injuries or aircraft damage of any sort. In the future I will instruct the FO to tell ATC we need an immediate heading away from the weather when on a missed approach anywhere near a microburst."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were enroute from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and getting vectored for the ILS XXL. I was pilot monitoring and the Captain was pilot flying. The controller told us, “Aircraft X, maintain 180 kt. until ZZZZZ and contact Tower XXX.X.” I repeated the clearance back, then literally 1 second after my repeat and before I switched to Tower the controller announced, “Attention all aircraft, low level microburst alert, 30-kt. loss on 3-mile final.” My Captain told me to cancel our approach clearance and without wasting any time, after an aircraft had already asked to cancel theirs, I said “we can’t take that either” and “we’d like to cancel our approach due to the microburst.” Then the controller instructed us to “fly heading 220 and maintain 5000.” The final approach course to the ILS XXL is a 219 heading so the 220 heading sent us straight into the weather. My Captain asked me to get a different heading to avoid the weather. I called about 4 times before we were finally told, “I gave you a heading of 220, but you can have whatever heading you want,” a few moments later. At that point we had already flown through the worst of the weather. Being in the position that we were, ZZZ2, and ZZZ3 to our left and ZZZ4 traffic to our right, we were hesitant to deviate from our instructions more than a few degrees given it’s one of the busiest airspace in the world with jets everywhere. We initiated a soft go- around and climbed to 5000 with flight level change 210, and selected a heading of 220. We were slightly configured with flaps 2 and in our climb we selected flaps 1. Around 4000 ft. or so we encountered a microburst. The aircraft lost an incredible amount of lift and we began to lose altitude fast. The Captain announced wind shear and moved the thrust levers to max. I announced what altitude we were at during the microburst and looked at our airspeed and was shocked to see how much airspeed we had lost. I told him we need to push the nose down more and I looked to left left and saw the yoke full forward. After about 20 seconds we were out of it and hit an updraft and shot up to 8000 ft. before we could start to recover. After that the Captain told me to “recover” and I selected heading and we cleaned up the aircraft and regained control. After going through the microburst, the flight director automation of the aircraft was not cooperating with our inputs and he hand-flew the aircraft until we got it to work. Towards the end of the ordeal I told ATC we were recovering from wind shear. The Captain made a comment to air traffic control of what we had went through in hopes of not sending any more aircraft through the weather we went in. My suggestion is that air traffic controller should’ve realized the heading of 220 was essentially our current heading into the weather and thus given us a different heading. Also, given the microburst alert, they should’ve alerted us better and given us instructions to avoid the weather. Had we switched over to Tower and not heard the microburst alert on the Approach frequency we might’ve been in an even more dire situation."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring our 3rd leg of the day from ZZZ1 to ZZZ we encountered a microburst while on the missed approach for Runway XXL in ZZZ. The following is a narrative of this event. I was the pilot flying and the FO (First Officer) was pilot monitoring. Momentarily after being given the approach clearance for Runway XXL into ZZZ and being told to switch to Tower, a microburst alert came across for the Approach frequency for Runway XXL. The First Officer on my command immediately canceled the approach clearance. We were given a heading of 220 and instructions to climb to 5000 ft. The heading didn’t turn us away from the weather and then subsequently flew us through the weather. I asked the FO to get a heading away from the weather to avoid the microburst. However, he was unable to get a word in with ATC as he tried to call them at least 4 times and due to the fact that we were in IMC conditions in one of the world’s busiest airspace and surrounded by weather, I was reluctant to turn more than a few degrees without permission. After initiating the go- around as instructed we initiated the climb and go-around procedures. I selected the heading of 220, dialed in 5000 ft., selected flight level change speed 210. We were already at flaps 2 so we went to flaps 1 and while climbing through 3800 ft. the plane encountered a microburst and lost all lift. I announced windshear and commanded max thrust and pushed the nose forward to gain airspeed and prevent a full stall. I will note we never received an annunciated winds shear alert nor did we get a shaker or a pusher indication. I will also note the exact altitude loss and airspeed loss is unknown. I estimate the altitude loss was around 2000 ft. and the airspeed loss was around 50 kt. Once I recovered to the point where the plane regained lift, we initiated a climb back to our assigned altitude of 5000 ft. and entered a severe updraft that made us blow through 5000 ft. up to 8000 ft. before I was able to regain control of the aircraft. Once control was regained I commanded the FO to “recover.” It took several minutes for the FD (Flight Director) to become useful again. The FO during the windshear recovery and on my command informed ATC as to the fact that we were recovering from windshear. Once we were at a safe altitude and I was able to get the autopilot on, I made an announcement on the radio to help articulate how bad the microburst and windshear were in hopes of stopping other planes from flying through it. In closing, this situation could have been minimized had the ATC controller turned us away from the weather on the missed. We were able to recover control of the aircraft with no injuries or aircraft damage of any sort. In the future I will instruct the FO to tell ATC we need an immediate heading away from the weather when on a missed approach anywhere near a microburst.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were enroute from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and getting vectored for the ILS XXL. I was pilot monitoring and the Captain was pilot flying. The controller told us, “Aircraft X, maintain 180 kt. until ZZZZZ and contact Tower XXX.X.” I repeated the clearance back, then literally 1 second after my repeat and before I switched to Tower the controller announced, “Attention all aircraft, low level microburst alert, 30-kt. loss on 3-mile final.” My Captain told me to cancel our approach clearance and without wasting any time, after an aircraft had already asked to cancel theirs, I said “we can’t take that either” and “we’d like to cancel our approach due to the microburst.” Then the controller instructed us to “fly heading 220 and maintain 5000.” The final approach course to the ILS XXL is a 219 heading so the 220 heading sent us straight into the weather. My Captain asked me to get a different heading to avoid the weather. I called about 4 times before we were finally told, “I gave you a heading of 220, but you can have whatever heading you want,” a few moments later. At that point we had already flown through the worst of the weather. Being in the position that we were, ZZZ2, and ZZZ3 to our left and ZZZ4 traffic to our right, we were hesitant to deviate from our instructions more than a few degrees given it’s one of the busiest airspace in the world with jets everywhere. We initiated a soft go- around and climbed to 5000 with flight level change 210, and selected a heading of 220. We were slightly configured with flaps 2 and in our climb we selected flaps 1. Around 4000 ft. or so we encountered a microburst. The aircraft lost an incredible amount of lift and we began to lose altitude fast. The Captain announced wind shear and moved the thrust levers to max. I announced what altitude we were at during the microburst and looked at our airspeed and was shocked to see how much airspeed we had lost. I told him we need to push the nose down more and I looked to left left and saw the yoke full forward. After about 20 seconds we were out of it and hit an updraft and shot up to 8000 ft. before we could start to recover. After that the Captain told me to “recover” and I selected heading and we cleaned up the aircraft and regained control. After going through the microburst, the flight director automation of the aircraft was not cooperating with our inputs and he hand-flew the aircraft until we got it to work. Towards the end of the ordeal I told ATC we were recovering from wind shear. The Captain made a comment to air traffic control of what we had went through in hopes of not sending any more aircraft through the weather we went in. My suggestion is that air traffic controller should’ve realized the heading of 220 was essentially our current heading into the weather and thus given us a different heading. Also, given the microburst alert, they should’ve alerted us better and given us instructions to avoid the weather. Had we switched over to Tower and not heard the microburst alert on the Approach frequency we might’ve been in an even more dire situation.",
    "synopsis": "ERJ 170 flight crew reported loss of aircraft control due to microburst and windshear on final approach. Flight crew regained aircraft control and conducted a go-around.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=33",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 33,
      "pageEnd": 36,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=33",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 33,
        "pageEnd": 36,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
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    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
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    "title": "ASRS 2077850 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "ERJ 170 flight crew reported loss of aircraft control due to microburst and windshear on final approach. Flight crew regained aircraft control and conducted a go-around.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2077387",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Baron 58/58TC"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During cruise flight en-route to destination ZZZ1 at 11,000 MSL and in the vicinity of Location A, scattered convective activity persisted along our cleared route of flight. In an effort to deviate away from a visually acquired build up ahead, I requested a radar vector away from ground radar returns. ZZZ Center issued a heading of 075 to avoid weather which was consistent with the visual picture we had while in VMC. Within a few minutes on the vector, the aircraft re-entered IMC and with in approximately 1-2 minutes experienced a strong updraft followed by heavy rain and then hail which lasted for 30-60 seconds. Severe turbulence made altitude control not possible and I obtained clearance from ZZZ [Center] for any altitude. Upon exiting the hail encounter, I requested the field conditions at the nearest airports and ZZZ2 was suggested. Due to local knowledge and lack of emergency services however, a diversion to the nearest suitable field with an ILS and CFR resulted in selection and uneventful approach and landing to ZZZ3. This aircraft was not equipped with airborne weather radar. This could have been a primary tool that might have depicted the threat of hail or heavy precipitation on the vectored heading and in IMC."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring cruise flight en-route to destination ZZZ1 at 11,000 MSL and in the vicinity of Location A, scattered convective activity persisted along our cleared route of flight. In an effort to deviate away from a visually acquired build up ahead, I requested a radar vector away from ground radar returns. ZZZ Center issued a heading of 075 to avoid weather which was consistent with the visual picture we had while in VMC. Within a few minutes on the vector, the aircraft re-entered IMC and with in approximately 1-2 minutes experienced a strong updraft followed by heavy rain and then hail which lasted for 30-60 seconds. Severe turbulence made altitude control not possible and I obtained clearance from ZZZ [Center] for any altitude. Upon exiting the hail encounter, I requested the field conditions at the nearest airports and ZZZ2 was suggested. Due to local knowledge and lack of emergency services however, a diversion to the nearest suitable field with an ILS and CFR resulted in selection and uneventful approach and landing to ZZZ3. This aircraft was not equipped with airborne weather radar. This could have been a primary tool that might have depicted the threat of hail or heavy precipitation on the vectored heading and in IMC.",
    "synopsis": "Pilot reported severe weather and hail during cruise flight leading to temporary loss of control.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=37",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 37,
      "pageEnd": 38,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=37",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 37,
        "pageEnd": 38,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2077387 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Pilot reported severe weather and hail during cruise flight leading to temporary loss of control.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2076359",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On the approach into DCA we received a \" Caution obstacle\" aural. The visibility was improving from 1/4NM to 7, but the ceiling was still BKN 00 according to the ATIS, which required the use of the LDA Z. FO (First Officer) was flying and briefed the approach, during the briefing we set 720 as the MDA, unfortunately I did not verify this as I was task saturated due to the early morning, fatigue, a significant tail wind and some late approach briefing. Once cleared for the approach we were given direct to FERGI, 3K until established cleared for the LDA. During the approach we had a significant x-wind of roughly 47 knots from the right, roughly 180, which put us left of the 147 degree approach course. I noticed that we were quite far to the left of course and was focused on correcting this. FO switched to white needles to try and get the auto pilot to recapture the Localizer course which helped a bit, but I felt that we were still too far left of course and in danger of encroaching on PLVIA. FO started descending just after FERGI and was using the direct intercept page as his vertical guidance. Unfortunately a combination of task saturation, my target fixation and lack of situational awareness lead to us being right around 800 ft right over WEVPU. We broke out at roughly 1000 ft which is when I saw the buildings we were descending near. Once I heard the aural as well as the tower's advisory, I asked the FO to turn off the auto pilot and start following the river so as to avoid any further conflict, we had the runway and PAPIs in sight at this time. We continued following the river and landed without further incident. Cause: This was a combination of situational awareness, task saturation, fatigue and target fixation. The low Ceilings were a concern and I was fixated on the thought that we were going to have to go around or divert to ZZZ. Once we got to the approach I was further fixated on the fact that the plane was not following the localizer course very accurately and in fact putting us in line with a restricted area. I have been crediting an average of 100 hrs a month and can certainly feel the fatigue, the early morning combined with my commute further exacerbates this issue. Suggestion: More details for this approach in the company pages would be very helpful. Due to a lack of glide-slope as well as the runway not on the approach a procedure to set the field altitude, much like a localizer approach, would be helpful. I debriefed with the FO how we needed to utilize the special procedures manual for an approach such as this, which we do very infrequently."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We followed the LDA Z 19 in DCA and received an obstacle alert. We set 800 ft and the autopilot followed the vertical speed set by the PF to comply with the altitude restrictions set forth in the procedure. Just before leveling off at 800 ft the aircraft issued an obstacle alert. The autopilot leveled at 800 ft and the PF disengaged the autopilot, turned away from the building, and followed the river to land uneventfully from a stabilized descent. Cause: The procedure has us descend directly toward a building on the approach course. The altitude selection is to be set at 800 ft and the building has a height of 470 ft."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn the approach into DCA we received a \" Caution obstacle\" aural. The visibility was improving from 1/4NM to 7, but the ceiling was still BKN 00 according to the ATIS, which required the use of the LDA Z. FO (First Officer) was flying and briefed the approach, during the briefing we set 720 as the MDA, unfortunately I did not verify this as I was task saturated due to the early morning, fatigue, a significant tail wind and some late approach briefing. Once cleared for the approach we were given direct to FERGI, 3K until established cleared for the LDA. During the approach we had a significant x-wind of roughly 47 knots from the right, roughly 180, which put us left of the 147 degree approach course. I noticed that we were quite far to the left of course and was focused on correcting this. FO switched to white needles to try and get the auto pilot to recapture the Localizer course which helped a bit, but I felt that we were still too far left of course and in danger of encroaching on PLVIA. FO started descending just after FERGI and was using the direct intercept page as his vertical guidance. Unfortunately a combination of task saturation, my target fixation and lack of situational awareness lead to us being right around 800 ft right over WEVPU. We broke out at roughly 1000 ft which is when I saw the buildings we were descending near. Once I heard the aural as well as the tower's advisory, I asked the FO to turn off the auto pilot and start following the river so as to avoid any further conflict, we had the runway and PAPIs in sight at this time. We continued following the river and landed without further incident. Cause: This was a combination of situational awareness, task saturation, fatigue and target fixation. The low Ceilings were a concern and I was fixated on the thought that we were going to have to go around or divert to ZZZ. Once we got to the approach I was further fixated on the fact that the plane was not following the localizer course very accurately and in fact putting us in line with a restricted area. I have been crediting an average of 100 hrs a month and can certainly feel the fatigue, the early morning combined with my commute further exacerbates this issue. Suggestion: More details for this approach in the company pages would be very helpful. Due to a lack of glide-slope as well as the runway not on the approach a procedure to set the field altitude, much like a localizer approach, would be helpful. I debriefed with the FO how we needed to utilize the special procedures manual for an approach such as this, which we do very infrequently.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe followed the LDA Z 19 in DCA and received an obstacle alert. We set 800 ft and the autopilot followed the vertical speed set by the PF to comply with the altitude restrictions set forth in the procedure. Just before leveling off at 800 ft the aircraft issued an obstacle alert. The autopilot leveled at 800 ft and the PF disengaged the autopilot, turned away from the building, and followed the river to land uneventfully from a stabilized descent. Cause: The procedure has us descend directly toward a building on the approach course. The altitude selection is to be set at 800 ft and the building has a height of 470 ft.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported receiving an aural alert tower advisory for an obstacle during approach in IMC. Flight crew entered visual conditions and continued to a landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=39",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 39,
      "pageEnd": 41,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=39",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 39,
        "pageEnd": 41,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2076359 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported receiving an aural alert tower advisory for an obstacle during approach in IMC. Flight crew entered visual conditions and continued to a landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2075947",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Ceilings in DCA were near the MDA for the LDA Z 19 Approach. Visibility was roughly 2 SM. We knew there would be a possibility to go missed due to inability to see the runway. At the MDA, we still could not identify the runway. By the time we saw the runway, we were too close for a stable landing. We decided to go around, and ATC gave us a 250 vector and 3,000 altitude to set up for another try. On the second time around for the LDA Z approach, ATC notified us the prior three aircraft went missed as well. After the step-down fix, WEVPU, around 1,000 MSL, we still had not identified the runway and we received and obstacle alert. We decided to go around once more. ATC vectored us to the ILS 1 and landing was normal. Cloud ceilings were around 700 AGL, 40 kt winds aloft around 2,000 ft., calm on the runway. Procedures were followed. We briefed the strong possibility of a go around before the approach due to the weather. Both go arounds were performed as briefed."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nCeilings in DCA were near the MDA for the LDA Z 19 Approach. Visibility was roughly 2 SM. We knew there would be a possibility to go missed due to inability to see the runway. At the MDA, we still could not identify the runway. By the time we saw the runway, we were too close for a stable landing. We decided to go around, and ATC gave us a 250 vector and 3,000 altitude to set up for another try. On the second time around for the LDA Z approach, ATC notified us the prior three aircraft went missed as well. After the step-down fix, WEVPU, around 1,000 MSL, we still had not identified the runway and we received and obstacle alert. We decided to go around once more. ATC vectored us to the ILS 1 and landing was normal. Cloud ceilings were around 700 AGL, 40 kt winds aloft around 2,000 ft., calm on the runway. Procedures were followed. We briefed the strong possibility of a go around before the approach due to the weather. Both go arounds were performed as briefed.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported obstacle alert while on approach to DCA.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=42",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 42,
      "pageEnd": 43,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=42",
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        "pageEnd": 43,
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    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2075947 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported obstacle alert while on approach to DCA.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2075945",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "First approach to Runway 19 LDA Z ended with missed approach due to weather at minimums. Vectored back again and at approximately 200 feet above MDA we received an obstacle alert. We went around and were vectored to Runway 1 ILS. Rest of flight normal. NOTE: Weather was at minimums and 40 knot corsswind. Three flights in front of us had also just gone missed. All considerations for missed approach were briefed prior and executed as briefed."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nFirst approach to Runway 19 LDA Z ended with missed approach due to weather at minimums. Vectored back again and at approximately 200 feet above MDA we received an obstacle alert. We went around and were vectored to Runway 1 ILS. Rest of flight normal. NOTE: Weather was at minimums and 40 knot corsswind. Three flights in front of us had also just gone missed. All considerations for missed approach were briefed prior and executed as briefed.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew received an obstacle alert while on approach to DCA airport. Flight crew did a go-around and landed uneventfully.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=44",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 44,
      "pageEnd": 45,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=44",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 44,
        "pageEnd": 45,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "Two missed approaches in poor weather and strong crosswind",
    "summary": "After a first missed approach because of weather, a crew received an obstacle alert on its second approach and went around again. Air traffic control vectored the flight to another approach, and the remainder of the flight was normal; the crew had briefed the possibility of a missed approach.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Weather",
      "Procedures"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2075614",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "A321"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On decent on STAR into ZZZ at 13k we had a lighting strike that disabled our weather radar. There were thunderstorms in the area that we were diverting around. We leveled off at 12k and asked for diversion to ZZZ1 airport which was reporting 7 miles vis. ZZZ was 3/4 mile and 100 overcast with thunderstorms. we received diversion headings from ATC. Approximately 10 minutes after the lightning strike the radar came back on. We continued with vectors from ATC to ZZZ1 to stay clear of heavy rain and thunderstorms that were now moving into the ZZZ1 area. We landed on Runway XX in heavy rain and reduced visibility with 400 overcast. Cause: Being dispatched to an airport with forecast bad weather. Suggestions: Cancel flight."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Operating from ZZZ1 to ZZZ flying the ZZZZZ arrival, we encountered moderate/severe turbulence and a lightning strike originating on the nose of the aircraft which resulted in the immediate loss of our radar system. Some active weather near the arrival corridor had been monitored prior to and throughout the flight, flight was Dispatched with plenty of holding/alternate fuel. We proactively updated weather and arrival information into the ZZZ airport, the weather forecast and observations pointed to the need for an autoland setup which required the Captain to be the Pilot Flying. We also coordinated with Dispatch regarding alternate planning, originally listed as ZZZ2, the weather situation prompted an update to ZZZ3. We briefed and programmed the corresponding approach into the FMS and elected as a crew to transfer the aircraft to the Captain as Flying Pilot for the remainder of the flight (originally planned as FO (First Officer) leg) given the high probability of a required autoland. We were cleared to descend via the arrival landing to the north. Radar returns appeared stronger during a portion of the arrival between ZZZZZ1 and ZZZZZ2, ATC had previously indicated that a regional aircraft has just traversed this area with light/moderate turbulence and heavy rain. As we began to descend, I inquired again about this specific sector and altitude based on the radar observations to which the controller again indicated the report from the previous airplane. As we approached this area of weather, radar returns appeared to intensify and we requested deviations to avoid the area of strongest returns, as we began to deviate, turbulence increased rapidly and, suddenly and without any static buildup on the radio, we were struck by a very large lightning bolt which immediately disabled the radar system. At this point we reported to ATC that we needed to level off and fly away from the weather, reporting the lightning strike and loss of radar, we then requested a climb and diversion to ZZZ3 as previously discussed and coordinated with Dispatch and briefed as a possible outcome in case of an unsuccessful approach into ZZZ. We informed the next ATC controller about the loss of our radar and requested vectors around stronger returns, ultimately assigned an arrival into ZZZ3 and eventual vectors for ILS [Runway] XX. We also updated the Dispatcher about our diversion. Our radar came back on its own approximately 10 minutes after the lightning strike, however we requested vectors away from stronger returns due to lack of certainty of radar information being displayed. We briefed the ILS XX and flew it to a safe landing in ZZZ3 and proceeded to the gate once it became available. Cause: Rapidly changing weather conditions. Suggestions: Weather is unpredictable and dynamic, it is possible that weather deteriorated faster than it would’ve been reasonably expected, lightning was not present during our descent into the airport."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn decent on STAR into ZZZ at 13k we had a lighting strike that disabled our weather radar. There were thunderstorms in the area that we were diverting around. We leveled off at 12k and asked for diversion to ZZZ1 airport which was reporting 7 miles vis. ZZZ was 3/4 mile and 100 overcast with thunderstorms. we received diversion headings from ATC. Approximately 10 minutes after the lightning strike the radar came back on. We continued with vectors from ATC to ZZZ1 to stay clear of heavy rain and thunderstorms that were now moving into the ZZZ1 area. We landed on Runway XX in heavy rain and reduced visibility with 400 overcast. Cause: Being dispatched to an airport with forecast bad weather. Suggestions: Cancel flight.\n\nNarrative 2\nOperating from ZZZ1 to ZZZ flying the ZZZZZ arrival, we encountered moderate/severe turbulence and a lightning strike originating on the nose of the aircraft which resulted in the immediate loss of our radar system. Some active weather near the arrival corridor had been monitored prior to and throughout the flight, flight was Dispatched with plenty of holding/alternate fuel. We proactively updated weather and arrival information into the ZZZ airport, the weather forecast and observations pointed to the need for an autoland setup which required the Captain to be the Pilot Flying. We also coordinated with Dispatch regarding alternate planning, originally listed as ZZZ2, the weather situation prompted an update to ZZZ3. We briefed and programmed the corresponding approach into the FMS and elected as a crew to transfer the aircraft to the Captain as Flying Pilot for the remainder of the flight (originally planned as FO (First Officer) leg) given the high probability of a required autoland. We were cleared to descend via the arrival landing to the north. Radar returns appeared stronger during a portion of the arrival between ZZZZZ1 and ZZZZZ2, ATC had previously indicated that a regional aircraft has just traversed this area with light/moderate turbulence and heavy rain. As we began to descend, I inquired again about this specific sector and altitude based on the radar observations to which the controller again indicated the report from the previous airplane. As we approached this area of weather, radar returns appeared to intensify and we requested deviations to avoid the area of strongest returns, as we began to deviate, turbulence increased rapidly and, suddenly and without any static buildup on the radio, we were struck by a very large lightning bolt which immediately disabled the radar system. At this point we reported to ATC that we needed to level off and fly away from the weather, reporting the lightning strike and loss of radar, we then requested a climb and diversion to ZZZ3 as previously discussed and coordinated with Dispatch and briefed as a possible outcome in case of an unsuccessful approach into ZZZ. We informed the next ATC controller about the loss of our radar and requested vectors around stronger returns, ultimately assigned an arrival into ZZZ3 and eventual vectors for ILS [Runway] XX. We also updated the Dispatcher about our diversion. Our radar came back on its own approximately 10 minutes after the lightning strike, however we requested vectors away from stronger returns due to lack of certainty of radar information being displayed. We briefed the ILS XX and flew it to a safe landing in ZZZ3 and proceeded to the gate once it became available. Cause: Rapidly changing weather conditions. Suggestions: Weather is unpredictable and dynamic, it is possible that weather deteriorated faster than it would’ve been reasonably expected, lightning was not present during our descent into the airport.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier A321 flight crew reported the aircraft had a lightning strike during arrival descent which disabled the weather radar system. Flight crew received vectors away from the area of weather and completed a diversion with safe landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=46",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 46,
      "pageEnd": 48,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=46",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 46,
        "pageEnd": 48,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2075614 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air Carrier A321 flight crew reported the aircraft had a lightning strike during arrival descent which disabled the weather radar system. Flight crew received vectors away from the area of weather and completed a diversion with safe landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2074883",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We circled to land RWY XX in ZZZ. We were fully configured before crossing the visual reference point at 1200 ft. Crossed over the second visual reference point at 500 ft and maintained the GSI (Glide Slope Indicator). At 100 ft call, I verbalized check. At minimums call, I verbalized landing. We experienced wind shear caution at a very low altitude, probably at 75 ft. We gained 20-25 knots, sink rate was abrupt and increasing. I had to maintain extra power to be able to compensate for gust and almost reached APR. The PM called a go-around. I performed the go-around using APR. The right wing dropped significantly, but we did not feel or hear anything. We were vectored around for a visual to RWY XY. Landed on RWY XY uneventfully. Cause: Wind shear very close to the ground. Wind shear caution appeared just before round out to flare."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Circled to land on RWY XX in ZZZ. We were fully configured prior to reaching 1000ft. Had a 20-25 knot speed gain on final which brought our speed to about 160 knots. PF got it back to slightly above Vref and was bracketing. PF called “landing” at minimums. We were close to the RWY in the round out/ flare portion. I saw the wind shear advisory caution on the PFD and called it out. Then the right wing dropped/banked hard to the right, followed by a sharp bank to the left. I called out a go around. We went around and landed on RWY XY."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe circled to land RWY XX in ZZZ. We were fully configured before crossing the visual reference point at 1200 ft. Crossed over the second visual reference point at 500 ft and maintained the GSI (Glide Slope Indicator). At 100 ft call, I verbalized check. At minimums call, I verbalized landing. We experienced wind shear caution at a very low altitude, probably at 75 ft. We gained 20-25 knots, sink rate was abrupt and increasing. I had to maintain extra power to be able to compensate for gust and almost reached APR. The PM called a go-around. I performed the go-around using APR. The right wing dropped significantly, but we did not feel or hear anything. We were vectored around for a visual to RWY XY. Landed on RWY XY uneventfully. Cause: Wind shear very close to the ground. Wind shear caution appeared just before round out to flare.\n\nNarrative 2\nCircled to land on RWY XX in ZZZ. We were fully configured prior to reaching 1000ft. Had a 20-25 knot speed gain on final which brought our speed to about 160 knots. PF got it back to slightly above Vref and was bracketing. PF called “landing” at minimums. We were close to the RWY in the round out/ flare portion. I saw the wind shear advisory caution on the PFD and called it out. Then the right wing dropped/banked hard to the right, followed by a sharp bank to the left. I called out a go around. We went around and landed on RWY XY.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported encountering wind shear during round out/flare resulting in loss of control. Flight crew performed a go-around and landed safely.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=49",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 49,
      "pageEnd": 50,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=49",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 49,
        "pageEnd": 50,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2074883 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported encountering wind shear during round out/flare resulting in loss of control. Flight crew performed a go-around and landed safely.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2074759",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Aircraft X was from ZZZ to AUS. AUS weather OVC012 3 SM -RA. Weird weather with 45 - 50 tailwinds until 800 ft. on approach and huge temperature inversion where temps at 2000 ft. were 17°C and at 500 ft. were 6°C. At 1000 ft. we were still fighting tailwinds and calling landing checklist complete, while breaking out of the clouds with limited visibility. Runway lights were then in sight. At 500 ft. “stable” call was completed, at which point I focused on the runway and at 400 ft. stated that I believed an aircraft was on the runway. The FO (First Officer) believed it was the runway approach lights. At 300 ft. I stated again that it was indeed an aircraft. He called the Tower and told them we had an aircraft on the approach end of the runway. Tower told us they were a midfield departure. As Tower was stating this the aircraft was noticeably starting its departure roll. At 200 ft. I called and executed a go-around. At that point I suspect the aircraft was about 3000 - 4000 ft. down the runway, but my focus was on flying the aircraft and executing procedures for the go- around. The go-around was flown and executed well. We were vectored around for a second approach that was uneventful, except for the significant abnormal weather - tailwinds and temps on final. After landing, Ground asked us to call TRACON to inform him of what triggered our go-around. After parking, I discussed everything that I’ve stated here with TRACON. He told me that Tower Controller stated we had approximately 6100 ft. of spacing and the minimum allowed is 6000 ft. I do not believe that we had that spacing. With the poor visibility and abnormal weather, the very close spacing felt unsafe and uncomfortable. During the debrief, we both agreed that the go-around was a good safe conservative call and were both concerned about the tight landing to departure spacing. I feel that the significant tailwinds on final were the causal factor. The 45- - 50-kt. tailwinds would have accelerated our ground speeds and caused problems for ATC when trying to time aircraft arrivals, especially when sequencing them with departures. Likely they cleared the departure aircraft to takeoff when we were about 4-mile final, which usually might be sufficient. If we carried that huge tailwind, our ground speed would’ve been 45 - 50 kt. faster than usual and would’ve compressed the timing. Furthermore, the departure aircraft likely was being diligent in their operations and not rushing things as it was nighttime and the weather was rather poor."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAircraft X was from ZZZ to AUS. AUS weather OVC012 3 SM -RA. Weird weather with 45 - 50 tailwinds until 800 ft. on approach and huge temperature inversion where temps at 2000 ft. were 17°C and at 500 ft. were 6°C. At 1000 ft. we were still fighting tailwinds and calling landing checklist complete, while breaking out of the clouds with limited visibility. Runway lights were then in sight. At 500 ft. “stable” call was completed, at which point I focused on the runway and at 400 ft. stated that I believed an aircraft was on the runway. The FO (First Officer) believed it was the runway approach lights. At 300 ft. I stated again that it was indeed an aircraft. He called the Tower and told them we had an aircraft on the approach end of the runway. Tower told us they were a midfield departure. As Tower was stating this the aircraft was noticeably starting its departure roll. At 200 ft. I called and executed a go-around. At that point I suspect the aircraft was about 3000 - 4000 ft. down the runway, but my focus was on flying the aircraft and executing procedures for the go- around. The go-around was flown and executed well. We were vectored around for a second approach that was uneventful, except for the significant abnormal weather - tailwinds and temps on final. After landing, Ground asked us to call TRACON to inform him of what triggered our go-around. After parking, I discussed everything that I’ve stated here with TRACON. He told me that Tower Controller stated we had approximately 6100 ft. of spacing and the minimum allowed is 6000 ft. I do not believe that we had that spacing. With the poor visibility and abnormal weather, the very close spacing felt unsafe and uncomfortable. During the debrief, we both agreed that the go-around was a good safe conservative call and were both concerned about the tight landing to departure spacing. I feel that the significant tailwinds on final were the causal factor. The 45- - 50-kt. tailwinds would have accelerated our ground speeds and caused problems for ATC when trying to time aircraft arrivals, especially when sequencing them with departures. Likely they cleared the departure aircraft to takeoff when we were about 4-mile final, which usually might be sufficient. If we carried that huge tailwind, our ground speed would’ve been 45 - 50 kt. faster than usual and would’ve compressed the timing. Furthermore, the departure aircraft likely was being diligent in their operations and not rushing things as it was nighttime and the weather was rather poor.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier Captain reported a performing a go-around as an aircraft was taking off on the runway while the flight crew was on final approach. ATC stated there was proper spacing, but the flight crew believed that with the poor visibility and weather, it was unsafe to continue with the approach.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=51",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 51,
      "pageEnd": 52,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=51",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 51,
        "pageEnd": 52,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2074759 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier Captain reported a performing a go-around as an aircraft was taking off on the runway while the flight crew was on final approach. ATC stated there was proper spacing, but the flight crew believed that with the poor visibility and weather, it was unsafe to continue with the approach.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2074715",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During Captain OE (Operating Experience), we set up for an autoland into ZZZZ as the weather was 1,200 ft. RVR. After a thorough brief and setup, we decided to land flaps 40 for a little more visibility. During flaps extension on final approach, the pilot monitoring selected flaps to 30°, then 40°, and ran the Landing Checklist. At that time the pilot monitoring saw the trailing edge flaps were stuck at 15° and verbalized the configuration. The pilot flying spun the speed bug back up so we didn’t get too slow and said during the debrief he noticed the PFD’s (Primary Flight Display) speed tape looked different that normal, but hadn’t realized why until the pilot monitoring called out the failure. A missed approach was executed and [priority handling was requested]. Once the missed was completed and the aircraft stable, the pilot flying continued flying and took radio duties, while the pilot monitoring ran the QRH for Trailing Edge Flaps Disagree. That concluded that the flap handle did nothing to alter the flap position. Because of the weather in ZZZZ, the crew discussed going to the listed alternate airport of ZZZ. However, with the current fuel on board and the flaps stuck extended, decided that would not be prudent as we would land in a very low fuel state. While conducting the QRH, the procedure set us up for a flaps 15 landing. With the weather still at 1,200 ft. RVR in ZZZZ and an autoland required, we elected to use the alternate flap extension system to attempt to get the flaps to 30 as we didn’t know how the aircraft would react to a flaps 15 autoland, or even if it would do an autoland at all. We deviated from the QRH to make this happen as it seems the procedure never planned on a requirement of a CAT III autoland after a flap malfunction. The flight attendants were briefed with the brief items, and a passenger announcement was made. Once realigned with final, the flap handle was moved to the 30 detent, the alternate extension was used, and the flaps and slats extended. The pilot monitoring changed the landing speeds to flaps 30 speeds and an uneventful autoland was accomplished on Runway XXL. ZZZZ ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) was standing by to do an inspection which concluded with no issues and the aircraft taxied to the gate under its own power. The Chief Pilot and Dispatch were called and debriefed."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring Captain OE (Operating Experience), we set up for an autoland into ZZZZ as the weather was 1,200 ft. RVR. After a thorough brief and setup, we decided to land flaps 40 for a little more visibility. During flaps extension on final approach, the pilot monitoring selected flaps to 30°, then 40°, and ran the Landing Checklist. At that time the pilot monitoring saw the trailing edge flaps were stuck at 15° and verbalized the configuration. The pilot flying spun the speed bug back up so we didn’t get too slow and said during the debrief he noticed the PFD’s (Primary Flight Display) speed tape looked different that normal, but hadn’t realized why until the pilot monitoring called out the failure. A missed approach was executed and [priority handling was requested]. Once the missed was completed and the aircraft stable, the pilot flying continued flying and took radio duties, while the pilot monitoring ran the QRH for Trailing Edge Flaps Disagree. That concluded that the flap handle did nothing to alter the flap position. Because of the weather in ZZZZ, the crew discussed going to the listed alternate airport of ZZZ. However, with the current fuel on board and the flaps stuck extended, decided that would not be prudent as we would land in a very low fuel state. While conducting the QRH, the procedure set us up for a flaps 15 landing. With the weather still at 1,200 ft. RVR in ZZZZ and an autoland required, we elected to use the alternate flap extension system to attempt to get the flaps to 30 as we didn’t know how the aircraft would react to a flaps 15 autoland, or even if it would do an autoland at all. We deviated from the QRH to make this happen as it seems the procedure never planned on a requirement of a CAT III autoland after a flap malfunction. The flight attendants were briefed with the brief items, and a passenger announcement was made. Once realigned with final, the flap handle was moved to the 30 detent, the alternate extension was used, and the flaps and slats extended. The pilot monitoring changed the landing speeds to flaps 30 speeds and an uneventful autoland was accomplished on Runway XXL. ZZZZ ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) was standing by to do an inspection which concluded with no issues and the aircraft taxied to the gate under its own power. The Chief Pilot and Dispatch were called and debriefed.",
    "synopsis": "B737 Captain reported the trailing edge flaps got stuck at 15 degrees during flap extension on final approach. The flight crew performed a go-around, used an alternative solution that deviated from the QRH as it was not applicable, and safely landed.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=53",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 53,
      "pageEnd": 54,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=53",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 53,
        "pageEnd": 54,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2074715 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "B737 Captain reported the trailing edge flaps got stuck at 15 degrees during flap extension on final approach. The flight crew performed a go-around, used an alternative solution that deviated from the QRH as it was not applicable, and safely landed.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2073637",
    "date": "2023-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Parked"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I am submitting this report for informational purposes because I believe some lessons can be derived that can improve safety for not only Company but also aviation in general. Day 0 was the day before the beginning of my work week. At XO:00, I received my next day brief, which was to ferry from ZZZ to LVM Livingston, Montana, departing XB:00 and landing LVM at XD:00, to pick up a passenger and take him to ZZZ1. Taking in consideration my previous experience with LVM and what I knew to be the current and future weather that day in LVM, I knew I would not be able to land in LVM the next day. The evening of Day 0, it had been snowing in LVM for about 12 - 18 hours nonstop and was forecast to be snowing all night. I checked the NOTAMs for LVM and it caught my attention that there were no runway conditions reported for LVM. From previous experience flying into LVM, I knew the services were limited and I suspected that the runway at LVM had not been plowed, and would not be plowed in the morning. I called the FBO the evening of Day 0 and spoke with the person on duty. They told me that the runway had not been plowed since it had started snowing, that it wouldn't be plowed in time for our arrival the next day, and probably would not be plowed for some time as the city does a “quick going over, when they get around to it.” They also added that the runway had been wet with puddles and standing water prior to the freezing air arriving, so that the runway had flash frozen and was ice, that was then covered with snow. They told me straight out, “Do not come here, go to ZZZ2.” ZZZ2 is a full service airport that is about an hour drive away from Livingston. After speaking with the LVM FBO, I knew I should let Company know what was going on and try to get them to switch the trip from LVM to ZZZ2. I spoke with Operations, Scheduling, and the Chief Pilot in three separate phone calls relaying the data that I had collected. All three departments declined to make any decisions that evening and punted the decision the next morning. I then called the FBO in LVM back and asked them if they would mind heading out to the airport at XB:30 on Day 1 to give me a runway condition report, to which they agreed to do. The next morning we showed at XA:00 to prep for our ferry to LVM. I checked the weather, including the observations over the previous night, which showed snow with low visibility all night. Additionally, the airport NOTAMs for LVM did not show any runway condition NOTAMs. The airport appeared open and normal operations, and the snow was forecast to end later that morning. For someone with no experience with LVM and no data beyond current and forecast weather, and current NOTAMS, it would seem that LVM would be a go for launch. However, it was not. I made a call to the Dispatcher who was working us that morning and relayed what I knew about LVM from the night before. She listened to what I had to say, but was reluctant to change the destination to ZZZ2 based on what I had relayed. She told me that looking at the data she had, the airport looked okay, other than it snowing all night. She wanted to wait until we got a runway condition report from the FBO that morning before changing the flight. At XB:30, I called the FBO to get the report. They told me the runway was snow over ice and that they had lost control of a vehicle while driving down the runway. That was enough for me, I knew I would not go to LVM that morning regardless of what Company or the owner wanted to do. I called the Dispatcher, relayed what I heard, and she told me she wanted to hear it herself. She called me back and told me that the FBO said it was snow over ice and that he had lost control of his truck. She said we will send you to ZZZ2. We ended up flying to ZZZ2 to pick up the passenger and landed in low visibility and snow. The owner had told us the drive from LVM was harrowing and the road conditions terrible. He also relayed that he had also called the FBO and the FBO had told him not to come to LVM, all the while he had been pressuring Operations to get us to pick him up in LVM. On the flight to ZZZ1 from ZZZ2, my second in command, who was a brand new, recently upgraded Captain, told me he was glad I had previous experience with LVM and that I had done all that extra work on the phones the night prior and that morning. He told me, initially he thought it was odd that I was making all these calls, but now looking back he realized that I was doing the prep work required of a diligent Captain. He told me, that if he had been the Captain that morning, he probably would have looked at the NOTAMs and saw no runway condition reports and launched from LVM. He said, “Hopefully, someone would have been there on the UNICOM to tell us that the runway was contaminated with snow over ice, otherwise we probably would have discovered it on approach, or perhaps even touchdown!” He seemed to be a bit alarmed by the whole situation, but it seemed to be a good learning experience for him as a new Captain. We completed our duty day safely and I didn't really think about this experience for several months, until a few months later. I saw that Aircraft Y ran off the runway in Livingston Montana in wintery conditions. I couldn't help but think that perhaps that crew had run into a similar situation as we had, but had pressed on in their mission believing that the runway conditions were normal. I checked the NOTAMs for LVM for that day and saw no runway condition reports. It makes me wonder if I had relayed my experiences earlier, perhaps I could have helped prevent the Aircraft Y incident? I would like to know what the requirements for an Airport Manager or Operator is to report runway conditions? It seems to me, that I've had similar experiences at other Montana uncontrolled fields. Specific examples of similar airports are Anaconda 3U3, Deer Lodge 38S, Ennis Keks, Dillon DLN. It seems surprising to me that whole days can pass at LVM of snow and winter weather and no runway condition NOTAMs are issued. I would like to know what the regulatory requirements are for an Airport Manager / Operator to issue runway condition NOTAMs. I wonder if even the minimal issuing of runway condition NOTAMs at LVM, or even a “runway condition not reported” note on the Jepp chart would have saved Aircraft Y? I would like to suggest more intensive training for new hire pilots, recent upgrades, dispatchers and schedulers here at Company regarding the lack of runway condition NOTAMs at some of these airports. I am scared that the influx of inexperience at Company might result in a similar accident as to Aircraft Y. As relayed by my second in command, he didn't know what he didn't know, and probably would have only looked at weather and NOTAMs. I would suggest that the Company emphasize getting on-the-ground runway reports, rather than just rely on issued NOTAMs. And this emphasis can't be through comply messages or newsletters, it has to be in ground school and IOE and mentoring. I also feel that the company culture that I experienced, of being skeptical of the info that I was trying to relay, as being a safety issue. I know Operations, Management, and even the Dispatcher were under pressure from a difficult owner to pick him up at LVM, but their unwillingness to listen to me, and also their unwillingness to make a decision until the last minute removes important barriers that block unsafe operations from proceeding - thinking of Swiss cheese model here. Waiting until the last minute only increases the urgency of the decision making and increases pressure on those decision makers. The Company should be striving to reduce pressure rather than increasing it."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI am submitting this report for informational purposes because I believe some lessons can be derived that can improve safety for not only Company but also aviation in general. Day 0 was the day before the beginning of my work week. At XO:00, I received my next day brief, which was to ferry from ZZZ to LVM Livingston, Montana, departing XB:00 and landing LVM at XD:00, to pick up a passenger and take him to ZZZ1. Taking in consideration my previous experience with LVM and what I knew to be the current and future weather that day in LVM, I knew I would not be able to land in LVM the next day. The evening of Day 0, it had been snowing in LVM for about 12 - 18 hours nonstop and was forecast to be snowing all night. I checked the NOTAMs for LVM and it caught my attention that there were no runway conditions reported for LVM. From previous experience flying into LVM, I knew the services were limited and I suspected that the runway at LVM had not been plowed, and would not be plowed in the morning. I called the FBO the evening of Day 0 and spoke with the person on duty. They told me that the runway had not been plowed since it had started snowing, that it wouldn't be plowed in time for our arrival the next day, and probably would not be plowed for some time as the city does a “quick going over, when they get around to it.” They also added that the runway had been wet with puddles and standing water prior to the freezing air arriving, so that the runway had flash frozen and was ice, that was then covered with snow. They told me straight out, “Do not come here, go to ZZZ2.” ZZZ2 is a full service airport that is about an hour drive away from Livingston. After speaking with the LVM FBO, I knew I should let Company know what was going on and try to get them to switch the trip from LVM to ZZZ2. I spoke with Operations, Scheduling, and the Chief Pilot in three separate phone calls relaying the data that I had collected. All three departments declined to make any decisions that evening and punted the decision the next morning. I then called the FBO in LVM back and asked them if they would mind heading out to the airport at XB:30 on Day 1 to give me a runway condition report, to which they agreed to do. The next morning we showed at XA:00 to prep for our ferry to LVM. I checked the weather, including the observations over the previous night, which showed snow with low visibility all night. Additionally, the airport NOTAMs for LVM did not show any runway condition NOTAMs. The airport appeared open and normal operations, and the snow was forecast to end later that morning. For someone with no experience with LVM and no data beyond current and forecast weather, and current NOTAMS, it would seem that LVM would be a go for launch. However, it was not. I made a call to the Dispatcher who was working us that morning and relayed what I knew about LVM from the night before. She listened to what I had to say, but was reluctant to change the destination to ZZZ2 based on what I had relayed. She told me that looking at the data she had, the airport looked okay, other than it snowing all night. She wanted to wait until we got a runway condition report from the FBO that morning before changing the flight. At XB:30, I called the FBO to get the report. They told me the runway was snow over ice and that they had lost control of a vehicle while driving down the runway. That was enough for me, I knew I would not go to LVM that morning regardless of what Company or the owner wanted to do. I called the Dispatcher, relayed what I heard, and she told me she wanted to hear it herself. She called me back and told me that the FBO said it was snow over ice and that he had lost control of his truck. She said we will send you to ZZZ2. We ended up flying to ZZZ2 to pick up the passenger and landed in low visibility and snow. The owner had told us the drive from LVM was harrowing and the road conditions terrible. He also relayed that he had also called the FBO and the FBO had told him not to come to LVM, all the while he had been pressuring Operations to get us to pick him up in LVM. On the flight to ZZZ1 from ZZZ2, my second in command, who was a brand new, recently upgraded Captain, told me he was glad I had previous experience with LVM and that I had done all that extra work on the phones the night prior and that morning. He told me, initially he thought it was odd that I was making all these calls, but now looking back he realized that I was doing the prep work required of a diligent Captain. He told me, that if he had been the Captain that morning, he probably would have looked at the NOTAMs and saw no runway condition reports and launched from LVM. He said, “Hopefully, someone would have been there on the UNICOM to tell us that the runway was contaminated with snow over ice, otherwise we probably would have discovered it on approach, or perhaps even touchdown!” He seemed to be a bit alarmed by the whole situation, but it seemed to be a good learning experience for him as a new Captain. We completed our duty day safely and I didn't really think about this experience for several months, until a few months later. I saw that Aircraft Y ran off the runway in Livingston Montana in wintery conditions. I couldn't help but think that perhaps that crew had run into a similar situation as we had, but had pressed on in their mission believing that the runway conditions were normal. I checked the NOTAMs for LVM for that day and saw no runway condition reports. It makes me wonder if I had relayed my experiences earlier, perhaps I could have helped prevent the Aircraft Y incident? I would like to know what the requirements for an Airport Manager or Operator is to report runway conditions? It seems to me, that I've had similar experiences at other Montana uncontrolled fields. Specific examples of similar airports are Anaconda 3U3, Deer Lodge 38S, Ennis Keks, Dillon DLN. It seems surprising to me that whole days can pass at LVM of snow and winter weather and no runway condition NOTAMs are issued. I would like to know what the regulatory requirements are for an Airport Manager / Operator to issue runway condition NOTAMs. I wonder if even the minimal issuing of runway condition NOTAMs at LVM, or even a “runway condition not reported” note on the Jepp chart would have saved Aircraft Y? I would like to suggest more intensive training for new hire pilots, recent upgrades, dispatchers and schedulers here at Company regarding the lack of runway condition NOTAMs at some of these airports. I am scared that the influx of inexperience at Company might result in a similar accident as to Aircraft Y. As relayed by my second in command, he didn't know what he didn't know, and probably would have only looked at weather and NOTAMs. I would suggest that the Company emphasize getting on-the-ground runway reports, rather than just rely on issued NOTAMs. And this emphasis can't be through comply messages or newsletters, it has to be in ground school and IOE and mentoring. I also feel that the company culture that I experienced, of being skeptical of the info that I was trying to relay, as being a safety issue. I know Operations, Management, and even the Dispatcher were under pressure from a difficult owner to pick him up at LVM, but their unwillingness to listen to me, and also their unwillingness to make a decision until the last minute removes important barriers that block unsafe operations from proceeding - thinking of Swiss cheese model here. Waiting until the last minute only increases the urgency of the decision making and increases pressure on those decision makers. The Company should be striving to reduce pressure rather than increasing it.",
    "synopsis": "Fractional Captain reported there were no NOTAMs regarding LVM runway conditions where it had snowed heavily. Due to safety concerns with LVN runway and ramp conditions, Captain flew to a different airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=55",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 55,
      "pageEnd": 57,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=55",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 55,
        "pageEnd": 57,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2073637 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Fractional Captain reported there were no NOTAMs regarding LVM runway conditions where it had snowed heavily. Due to safety concerns with LVN runway and ramp conditions, Captain flew to a different airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2073178",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small UAS (At or above 0.55 lbs and less than 55 lbs)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "When preparing for my flight, the Dronecast app indicated clouds, but not cloud ceiling. I misjudged the height of the cloud base and when ascending to 390 ft. AGL began to experience reduced visibility. I reduced altitude to remain clear of the clouds, forgetting that I had to remain 500 ft. below. Aircraft was about 600 meters away. I flew back and landed without incident. Total flight time was 11 minutes. After landing I checked Air Control app which did provide ceiling height. It was then that I realized that I should not have taken off in the first place. I also noticed very slight icing on the prop leading edges. This was a learning experience. I now know not to try to judge cloud height visually and to confirm cloud height before takeoff to ensure I can maintain 500 ft. vertical distance from cloud base."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhen preparing for my flight, the Dronecast app indicated clouds, but not cloud ceiling. I misjudged the height of the cloud base and when ascending to 390 ft. AGL began to experience reduced visibility. I reduced altitude to remain clear of the clouds, forgetting that I had to remain 500 ft. below. Aircraft was about 600 meters away. I flew back and landed without incident. Total flight time was 11 minutes. After landing I checked Air Control app which did provide ceiling height. It was then that I realized that I should not have taken off in the first place. I also noticed very slight icing on the prop leading edges. This was a learning experience. I now know not to try to judge cloud height visually and to confirm cloud height before takeoff to ensure I can maintain 500 ft. vertical distance from cloud base.",
    "synopsis": "Recreational / Hobbyist UAS pilot reported flying in marginal VFR conditions and did not follow the cloud clearance requirements.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=58",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 58,
      "pageEnd": 59,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=58",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 58,
        "pageEnd": 59,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "Drone flies too close to clouds and returns with slight icing",
    "summary": "A recreational drone pilot relied on a weather app that did not show the cloud ceiling and misjudged the cloud base. After reduced visibility, the pilot descended and landed, then found slight icing on the propellers and realized the required cloud clearance had not been maintained.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Weather",
      "Procedures",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2072681",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During a right-seat takeoff from Runway XX, following the ZZZZZ departure protocol, the aircraft encountered a severe systems malfunction. At approximately 1400 feet altitude, the Flight Guidance Computer (FGC) 1-2 failed, resulting in the loss of both the Flight Director Control Unit and the display units. The incident occurred under Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) with prevalent icing conditions, significantly impairing visibility and navigational capabilities. As the Pilot in Command, I observed an inability to reduce power effectively; despite attempts to do so, the aircraft continued to gain speed. This unusual behavior was noted by ZZZ Departure Control, who inquired if [priority handling] was necessary due to the increasing speed and altitude. Acknowledging the severity of the situation, I [requested priority]. Following the [request], ZZZ Departure provided vectors for an approach to Runway XY. I instructed the First Officer to run the approach and pre-landing checklist to ensure all safety protocols were followed. Upon approach to Runway XY, the IFR conditions rendered the runway invisible. A go-around procedure was initiated. During the ascent, we gained visual contact with the runway environment. Seizing the moment, I requested permission from ZZZ Tower to perform a 360-degree maneuver for a safer approach and landing on Runway XX. The tower approved this request. The aircraft successfully executed the maneuver and safely landed on Runway XX. The dynamic response to the unfolding events by the flight crew was instrumental in the safe resolution of this event."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring a right-seat takeoff from Runway XX, following the ZZZZZ departure protocol, the aircraft encountered a severe systems malfunction. At approximately 1400 feet altitude, the Flight Guidance Computer (FGC) 1-2 failed, resulting in the loss of both the Flight Director Control Unit and the display units. The incident occurred under Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) with prevalent icing conditions, significantly impairing visibility and navigational capabilities. As the Pilot in Command, I observed an inability to reduce power effectively; despite attempts to do so, the aircraft continued to gain speed. This unusual behavior was noted by ZZZ Departure Control, who inquired if [priority handling] was necessary due to the increasing speed and altitude. Acknowledging the severity of the situation, I [requested priority]. Following the [request], ZZZ Departure provided vectors for an approach to Runway XY. I instructed the First Officer to run the approach and pre-landing checklist to ensure all safety protocols were followed. Upon approach to Runway XY, the IFR conditions rendered the runway invisible. A go-around procedure was initiated. During the ascent, we gained visual contact with the runway environment. Seizing the moment, I requested permission from ZZZ Tower to perform a 360-degree maneuver for a safer approach and landing on Runway XX. The tower approved this request. The aircraft successfully executed the maneuver and safely landed on Runway XX. The dynamic response to the unfolding events by the flight crew was instrumental in the safe resolution of this event.",
    "synopsis": "Gulfstream GIV pilot reported failure of the Flight Guidance Computer during departure in IMC resulted in return to departure airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=60",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 60,
      "pageEnd": 61,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=60",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 60,
        "pageEnd": 61,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2072681 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Gulfstream GIV pilot reported failure of the Flight Guidance Computer during departure in IMC resulted in return to departure airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2072501",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Beechjet 400"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb",
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Suffered delayed departure due to weather, once the active precipitation at the surface stopped we dispatched. We conducted a full ops check of aircraft anti icing equipment in taxi and all systems checked good. Conducted a normal takeoff with initial clearance to climb to 4000 ft. In climb between 500 and 1000 ft. we activated all aircraft anti ice equipment and received an immediate ‘H stab ice fail’ annunciation. We leveled at 4000 ft. momentarily where we were below the ceiling but in significant mixed icing conditions, probably moderate icing. We [requested priority] with ATC and requested a lower altitude, were cleared down to 2000 ft. We then requested and received vectors to the ILS XXL at ZZZ. We conducted the “H stab de-ice system failure” checklist and conducted a flap 10 landing with no further issues. Post flight inspection we found trace ice on the leading edge of the tail. We conducted the ground checks of tail de-ice system in taxi and it passed. We used the tail de-ice system inbound the night prior with no issues. The aircraft was kept in a hangar overnight. I am not aware of any further actions we could reasonably take that would prevent this mechanical failure or help us become aware of it prior to takeoff. MVFR at the surface, approximately 4000 ft. ceiling with light to moderate icing conditions up to around 8000 ft. or higher."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nSuffered delayed departure due to weather, once the active precipitation at the surface stopped we dispatched. We conducted a full ops check of aircraft anti icing equipment in taxi and all systems checked good. Conducted a normal takeoff with initial clearance to climb to 4000 ft. In climb between 500 and 1000 ft. we activated all aircraft anti ice equipment and received an immediate ‘H stab ice fail’ annunciation. We leveled at 4000 ft. momentarily where we were below the ceiling but in significant mixed icing conditions, probably moderate icing. We [requested priority] with ATC and requested a lower altitude, were cleared down to 2000 ft. We then requested and received vectors to the ILS XXL at ZZZ. We conducted the “H stab de-ice system failure” checklist and conducted a flap 10 landing with no further issues. Post flight inspection we found trace ice on the leading edge of the tail. We conducted the ground checks of tail de-ice system in taxi and it passed. We used the tail de-ice system inbound the night prior with no issues. The aircraft was kept in a hangar overnight. I am not aware of any further actions we could reasonably take that would prevent this mechanical failure or help us become aware of it prior to takeoff. MVFR at the surface, approximately 4000 ft. ceiling with light to moderate icing conditions up to around 8000 ft. or higher.",
    "synopsis": "BE-400 pilot reported horizontal stabilizer de-ice system failure in flight. Returned to departure airport and landed uneventfully.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=62",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 62,
      "pageEnd": 63,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=62",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 62,
        "pageEnd": 63,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2072501 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "BE-400 pilot reported horizontal stabilizer de-ice system failure in flight. Returned to departure airport and landed uneventfully.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2072464",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "A320"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Encountered Sudden Severe Turbulence - Followed guidance for Severe Turbulence Procedure. Announced be leaving autopilot on per Sever Turbulence Procedure BUT after encountering vertical shear updraft plus 300 feet followed by loss 20 KTS and downdraft shear loss of 600 feet announce and disengaged autopilot and followed manual to ride out shear and regained control after loosing 1000 feet. After exiting downdraft selected speed green (best lift/drag ) dot plus 10 since Severe Turbulent Speed MACH .76 aircraft was not climbing. Recovered climb to 30,000 preciously assigned established altitude. No conflict with any other traffic. No damage. No injuries. Total surprise severe turbulence encounter. Nothing from my electronic flight bag, WSI, or ATC reports of any severe or moderate turbulence in our area. All resources were used.. nothing on radar.. tried to be aware of any turbulence and preventive 1.3 g speed rename was determined in case as a practice all the time to be ready just in case but with all the technology this vertical shear upward 300 feet followed by immediate downdraft loss 1000 feet first time this bad in my XX year 121 career."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nEncountered Sudden Severe Turbulence - Followed guidance for Severe Turbulence Procedure. Announced be leaving autopilot on per Sever Turbulence Procedure BUT after encountering vertical shear updraft plus 300 feet followed by loss 20 KTS and downdraft shear loss of 600 feet announce and disengaged autopilot and followed manual to ride out shear and regained control after loosing 1000 feet. After exiting downdraft selected speed green (best lift/drag ) dot plus 10 since Severe Turbulent Speed MACH .76 aircraft was not climbing. Recovered climb to 30,000 preciously assigned established altitude. No conflict with any other traffic. No damage. No injuries. Total surprise severe turbulence encounter. Nothing from my electronic flight bag, WSI, or ATC reports of any severe or moderate turbulence in our area. All resources were used.. nothing on radar.. tried to be aware of any turbulence and preventive 1.3 g speed rename was determined in case as a practice all the time to be ready just in case but with all the technology this vertical shear upward 300 feet followed by immediate downdraft loss 1000 feet first time this bad in my XX year 121 career.",
    "synopsis": "A320 pilot reported severe turbulence and wind shear in cruise flight without any warning from normal weather forecast sources.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=64",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 64,
      "pageEnd": 65,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=64",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 64,
        "pageEnd": 65,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "Unexpected wind shear causes a large altitude loss",
    "summary": "An A320 pilot reported severe turbulence and vertical wind shear in cruise without warning from the weather sources being monitored. The pilot disconnected the autopilot, regained control after losing about 1,000 feet, and returned to the assigned altitude, reporting no injuries, damage, or traffic conflict.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Weather",
      "Equipment"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2072463",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were cruising at Flight Level 350 approaching waypoint ZZZZZ enroute to ZZZZ. I had just return to my seat after retrieving a crew meal and the Captain was coordinating with ZZZ Radio to deviate from course due to some weather that had popped up on the radar. He requested 5 miles left of course to traverse the weather at a gap that was both visually clear and clear on the radar return. ZZZ radio cleared us up to 10 miles left of course and the Captain selected another larger gap a little further left than the original 5-mile space selected. The Captain called the Flight Attendants and informed them that we were about to encounter some weather and to stop any service taking place and to take their seats for a few minutes. When we entered the weather there was some light chop and as we were about to exit, we hit some turbulence which caused an immediate loss of altitude of almost 500 feet. The autopilot kicked off and the Captain immediately took control of the aircraft, ensured the autopilot was off and reduced airspeed to .76M then recovered the aircraft to its original airspeed and altitude before reengaging the autopilot. The entire event was about 15-20 seconds in duration. What was weird was that the turbulence that caused the altitude deviation was not extreme or severe and was barely moderate. But it was like we hit a road bump then just dropped in altitude like in an elevator quickly and it was over. Following recovery, I heard the Flight Attendants checking in with each other in the back and while it caught everyone off guard no injuries or damages were reported. The rest of the flight continued normally. The Captain and I did some research to see how best to report the incident and what additional actions might be required and determined that we would each submit a report and that the Captain would submit an additional report for the altitude deviation. Cause: Weather event, possibly clear air turbulence associate with the weather we deviated for. Suggestions: Possibly making an even greater deviation for the weather?"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were cruising at Flight Level 350 approaching waypoint ZZZZZ enroute to ZZZZ. I had just return to my seat after retrieving a crew meal and the Captain was coordinating with ZZZ Radio to deviate from course due to some weather that had popped up on the radar. He requested 5 miles left of course to traverse the weather at a gap that was both visually clear and clear on the radar return. ZZZ radio cleared us up to 10 miles left of course and the Captain selected another larger gap a little further left than the original 5-mile space selected. The Captain called the Flight Attendants and informed them that we were about to encounter some weather and to stop any service taking place and to take their seats for a few minutes. When we entered the weather there was some light chop and as we were about to exit, we hit some turbulence which caused an immediate loss of altitude of almost 500 feet. The autopilot kicked off and the Captain immediately took control of the aircraft, ensured the autopilot was off and reduced airspeed to .76M then recovered the aircraft to its original airspeed and altitude before reengaging the autopilot. The entire event was about 15-20 seconds in duration. What was weird was that the turbulence that caused the altitude deviation was not extreme or severe and was barely moderate. But it was like we hit a road bump then just dropped in altitude like in an elevator quickly and it was over. Following recovery, I heard the Flight Attendants checking in with each other in the back and while it caught everyone off guard no injuries or damages were reported. The rest of the flight continued normally. The Captain and I did some research to see how best to report the incident and what additional actions might be required and determined that we would each submit a report and that the Captain would submit an additional report for the altitude deviation. Cause: Weather event, possibly clear air turbulence associate with the weather we deviated for. Suggestions: Possibly making an even greater deviation for the weather?",
    "synopsis": "B737 First Officer reported a sudden loss in altitude of 500 feet during cruise while the aircraft was passing through turbulence. Captain recovered aircraft and flight continued with no injuries or damage reported.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=66",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 66,
      "pageEnd": 67,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=66",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 66,
        "pageEnd": 67,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2072463 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "B737 First Officer reported a sudden loss in altitude of 500 feet during cruise while the aircraft was passing through turbulence. Captain recovered aircraft and flight continued with no injuries or damage reported.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2072253",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 MAX 8"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Passing 10,000 ft. into ZZZ, both pilots noticed ice accumulation on the windshield wipers. The Captain then looked out his window and noticed a slight amount of ice on the left wing. He announced that he was turning on the Wing A/I. Upon further descent, somewhere between 8,000 ft. and 6,000 ft. the left-wing A/I light illuminated. We were being vectored for final but still had time to open the QRH. The Captain ran the QRH as directed, and we complied with the final step to get out of the icing condition. ATC advised us that they had icing reported all the way down to 5,000 ft. and we asked to get below that. ATC then gave us a descent to 4,000 ft. where the ice accumulation abated. We flew the rest of the approach uneventfully and landed on Runway XXR. Once we got to the gate, the oncoming Captain began his walkaround. I met him in the jetway and advised him what happened and that my Captain had called maintenance and was writing up the Wing A/I System. That is when he notified me that there was significant ice on the left wing. I went to inspect the wing myself and noticed a significant, almost clear layer of ice on the middle of the left wing. The Captain completed the writeup and briefed the situation to maintenance. We turned the aircraft over to the outbound crew. We did not know we had a problem until the Wing A/I failed while we were in icing conditions. Other than getting out of the icing condition per the QRH, it would be nice to know if there was a reset or way to know if the valve had actually failed."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While being vectored for an ILS approach, at 8,000 ft. we encountered moderate rime ice. At that point I turned on the wing anti-ice switch. Shortly after doing so, a Master Caution light illuminated, indicating a left valve issue. We ran the appropriate QRH Checklist and realized we indeed had a failure of that system. We notified ATC that we were encountering moderate rime ice and were told that no icing was reported below 5,000 ft. We descended to 4,000 ft. There was no further accumulation of ice below 5,000 ft. and we continued the approach and landed without any further incident. After this incident I was informed that this may be a possible known issue with the MAX 8. Wing anti-ice (left valve) failed to work."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nPassing 10,000 ft. into ZZZ, both pilots noticed ice accumulation on the windshield wipers. The Captain then looked out his window and noticed a slight amount of ice on the left wing. He announced that he was turning on the Wing A/I. Upon further descent, somewhere between 8,000 ft. and 6,000 ft. the left-wing A/I light illuminated. We were being vectored for final but still had time to open the QRH. The Captain ran the QRH as directed, and we complied with the final step to get out of the icing condition. ATC advised us that they had icing reported all the way down to 5,000 ft. and we asked to get below that. ATC then gave us a descent to 4,000 ft. where the ice accumulation abated. We flew the rest of the approach uneventfully and landed on Runway XXR. Once we got to the gate, the oncoming Captain began his walkaround. I met him in the jetway and advised him what happened and that my Captain had called maintenance and was writing up the Wing A/I System. That is when he notified me that there was significant ice on the left wing. I went to inspect the wing myself and noticed a significant, almost clear layer of ice on the middle of the left wing. The Captain completed the writeup and briefed the situation to maintenance. We turned the aircraft over to the outbound crew. We did not know we had a problem until the Wing A/I failed while we were in icing conditions. Other than getting out of the icing condition per the QRH, it would be nice to know if there was a reset or way to know if the valve had actually failed.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile being vectored for an ILS approach, at 8,000 ft. we encountered moderate rime ice. At that point I turned on the wing anti-ice switch. Shortly after doing so, a Master Caution light illuminated, indicating a left valve issue. We ran the appropriate QRH Checklist and realized we indeed had a failure of that system. We notified ATC that we were encountering moderate rime ice and were told that no icing was reported below 5,000 ft. We descended to 4,000 ft. There was no further accumulation of ice below 5,000 ft. and we continued the approach and landed without any further incident. After this incident I was informed that this may be a possible known issue with the MAX 8. Wing anti-ice (left valve) failed to work.",
    "synopsis": "B737 MAX 8 crew reported the left wing anti ice failed and they landed with ice accumulation on the wing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=68",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 68,
      "pageEnd": 70,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=68",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 68,
        "pageEnd": 70,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2072253 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "B737 MAX 8 crew reported the left wing anti ice failed and they landed with ice accumulation on the wing.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2072243",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were in cruise at 13,000 feet, coming from ZZZ, and about to begin our descent into ZZZ1. There had been a lot of bad weather in the general area all day. We passed through some clouds that appeared to have tops of about 15,000 feet. The radar was not indicating anything but very light scattered precipitation. As we entered the clouds, we encountered severe turbulence. The aircraft was thrown down about 400 feet instantly with about 20 degrees of bank to the left. Speed increased towards red line, 320 knots, and I deployed the spoilers. As we climbed back up towards 13,000 feet the aircraft was repeatedly thrown down to a lower altitude. After about a minute, the turbulence subsided to light turbulence and we climbed back to our assigned altitude of 13,000 feet and on course. We reported the severe turbulence and the deviation to ATC and continued on to our destination. Suggestion: Possibly request a deviation around clouds when widespread bad weather has been occurring for a prolonged period of time."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were in cruise at 13,000 feet, coming from ZZZ, and about to begin our descent into ZZZ1. There had been a lot of bad weather in the general area all day. We passed through some clouds that appeared to have tops of about 15,000 feet. The radar was not indicating anything but very light scattered precipitation. As we entered the clouds, we encountered severe turbulence. The aircraft was thrown down about 400 feet instantly with about 20 degrees of bank to the left. Speed increased towards red line, 320 knots, and I deployed the spoilers. As we climbed back up towards 13,000 feet the aircraft was repeatedly thrown down to a lower altitude. After about a minute, the turbulence subsided to light turbulence and we climbed back to our assigned altitude of 13,000 feet and on course. We reported the severe turbulence and the deviation to ATC and continued on to our destination. Suggestion: Possibly request a deviation around clouds when widespread bad weather has been occurring for a prolonged period of time.",
    "synopsis": "EMB-145 Captain reported loss of aircraft control for a short period of time when they entered an area of severe turbulence.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=71",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 71,
      "pageEnd": 72,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=71",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 71,
        "pageEnd": 72,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2072243 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "EMB-145 Captain reported loss of aircraft control for a short period of time when they entered an area of severe turbulence.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2072217",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "A320"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Upon reaching cruise flight (FL300), the CA and myself noticed we were entering an area of light radar returns. Above us (at FL340) and ahead of us (10-20 nm) an aircraft reported to ATC they were unable to maintain altitude, and were in a climb above FL340. Within seconds of that call, we entered an area of moderate turbulence and an updraft. We too, were unable to maintain altitude and began to climb. To the best of my recollection, we climbed to FL302 before we entered the subsequent downdraft. Once the altitude came back down through FL300, the autopilot attempted to maintain the altitude, but the airspeed degraded below green dot and all the way to Alpha Protection (a-prot). Once at a-prot, we began to sink, to the best of my recollection, at about 800-1000 FPM to FL290. The entire time we were in moderate turbulence. Somewhere before reaching FL290, I reported to ATC the turbulence as well as the inability to maintain altitude. I had my eye on the TCAS as well, and the aircraft above was the only one that was nearby. There were no lower aircraft we could see that would be an issue. ATC gave us a 30 degree left turn for traffic (assuming it was for the aircraft above also sinking ahead of us). However, at this point, the autopilot had been disconnected and we did not make the turn. Everything happened incredibly quickly, and we were able to return to FL300 before making the turn. I advised ATC that we were back at assigned altitude, and I think we were recleared direct to a fix. By my best estimate, we initially descended out of FL300 to FL290 and back to FL300 in less than 2 minutes. The main cause of this event was the large cell of weather we flew through. We did not have a good picture of it with the onboard weather radar, as there was nothing other than green that I remember. I was rotating through several radar apps, and saw nothing alarming about our route. If I was presented with the information we had again, I don't think I would have done much different to avoid the weather. We simply did not know the weather was there. Once the event began, however, I could have done a better job helping the PF with making sure we made the turn as instructed by ATC. I was definitively task saturated making sure the airplane was still flying (aviating), and did not do as good at navigating and communicating as I could have."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nUpon reaching cruise flight (FL300), the CA and myself noticed we were entering an area of light radar returns. Above us (at FL340) and ahead of us (10-20 nm) an aircraft reported to ATC they were unable to maintain altitude, and were in a climb above FL340. Within seconds of that call, we entered an area of moderate turbulence and an updraft. We too, were unable to maintain altitude and began to climb. To the best of my recollection, we climbed to FL302 before we entered the subsequent downdraft. Once the altitude came back down through FL300, the autopilot attempted to maintain the altitude, but the airspeed degraded below green dot and all the way to Alpha Protection (a-prot). Once at a-prot, we began to sink, to the best of my recollection, at about 800-1000 FPM to FL290. The entire time we were in moderate turbulence. Somewhere before reaching FL290, I reported to ATC the turbulence as well as the inability to maintain altitude. I had my eye on the TCAS as well, and the aircraft above was the only one that was nearby. There were no lower aircraft we could see that would be an issue. ATC gave us a 30 degree left turn for traffic (assuming it was for the aircraft above also sinking ahead of us). However, at this point, the autopilot had been disconnected and we did not make the turn. Everything happened incredibly quickly, and we were able to return to FL300 before making the turn. I advised ATC that we were back at assigned altitude, and I think we were recleared direct to a fix. By my best estimate, we initially descended out of FL300 to FL290 and back to FL300 in less than 2 minutes. The main cause of this event was the large cell of weather we flew through. We did not have a good picture of it with the onboard weather radar, as there was nothing other than green that I remember. I was rotating through several radar apps, and saw nothing alarming about our route. If I was presented with the information we had again, I don't think I would have done much different to avoid the weather. We simply did not know the weather was there. Once the event began, however, I could have done a better job helping the PF with making sure we made the turn as instructed by ATC. I was definitively task saturated making sure the airplane was still flying (aviating), and did not do as good at navigating and communicating as I could have.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier pilot reported unable to maintain altitude for several minutes due to encountering downdrafts and turbulence.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=73",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 73,
      "pageEnd": 74,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=73",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 73,
        "pageEnd": 74,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2072217 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier pilot reported unable to maintain altitude for several minutes due to encountering downdrafts and turbulence.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2072169",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While we were climbing, the ATC vectored us turning into a CB clouds for separation. I was hand flying expecting better handling the airplane if encounter unexpected turbulence. During the climbing turn around 7000 ft. we encountered sudden uplifting air, causing the \"bank angle\" warning announcement, followed by the temporary stick shaker activation. We immediately initiated Undesired Aircraft State recovery [and] the aircraft returned to normal state of climb. The whole event only lasted a few seconds, no noticeable altitude drop during climbing."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile we were climbing, the ATC vectored us turning into a CB clouds for separation. I was hand flying expecting better handling the airplane if encounter unexpected turbulence. During the climbing turn around 7000 ft. we encountered sudden uplifting air, causing the \"bank angle\" warning announcement, followed by the temporary stick shaker activation. We immediately initiated Undesired Aircraft State recovery [and] the aircraft returned to normal state of climb. The whole event only lasted a few seconds, no noticeable altitude drop during climbing.",
    "synopsis": "B737NG Captain reported an inflight upset occurred when they encountered significant turbulence after ATC vectored them into storm clouds.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=75",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 75,
      "pageEnd": 76,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=75",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 75,
        "pageEnd": 76,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "Climbing turn into storm cloud triggers bank and stall warnings",
    "summary": "A B737 captain reported an abrupt updraft during a climbing turn into a storm cloud while following air traffic control vectors. A bank-angle warning and brief stick-shaker activation followed; the crew performed a recovery and returned to a normal climb within seconds.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Weather",
      "Procedures"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2072089",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was Pilot Flying and PIC (Pilot in Command) on this flight and we were cleared to descend via our arrival that we had briefed. The bottom altitude of the arrival was 8000ft so 8000 was set in the altitude selector and confirmed by both myself and the FO (First Officer) who was PM (Pilot Monitoring). The aircraft was in LNAV/VNAV modes and descending on profile. The weather at our destination had not been good all morning and the current conditions had 1 1/4 visibility, gusty winds, and snow. I had briefed the existence of terrain in the north east vicinity of the airport and the highest MSA of 9500ft. I had a terrain map page displayed on my MFD (Multi-Function Display). The runway condition codes had just been updated in the ATIS and I was trying to figure out if I could use ILS CAT I mins because I was still on high PIC mins. We were handed off to Approach Control who then gave us a heading of 130 and to descend and maintain 9000ft. I selected heading mode and selected 130. I remember my FO (First Officer) reading back 8000 for the altitude and I saw that 8000 was still bugged. We both paused and confirmed 8000ft at the same time. We continued descending and built the approach straight out in the downwind, anticipating the base turn. I noticed afterwards that I was high on profile and deployed speed brakes to return to profile. At around 8600ft, ATC issued an altitude alert and advised us to check our altitude at once. A few seconds later, we get a terrain caution, followed by an EGPWS warning at the same time ATC demanded we return to 9000ft. I executed the CFIT escape maneuver immediately and leveled at 9300ft. After regaining control of the aircraft we returned to 9000 and reengaged the automation. I was later informed the lowest ATC recorded us was 8200ft. We joined the approach and landed without further incident. The primary cause of this event was task saturation on both pilots during a critical phase of flight while receiving ATC instructions. Factors also include poor weather. Suggestions: Immediate confirmation of ATC instructions and asking for clarification when there is any doubt from either crew member."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were originally cleared on the arrival to 8000, but then we were vectored off and then told to descend 9000 instead. As Pilot Monitoring I read back 9000 to ATC. We got distracted with other tasks right after I read 9000, and the Pilot Flying forgot to set 9000. We then looked up from distractions and saw 8000 and just said 8000 out loud for our altitude. We descended below 9000 and got a warning from ATC about altitude, and then we got a EGPWS warning from terrain and the Pilot Flying immediately flew the CFIT escape maneuver correctly. We got back up to 9000 and flew the rest of the flight normally The cause of event would probably be high task saturation with being on the descent, and about to turn to final. We also both got distracted with other tasks getting ready for the approach. The weather was also a strong snow storm which played a factor. I would suggest anytime a new altitude is assigned, that unless it is an emergency situation or maneuver, to always read back the altitude out loud right away. If unsure ask ATC"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was Pilot Flying and PIC (Pilot in Command) on this flight and we were cleared to descend via our arrival that we had briefed. The bottom altitude of the arrival was 8000ft so 8000 was set in the altitude selector and confirmed by both myself and the FO (First Officer) who was PM (Pilot Monitoring). The aircraft was in LNAV/VNAV modes and descending on profile. The weather at our destination had not been good all morning and the current conditions had 1 1/4 visibility, gusty winds, and snow. I had briefed the existence of terrain in the north east vicinity of the airport and the highest MSA of 9500ft. I had a terrain map page displayed on my MFD (Multi-Function Display). The runway condition codes had just been updated in the ATIS and I was trying to figure out if I could use ILS CAT I mins because I was still on high PIC mins. We were handed off to Approach Control who then gave us a heading of 130 and to descend and maintain 9000ft. I selected heading mode and selected 130. I remember my FO (First Officer) reading back 8000 for the altitude and I saw that 8000 was still bugged. We both paused and confirmed 8000ft at the same time. We continued descending and built the approach straight out in the downwind, anticipating the base turn. I noticed afterwards that I was high on profile and deployed speed brakes to return to profile. At around 8600ft, ATC issued an altitude alert and advised us to check our altitude at once. A few seconds later, we get a terrain caution, followed by an EGPWS warning at the same time ATC demanded we return to 9000ft. I executed the CFIT escape maneuver immediately and leveled at 9300ft. After regaining control of the aircraft we returned to 9000 and reengaged the automation. I was later informed the lowest ATC recorded us was 8200ft. We joined the approach and landed without further incident. The primary cause of this event was task saturation on both pilots during a critical phase of flight while receiving ATC instructions. Factors also include poor weather. Suggestions: Immediate confirmation of ATC instructions and asking for clarification when there is any doubt from either crew member.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were originally cleared on the arrival to 8000, but then we were vectored off and then told to descend 9000 instead. As Pilot Monitoring I read back 9000 to ATC. We got distracted with other tasks right after I read 9000, and the Pilot Flying forgot to set 9000. We then looked up from distractions and saw 8000 and just said 8000 out loud for our altitude. We descended below 9000 and got a warning from ATC about altitude, and then we got a EGPWS warning from terrain and the Pilot Flying immediately flew the CFIT escape maneuver correctly. We got back up to 9000 and flew the rest of the flight normally The cause of event would probably be high task saturation with being on the descent, and about to turn to final. We also both got distracted with other tasks getting ready for the approach. The weather was also a strong snow storm which played a factor. I would suggest anytime a new altitude is assigned, that unless it is an emergency situation or maneuver, to always read back the altitude out loud right away. If unsure ask ATC",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert and a low altitude alert from ATC on approach to BOI when they misunderstood their descent clearance.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=77",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 77,
      "pageEnd": 79,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=77",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 77,
        "pageEnd": 79,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2072089 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert and a low altitude alert from ATC on approach to BOI when they misunderstood their descent clearance.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2071904",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "B747-400"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "The approach was flown with gusty winds resulting in some airspeed fluctuations. At about 700 ft. out of the clouds in the rain with windshield wipers on and the Runway in sight we received a GPWS indication of sink rate I stated disregard continue as I made the correction because it was safe to pursue the landing."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nThe approach was flown with gusty winds resulting in some airspeed fluctuations. At about 700 ft. out of the clouds in the rain with windshield wipers on and the Runway in sight we received a GPWS indication of sink rate I stated disregard continue as I made the correction because it was safe to pursue the landing.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier pilot reported during unstable approach and terrain warning they decided to land aircraft after making corrections.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=80",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 80,
      "pageEnd": 81,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=80",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 80,
        "pageEnd": 81,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "Crew continues approach after a sink-rate warning",
    "summary": "A B747 crew encountered gusty winds and airspeed fluctuations on approach, then received a sink-rate warning near 700 feet. The reporting pilot made a correction and elected to continue the landing. The account describes the pilot's decision, not an independent assessment of its safety.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Weather",
      "Procedures"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2071151",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "In between waypoints ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 intersection at FL360, PF (Pilot Flying) and PM (Pilot Monitoring) have been keeping a close eye on a squall line passing through the sector. After some discussion we decided we would stay the course but looking for an opening that would provide the least turbulence. We heard a radio call between an Aircraft Y flight and ATC advising them that storms are below FL330 and that FL360 is fine. Upon hearing that we became sure of our decision to press on. About 10-15 mins later Aircraft Y had alerted ATC that they were experiencing moderate to severe turbulence and requested deviation to the right. We checked our radar and saw in the direction of our route that there was a section of the squall line with tops at FL400. We then discussed and agreed to also deviate to our right to avoid that section. About 10 mins after we encountered severe updraft with severe turbulence, showing extensive airspeed fluctuations, VSI +6000fpm for about 20 secs. AP (Autopilot) kicked off and we were unable to maintain altitude to a point we briefly hit FL390 before immediately pushed back down to FL360. We acted on training and PF flew the aircraft while I handled all other responsibilities. We asked ATC immediately for altitude relief which we got, deviated to our left to avoid the situation. CA (Captain) side PFD (Primary Flight Display) lost airspeed/altitude/VS information after about 1min with EICAS message showing IC1WOW INOP and SPS ADVANCED. We consulted the QRH on the two issues while hand flying with ISIS. Problem did not resolve following QRH. FO (First Officer) side instruments were working in conjunction with ISIS so we selected ADC2 and changed the AP couple side to FO side. Exited the storm and was able to continue enroute to our destination. No injuries reported. Cause: Inadvertent entry into an active developing cell with the information at hand. Suggestions: Choose the best path of least turbulence, stay at least 5000 ft. from top of cells to clear the storm, stay 20 NM away from storm cells. Make decision early to deviate for the best path as early as possible."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were between ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 intersection at FL360 above the storm cells. We discussed about deviation plans and consulted ATC. ATC advised storms are below FL330 and previous traffic stayed on course at FL360, so we decided to stay and keep monitoring the situation. Minutes later Aircraft Y in front of us at FL360 reported moderate turbulence and asked for higher, ATC told them unable FL370. Moments later we got into IMC and started moderate chops. We immediately asked for right deviation based on the info we had. After we turned, we encountered severe updraft showing extensive airspeed fluctuations, VSI +6000 fpm momentarily. Auto pilot kicked off. We were unable to maintain altitude so we immediately asked for and got the altitude relief from ATC. CA (Captain) side PFD (Primary Flight Display) lost airspeed/altitude/vs information. We hand flew using ISIS. Once airplane stabilized, PM (Pilot Monitoring) run QRH on the two EICAS messages IC1 WOW INOP & SPS ADVANCED, did not fix the issue. We saw FO (First Officer) side instruments are working so we selected ADC2 and changed the AP (Autopilot) couple side to FO side. This time autopilot stayed, we exit storm and were able to continue enroute. We advised ATC about the event and we were able to continue the flight. FA was in her seat during the event, no injuries and no object fell in cabin. Cause: We went into an activity developing cell inadvertently Suggestions: Stay at least 20 NM away from storm cell. If have to cross, make sure to clear the storm at least 5000 ft. Make decision to deviate as early as possible."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nIn between waypoints ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 intersection at FL360, PF (Pilot Flying) and PM (Pilot Monitoring) have been keeping a close eye on a squall line passing through the sector. After some discussion we decided we would stay the course but looking for an opening that would provide the least turbulence. We heard a radio call between an Aircraft Y flight and ATC advising them that storms are below FL330 and that FL360 is fine. Upon hearing that we became sure of our decision to press on. About 10-15 mins later Aircraft Y had alerted ATC that they were experiencing moderate to severe turbulence and requested deviation to the right. We checked our radar and saw in the direction of our route that there was a section of the squall line with tops at FL400. We then discussed and agreed to also deviate to our right to avoid that section. About 10 mins after we encountered severe updraft with severe turbulence, showing extensive airspeed fluctuations, VSI +6000fpm for about 20 secs. AP (Autopilot) kicked off and we were unable to maintain altitude to a point we briefly hit FL390 before immediately pushed back down to FL360. We acted on training and PF flew the aircraft while I handled all other responsibilities. We asked ATC immediately for altitude relief which we got, deviated to our left to avoid the situation. CA (Captain) side PFD (Primary Flight Display) lost airspeed/altitude/VS information after about 1min with EICAS message showing IC1WOW INOP and SPS ADVANCED. We consulted the QRH on the two issues while hand flying with ISIS. Problem did not resolve following QRH. FO (First Officer) side instruments were working in conjunction with ISIS so we selected ADC2 and changed the AP couple side to FO side. Exited the storm and was able to continue enroute to our destination. No injuries reported. Cause: Inadvertent entry into an active developing cell with the information at hand. Suggestions: Choose the best path of least turbulence, stay at least 5000 ft. from top of cells to clear the storm, stay 20 NM away from storm cells. Make decision early to deviate for the best path as early as possible.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were between ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 intersection at FL360 above the storm cells. We discussed about deviation plans and consulted ATC. ATC advised storms are below FL330 and previous traffic stayed on course at FL360, so we decided to stay and keep monitoring the situation. Minutes later Aircraft Y in front of us at FL360 reported moderate turbulence and asked for higher, ATC told them unable FL370. Moments later we got into IMC and started moderate chops. We immediately asked for right deviation based on the info we had. After we turned, we encountered severe updraft showing extensive airspeed fluctuations, VSI +6000 fpm momentarily. Auto pilot kicked off. We were unable to maintain altitude so we immediately asked for and got the altitude relief from ATC. CA (Captain) side PFD (Primary Flight Display) lost airspeed/altitude/vs information. We hand flew using ISIS. Once airplane stabilized, PM (Pilot Monitoring) run QRH on the two EICAS messages IC1 WOW INOP & SPS ADVANCED, did not fix the issue. We saw FO (First Officer) side instruments are working so we selected ADC2 and changed the AP (Autopilot) couple side to FO side. This time autopilot stayed, we exit storm and were able to continue enroute. We advised ATC about the event and we were able to continue the flight. FA was in her seat during the event, no injuries and no object fell in cabin. Cause: We went into an activity developing cell inadvertently Suggestions: Stay at least 20 NM away from storm cell. If have to cross, make sure to clear the storm at least 5000 ft. Make decision to deviate as early as possible.",
    "synopsis": "EMB-145 crew reported severe turbulence and altitude excursion at cruise when deviating around thunderstorms. The aircraft exited the area of weather and continued the flight without injuries.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=82",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 82,
      "pageEnd": 84,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=82",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 82,
        "pageEnd": 84,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2071151 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "EMB-145 crew reported severe turbulence and altitude excursion at cruise when deviating around thunderstorms. The aircraft exited the area of weather and continued the flight without injuries.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2071065",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We departed ZZZ at around XA:01. As instructed, we departed on runway heading up to 3000 ft. During the climb, which was significantly bumpy and in IMC conditions, we were given a left turn. As the Pilot Flying, I noticed that the FO (First Officer), Pilot Monitoring, was a bit task-saturated cleaning up the configuration, talking to departure, tuning in a new altitude, and turning my heading bug. While banking left, I noticed that the windshield wipers were still on, so I quickly reached up to shut them off. As I shut off both wipers, I heard the audio warning 'bank angle, bank angle.' I quickly corrected the bank and continued the flight with no further incidents. The bank angle caution message was triggered when, I, flying in IMC conditions with no outside horizon reference, was momentarily distracted by turning off the windshield wipers. This led to an excessive banking angle during the left turn. Suggestions: To prevent such incidents in the future, it is crucial to maintain focus on the primary task of flying the aircraft, especially during critical phases of flight such as takeoff and climb. As the Pilot Flying, I should prioritize aircraft control and navigation over secondary tasks. The windshield wipers could have been turned off once the aircraft was stabilized on its new heading and altitude. If the pilot monitoring is task-saturated, I could assist in managing the workload, but not at the expense of aircraft control."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While Departing Runway XX on our initial climb, we got a “bank angle” warning. Captain was Pilot Flying and I was Pilot Monitoring as First Officer. This was a very high workload situation as we lifted off. At approximately 500ft we got windshear, although no caution or warning came up. We continued to climb in moderate turbulence and IMC conditions when we got a turn to a heading from Departure. At this time we had both side windshield wipers on. I was very overloaded at this time, and the Captain reached up to turn off the wipers as to not exceed a limitation. When he reached up to turn them off is when we got the bank angle audible warning. The Captain immediately corrected the bank and the flight continued on as normal. The main cause was pilot saturation, which in hand caused the Pilot Flying to aid the Pilot Monitoring ultimately leading to taking eyes off the flight controls momentarily. Other factors involved were weather (moderate turbulence, IMC, windshear), and an MEL for the boom MIC being INOP on the FO (First Officer) side. As Pilot Monitoring, this caused me to have to use the handheld as my only source talking to ATC. My hot mic of being able to communicate with the CA (Captain) was also inop as part of the MEL. I believe these factors, especially the latter played a huge part in pilot saturation on my side. Suggestions: Keep flying the aircraft- Captain did a fantastic job flying the aircraft and showed great airmanship on the departure aside from the conditions and corrected Immediately. I would also suggest a change to the MEL we had, as it caused quite a delay for me to perform my duties as Pilot Monitoring."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe departed ZZZ at around XA:01. As instructed, we departed on runway heading up to 3000 ft. During the climb, which was significantly bumpy and in IMC conditions, we were given a left turn. As the Pilot Flying, I noticed that the FO (First Officer), Pilot Monitoring, was a bit task-saturated cleaning up the configuration, talking to departure, tuning in a new altitude, and turning my heading bug. While banking left, I noticed that the windshield wipers were still on, so I quickly reached up to shut them off. As I shut off both wipers, I heard the audio warning 'bank angle, bank angle.' I quickly corrected the bank and continued the flight with no further incidents. The bank angle caution message was triggered when, I, flying in IMC conditions with no outside horizon reference, was momentarily distracted by turning off the windshield wipers. This led to an excessive banking angle during the left turn. Suggestions: To prevent such incidents in the future, it is crucial to maintain focus on the primary task of flying the aircraft, especially during critical phases of flight such as takeoff and climb. As the Pilot Flying, I should prioritize aircraft control and navigation over secondary tasks. The windshield wipers could have been turned off once the aircraft was stabilized on its new heading and altitude. If the pilot monitoring is task-saturated, I could assist in managing the workload, but not at the expense of aircraft control.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile Departing Runway XX on our initial climb, we got a “bank angle” warning. Captain was Pilot Flying and I was Pilot Monitoring as First Officer. This was a very high workload situation as we lifted off. At approximately 500ft we got windshear, although no caution or warning came up. We continued to climb in moderate turbulence and IMC conditions when we got a turn to a heading from Departure. At this time we had both side windshield wipers on. I was very overloaded at this time, and the Captain reached up to turn off the wipers as to not exceed a limitation. When he reached up to turn them off is when we got the bank angle audible warning. The Captain immediately corrected the bank and the flight continued on as normal. The main cause was pilot saturation, which in hand caused the Pilot Flying to aid the Pilot Monitoring ultimately leading to taking eyes off the flight controls momentarily. Other factors involved were weather (moderate turbulence, IMC, windshear), and an MEL for the boom MIC being INOP on the FO (First Officer) side. As Pilot Monitoring, this caused me to have to use the handheld as my only source talking to ATC. My hot mic of being able to communicate with the CA (Captain) was also inop as part of the MEL. I believe these factors, especially the latter played a huge part in pilot saturation on my side. Suggestions: Keep flying the aircraft- Captain did a fantastic job flying the aircraft and showed great airmanship on the departure aside from the conditions and corrected Immediately. I would also suggest a change to the MEL we had, as it caused quite a delay for me to perform my duties as Pilot Monitoring.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported exceeding bank angle during climbout in IMC. Flight crew corrected bank angle and continued flight uneventfully.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=85",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 85,
      "pageEnd": 87,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=85",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 85,
        "pageEnd": 87,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
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        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
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    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2071065 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported exceeding bank angle during climbout in IMC. Flight crew corrected bank angle and continued flight uneventfully.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2070497",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "The event occurred while on the RNAV 28 approach into Morey Field (C29). The flight originated from ZZZ under MVFR conditions. I did not file a flight plan. While enroute, ceilings were lower than I expected so I requested, and received, a pop up IFR clearance direct to C29. The flight enroute was uneventful. Upon contact with Madison Approach I requested the RNAV 28 approach into C29 and was told to expect the approach. I received a vector assignment of 050 degrees. At that time I assumed I would receive vectors to the final approach fix and set the GPS (Garmin 530) for vectors to final. I then received an altitude assignment that put me into actual IMC conditions. I was then approved for the RNAV 29 approach via the IAF EXIDE. This was my first time flying in the area and I had to confirm the IAF name. I received a vector to the IAF and while updating the GPS route I entered an unusual attitude. Once I recovered from the unusual attitude I already passed the IAF and instead of flying the appropriate approach via a course reversal I immediately turned inbound which took me out of the protected airspace and close to Madison (MSN). I then continued the approach without incident and cancelled my IFR flight plan in the air."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nThe event occurred while on the RNAV 28 approach into Morey Field (C29). The flight originated from ZZZ under MVFR conditions. I did not file a flight plan. While enroute, ceilings were lower than I expected so I requested, and received, a pop up IFR clearance direct to C29. The flight enroute was uneventful. Upon contact with Madison Approach I requested the RNAV 28 approach into C29 and was told to expect the approach. I received a vector assignment of 050 degrees. At that time I assumed I would receive vectors to the final approach fix and set the GPS (Garmin 530) for vectors to final. I then received an altitude assignment that put me into actual IMC conditions. I was then approved for the RNAV 29 approach via the IAF EXIDE. This was my first time flying in the area and I had to confirm the IAF name. I received a vector to the IAF and while updating the GPS route I entered an unusual attitude. Once I recovered from the unusual attitude I already passed the IAF and instead of flying the appropriate approach via a course reversal I immediately turned inbound which took me out of the protected airspace and close to Madison (MSN). I then continued the approach without incident and cancelled my IFR flight plan in the air.",
    "synopsis": "GA pilot reported a momentary loss of aircraft control while on the RNAV 28 approach to C29 airport in IMC conditions.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=88",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 88,
      "pageEnd": 89,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=88",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 88,
        "pageEnd": 89,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
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    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2070497 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "GA pilot reported a momentary loss of aircraft control while on the RNAV 28 approach to C29 airport in IMC conditions.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2070299",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Receiving vectors for the visual approach to Runway 33 after concluding Janny5 arrival. Heading 160, ATC says maintain 3000 until abeam of Van Nuys airport, which would then be to our North when turning towards BUR. We were not yet cleared for the visual approach. Just as I am questioning our vector towards the South of our desired track to the visual approach towards BUR and our altitude clearance of 3000, we have a “TERRAIN, TERRAIN, CLIMB, CLIMB alert from our GPWS. Our altitude was then 3200. Disconnected the autopilot and climbed, received our cleared for the visual approach, Runway 33. We could now fly back to our desired track well to the North of us and concluded the visual approach to the runway. I believe the Controller thought they had another minute or two before they could steer us to the visual track, however we had a substantial tailwind from the North that took us further South than the Controller had counted on. Sure glad this was under VFR. ATC failure to understand our track, altitude and ground speed. Suggestions: Have similar things happen in the past where the Controllers do not understand wind effect on ground speed. To me obviously Controllers are not briefed on winds aloft in a quantitative measure."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nReceiving vectors for the visual approach to Runway 33 after concluding Janny5 arrival. Heading 160, ATC says maintain 3000 until abeam of Van Nuys airport, which would then be to our North when turning towards BUR. We were not yet cleared for the visual approach. Just as I am questioning our vector towards the South of our desired track to the visual approach towards BUR and our altitude clearance of 3000, we have a “TERRAIN, TERRAIN, CLIMB, CLIMB alert from our GPWS. Our altitude was then 3200. Disconnected the autopilot and climbed, received our cleared for the visual approach, Runway 33. We could now fly back to our desired track well to the North of us and concluded the visual approach to the runway. I believe the Controller thought they had another minute or two before they could steer us to the visual track, however we had a substantial tailwind from the North that took us further South than the Controller had counted on. Sure glad this was under VFR. ATC failure to understand our track, altitude and ground speed. Suggestions: Have similar things happen in the past where the Controllers do not understand wind effect on ground speed. To me obviously Controllers are not briefed on winds aloft in a quantitative measure.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported GPWS alert on approach. Flight crew took evasive action and landed uneventfully.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=90",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 90,
      "pageEnd": 91,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=90",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 90,
        "pageEnd": 91,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2070299 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported GPWS alert on approach. Flight crew took evasive action and landed uneventfully.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2037498",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Large Transport"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "As we were nearing GJT airport, we requested the RNAV (GPS) Rwy 29 Approach. We were told by the ATC Controller that he would be unable to clear us for any approach to RWY 29 from our direction because their minimum vectoring altitudes were well above the charted approach altitudes. We queried him, because I did not believe that we would be unable to shoot either of the published approaches to 29, into an airport surrounded by high terrain at night. The Controller descended us incrementally as he could, but once we reached 9500 ft MSL, he stated that until we reported the runway in sight and cleared us for the visual, he was unable to clear us to a lower altitude due to terrain. As a result, we flew past the extended centerline of the runway and finally saw the airport as we passed approx. 5000 ft above the field elevation. I did not recognize the airport at first, because from our altitude it looked tiny, and I was looking farther to the north for the visual picture I expect when looking for an airport. Once we passed to the west of the airport and reported GJT in sight, the controller was able to give us vectors and a lower altitude. We were given a 180 degree turn for the downwind leg and then cleared for the visual approach, with turns onto base and final legs at our discretion. Given the limited moonlight, we could not see any of the terrain to the south or west of the field, only the outline of the mountain peaks against the skyline. I have approx. 12,500 hours of flight time; 10,000 with the airline and was extremely uncomfortable throughout this approach. Although I believe I was flying conservatively, I had no actual idea where the terrain was and just tried to fly the closest-in approach I could, while still getting configured in time to be stabilized for landing. To add to my mental workload, I was conducting IOE with a new- hire. I was mentally prepared to conduct the terrain escape maneuver if needed. One of the only things that gave me any comfort in conducting the visual approach is my experience level, conservative energy management and belief that ATC was watching us on radar and would have alerted us if they had gotten a ‘low altitude’ alert. I believe this operation is inherently unsafe: descending into a valley, surrounded by high terrain and just guessing what altitudes were appropriate while on a visual approach. I half considered diverting, thinking to myself, “How is it possible that this is legal?” The airline should commission Jeppesen to create a custom RNAV STAR linked to an Approach for Rwy 29 that meets the criteria required by ATC."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAs we were nearing GJT airport, we requested the RNAV (GPS) Rwy 29 Approach. We were told by the ATC Controller that he would be unable to clear us for any approach to RWY 29 from our direction because their minimum vectoring altitudes were well above the charted approach altitudes. We queried him, because I did not believe that we would be unable to shoot either of the published approaches to 29, into an airport surrounded by high terrain at night. The Controller descended us incrementally as he could, but once we reached 9500 ft MSL, he stated that until we reported the runway in sight and cleared us for the visual, he was unable to clear us to a lower altitude due to terrain. As a result, we flew past the extended centerline of the runway and finally saw the airport as we passed approx. 5000 ft above the field elevation. I did not recognize the airport at first, because from our altitude it looked tiny, and I was looking farther to the north for the visual picture I expect when looking for an airport. Once we passed to the west of the airport and reported GJT in sight, the controller was able to give us vectors and a lower altitude. We were given a 180 degree turn for the downwind leg and then cleared for the visual approach, with turns onto base and final legs at our discretion. Given the limited moonlight, we could not see any of the terrain to the south or west of the field, only the outline of the mountain peaks against the skyline. I have approx. 12,500 hours of flight time; 10,000 with the airline and was extremely uncomfortable throughout this approach. Although I believe I was flying conservatively, I had no actual idea where the terrain was and just tried to fly the closest-in approach I could, while still getting configured in time to be stabilized for landing. To add to my mental workload, I was conducting IOE with a new- hire. I was mentally prepared to conduct the terrain escape maneuver if needed. One of the only things that gave me any comfort in conducting the visual approach is my experience level, conservative energy management and belief that ATC was watching us on radar and would have alerted us if they had gotten a ‘low altitude’ alert. I believe this operation is inherently unsafe: descending into a valley, surrounded by high terrain and just guessing what altitudes were appropriate while on a visual approach. I half considered diverting, thinking to myself, “How is it possible that this is legal?” The airline should commission Jeppesen to create a custom RNAV STAR linked to an Approach for Rwy 29 that meets the criteria required by ATC.",
    "synopsis": "Captain reported a loss of situational awareness when maneuvering at the minimum vectoring altitude while trying to locate GJT airport at night in mountainous terrain. The Captain expressed concern that this approach may not be safe.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=92",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 92,
      "pageEnd": 93,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=92",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 92,
        "pageEnd": 93,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2037498 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Captain reported a loss of situational awareness when maneuvering at the minimum vectoring altitude while trying to locate GJT airport at night in mountainous terrain. The Captain expressed concern that this approach may not be safe.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2034009",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While level at FL340 we could see in the distance about 50 miles away several thunderstorms starting to form a solid line. Our radar confirmed what we were seeing and I decided that going through that area was not an option. We asked for a 90-degree turn to the right or a western heading. After getting our reroute to the west, parallel to the storms we encountered a layer of hazy skies and some moderate chop. Our radar was not hitting any precipitation and our track looked decent. To be safe we started slowing the aircraft for our turbulence procedures. I already had the FAs (Flight Attendant) sitting down and everything seemed fine. The moderate chop suddenly turned into to light turbulence and shortly after severe turbulence. The plane climbed up and down about 1000 ft. and I saw our VSI was up and down about 1200 ft. I immediately told Center and requested a turn back to the north but without anything showing on the radar, Center or ourselves really had no idea which direction would get us clear of the turbulent weather. Eventually the severe turbulence returned back to moderate chop, I called the FAs, they said no injuries and everyone was OK. At that point I made an announcement and we continued to ZZZ."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile level at FL340 we could see in the distance about 50 miles away several thunderstorms starting to form a solid line. Our radar confirmed what we were seeing and I decided that going through that area was not an option. We asked for a 90-degree turn to the right or a western heading. After getting our reroute to the west, parallel to the storms we encountered a layer of hazy skies and some moderate chop. Our radar was not hitting any precipitation and our track looked decent. To be safe we started slowing the aircraft for our turbulence procedures. I already had the FAs (Flight Attendant) sitting down and everything seemed fine. The moderate chop suddenly turned into to light turbulence and shortly after severe turbulence. The plane climbed up and down about 1000 ft. and I saw our VSI was up and down about 1200 ft. I immediately told Center and requested a turn back to the north but without anything showing on the radar, Center or ourselves really had no idea which direction would get us clear of the turbulent weather. Eventually the severe turbulence returned back to moderate chop, I called the FAs, they said no injuries and everyone was OK. At that point I made an announcement and we continued to ZZZ.",
    "synopsis": "CRJ900 Captain reported encountering severe turbulence despite rerouting to avoid storms that were seen in the distance. As there was nothing showing up on radar, the reporter and Center did not know which direction would lead to flying in better weather. The severe turbulence eventually subsided and there were no injuries noted.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=94",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 94,
      "pageEnd": 95,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=94",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 94,
        "pageEnd": 95,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2034009 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "CRJ900 Captain reported encountering severe turbulence despite rerouting to avoid storms that were seen in the distance. As there was nothing showing up on radar, the reporter and Center did not know which direction would lead to flying in better weather. The severe turbulence eventually subsided and there were no injuries noted.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2033866",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Operating to ZZZ, Runway XX. Tower amended the take-off clearance from FL230 to heading 280 at 10,000 ft. After take-off, the FO (First Officer) checked in and ATC adjusted the heading to 260 degrees for weather avoidance. We climbed to and leveled off at 10,000 ft. Captain was the PF (Pilot Flying) and it sounded busy so I turned the AP (Autopilot) on at 7,000 ft. to be sure that I caught all ATC transmissions. At 10,000 ft. ATC radio traffic got extremely busy as we were waiting for a clearance to a higher altitude. Then ATC gave us a Terrain Altitude alert, and a climbing turn with a heading. The FO tried to acknowledge and the Captain immediately turned and climbed. The aircraft indicated a single call-out of 2500 ft. once and as the aircraft was climbing/turning the lowest recorded Radar Altimeter was 2120 ft for 5 seconds. No aircraft damage, no terrain contact and no passengers were injured during the maneuvers. ATC reiterated the heading and climb but the ATC frequency was flooded with requests. We managed to acknowledge and then we were handed off to en-route ATC, and requested a further climb. Captain requested the ATC phone number after a few minutes. The Captain notified dispatch during the flight and pilot manager after landing. And then called and spoke with the Approach Control Supervisor and reviewed the situation. I gave the Supervisor the time to mark the tapes. He took my information and indicated that they will be calling me as they begin their investigation."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOperating to ZZZ, Runway XX. Tower amended the take-off clearance from FL230 to heading 280 at 10,000 ft. After take-off, the FO (First Officer) checked in and ATC adjusted the heading to 260 degrees for weather avoidance. We climbed to and leveled off at 10,000 ft. Captain was the PF (Pilot Flying) and it sounded busy so I turned the AP (Autopilot) on at 7,000 ft. to be sure that I caught all ATC transmissions. At 10,000 ft. ATC radio traffic got extremely busy as we were waiting for a clearance to a higher altitude. Then ATC gave us a Terrain Altitude alert, and a climbing turn with a heading. The FO tried to acknowledge and the Captain immediately turned and climbed. The aircraft indicated a single call-out of 2500 ft. once and as the aircraft was climbing/turning the lowest recorded Radar Altimeter was 2120 ft for 5 seconds. No aircraft damage, no terrain contact and no passengers were injured during the maneuvers. ATC reiterated the heading and climb but the ATC frequency was flooded with requests. We managed to acknowledge and then we were handed off to en-route ATC, and requested a further climb. Captain requested the ATC phone number after a few minutes. The Captain notified dispatch during the flight and pilot manager after landing. And then called and spoke with the Approach Control Supervisor and reviewed the situation. I gave the Supervisor the time to mark the tapes. He took my information and indicated that they will be calling me as they begin their investigation.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier Captain reported they were assigned a heading for weather avoidance and an altitude to maintain. After reaching the initial assigned altitude, ATC issued them a Low Altitude Alert and a climb.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=96",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 96,
      "pageEnd": 97,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=96",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 96,
        "pageEnd": 97,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2033866 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier Captain reported they were assigned a heading for weather avoidance and an altitude to maintain. After reaching the initial assigned altitude, ATC issued them a Low Altitude Alert and a climb.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2032995",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On Day 0, I rented the aircraft aforementioned from flight school for a VFR flight in the vicinity between XB30 to XE00. The runway and taxiway conditions were wet according to the XA:21 meteorological report, in which the airport reported heavy rain and thunderstorms, ending at XA:47. Preflight and runup checks were completed as normal and all systems showed safe parameters. Coming to a full stop landing after performing 11 touch and go practice approaches, ZZZ Ground Control instructed to taxi back to spot X ramp via: taxiway 1, 2, Runway XX, and taxiway 3 to ramp parking. When turning right into taxiway 3 from Runway XX, I missed the corner entrance of taxiway 3 and overrun the grass area further ahead of the same taxiway, as a result of aircraft speed and wet taxiway conditions that affected traction and consequently rate of turn. I instantly applied idle power and right brake to increase the rate of turn, but the aircraft momentum allowed it to come back at the taxiway pavement. Engine and rudder controls were still operating normally, therefore I proceeded to park the aircraft at the ramp area. After grounding the aircraft and notifying the flight school, significant damage was visible to the propeller blade during an inspection with the flight school's mechanic."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn Day 0, I rented the aircraft aforementioned from flight school for a VFR flight in the vicinity between XB30 to XE00. The runway and taxiway conditions were wet according to the XA:21 meteorological report, in which the airport reported heavy rain and thunderstorms, ending at XA:47. Preflight and runup checks were completed as normal and all systems showed safe parameters. Coming to a full stop landing after performing 11 touch and go practice approaches, ZZZ Ground Control instructed to taxi back to spot X ramp via: taxiway 1, 2, Runway XX, and taxiway 3 to ramp parking. When turning right into taxiway 3 from Runway XX, I missed the corner entrance of taxiway 3 and overrun the grass area further ahead of the same taxiway, as a result of aircraft speed and wet taxiway conditions that affected traction and consequently rate of turn. I instantly applied idle power and right brake to increase the rate of turn, but the aircraft momentum allowed it to come back at the taxiway pavement. Engine and rudder controls were still operating normally, therefore I proceeded to park the aircraft at the ramp area. After grounding the aircraft and notifying the flight school, significant damage was visible to the propeller blade during an inspection with the flight school's mechanic.",
    "synopsis": "C172 pilot reported taxiway excursion onto grass area while turning on a wet taxiway. Pilot regained control and returned to paved surface. Post flight inspection revealed damage to propeller.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=98",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 98,
      "pageEnd": 99,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=98",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 98,
        "pageEnd": 99,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2032995 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "C172 pilot reported taxiway excursion onto grass area while turning on a wet taxiway. Pilot regained control and returned to paved surface. Post flight inspection revealed damage to propeller.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2032898",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) on a flight XXXX ZZZ1- ZZZ. We were descending through approximately 8000 ft prepared for the ILS RWY XX in ZZZ. The ATC changed our runway and approach for RNAV XYR. We received a vector to the new approach and I loaded the new RWY and approach into the FMS. I then realized that the vector takes us through a large thunderstorm cell that was located between the final courses of RWY XX and XYR. We had the discussion about it with the CA (PF) and I expressed my concern to the ATC. I told the ATC that that the vector they gave us takes us right into the cell, that we are not able to continue on that heading and need a new vector around it. The ATC was not cooperative, and even after suggesting a heading that we knew that would work for us, they kept refusing it and gave us vectors back into the severe weather. At this point we had reached the edge of the cell with heavy precipitation and moderate turbulence. We [requested priority] as we needed to turn away from the weather. The CA (PF) disconnected the AP and took a right turn taking us out of the cell. The CA (PF) over banked the aircraft which he immediately corrected for after the over-bank warning. Upon several back and forth communication with the ATC we got cleared back to the ILS RWY XX. We requested extra time to prepare for the approach. The approach to ILS XX and landing commenced without issues. We should have had a better situational awareness about the weather and not accepted the runway change that late on the arrival in these circumstances at first place. I did not realize the severity of the weather and its location until we had already accepted the RWY change. It was surprising to us that the ATC attempted to vector us straight into the bad weather and that they were not helpful finding a way around it. It caught us off guard because ZZZ ATC is usually experienced and extremely cooperative helping to cope with weather in the area. We also speculated that the ZZZ ATCs radars could have not portrayed the same info we had. We should always maintain a good situational awareness and never rely on ATC doing a right thing."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) on a flight XXXX ZZZ1- ZZZ. We were descending through approximately 8000 ft prepared for the ILS RWY XX in ZZZ. The ATC changed our runway and approach for RNAV XYR. We received a vector to the new approach and I loaded the new RWY and approach into the FMS. I then realized that the vector takes us through a large thunderstorm cell that was located between the final courses of RWY XX and XYR. We had the discussion about it with the CA (PF) and I expressed my concern to the ATC. I told the ATC that that the vector they gave us takes us right into the cell, that we are not able to continue on that heading and need a new vector around it. The ATC was not cooperative, and even after suggesting a heading that we knew that would work for us, they kept refusing it and gave us vectors back into the severe weather. At this point we had reached the edge of the cell with heavy precipitation and moderate turbulence. We [requested priority] as we needed to turn away from the weather. The CA (PF) disconnected the AP and took a right turn taking us out of the cell. The CA (PF) over banked the aircraft which he immediately corrected for after the over-bank warning. Upon several back and forth communication with the ATC we got cleared back to the ILS RWY XX. We requested extra time to prepare for the approach. The approach to ILS XX and landing commenced without issues. We should have had a better situational awareness about the weather and not accepted the runway change that late on the arrival in these circumstances at first place. I did not realize the severity of the weather and its location until we had already accepted the RWY change. It was surprising to us that the ATC attempted to vector us straight into the bad weather and that they were not helpful finding a way around it. It caught us off guard because ZZZ ATC is usually experienced and extremely cooperative helping to cope with weather in the area. We also speculated that the ZZZ ATCs radars could have not portrayed the same info we had. We should always maintain a good situational awareness and never rely on ATC doing a right thing.",
    "synopsis": "B737-800 First Officer reported the Captain overbanked the aircraft during arrival while maneuvering away from an area of severe weather. Captain corrected overbank and flight continued on approach to landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=100",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 100,
      "pageEnd": 101,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=100",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 100,
        "pageEnd": 101,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2032898 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "B737-800 First Officer reported the Captain overbanked the aircraft during arrival while maneuvering away from an area of severe weather. Captain corrected overbank and flight continued on approach to landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2032837",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model",
      "A380"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were flying over the Pacific Ocean where we were on a filed track that everyone else seemed to be on. We had noticed a few other aircraft in front of us at differing altitudes through at least the first half of the flight. While I was upfront for the first half, we had to adjust our SLOP (Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure) a few times to account for the winds and what we can see the other aircraft doing utilizing TCAS and their respective contrails. Prior to the event, we had swapped in the [Relief Pilot] so that the Captain (CA) and I can take our break prior to landing. At the time of the swap, the weather outside was VMC and we were clear of any clouds nearby. We were cruising at FL350, having stepped climbed according to the VNAV CRZ page, at the filed cost index ECON speeds. However, there was a bend in the jet stream right around that time to swap. I had just laid down and strapped myself in when we hit the first bump. I did hear a PA be made within a second of it which I presume is the turbulence PA for the Flight Attendants (FAs). I am not sure which one since it wasn’t broadcasted into the bunk room so it was muffled. It was clearly in the moderate category maybe a bit higher at certain points of the event based off of my motion laying down under the seat belt in a dark bunk. The motion of the turbulence did feel like wake turbulence to me and therefore, out of curiosity and since I was on break, I utilized the WIFI to see what was up in front of us. On the app, I saw that there was an aircraft in front of us and only 1,000 feet above our current altitude. I heard the Captain (CA) pick the phone up in the seating area and I told him about what I had found to suggest that we could’ve possibly had a wake turbulence encounter and to maybe relay to the [Relief Pilot] in the flight deck for increased situational awareness."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Just after the half way point in our flight, and shortly after the relief pilots took over, during my rest, the aircraft experienced abrupt moderate or greater turbulence that lasted about 30 to 40 seconds. I had just gotten into the overhead crew rest area and was able to buckle into one of the Jump seats. After the ride smoothed out, I went into the cabin to check on the Flight Attendants and Passengers. The Flight Attendants were shaken, but there were no injuries. I called the flight deck and talked to the relief pilots, who had taken the correct action and had requested a lower altitude to get a smoother ride. The Relief Pilots had contacted Dispatch to report the turbulence and while discussing it they determined that it was possibly wake turbulence from an aircraft that was higher and ahead of us. At the time we were in an area of no forecasted or reported turbulence, we were, however, following SOP and (Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure) SLOP 1 mile right of course. The area we were crossing had multiple fragmented jet streams depicted along our route at different altitudes. During the event, the auto pilot remained engaged, and the aircraft maintained altitude. considering the circumstances, the Relief Pilots did an excellent job and the flight continued without further issue."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were flying over the Pacific Ocean where we were on a filed track that everyone else seemed to be on. We had noticed a few other aircraft in front of us at differing altitudes through at least the first half of the flight. While I was upfront for the first half, we had to adjust our SLOP (Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure) a few times to account for the winds and what we can see the other aircraft doing utilizing TCAS and their respective contrails. Prior to the event, we had swapped in the [Relief Pilot] so that the Captain (CA) and I can take our break prior to landing. At the time of the swap, the weather outside was VMC and we were clear of any clouds nearby. We were cruising at FL350, having stepped climbed according to the VNAV CRZ page, at the filed cost index ECON speeds. However, there was a bend in the jet stream right around that time to swap. I had just laid down and strapped myself in when we hit the first bump. I did hear a PA be made within a second of it which I presume is the turbulence PA for the Flight Attendants (FAs). I am not sure which one since it wasn’t broadcasted into the bunk room so it was muffled. It was clearly in the moderate category maybe a bit higher at certain points of the event based off of my motion laying down under the seat belt in a dark bunk. The motion of the turbulence did feel like wake turbulence to me and therefore, out of curiosity and since I was on break, I utilized the WIFI to see what was up in front of us. On the app, I saw that there was an aircraft in front of us and only 1,000 feet above our current altitude. I heard the Captain (CA) pick the phone up in the seating area and I told him about what I had found to suggest that we could’ve possibly had a wake turbulence encounter and to maybe relay to the [Relief Pilot] in the flight deck for increased situational awareness.\n\nNarrative 2\nJust after the half way point in our flight, and shortly after the relief pilots took over, during my rest, the aircraft experienced abrupt moderate or greater turbulence that lasted about 30 to 40 seconds. I had just gotten into the overhead crew rest area and was able to buckle into one of the Jump seats. After the ride smoothed out, I went into the cabin to check on the Flight Attendants and Passengers. The Flight Attendants were shaken, but there were no injuries. I called the flight deck and talked to the relief pilots, who had taken the correct action and had requested a lower altitude to get a smoother ride. The Relief Pilots had contacted Dispatch to report the turbulence and while discussing it they determined that it was possibly wake turbulence from an aircraft that was higher and ahead of us. At the time we were in an area of no forecasted or reported turbulence, we were, however, following SOP and (Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure) SLOP 1 mile right of course. The area we were crossing had multiple fragmented jet streams depicted along our route at different altitudes. During the event, the auto pilot remained engaged, and the aircraft maintained altitude. considering the circumstances, the Relief Pilots did an excellent job and the flight continued without further issue.",
    "synopsis": "Two air carrier pilots on break reported noticing the effects of possible wake turbulence on their trans-Pacific flight.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=102",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 102,
      "pageEnd": 104,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=102",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 102,
        "pageEnd": 104,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2032837 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Two air carrier pilots on break reported noticing the effects of possible wake turbulence on their trans-Pacific flight.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2032768",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large UAS, Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Conducting training flight as instructor pilot in an unmanned Aircraft X. Tower weather per ATIS was reported as Few clouds 1100 ft. Prior to that, skies had been reported as clear. Took off planning on VFR pattern work and found that the clouds had thickened and pushed in. Decision was made and communicated to tower that we would make a full stop landing. VFR cloud clearances were not maintained at times during the pattern. Full stop landing was successfully completed after which Tower stated that clouds were now Broken at 1200 ft. AGL."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nConducting training flight as instructor pilot in an unmanned Aircraft X. Tower weather per ATIS was reported as Few clouds 1100 ft. Prior to that, skies had been reported as clear. Took off planning on VFR pattern work and found that the clouds had thickened and pushed in. Decision was made and communicated to tower that we would make a full stop landing. VFR cloud clearances were not maintained at times during the pattern. Full stop landing was successfully completed after which Tower stated that clouds were now Broken at 1200 ft. AGL.",
    "synopsis": "Government UAS pilot reported conducting operations in deteriorating conditions. They chose to land after they were unable to comply with VFR cloud clearance requirements.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=105",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 105,
      "pageEnd": 106,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=105",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 105,
        "pageEnd": 106,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "Worsening cloud prompts an unmanned aircraft to land",
    "summary": "An instructor flying a large unmanned aircraft began a visual training pattern using a report of a few clouds at 1,100 feet. Conditions worsened after takeoff and cloud clearance was not maintained at times, so the crew advised the tower and made a full-stop landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Weather",
      "Procedures",
      "Communication"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2032767",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Light Transport"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While on the RNAV approach to ZZZ Airport visibility deteriorated rapidly as the descent into the final approach segment of the RNAV XX. Heavy rain began prior to the arrival of the minimum approach altitude and continued until nearly reaching the field. Visibility deteriorated to the point of almost zero, yet the Captain continued the approach in belief the rain would clear up. At the missed approach altitude I called \"go missed\" approximately 3 times in an effort to get the Captain to discontinue the approach, yet the Captain continued his descent into the field. As he continued I continued to called negative contact, \"GO missed\". The Captain ignored all calls and continued until breaking out at an altitude of nearly 200 ft. AGL, which was an extremely low altitude so to the point we were short of the field and well below the glide path. The \"break out\" altitude was approximately 300 ft. bellow the appropriate ceiling requirements for the RNAV XX at ZZZ. Upon landing the Captain remarked \"you were right, we should have went missed, I thought we were going to break out just below\". I have never been more afraid for my life and terror than on that approach into ZZZ to the point I feared for my life as the Captain ignored all my pleas to go around. I reported this incident to the training Captain. This is not the first time this has happened while flying with other captains at Company X and the conduct has been reported to the director of operations and chief pilot multiple times and was told to \"not make waves\". The safety culture at Company X presents a serious risk to aviation safety as a whole."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile on the RNAV approach to ZZZ Airport visibility deteriorated rapidly as the descent into the final approach segment of the RNAV XX. Heavy rain began prior to the arrival of the minimum approach altitude and continued until nearly reaching the field. Visibility deteriorated to the point of almost zero, yet the Captain continued the approach in belief the rain would clear up. At the missed approach altitude I called \"go missed\" approximately 3 times in an effort to get the Captain to discontinue the approach, yet the Captain continued his descent into the field. As he continued I continued to called negative contact, \"GO missed\". The Captain ignored all calls and continued until breaking out at an altitude of nearly 200 ft. AGL, which was an extremely low altitude so to the point we were short of the field and well below the glide path. The \"break out\" altitude was approximately 300 ft. bellow the appropriate ceiling requirements for the RNAV XX at ZZZ. Upon landing the Captain remarked \"you were right, we should have went missed, I thought we were going to break out just below\". I have never been more afraid for my life and terror than on that approach into ZZZ to the point I feared for my life as the Captain ignored all my pleas to go around. I reported this incident to the training Captain. This is not the first time this has happened while flying with other captains at Company X and the conduct has been reported to the director of operations and chief pilot multiple times and was told to \"not make waves\". The safety culture at Company X presents a serious risk to aviation safety as a whole.",
    "synopsis": "Air taxi First Officer reported an unstabilized approach resulting in a CFTT event in inclement weather with close to zero reported visibility. The First Officer repeatedly asked the Captain to execute a go-around, yet the Captain ignored the requests. Post landing, Captain admitted a go-around would have been the best decision.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=107",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 107,
      "pageEnd": 108,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=107",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 107,
        "pageEnd": 108,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2032767 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air taxi First Officer reported an unstabilized approach resulting in a CFTT event in inclement weather with close to zero reported visibility. The First Officer repeatedly asked the Captain to execute a go-around, yet the Captain ignored the requests. Post landing, Captain admitted a go-around would have been the best decision.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2032417",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We had been picking our way through thunderstorms and were heading towards ZZZZZ into ZZZ at 12,000 ft. We had been talking with ATC about the deviations for weather and had just let them know we were back towards ZZZZZ. Shortly after this radio call ATC called us and said descend and maintain 10,000 ft. I read this back to them with our call sign. The Captain put 10,000 ft. into the FCU and we started down. When we started down I was thinking we are still a ways from ZZZZZ and we normally cross ZZZZZ at 14,000 ft. We were off our normal course into ZZZ because of the deviations and I thought maybe this is what the controller wanted? As we descended though I thought the terrain looked to close. I was about to key up the mic and ask ATC to confirm the altitude they wanted us to descend too when they called us back and told us we took another aircraft's clearance and we needed to climb back to 12,000 ft. It seemed that this controller was training because another voice came on and asked us if we had been told there was a similar call sign on frequency? We had not been told this we said. The flight continued without incident. Having two flights with similar sounding call signs arriving at the same time into ZZZ is a threat. Hopefully planning can work on changing this."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "As we descended into the ZZZ area we responded to an ATC call to descend to and maintain 10000 ft. The First Officer (FO) who was the pilot monitoring read back this clearance with our call sign. I put the altitude in the FCU and we both verified on the FMA. We didn’t hear anything else from ATC until we were given a frequency change. We checked into the new frequency with our call sign and descent altitude. As we descend through 11000 ft. I cross referenced my GPWS terrain indication on my ND. The assigned altitude seemed lower than what I remembered in the past and there was some terrain ahead that was now appearing yellow. Our routing was still a few thousand feet above the terrain along our route however and we were VMC so I didn’t immediately have concerns and thought ATC had stepped us down a bit early. Descending through 10700 ft. ATC radioed and said to immediately climb to 12000 ft. and that we had taken our company aircraft’s descent. Until now we had not been advised of a similar sounding call sign on frequency. ATC now informed us Aircraft Y was also on frequency and in the descent to ZZZ. The flight was completed without incident, but we were informed by ZZZ tower to contact TRACON of a possible pilot deviation. In doing so I had to call back multiple times as they informed me they were unable to access the recordings. Ultimately they called me back and said they were still working out the details but they believed we had taken another aircraft’s frequency change but they couldn’t say definitively. We never received a similar sounding call sign notification from ATC nor were we corrected during the initial read back or the new frequency check in. Both these things could have trapped this error. In addition having two company flights with similar call signs arriving at the same time should be avoided in the planning phase by the company. While we are not sure if we actually took the other aircraft’s altitude assignment or ATC gave the altitude to the wrong similar call sign we admit it was possible that we made an error which we didn’t catch."
      },
      {
        "number": 3,
        "text": "Aircraft Y began flashing on my scope around 15000 [ft.] and I accepted a radar handoff. Shortly thereafter company Aircraft X checks in. Aircraft X was not on my scope and I missed that an incorrect call sign had checked in. Assuming Aircraft Y was the one who checked in, I instructed Aircraft Y (correct aircraft) to descend and maintain 10000 and advise when they got the current ATIS. The Aircraft X pilot read back the control instructions with out using a their call sign. Meanwhile, Aircraft Y whom I thought I was talking to continues to descend, making me believe he has received my instructions. Center then gives me a call and asks if I am talking to Aircraft X and I respond that I have Aircraft Y on frequency. He then explains that he believes the wrong aircraft switched to me and I have Aircraft X and not Aircraft Y. I scroll out and see that Aircraft X is flashing to me and is at an unsafe altitude (10700) for the MVA's (12000). Not yet sure if I do in fact have the wrong aircraft I reach out and instruct Aircraft X to climb immediately to 12000 to which he replies. Traffic was slow and I let expectation bias and a lack of catching the incorrect call sign on initial contact to place aircraft in an unsafe situation. This was a perfect swiss cheese model where multiple controllers and the pilots failed to catch a developing situation. I failed to catch the incorrect call sign on initial check-in. Aircraft X continued to take control instructions when all instructions were given to Aircraft Y. Center shipped me the incorrect aircraft, never told the two aircraft about similar sounding call signs, and did not catch that they had Aircraft X descending in their airspace to an unsafe altitude until well below the MVA. I missed that the wrong aircraft checked in and let expectation bias and lack of proper hearback/readback contribute to an unsafe situation. I assigned all control instructions to the correct intended aircraft but failed to verify when the pilot was responding without using their call sign. This was definitely a wake up call to be more vigilant."
      },
      {
        "number": 4,
        "text": "I was working Aircraft X and Aircraft Y from the east and west respectively into ZZZ via LOA (Letter of Authorization) routing. Aircraft Y was issued a descent to 13000 ft. and was routed ZZZ1-ZZZ. Approach had accepted the handoff. Aircraft X was issued a descent to 14000 ft. on the east side of ZZZ1 via ZZZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ. I coordinated the ZZZ arrival from the east side of ZZZ1 as directed by Center and Approach LOA to which the Approach Controller acknowledged and approved. Aircraft X was just clear of weather after deviating right of course and proceeded direct ZZZZZ. I issued a frequency change to Aircraft Y to Approach and I received a readback that sounded correct at that moment but wasn't. Approach had not yet accepted the handoff on Aircraft X. Aircraft X was still descending below 14000 ft. into lower terrain of 12300 ft. I then issued a control instruction to Aircraft X to maintain 14000 ft. with no response. I then issued a low altitude alert to Aircraft X with no response. Aircraft Y responded to me on frequency and then I realized that Aircraft X took the frequency from Aircraft Y. I believe that the Approach Controller was mistakenly giving instructions to Aircraft X who kept taking instructions for Aircraft Y. The Approach Controller did not have a hand off on Aircraft X yet. I called the Approach Controller to inform him that there may have been a confusion between the two aircraft. He told me he was talking to Aircraft Y and I said that Aircraft Y was on my frequency still. I called the Approach Controller and asked him if Aircraft X was climbing up to 14000 ft. and he said that he was climbing him up to 12000 ft. and told me that was his MVA for that area. The controller still did not have radar contact until I called him back and asked him to accept the hand off. The call signs were not that similar but to listen to read backs and similar call signs is very important. In hindsight, I should have called the call signs to each aircraft to have them listen carefully to prevent this error from happening to me and the Approach Controller."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe had been picking our way through thunderstorms and were heading towards ZZZZZ into ZZZ at 12,000 ft. We had been talking with ATC about the deviations for weather and had just let them know we were back towards ZZZZZ. Shortly after this radio call ATC called us and said descend and maintain 10,000 ft. I read this back to them with our call sign. The Captain put 10,000 ft. into the FCU and we started down. When we started down I was thinking we are still a ways from ZZZZZ and we normally cross ZZZZZ at 14,000 ft. We were off our normal course into ZZZ because of the deviations and I thought maybe this is what the controller wanted? As we descended though I thought the terrain looked to close. I was about to key up the mic and ask ATC to confirm the altitude they wanted us to descend too when they called us back and told us we took another aircraft's clearance and we needed to climb back to 12,000 ft. It seemed that this controller was training because another voice came on and asked us if we had been told there was a similar call sign on frequency? We had not been told this we said. The flight continued without incident. Having two flights with similar sounding call signs arriving at the same time into ZZZ is a threat. Hopefully planning can work on changing this.\n\nNarrative 2\nAs we descended into the ZZZ area we responded to an ATC call to descend to and maintain 10000 ft. The First Officer (FO) who was the pilot monitoring read back this clearance with our call sign. I put the altitude in the FCU and we both verified on the FMA. We didn’t hear anything else from ATC until we were given a frequency change. We checked into the new frequency with our call sign and descent altitude. As we descend through 11000 ft. I cross referenced my GPWS terrain indication on my ND. The assigned altitude seemed lower than what I remembered in the past and there was some terrain ahead that was now appearing yellow. Our routing was still a few thousand feet above the terrain along our route however and we were VMC so I didn’t immediately have concerns and thought ATC had stepped us down a bit early. Descending through 10700 ft. ATC radioed and said to immediately climb to 12000 ft. and that we had taken our company aircraft’s descent. Until now we had not been advised of a similar sounding call sign on frequency. ATC now informed us Aircraft Y was also on frequency and in the descent to ZZZ. The flight was completed without incident, but we were informed by ZZZ tower to contact TRACON of a possible pilot deviation. In doing so I had to call back multiple times as they informed me they were unable to access the recordings. Ultimately they called me back and said they were still working out the details but they believed we had taken another aircraft’s frequency change but they couldn’t say definitively. We never received a similar sounding call sign notification from ATC nor were we corrected during the initial read back or the new frequency check in. Both these things could have trapped this error. In addition having two company flights with similar call signs arriving at the same time should be avoided in the planning phase by the company. While we are not sure if we actually took the other aircraft’s altitude assignment or ATC gave the altitude to the wrong similar call sign we admit it was possible that we made an error which we didn’t catch.\n\nNarrative 3\nAircraft Y began flashing on my scope around 15000 [ft.] and I accepted a radar handoff. Shortly thereafter company Aircraft X checks in. Aircraft X was not on my scope and I missed that an incorrect call sign had checked in. Assuming Aircraft Y was the one who checked in, I instructed Aircraft Y (correct aircraft) to descend and maintain 10000 and advise when they got the current ATIS. The Aircraft X pilot read back the control instructions with out using a their call sign. Meanwhile, Aircraft Y whom I thought I was talking to continues to descend, making me believe he has received my instructions. Center then gives me a call and asks if I am talking to Aircraft X and I respond that I have Aircraft Y on frequency. He then explains that he believes the wrong aircraft switched to me and I have Aircraft X and not Aircraft Y. I scroll out and see that Aircraft X is flashing to me and is at an unsafe altitude (10700) for the MVA's (12000). Not yet sure if I do in fact have the wrong aircraft I reach out and instruct Aircraft X to climb immediately to 12000 to which he replies. Traffic was slow and I let expectation bias and a lack of catching the incorrect call sign on initial contact to place aircraft in an unsafe situation. This was a perfect swiss cheese model where multiple controllers and the pilots failed to catch a developing situation. I failed to catch the incorrect call sign on initial check-in. Aircraft X continued to take control instructions when all instructions were given to Aircraft Y. Center shipped me the incorrect aircraft, never told the two aircraft about similar sounding call signs, and did not catch that they had Aircraft X descending in their airspace to an unsafe altitude until well below the MVA. I missed that the wrong aircraft checked in and let expectation bias and lack of proper hearback/readback contribute to an unsafe situation. I assigned all control instructions to the correct intended aircraft but failed to verify when the pilot was responding without using their call sign. This was definitely a wake up call to be more vigilant.\n\nNarrative 4\nI was working Aircraft X and Aircraft Y from the east and west respectively into ZZZ via LOA (Letter of Authorization) routing. Aircraft Y was issued a descent to 13000 ft. and was routed ZZZ1-ZZZ. Approach had accepted the handoff. Aircraft X was issued a descent to 14000 ft. on the east side of ZZZ1 via ZZZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ. I coordinated the ZZZ arrival from the east side of ZZZ1 as directed by Center and Approach LOA to which the Approach Controller acknowledged and approved. Aircraft X was just clear of weather after deviating right of course and proceeded direct ZZZZZ. I issued a frequency change to Aircraft Y to Approach and I received a readback that sounded correct at that moment but wasn't. Approach had not yet accepted the handoff on Aircraft X. Aircraft X was still descending below 14000 ft. into lower terrain of 12300 ft. I then issued a control instruction to Aircraft X to maintain 14000 ft. with no response. I then issued a low altitude alert to Aircraft X with no response. Aircraft Y responded to me on frequency and then I realized that Aircraft X took the frequency from Aircraft Y. I believe that the Approach Controller was mistakenly giving instructions to Aircraft X who kept taking instructions for Aircraft Y. The Approach Controller did not have a hand off on Aircraft X yet. I called the Approach Controller to inform him that there may have been a confusion between the two aircraft. He told me he was talking to Aircraft Y and I said that Aircraft Y was on my frequency still. I called the Approach Controller and asked him if Aircraft X was climbing up to 14000 ft. and he said that he was climbing him up to 12000 ft. and told me that was his MVA for that area. The controller still did not have radar contact until I called him back and asked him to accept the hand off. The call signs were not that similar but to listen to read backs and similar call signs is very important. In hindsight, I should have called the call signs to each aircraft to have them listen carefully to prevent this error from happening to me and the Approach Controller.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier flight crew reported ATC told them they took a similar sounding call sign's descent clearance and descended below the minimum altitude for terrain obstruction.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=109",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 109,
      "pageEnd": 113,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=109",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 109,
        "pageEnd": 113,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2032417 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air Carrier flight crew reported ATC told them they took a similar sounding call sign's descent clearance and descended below the minimum altitude for terrain obstruction.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2028890",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft",
      "Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was the relieving controller on local control. I had just accepted the position. There were two flight school aircraft on final to runway XX. There were at least 5 aircraft waiting to go at runway XL. Weather was hazy and could not see the aircraft. I cleared Aircraft Y to land runway XX. He was about 2 miles out. Another flight school aircraft keyed up and said he was on runway XX. I had no idea what was going on, as I was just briefed and nothing was said about an aircraft being on that runway. The controller being relieved was still plugged in with me and he explained that it was probably the previous aircraft that he thought he had cleared for takeoff and departed a few minutes previous. That aircraft was still on the runway holding in position at hotel intersection. I told the Aircraft Y on final to go-around, then went back and started asking Aircraft X where he was and to exit the runway. I could not see Aircraft X on the runway due to the haze and how far away that runway is from the tower. I thought the runway was clear because I was never briefed on any aircraft still holding in position. I still felt uncomfortable as to where Aircraft X was, so I sent Aircraft Y on final to go-around. There was some back and forth communications with Aircraft X on the runway. He finally cleared the runway and decided to taxi back to parking. We really need ground radar at this facility. It is just a matter of time before a catastrophic event happens involving all of these aircraft. We just cannot see them! We are running a one runway operation here most of the time because we always have one of the parallels closed due to various reasons."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I instructed Aircraft X to LUAW (Line Up and Wait) RWY XX at intersection [taxiway] 1 to ensure they were lining up in the correct direction. I then turned my attention to the active RWY which was RWY XL and cleared numerous A/C to land and take off. I believed I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff and either did not or transmission was blocked or did not go out. I then vectored 2 flight school a/c off the RWY XL final to RWY XX to accommodate IFR departures off RWY XL. After departures cleared, I then cleared to two flight school A/C to land on RWY XX. When the first Aircraft Y was an estimated 2 mile final, Aircraft X advised tower that they were still on the RWY XX. As I was performing my 2 minute overlap the relieving controller instructed Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z to go around for re- sequencing and taxied Aircraft X off RWY XX and back to their ramp. Surface detection equipment and having sufficient help would have helped greatly in this situation."
      },
      {
        "number": 3,
        "text": "Was flying radar vectors for the visual Runway XX into ZZZ. Tower cleared me and my student to land Runway XX. We flew the Visual Approach straight on. On short Final, I noticed Aircraft X on the Runway, halfway down the Runway. I was waiting to see if it was going to exit the Runway, as it was almost parallel to an exit of Runway XX. We continued to fly the visual down, while I told my student to prepare for a go around. Aircraft X on the Runway keyed up his microphone and asked if he was cleared to leave the Runway. At this point, the Controller sounded confused and asked for clarification. They were talking, and I told my student to go around as the Controller told us to go around. I was waiting to see if we could tell the Controller were were going around as I was not sure if there was a plane taking of Runway XL straight into us at the time. On the go around, Aircraft Z behind us was also told to go around. The Controller told us to fly right downwind for Runway XX. We complied and noticed that we would be overflying Runway XL which was the active runway for commercial traffic. The Controller then told us we were cleared for Runway XL. Based on our position, we were overflying the departure end of Runway XL. I asked if she wanted us to make a left turn for Runway XL. She confused me with Aircraft Z, even after I corrected her with our call sign. She then made some comments and vectored us outbound before establishing us on final for XL."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was the relieving controller on local control. I had just accepted the position. There were two flight school aircraft on final to runway XX. There were at least 5 aircraft waiting to go at runway XL. Weather was hazy and could not see the aircraft. I cleared Aircraft Y to land runway XX. He was about 2 miles out. Another flight school aircraft keyed up and said he was on runway XX. I had no idea what was going on, as I was just briefed and nothing was said about an aircraft being on that runway. The controller being relieved was still plugged in with me and he explained that it was probably the previous aircraft that he thought he had cleared for takeoff and departed a few minutes previous. That aircraft was still on the runway holding in position at hotel intersection. I told the Aircraft Y on final to go-around, then went back and started asking Aircraft X where he was and to exit the runway. I could not see Aircraft X on the runway due to the haze and how far away that runway is from the tower. I thought the runway was clear because I was never briefed on any aircraft still holding in position. I still felt uncomfortable as to where Aircraft X was, so I sent Aircraft Y on final to go-around. There was some back and forth communications with Aircraft X on the runway. He finally cleared the runway and decided to taxi back to parking. We really need ground radar at this facility. It is just a matter of time before a catastrophic event happens involving all of these aircraft. We just cannot see them! We are running a one runway operation here most of the time because we always have one of the parallels closed due to various reasons.\n\nNarrative 2\nI instructed Aircraft X to LUAW (Line Up and Wait) RWY XX at intersection [taxiway] 1 to ensure they were lining up in the correct direction. I then turned my attention to the active RWY which was RWY XL and cleared numerous A/C to land and take off. I believed I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff and either did not or transmission was blocked or did not go out. I then vectored 2 flight school a/c off the RWY XL final to RWY XX to accommodate IFR departures off RWY XL. After departures cleared, I then cleared to two flight school A/C to land on RWY XX. When the first Aircraft Y was an estimated 2 mile final, Aircraft X advised tower that they were still on the RWY XX. As I was performing my 2 minute overlap the relieving controller instructed Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z to go around for re- sequencing and taxied Aircraft X off RWY XX and back to their ramp. Surface detection equipment and having sufficient help would have helped greatly in this situation.\n\nNarrative 3\nWas flying radar vectors for the visual Runway XX into ZZZ. Tower cleared me and my student to land Runway XX. We flew the Visual Approach straight on. On short Final, I noticed Aircraft X on the Runway, halfway down the Runway. I was waiting to see if it was going to exit the Runway, as it was almost parallel to an exit of Runway XX. We continued to fly the visual down, while I told my student to prepare for a go around. Aircraft X on the Runway keyed up his microphone and asked if he was cleared to leave the Runway. At this point, the Controller sounded confused and asked for clarification. They were talking, and I told my student to go around as the Controller told us to go around. I was waiting to see if we could tell the Controller were were going around as I was not sure if there was a plane taking of Runway XL straight into us at the time. On the go around, Aircraft Z behind us was also told to go around. The Controller told us to fly right downwind for Runway XX. We complied and noticed that we would be overflying Runway XL which was the active runway for commercial traffic. The Controller then told us we were cleared for Runway XL. Based on our position, we were overflying the departure end of Runway XL. I asked if she wanted us to make a left turn for Runway XL. She confused me with Aircraft Z, even after I corrected her with our call sign. She then made some comments and vectored us outbound before establishing us on final for XL.",
    "synopsis": "Tower Controllers and a flight school instructor reported the instructor initiated a go around from short final due to another flight school aircraft being on the runway. The Controllers reported a mix up in communications, their inability to see the runway involved, and no ground radar contributed to their lack of awareness of an aircraft on the runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=114",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 114,
      "pageEnd": 117,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=114",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 114,
        "pageEnd": 117,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2028890 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Tower Controllers and a flight school instructor reported the instructor initiated a go around from short final due to another flight school aircraft being on the runway. The Controllers reported a mix up in communications, their inability to see the runway involved, and no ground radar contributed to their lack of awareness of an aircraft on the runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2028563",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "In the morning, I started a VFR flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. I departed VFR knowing that the weather at ZZZ was marginal but possibly improving. As I approached ZZZ, I could see that that ceilings were not as forecast. Approaching, I decided to file a pop-up IFR flight plan with Center, who at the time, was monitoring my flight through flight following. As I approached ZZZ, I was handed off to Approach close to ZZZ2. At the time of hand off, ATC asked me what approach I would like and I choose the ILS for XXL, circle XXR. I choose this by default as I always will choose the ILS when able, due to the accuracy and the ability to provided a lower DA. My error in choosing this approach, was that this certain approach was in-operative at the time I requested. I was aware of the notam being ZZZ is my home airport. For reason's listed above, I choose this approach subconsciously making a critical error. I was allowed to continue on for the ILS at ZZZ. As I entered in to the nearby Class C airspace, I could see that the ceilings were possibly lower than what may have been originally forecast. As I approached north of the airport, I went to Ident the LOC frequency and did not get a tone. Although concerning, I thought maybe it was my location relative to the airport and had planned to check again as I got closer to the approach. As I entered the approach, ATC cleared me for the ILS XXL, circle XXR. As I was cleared for the approach, I went to test the identifier for the LOC once again. As I was doing this, I received communication from Approach that the ILS was inoperative at ZZZ. They changed my approach to the RNAV YYL Circle XXR. Being in full IMC, and as I already had the airplane set-up for the ILS, I struggled getting the information into the GPS and pulling the new approach plate so that I could properly brief the approach. As I approached the IF assigned, I was having issues putting the IF in the GPS. At this point, I had the AP (Autopilot) off as I always hand fly all approaches. As I blew the RNAV intercept, I attempted to turn back into it. Being distracted by my GPS, I inadvertently took my eyes off the instruments and did not have my AP engaged. At this point, I noticed a concerning sound in my headset, knowing it was wind caused by increased speed, looked at my VSI and seen a 1500 FPM descent. I was still in full IMC and took evasive actions to correct the attitude of the airplane. In addition to being in a dive, I was in a right banking turn. I was able to get the power pulled out, level the wings, and ultimately, able to stop the descent. During this time, ZZZ Approach broadcast an altitude alert. After getting the airplane stabilized, I reengaged the auto pilot and climbed to 3000 ft. At this point, I was given the option to reattempt the previous botched approach and I mentioned that I was not comfortable with the ceilings and would like to go to a VFR airport if possible. With nothing VFR available, I choose to set up for the RNAV XYL at ZZZ3. In the seconds that I experienced the incident, I lost close to 1200 ft in just a few seconds increasing my airspeed close to 180 kts. Everything leading up to the approach was comfortable, manageable, and for the most part, normal. I have re-ran the entire situation over and over in my mind, as well as reviewing ADSB data. After extensive review, I feel the point where things started to go south, was when I transitioned from the ILS to RNAV. I spent to much valuable time setting up the approach which led me not to take me eyes of my instruments, which is key to instrument flight. Knowing how to recover from an unusual attitude in IMC, ultimately saved my life!"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nIn the morning, I started a VFR flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. I departed VFR knowing that the weather at ZZZ was marginal but possibly improving. As I approached ZZZ, I could see that that ceilings were not as forecast. Approaching, I decided to file a pop-up IFR flight plan with Center, who at the time, was monitoring my flight through flight following. As I approached ZZZ, I was handed off to Approach close to ZZZ2. At the time of hand off, ATC asked me what approach I would like and I choose the ILS for XXL, circle XXR. I choose this by default as I always will choose the ILS when able, due to the accuracy and the ability to provided a lower DA. My error in choosing this approach, was that this certain approach was in-operative at the time I requested. I was aware of the notam being ZZZ is my home airport. For reason's listed above, I choose this approach subconsciously making a critical error. I was allowed to continue on for the ILS at ZZZ. As I entered in to the nearby Class C airspace, I could see that the ceilings were possibly lower than what may have been originally forecast. As I approached north of the airport, I went to Ident the LOC frequency and did not get a tone. Although concerning, I thought maybe it was my location relative to the airport and had planned to check again as I got closer to the approach. As I entered the approach, ATC cleared me for the ILS XXL, circle XXR. As I was cleared for the approach, I went to test the identifier for the LOC once again. As I was doing this, I received communication from Approach that the ILS was inoperative at ZZZ. They changed my approach to the RNAV YYL Circle XXR. Being in full IMC, and as I already had the airplane set-up for the ILS, I struggled getting the information into the GPS and pulling the new approach plate so that I could properly brief the approach. As I approached the IF assigned, I was having issues putting the IF in the GPS. At this point, I had the AP (Autopilot) off as I always hand fly all approaches. As I blew the RNAV intercept, I attempted to turn back into it. Being distracted by my GPS, I inadvertently took my eyes off the instruments and did not have my AP engaged. At this point, I noticed a concerning sound in my headset, knowing it was wind caused by increased speed, looked at my VSI and seen a 1500 FPM descent. I was still in full IMC and took evasive actions to correct the attitude of the airplane. In addition to being in a dive, I was in a right banking turn. I was able to get the power pulled out, level the wings, and ultimately, able to stop the descent. During this time, ZZZ Approach broadcast an altitude alert. After getting the airplane stabilized, I reengaged the auto pilot and climbed to 3000 ft. At this point, I was given the option to reattempt the previous botched approach and I mentioned that I was not comfortable with the ceilings and would like to go to a VFR airport if possible. With nothing VFR available, I choose to set up for the RNAV XYL at ZZZ3. In the seconds that I experienced the incident, I lost close to 1200 ft in just a few seconds increasing my airspeed close to 180 kts. Everything leading up to the approach was comfortable, manageable, and for the most part, normal. I have re-ran the entire situation over and over in my mind, as well as reviewing ADSB data. After extensive review, I feel the point where things started to go south, was when I transitioned from the ILS to RNAV. I spent to much valuable time setting up the approach which led me not to take me eyes of my instruments, which is key to instrument flight. Knowing how to recover from an unusual attitude in IMC, ultimately saved my life!",
    "synopsis": "Cessna 182 pilot reported becoming distracted during single pilot operation in IMC on approach and entering an unusual attitude. The pilot took immediate actions to recover the aircraft and elected to do an approach into a nearby airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=118",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 118,
      "pageEnd": 120,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=118",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 118,
        "pageEnd": 120,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2028563 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Cessna 182 pilot reported becoming distracted during single pilot operation in IMC on approach and entering an unusual attitude. The pilot took immediate actions to recover the aircraft and elected to do an approach into a nearby airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2028114",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Epic Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Adverse Clearance Revision without timely modification resulted in encounter with severe convective vertical wind shear. Departed ZZZ on IFR clearance to ZZZ1 at 33000 ft. via the ZZZZZ1 arrival. Preflight briefing showed route of flight through convective outlook area. Upon handoff to center, and to my dismay, ATC cleared us only to FL190 and said to expect no higher (14,000 feet below cleared flight plan route). With lots of deep moist convection in sight ahead I asked for higher and was denied. It was necessary to request multiple lateral deviations to avoid buildups. Other aircraft were doing the same. Repeated request for higher and was told airspace above too congested though we could see very few aircraft on TCAS within 40 miles of our position. A 40 degree right turn from ZZZZZ to ZZZ [VOR] had us pointed directly into fast rising convective clouds - towering cumulus. Again asked for immediate climb or turn back to the left to avoid weather. No response from ATC. We entered the cloud and experienced an uncommanded ascent above our selected altitude which the autopilot could not correct. There was intense convective vertical wind shear in excess of 6000 feet per minute. The plane experienced a 5000+FPM instantaneous rate of ascent and inside of 32 seconds had ascended nearly 3,000 feet, far beyond the climb capability of the airplane. I disconnected the autopilot and began roll and pitch changes to arrest the climb, get the aircraft under control and back down to its assigned altitude. The downward descent rate was nearly as high, exceeding 4000 FPM. Within the ensuring minute we were back down to 19000 ft, out of the clouds and headed toward ZZZ [VOR]. But the route ahead looked worse despite ATC saying they could see no weather. Not a surprise because the developing thunderstorm clouds had not reached full maturation. Our datalink weather display was showing severe weather along our route ahead. So I asked again for higher and, when handed off to the next controller, requested vectors to the north. We were cleared to FL230 and were given vectors all the way to ZZZ1. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. The cause of the adverse weather encounter was a result of a controller at workload saturation managing congested airspace full of threatening weather who was unable to provide a timely deviation clearance. My deviation request came too late to avoid the severe convective vertical shear present in developing deep moist convective atmosphere. As soon as I was advised that my route would take me through, rather than over, an area of developing thunderstorm clouds I should have rejected the clearance and negotiated a different route as I ultimately did. I also believe that more ARTCC personnel should be assigned to work busy airspaces when unusually severe weather (Hurricane was in area) is expected. That would make provide more time and flexibility to direct traffic safely through such areas."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAdverse Clearance Revision without timely modification resulted in encounter with severe convective vertical wind shear. Departed ZZZ on IFR clearance to ZZZ1 at 33000 ft. via the ZZZZZ1 arrival. Preflight briefing showed route of flight through convective outlook area. Upon handoff to center, and to my dismay, ATC cleared us only to FL190 and said to expect no higher (14,000 feet below cleared flight plan route). With lots of deep moist convection in sight ahead I asked for higher and was denied. It was necessary to request multiple lateral deviations to avoid buildups. Other aircraft were doing the same. Repeated request for higher and was told airspace above too congested though we could see very few aircraft on TCAS within 40 miles of our position. A 40 degree right turn from ZZZZZ to ZZZ [VOR] had us pointed directly into fast rising convective clouds - towering cumulus. Again asked for immediate climb or turn back to the left to avoid weather. No response from ATC. We entered the cloud and experienced an uncommanded ascent above our selected altitude which the autopilot could not correct. There was intense convective vertical wind shear in excess of 6000 feet per minute. The plane experienced a 5000+FPM instantaneous rate of ascent and inside of 32 seconds had ascended nearly 3,000 feet, far beyond the climb capability of the airplane. I disconnected the autopilot and began roll and pitch changes to arrest the climb, get the aircraft under control and back down to its assigned altitude. The downward descent rate was nearly as high, exceeding 4000 FPM. Within the ensuring minute we were back down to 19000 ft, out of the clouds and headed toward ZZZ [VOR]. But the route ahead looked worse despite ATC saying they could see no weather. Not a surprise because the developing thunderstorm clouds had not reached full maturation. Our datalink weather display was showing severe weather along our route ahead. So I asked again for higher and, when handed off to the next controller, requested vectors to the north. We were cleared to FL230 and were given vectors all the way to ZZZ1. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. The cause of the adverse weather encounter was a result of a controller at workload saturation managing congested airspace full of threatening weather who was unable to provide a timely deviation clearance. My deviation request came too late to avoid the severe convective vertical shear present in developing deep moist convective atmosphere. As soon as I was advised that my route would take me through, rather than over, an area of developing thunderstorm clouds I should have rejected the clearance and negotiated a different route as I ultimately did. I also believe that more ARTCC personnel should be assigned to work busy airspaces when unusually severe weather (Hurricane was in area) is expected. That would make provide more time and flexibility to direct traffic safely through such areas.",
    "synopsis": "Epic E1000 pilot reported ATC did not approve their weather deviation request which resulted in them encountering Wind Shear and an uncontrolled 3000 ft. climb. Pilot regained control of aircraft and returned to assigned altitude.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=121",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 121,
      "pageEnd": 123,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=121",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 121,
        "pageEnd": 123,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2028114 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Epic E1000 pilot reported ATC did not approve their weather deviation request which resulted in them encountering Wind Shear and an uncontrolled 3000 ft. climb. Pilot regained control of aircraft and returned to assigned altitude.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2027515",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "J3 Cub"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "As a 2900+ hour CFII who had always flown tricycle gear aircraft, I decided to receive training towards a tailwheel endorsement. I proceeded to receive training in a PA-11 at ZZZ. From the beginning I had difficulties with rudder control, resulting in overcorrections. With practice, these became less troublesome, but I still had difficulties making consistent wheel landings. On the morning of the incident, we had a left crosswind of about 40 degrees with winds gusting up to 15 kt. I questioned the [instructor] if it would be appropriate at my stage of training to fly. The instructor said we could proceed. The initial takeoff was uneventful, but on climb out I noticed moderate turbulence. We remained in the pattern to practice wheel landings. On my first approach and landing, the gusty crosswinds were difficult to deal. My rudder control was adequate but I bounced the landing and finally settled it on the runway further down before adding power for the touch and go. The second landing attempt was better but I still bounced slightly and had difficulty getting the stick forward to keep the airplane on the ground. On the third attempt, I succeeded in maintaining good runway alignment, was able to plant the airplane on the ground without bouncing and continued to track down the runway. I decided that I should declare success, added power for the touch and go and lifted off the runway. The instructor thought otherwise and pulled the power back so that I could make a second touchdown. The change in plans took me by surprise. We touched down and as I was trying to get the tail back up, I must have inadvertently added too much right rudder. The airplane started to head for the side of the runway, so the instructor yelled for me to let go of all the controls. He added power but the aircraft veered further right towards the the edge of the runway. He pulled the power back and we rolled across the grass area and slowly reentered the taxi ramp. We requested taxi clearance back to hangars to inspect the aircraft. I taxied the aircraft back with no further problems. We detected no damage to the aircraft. As we approached the parking area Ground Control asked us to contact them or Tower about the runway excursion The instructor thought that I may have inadvertently applied the right brake as he was adding power. I told him I didn't think I had because since the aircraft has heel brakes, I always have to work hard to reposition my heels to apply the brakes. I suspect the problem was a combination of an already deflected rudder, a gust of wind, and the yaw from suddenly adding power. On reflection, it probably wasn't a good decision to attempt training in gusty wind conditions without first having mastered tailwheel flying under normal circumstances. The instructor said he would contact the Tower."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAs a 2900+ hour CFII who had always flown tricycle gear aircraft, I decided to receive training towards a tailwheel endorsement. I proceeded to receive training in a PA-11 at ZZZ. From the beginning I had difficulties with rudder control, resulting in overcorrections. With practice, these became less troublesome, but I still had difficulties making consistent wheel landings. On the morning of the incident, we had a left crosswind of about 40 degrees with winds gusting up to 15 kt. I questioned the [instructor] if it would be appropriate at my stage of training to fly. The instructor said we could proceed. The initial takeoff was uneventful, but on climb out I noticed moderate turbulence. We remained in the pattern to practice wheel landings. On my first approach and landing, the gusty crosswinds were difficult to deal. My rudder control was adequate but I bounced the landing and finally settled it on the runway further down before adding power for the touch and go. The second landing attempt was better but I still bounced slightly and had difficulty getting the stick forward to keep the airplane on the ground. On the third attempt, I succeeded in maintaining good runway alignment, was able to plant the airplane on the ground without bouncing and continued to track down the runway. I decided that I should declare success, added power for the touch and go and lifted off the runway. The instructor thought otherwise and pulled the power back so that I could make a second touchdown. The change in plans took me by surprise. We touched down and as I was trying to get the tail back up, I must have inadvertently added too much right rudder. The airplane started to head for the side of the runway, so the instructor yelled for me to let go of all the controls. He added power but the aircraft veered further right towards the the edge of the runway. He pulled the power back and we rolled across the grass area and slowly reentered the taxi ramp. We requested taxi clearance back to hangars to inspect the aircraft. I taxied the aircraft back with no further problems. We detected no damage to the aircraft. As we approached the parking area Ground Control asked us to contact them or Tower about the runway excursion The instructor thought that I may have inadvertently applied the right brake as he was adding power. I told him I didn't think I had because since the aircraft has heel brakes, I always have to work hard to reposition my heels to apply the brakes. I suspect the problem was a combination of an already deflected rudder, a gust of wind, and the yaw from suddenly adding power. On reflection, it probably wasn't a good decision to attempt training in gusty wind conditions without first having mastered tailwheel flying under normal circumstances. The instructor said he would contact the Tower.",
    "synopsis": "Pilot reported a runway excursion during gusty wind conditions while receiving training in a tail-wheel aircraft. The instructor took over the controls as the aircraft rolled into a grass area undamaged, then taxied to the hangar.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=124",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 124,
      "pageEnd": 126,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=124",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 124,
        "pageEnd": 126,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2027515 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Pilot reported a runway excursion during gusty wind conditions while receiving training in a tail-wheel aircraft. The instructor took over the controls as the aircraft rolled into a grass area undamaged, then taxied to the hangar.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2027345",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Departed ZZZ on the ZZZZZ departure. Standard departure procedures. When climbing on the departure we were in VFR conditions with a fair amount of turbulence but weren’t concerned about any terrain as we picked up airspeed for to 250 knots. It seemed initially we would be above 9800 ft. at ZZZZZ but as we climbed it became apparent we were not going to meet the crossing restriction and did not have time to correct pitch enough and ended up around 300 feet low. We did receive a low altitude warning from ATC but informed them at that time we would be above terrain and any other crossing restriction wouldn’t be a problem. Cause: Not paying enough attention to climb performance during a turbulent climb out early enough to take corrective action to increase climb rate enough to be at or above a departure crossing restriction. Suggestions: Keep the pitch off the aircraft up with a lower climb out speed to have a higher climb rate necessary for crossing restriction instead of making sure the aircraft is accelerating to 250 knots. Especially in turbulent wind conditions."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Taking off [Runway] XXR ZZZ. I’ve taken off and landed several times through the year. But it was definitely hotter at this time of year. So when we took off we got into some light to moderate turbulence coming out bouncing around. We cleaned the plane up as soon as we could and went to climb 1 so that we could have the extra power climbing out. Well the plane wanted to pitch over to meet the preset airspeed. I was hand flying at this point for better control through the bumps. As we were climb I became aware too late to realize we weren’t going to make 9200 ft. on the ZZZZZ [arrival] at ZZZ. We cross it at about 8900 ft. We met all other altitudes easily. Thinking about potential causes. A slower power setting for the altitude and temperature than what we should have had. Then the next issue was me not adjusting the planes pitch. What I should have done is taken off with max to1 vs to1 with flex power. And adjusted the pitch so that the climb was made vs following the pitch that the plane wanted to do for the airspeed set in."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDeparted ZZZ on the ZZZZZ departure. Standard departure procedures. When climbing on the departure we were in VFR conditions with a fair amount of turbulence but weren’t concerned about any terrain as we picked up airspeed for to 250 knots. It seemed initially we would be above 9800 ft. at ZZZZZ but as we climbed it became apparent we were not going to meet the crossing restriction and did not have time to correct pitch enough and ended up around 300 feet low. We did receive a low altitude warning from ATC but informed them at that time we would be above terrain and any other crossing restriction wouldn’t be a problem. Cause: Not paying enough attention to climb performance during a turbulent climb out early enough to take corrective action to increase climb rate enough to be at or above a departure crossing restriction. Suggestions: Keep the pitch off the aircraft up with a lower climb out speed to have a higher climb rate necessary for crossing restriction instead of making sure the aircraft is accelerating to 250 knots. Especially in turbulent wind conditions.\n\nNarrative 2\nTaking off [Runway] XXR ZZZ. I’ve taken off and landed several times through the year. But it was definitely hotter at this time of year. So when we took off we got into some light to moderate turbulence coming out bouncing around. We cleaned the plane up as soon as we could and went to climb 1 so that we could have the extra power climbing out. Well the plane wanted to pitch over to meet the preset airspeed. I was hand flying at this point for better control through the bumps. As we were climb I became aware too late to realize we weren’t going to make 9200 ft. on the ZZZZZ [arrival] at ZZZ. We cross it at about 8900 ft. We met all other altitudes easily. Thinking about potential causes. A slower power setting for the altitude and temperature than what we should have had. Then the next issue was me not adjusting the planes pitch. What I should have done is taken off with max to1 vs to1 with flex power. And adjusted the pitch so that the climb was made vs following the pitch that the plane wanted to do for the airspeed set in.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported during climb out in turbulence they were below a crossing restriction on the SID and received a Low Altitude Alert from ATC.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=127",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 127,
      "pageEnd": 129,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=127",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 127,
        "pageEnd": 129,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2027345 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported during climb out in turbulence they were below a crossing restriction on the SID and received a Low Altitude Alert from ATC.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2027140",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Taxi and takeoff were uneventful, although on taxi-out, ZZZ Tower advised us of LLWS +/- 20 knots on final for [Runway] XXL. the FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying), and I was PM. The FO asked how ATC had that information in the absence of a PIREP. ATC explained that they used technology. We departed XXL with an assigned heading of 150 and a clearance to climb to 3000 ft. On a right downwind, were switched to departure. At that moment, just south of ZZZ1, the right engine experienced severe vibration accompanied with abnormal N1 and EGT indications. The EGT indicated an exceedance and displayed a red \"disk\". ATC cleared us to 6000 ft, but I set the altitude in the MCP (Mode Control Panel) to 3000 ft and advised Captain to maintain heading. It took several seconds to transmit to ATC, due to multiple aircraft in the approach/departure corridor. I advised ATC and requested immediate return to ZZZ. ATC asked if we were ready to return right away, and I informed them that we needed vectors to a safe area to allow us to run a checklist, then we would advise them. I started the Engine Vibration Checklist, then stopped. I reminded Captain that we had an exceedance, and the correct checklist was the Engine Fire, Failure, Severe Damage, or Separation QRC, followed by the QRH. We followed both the QRC and QRH deliberately and methodically, and once we were on the Deferred Items of the Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist, I requested vectors to the ILS XY Approach, and briefed the visual approach backed up by the ILS. We were landing Flaps 15, using speed off the INIT REF page, after verifying that we were not overweight. ATC advised us of LLWS on final approach. I referred to PROG PAGE 2 to ensure that we were not landing with a tailwind component. It was difficult to slow the aircraft down to VREF at Flaps 15, so I extended the speedbrake 30% to create drag. (The limitation for use of speedbrakes are up to Flaps 10). I explained to Captain that I had to \"hang some tin\" to get the speed under control, and we did not want excess kinetic energy. We landed with Autobrakes 3, taxied off at taxiway 1, and were instructed to wait at the holding pad. The ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) inspected the exterior of the aircraft, especially the right engine, then took the brake temperature (700C). After 30 minutes, we were cleared to be towed to the ramp. The Flight Attendants performed an excellent job of controlling the Passengers and keeping them calm. There were only XX people onboard, but not everyone spoke English, so that was a challenge. I kept the Passengers and Crew informed during the whole adventure, explaining that we would return to ZZZ and exchange this aircraft for a \"newer one\". I did this in English and in Spanish. My F/O performed his PF tasks flawlessly, displaying superb airmanship and reflecting the quality of his training. The Flight Attendants are to be commended on their professionalism and actions, which kept all of our customers safe from the moment of the fire to the deplaning at the gate. Good preparation and constant drills in the simulator, along with standardized briefings and adherence to SOPs made this event resemble a training exercise rather than a full-blown emergency. Every Crew Member did their jobs flawlessly. My only exception was the deliberate use of speedbrakes at Flaps 15, when the SOP prohibits their use above flaps 10. I chose this course of action because the risk of damaging the flap/speedbrakes was outweighed by the risk of a high-energy touchdown and a possible overrun, or the risk of a single-engine go-around in conditions of low-level windshear."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nTaxi and takeoff were uneventful, although on taxi-out, ZZZ Tower advised us of LLWS +/- 20 knots on final for [Runway] XXL. the FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying), and I was PM. The FO asked how ATC had that information in the absence of a PIREP. ATC explained that they used technology. We departed XXL with an assigned heading of 150 and a clearance to climb to 3000 ft. On a right downwind, were switched to departure. At that moment, just south of ZZZ1, the right engine experienced severe vibration accompanied with abnormal N1 and EGT indications. The EGT indicated an exceedance and displayed a red \"disk\". ATC cleared us to 6000 ft, but I set the altitude in the MCP (Mode Control Panel) to 3000 ft and advised Captain to maintain heading. It took several seconds to transmit to ATC, due to multiple aircraft in the approach/departure corridor. I advised ATC and requested immediate return to ZZZ. ATC asked if we were ready to return right away, and I informed them that we needed vectors to a safe area to allow us to run a checklist, then we would advise them. I started the Engine Vibration Checklist, then stopped. I reminded Captain that we had an exceedance, and the correct checklist was the Engine Fire, Failure, Severe Damage, or Separation QRC, followed by the QRH. We followed both the QRC and QRH deliberately and methodically, and once we were on the Deferred Items of the Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist, I requested vectors to the ILS XY Approach, and briefed the visual approach backed up by the ILS. We were landing Flaps 15, using speed off the INIT REF page, after verifying that we were not overweight. ATC advised us of LLWS on final approach. I referred to PROG PAGE 2 to ensure that we were not landing with a tailwind component. It was difficult to slow the aircraft down to VREF at Flaps 15, so I extended the speedbrake 30% to create drag. (The limitation for use of speedbrakes are up to Flaps 10). I explained to Captain that I had to \"hang some tin\" to get the speed under control, and we did not want excess kinetic energy. We landed with Autobrakes 3, taxied off at taxiway 1, and were instructed to wait at the holding pad. The ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) inspected the exterior of the aircraft, especially the right engine, then took the brake temperature (700C). After 30 minutes, we were cleared to be towed to the ramp. The Flight Attendants performed an excellent job of controlling the Passengers and keeping them calm. There were only XX people onboard, but not everyone spoke English, so that was a challenge. I kept the Passengers and Crew informed during the whole adventure, explaining that we would return to ZZZ and exchange this aircraft for a \"newer one\". I did this in English and in Spanish. My F/O performed his PF tasks flawlessly, displaying superb airmanship and reflecting the quality of his training. The Flight Attendants are to be commended on their professionalism and actions, which kept all of our customers safe from the moment of the fire to the deplaning at the gate. Good preparation and constant drills in the simulator, along with standardized briefings and adherence to SOPs made this event resemble a training exercise rather than a full-blown emergency. Every Crew Member did their jobs flawlessly. My only exception was the deliberate use of speedbrakes at Flaps 15, when the SOP prohibits their use above flaps 10. I chose this course of action because the risk of damaging the flap/speedbrakes was outweighed by the risk of a high-energy touchdown and a possible overrun, or the risk of a single-engine go-around in conditions of low-level windshear.",
    "synopsis": "B737 Captain reported an engine vibration and EGT exceedance during climb. The crew returned to the departure airport and landed safely.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=130",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 130,
      "pageEnd": 132,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=130",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 130,
        "pageEnd": 132,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2027140 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "B737 Captain reported an engine vibration and EGT exceedance during climb. The crew returned to the departure airport and landed safely.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2027095",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Leaving originating airport, APU door would not close. Speed thereafter was limited to 220 KIAS. Altitude initially limited to FL240 but later was able to climb to FL310 as our weight decreased. En route we ran into inclement weather and were unable to climb above it. In icing conditions, we utilized our wing and cowl anti ice. A few moments after, we received a Master warning \"Anti Ice Duct\". As led by the QRH, we turned off our anti ice equipment and searched for our closest option out of icing. As the Captain queried ATC as to the bases of the clouds, we saw a brief opening of clear air off to our right. There was some initial confusion with ATC as to why we needed to deviate from our current flight path. In effort to not lose the opportunity we began our turn just prior to ATC clearing us to do so. We were able to parallel our course for a short time and return soon after. After this, and still with our speed and altitude restrictions, ATC [requested priority handling] on our behalf to our limitations, sequencing into destination and VIP presence in there. From then on the flight continued safely and a normal landing was made. Cause: APU door failed in an unknown position limiting speed and altitude. Anti Ice duct prohibited us from flying in icing conditions. Additional factors as to why [priority handling was requested] include large flow of traffic going into destination and heightened security measures at the airport. Suggestions: I think it would be tough to predict either failure. Continuing to destination seemed like the best decision based on icing forecasts and reported weather."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "APU door failed to close on departure giving us APU door open caution and APU door status. Altitude limited to FL240 due to weight at APU door speed. Lower altitude left us in IMC avoiding weather. Once at FL310 as we had burned off weight to climb, the Anti ice duct master warning EICAS populated. The QRH told us to turn off the wing anti ice and leave icing conditions. I queried ATC for bases and they were confused by our requests so I told them we were turning right to leave the icing where the First Officer and I had last seen clear air. While ATC did eventually come to understand the situation, I believe my turn to exit may have been just prior to them clearing us to do so. We rejoined our course when it would not have required flying into further icing conditions. ATC [requested priority handling] on our behalf for our inability to go faster, higher, remain perfectly on course, and for a small mention of potential VIP movement. We continued to our destination safely. Cause: APU DOOR failure to show closed and associated APU door open caution restricted speed and altitude. ANTI ICE DUCT master warning restricted ability to fly in icing conditions. Suggestions: No simple solution due to limited divert options given weather conditions and inability to fly through ice normally. Safest course of action as determined by us at the time was to continue to our destination as it was known to be warm enough to not have ice."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nLeaving originating airport, APU door would not close. Speed thereafter was limited to 220 KIAS. Altitude initially limited to FL240 but later was able to climb to FL310 as our weight decreased. En route we ran into inclement weather and were unable to climb above it. In icing conditions, we utilized our wing and cowl anti ice. A few moments after, we received a Master warning \"Anti Ice Duct\". As led by the QRH, we turned off our anti ice equipment and searched for our closest option out of icing. As the Captain queried ATC as to the bases of the clouds, we saw a brief opening of clear air off to our right. There was some initial confusion with ATC as to why we needed to deviate from our current flight path. In effort to not lose the opportunity we began our turn just prior to ATC clearing us to do so. We were able to parallel our course for a short time and return soon after. After this, and still with our speed and altitude restrictions, ATC [requested priority handling] on our behalf to our limitations, sequencing into destination and VIP presence in there. From then on the flight continued safely and a normal landing was made. Cause: APU door failed in an unknown position limiting speed and altitude. Anti Ice duct prohibited us from flying in icing conditions. Additional factors as to why [priority handling was requested] include large flow of traffic going into destination and heightened security measures at the airport. Suggestions: I think it would be tough to predict either failure. Continuing to destination seemed like the best decision based on icing forecasts and reported weather.\n\nNarrative 2\nAPU door failed to close on departure giving us APU door open caution and APU door status. Altitude limited to FL240 due to weight at APU door speed. Lower altitude left us in IMC avoiding weather. Once at FL310 as we had burned off weight to climb, the Anti ice duct master warning EICAS populated. The QRH told us to turn off the wing anti ice and leave icing conditions. I queried ATC for bases and they were confused by our requests so I told them we were turning right to leave the icing where the First Officer and I had last seen clear air. While ATC did eventually come to understand the situation, I believe my turn to exit may have been just prior to them clearing us to do so. We rejoined our course when it would not have required flying into further icing conditions. ATC [requested priority handling] on our behalf for our inability to go faster, higher, remain perfectly on course, and for a small mention of potential VIP movement. We continued to our destination safely. Cause: APU DOOR failure to show closed and associated APU door open caution restricted speed and altitude. ANTI ICE DUCT master warning restricted ability to fly in icing conditions. Suggestions: No simple solution due to limited divert options given weather conditions and inability to fly through ice normally. Safest course of action as determined by us at the time was to continue to our destination as it was known to be warm enough to not have ice.",
    "synopsis": "ACRJ-700 flight crew reported an APU door malfunction, and subsequent Anti-Ice Duct warning, which precluded the ability to operate in icing conditions.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=133",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 133,
      "pageEnd": 135,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=133",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 133,
        "pageEnd": 135,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2027095 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "ACRJ-700 flight crew reported an APU door malfunction, and subsequent Anti-Ice Duct warning, which precluded the ability to operate in icing conditions.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2027067",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During the approach, flight crew was actively configuring the aircraft to Flaps 30 and reducing speed to achieve the stable approach criteria by 1000 ft. AGL. However, in the process of introducing our final flaps of 30 degrees, the aircraft made RA call of \"One thousand.” However, we looked at our radio altimeter and it read 1200-1300. We confirmed all three barometric altimeters read approximately 1730 MSL. After a brief discussion of a go-around, Captain determined it was safe to introduce flaps 30 at that time 1100-1200 AGL and continue the final items of the landing checklist below 1000 ft. AGL. We later discussed the possibility the Radio Altimeter was experiencing interference. The remainder of the approach was safely flown to a completed landing. Cause- We anticipated the morning low level cloud layer to lift prior to conducting the approach to 36R at CLT. However, the clouds did not lift and the First Officer, with prior discussion, relinquished the flight controls to the Captain on radar downwind. The reason for the exchange was so the Captain could fly the aircraft using CAT III criteria to ensure our arrival into CLT. We later discussed possible Radio Altimeter interference as causal on our delay to call our approach stable just under 1000 ft. AGL. Suggestions- Control Radio Altimeter spectrum interference in the vicinity of CLT airport."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "During the approach, flight crew was actively configuring the aircraft to Flaps 30 and reducing speed to achieve the stable approach criteria by 1000 ft. above ground. However, in the process of introducing our final flaps of 30 degrees, the aircraft made the \"One thousand,\" call. However, we looked at our radio altimeter and it read 1200-1300. After a brief discussion of a go-around, Captain determined it was safe to introduce flaps 30 at that time 1100-1200 RA and continue the final items of the landing checklist below 1000 ft. RA. Cause- We anticipated the morning low level cloud layer to lift prior to conducting the approach to 36R at CLT. However, the clouds did not lift and the First Officer, with prior discussion, relinquished the flight controls to the Captain prior to being vectored onto the final approach course. The reason for the exchange was so the pilot flying could execute a CAT III landing to ensure our arrival into CLT. Suggestions- The event could have been mitigated with a discussion and response to the task before entering the final phases of the descent/approach."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring the approach, flight crew was actively configuring the aircraft to Flaps 30 and reducing speed to achieve the stable approach criteria by 1000 ft. AGL. However, in the process of introducing our final flaps of 30 degrees, the aircraft made RA call of \"One thousand.” However, we looked at our radio altimeter and it read 1200-1300. We confirmed all three barometric altimeters read approximately 1730 MSL. After a brief discussion of a go-around, Captain determined it was safe to introduce flaps 30 at that time 1100-1200 AGL and continue the final items of the landing checklist below 1000 ft. AGL. We later discussed the possibility the Radio Altimeter was experiencing interference. The remainder of the approach was safely flown to a completed landing. Cause- We anticipated the morning low level cloud layer to lift prior to conducting the approach to 36R at CLT. However, the clouds did not lift and the First Officer, with prior discussion, relinquished the flight controls to the Captain on radar downwind. The reason for the exchange was so the Captain could fly the aircraft using CAT III criteria to ensure our arrival into CLT. We later discussed possible Radio Altimeter interference as causal on our delay to call our approach stable just under 1000 ft. AGL. Suggestions- Control Radio Altimeter spectrum interference in the vicinity of CLT airport.\n\nNarrative 2\nDuring the approach, flight crew was actively configuring the aircraft to Flaps 30 and reducing speed to achieve the stable approach criteria by 1000 ft. above ground. However, in the process of introducing our final flaps of 30 degrees, the aircraft made the \"One thousand,\" call. However, we looked at our radio altimeter and it read 1200-1300. After a brief discussion of a go-around, Captain determined it was safe to introduce flaps 30 at that time 1100-1200 RA and continue the final items of the landing checklist below 1000 ft. RA. Cause- We anticipated the morning low level cloud layer to lift prior to conducting the approach to 36R at CLT. However, the clouds did not lift and the First Officer, with prior discussion, relinquished the flight controls to the Captain prior to being vectored onto the final approach course. The reason for the exchange was so the pilot flying could execute a CAT III landing to ensure our arrival into CLT. Suggestions- The event could have been mitigated with a discussion and response to the task before entering the final phases of the descent/approach.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported a radio altimeter \"call-out\" that contradicted the radio altitude displayed in the cockpit. The flight crew suspected possible 5G radio interference and continued the CAT III approach to a normal landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=136",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 136,
      "pageEnd": 138,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=136",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 136,
        "pageEnd": 138,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2027067 · Inflight Weather Encounters",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported a radio altimeter \"call-out\" that contradicted the radio altitude displayed in the cockpit. The flight crew suspected possible 5G radio interference and continued the CAT III approach to a normal landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2026967",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Sudden gust of (tail) wind lifted tail of tailwheel aircraft. Propeller struck sauciest surface and damaged propeller. Engine RPM approx 400-500 at time of impact, engine did not shut down. Engine was stopped after tail settled back to ground. No vibration noted before engine shutdown. Aircraft pulled to ramp area. No damage to any components besides propeller. No injury."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nSudden gust of (tail) wind lifted tail of tailwheel aircraft. Propeller struck sauciest surface and damaged propeller. Engine RPM approx 400-500 at time of impact, engine did not shut down. Engine was stopped after tail settled back to ground. No vibration noted before engine shutdown. Aircraft pulled to ramp area. No damage to any components besides propeller. No injury.",
    "synopsis": "Pilot reported a propeller strike in his tail-wheel aircraft after a sudden gust of wind lifted the tail off the ground causing contact with surface. No injuries or damage to plane except for the propeller.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=139",
      "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
      "pageStart": 139,
      "pageEnd": 140,
      "fileName": "wx.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/wx.pdf#page=139",
        "reportSet": "Inflight Weather Encounters",
        "pageStart": 139,
        "pageEnd": 140,
        "fileName": "wx.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "1753311704b72177b695d7eb2480791431b417f2aebad9fd01f61bdd36958c64",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Inflight Weather Encounters"
    ],
    "title": "Tailwind gust causes a propeller strike during taxi",
    "summary": "A sudden tailwind gust lifted a tailwheel aircraft's tail and caused the propeller to strike the surface. The pilot stopped the engine after the tail settled and reported propeller damage without injury or other aircraft damage.",
    "themes": [
      "Weather"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Weather",
      "Equipment"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2093064",
    "date": "2024-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "Widebody Transport"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Runway incursion threat potential. Cape Town goes to a single communications frequency in the evening. The Controller monitors Clearance Delivery, Ground and Tower calls. We were cleared to taxi on A1, cross Runway 16 to Taxiway A2 holding point for Runway 19. Except for the red stop bar at the ILS critical area holding point on Taxiway A2, there was no indication by the Controller or ATIS that the Runway 19 ILS critical holding point was in use. The Taxiway A2 holding area in question is very close to the approach end of Runway 16. When a [widebody aircraft] is holding at this location, one-half to one-third of the aircraft overlaps and is on actually on Runway 16 approach end. This is a potentially dangerous condition. It would be better to know in advance and hold on Taxiway A1 before crossing Runway 16 to get to Runway 19."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nRunway incursion threat potential. Cape Town goes to a single communications frequency in the evening. The Controller monitors Clearance Delivery, Ground and Tower calls. We were cleared to taxi on A1, cross Runway 16 to Taxiway A2 holding point for Runway 19. Except for the red stop bar at the ILS critical area holding point on Taxiway A2, there was no indication by the Controller or ATIS that the Runway 19 ILS critical holding point was in use. The Taxiway A2 holding area in question is very close to the approach end of Runway 16. When a [widebody aircraft] is holding at this location, one-half to one-third of the aircraft overlaps and is on actually on Runway 16 approach end. This is a potentially dangerous condition. It would be better to know in advance and hold on Taxiway A1 before crossing Runway 16 to get to Runway 19.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier Captain reported a lack of indication of whether the ILS critical holding point was in use at FACT airport. Additionally, as the holding area is close to the approach end of another runway, larger aircraft could overlap the approach end.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=15",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 15,
      "pageEnd": 16,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=15",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 15,
        "pageEnd": 16,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2093064 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier Captain reported a lack of indication of whether the ILS critical holding point was in use at FACT airport. Additionally, as the holding area is close to the approach end of another runway, larger aircraft could overlap the approach end.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2089579",
    "date": "2024-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I landed on Runway 21 at SMO. ATIS was reporting the winds as calm. After an uneventful touchdown, I applied the brakes to slow to exit at Bravo 1. When I slowed down to make the turnoff at Bravo 1, I heard a thump, thump, thump. I immediately stopped the plane and called the Tower and told them that I may have blown a tire and I needed to get out of the plane and do an inspection. They asked if everything was OK and I said I would let them know. I got out of the plane and looked under the wings and both main tires were flat. I notified Tower and I believe they closed down the runway although I did see a helicopter land a short time later. I then called an on-field Maintenance shop. Maintenance and their mechanics jacked up both wings and placed dollies under the main wheels and towed the plane off the runway. The total time from my landing to the plane leaving the active runway was approximately 55 minutes. While moving the aircraft, Maintenance noticed a one-inch crack in the asphalt along the entire width of the taxiway exit at Bravo 1 where you immediately leave the runway. Maintenance had to secure sheets of aluminum to put over the cracks in order for the dollies’ wheels that were under each main tire to not fall into the cracks. If the cracks hadn't been present, Maintenance said they would have gotten the aircraft off the runway in 30 minutes instead of 55 minutes. There was no damage to the aircraft whatsoever except for the two main tires. The main tires and inner tubes were replaced within two hours total time. I then called the Tower. One of the Controllers in the SMO Tower answered the phone. He was aware of my plane stopping on the runway. He did not see my landing but noticed my tires smoking on the rollout. He mentioned that this occurrence had been beneficial to all in the Tower because they were training new controllers. I asked if I needed to fill any paperwork out and he said no. He did mention to me that the wind may have been a factor. He said that although on the ground it was calm, he had reports that above the surface the winds were at 130 degrees and around 5 kt. but they did not think it was enough of an event to put on the ATIS. I did not notice a tailwind while in the right-downwind pattern or on final for Runway 21, but this might have been a factor in my rollout after landing. The Controller also mentioned later that the Tower had told another aircraft, ready for takeoff shortly before I landed, that the wind was now showing 130 degrees at 5 kt. The other aircraft cancelled their takeoff due to the tailwind and waited for the wind to go calm again a few minutes later. This type aircraft have a tendency to float if not flown by the numbers. My incurring a tailwind on final could be a factor in my landing speed and my brakes locking up during the slowdown and planned exit via Taxiway Bravo 1."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI landed on Runway 21 at SMO. ATIS was reporting the winds as calm. After an uneventful touchdown, I applied the brakes to slow to exit at Bravo 1. When I slowed down to make the turnoff at Bravo 1, I heard a thump, thump, thump. I immediately stopped the plane and called the Tower and told them that I may have blown a tire and I needed to get out of the plane and do an inspection. They asked if everything was OK and I said I would let them know. I got out of the plane and looked under the wings and both main tires were flat. I notified Tower and I believe they closed down the runway although I did see a helicopter land a short time later. I then called an on-field Maintenance shop. Maintenance and their mechanics jacked up both wings and placed dollies under the main wheels and towed the plane off the runway. The total time from my landing to the plane leaving the active runway was approximately 55 minutes. While moving the aircraft, Maintenance noticed a one-inch crack in the asphalt along the entire width of the taxiway exit at Bravo 1 where you immediately leave the runway. Maintenance had to secure sheets of aluminum to put over the cracks in order for the dollies’ wheels that were under each main tire to not fall into the cracks. If the cracks hadn't been present, Maintenance said they would have gotten the aircraft off the runway in 30 minutes instead of 55 minutes. There was no damage to the aircraft whatsoever except for the two main tires. The main tires and inner tubes were replaced within two hours total time. I then called the Tower. One of the Controllers in the SMO Tower answered the phone. He was aware of my plane stopping on the runway. He did not see my landing but noticed my tires smoking on the rollout. He mentioned that this occurrence had been beneficial to all in the Tower because they were training new controllers. I asked if I needed to fill any paperwork out and he said no. He did mention to me that the wind may have been a factor. He said that although on the ground it was calm, he had reports that above the surface the winds were at 130 degrees and around 5 kt. but they did not think it was enough of an event to put on the ATIS. I did not notice a tailwind while in the right-downwind pattern or on final for Runway 21, but this might have been a factor in my rollout after landing. The Controller also mentioned later that the Tower had told another aircraft, ready for takeoff shortly before I landed, that the wind was now showing 130 degrees at 5 kt. The other aircraft cancelled their takeoff due to the tailwind and waited for the wind to go calm again a few minutes later. This type aircraft have a tendency to float if not flown by the numbers. My incurring a tailwind on final could be a factor in my landing speed and my brakes locking up during the slowdown and planned exit via Taxiway Bravo 1.",
    "synopsis": "Light aircraft pilot reported landing and while slowing down for a turnoff at Bravo 1 taxiway at SMO, both main tires ended up going flat. The pilot requested assistance from Maintenance and the aircraft was towed off the runway, but only after a long delay related to pavement condition.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=17",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 17,
      "pageEnd": 19,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=17",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 17,
        "pageEnd": 19,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2089579 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Light aircraft pilot reported landing and while slowing down for a turnoff at Bravo 1 taxiway at SMO, both main tires ended up going flat. The pilot requested assistance from Maintenance and the aircraft was towed off the runway, but only after a long delay related to pavement condition.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2084287",
    "date": "2024-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Aircraft X was cleared to land on runway XXL, but landed without receiving a landing clearance on a closed runway while personnel and equipment were occupying the departure end of runway XXR. The aircraft exited the runway at taxiway 1 (approximately 3600 ft. available - where the personnel and equipment were. No injuries or damage occurred. Brasher warning was given via recorded landline. Additional information - Runway edge lights were off, however FAA personnel were on the departure end of runway XXR erecting the first runway 'X' closure signs for runway XYL (Runway XXR 'X' was not up yet). Also, the MALSF approach lights (airport managed, not FAA) were on a low visibility setting, which could have affected the outcome of this deviation/incursion if they has been turned completely off. Recommendations: #1 In order to prevent aircraft from being able to visually line up with a closed runway, suggest the airport to make sure all runway lights, including the approach lights, are turned off. #2 Ensure pilots understand that they need a valid landing clearance from the tower before landing on any runway. If in doubt, ask ATC to clarify if they are cleared to land. #3 Even during the day, from the tower's vantage point, all aircraft appear to be aligned with either runway; you cannot tell which runway they are aligned with until they are fewer than 700 feet above it. Now it's even harder to discern if they are aligned with the assigned runway at night."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Aircraft X was cleared for a visual approach to runway XXL at ZZZ. The aircraft landed on closed runway XXR. ZZZ tower was open. I had no idea this happened until I received a text this morning. After listening to my recording, I became aware that I cleared this aircraft for a visual approach to runway XXL and instructed them to contact ZZZ tower. They readback, \"cleared visual approach, contact tower\". After some research into this event, there were holes in the swiss cheese everywhere. I have not yet gotten briefed on exactly what happened at ZZZ but there seems to be many issues that could have stopped this incident from occurring. A few contributing factors (some I learned after the incident): I don't believe the aircraft was ever cleared to land. After speaking to some prior ZZZ tower controllers, I learned that at night it is very hard to see whether and aircraft is lined up for XXL or XXR. It's impossible to see if an aircraft is landing XXL or XXR on our scope because of how close the runways are together. I heard that the runway lights/approach lights were not set appropriately. I believe a prior controller told the aircraft to expect runway XXR, possibly not knowing about the closure or told them prior to the closure occurring. The aircraft had VA (visual approach) in the scratch pad indicating to me they were already issued a runway assignment. I believe the aircraft had an ATIS that did not advertise the closure. The pilot also did not sound very proficient on the tapes. Recommendation: In hindsight, I should have clarified that the pilot was cleared visual approach to runway XXL and that the right side was closed. Though this was not the best readback, it was a correct readback."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAircraft X was cleared to land on runway XXL, but landed without receiving a landing clearance on a closed runway while personnel and equipment were occupying the departure end of runway XXR. The aircraft exited the runway at taxiway 1 (approximately 3600 ft. available - where the personnel and equipment were. No injuries or damage occurred. Brasher warning was given via recorded landline. Additional information - Runway edge lights were off, however FAA personnel were on the departure end of runway XXR erecting the first runway 'X' closure signs for runway XYL (Runway XXR 'X' was not up yet). Also, the MALSF approach lights (airport managed, not FAA) were on a low visibility setting, which could have affected the outcome of this deviation/incursion if they has been turned completely off. Recommendations: #1 In order to prevent aircraft from being able to visually line up with a closed runway, suggest the airport to make sure all runway lights, including the approach lights, are turned off. #2 Ensure pilots understand that they need a valid landing clearance from the tower before landing on any runway. If in doubt, ask ATC to clarify if they are cleared to land. #3 Even during the day, from the tower's vantage point, all aircraft appear to be aligned with either runway; you cannot tell which runway they are aligned with until they are fewer than 700 feet above it. Now it's even harder to discern if they are aligned with the assigned runway at night.\n\nNarrative 2\nAircraft X was cleared for a visual approach to runway XXL at ZZZ. The aircraft landed on closed runway XXR. ZZZ tower was open. I had no idea this happened until I received a text this morning. After listening to my recording, I became aware that I cleared this aircraft for a visual approach to runway XXL and instructed them to contact ZZZ tower. They readback, \"cleared visual approach, contact tower\". After some research into this event, there were holes in the swiss cheese everywhere. I have not yet gotten briefed on exactly what happened at ZZZ but there seems to be many issues that could have stopped this incident from occurring. A few contributing factors (some I learned after the incident): I don't believe the aircraft was ever cleared to land. After speaking to some prior ZZZ tower controllers, I learned that at night it is very hard to see whether and aircraft is lined up for XXL or XXR. It's impossible to see if an aircraft is landing XXL or XXR on our scope because of how close the runways are together. I heard that the runway lights/approach lights were not set appropriately. I believe a prior controller told the aircraft to expect runway XXR, possibly not knowing about the closure or told them prior to the closure occurring. The aircraft had VA (visual approach) in the scratch pad indicating to me they were already issued a runway assignment. I believe the aircraft had an ATIS that did not advertise the closure. The pilot also did not sound very proficient on the tapes. Recommendation: In hindsight, I should have clarified that the pilot was cleared visual approach to runway XXL and that the right side was closed. Though this was not the best readback, it was a correct readback.",
    "synopsis": "TRACON and Tower Controllers reported traffic landed on closed parallel runway at night, without a clearance. Controllers reported that the lit X closure indicator was not in place and it was difficult for tower to determine aircraft runway alignment at night.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=20",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 20,
      "pageEnd": 22,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=20",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 20,
        "pageEnd": 22,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2084287 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "TRACON and Tower Controllers reported traffic landed on closed parallel runway at night, without a clearance. Controllers reported that the lit X closure indicator was not in place and it was difficult for tower to determine aircraft runway alignment at night.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2081184",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Military",
      "Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I taxied Aircraft X from FBO to Runway XXR for departure via taxiway 1 initially, to hold short of Runway YY. After receiving permission from Local Control 2 I continued their taxi with a left on Runway YY, crossing Runway XXC, and then a right on taxiway 2 to the full length. The above was readback correctly and it appeared Aircraft X was complying. Local Control 2 informed me of Aircraft X deviated from the aforementioned route and heading towards the intersection of Runway XXR and Runway YY where it appeared Aircraft Y was on landing roll-out. I pleaded with \"Aircraft X\" to stop several times before adding the \"[last part of their call sign]\". I later saw them make an unprompted 180 and begin heading back southbound on Runway ZZ, so I issued a left on taxiway 2. It definitely appeared Aircraft X had crossed the hold line for the intersecting runways but couldn't determine what their proximity was with the Aircraft Y. The Tower team saved the day today, especially the watchful eye of Local Controller 2. It definitely seems like 100% pilot error in this particular case. No recommendations."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI taxied Aircraft X from FBO to Runway XXR for departure via taxiway 1 initially, to hold short of Runway YY. After receiving permission from Local Control 2 I continued their taxi with a left on Runway YY, crossing Runway XXC, and then a right on taxiway 2 to the full length. The above was readback correctly and it appeared Aircraft X was complying. Local Control 2 informed me of Aircraft X deviated from the aforementioned route and heading towards the intersection of Runway XXR and Runway YY where it appeared Aircraft Y was on landing roll-out. I pleaded with \"Aircraft X\" to stop several times before adding the \"[last part of their call sign]\". I later saw them make an unprompted 180 and begin heading back southbound on Runway ZZ, so I issued a left on taxiway 2. It definitely appeared Aircraft X had crossed the hold line for the intersecting runways but couldn't determine what their proximity was with the Aircraft Y. The Tower team saved the day today, especially the watchful eye of Local Controller 2. It definitely seems like 100% pilot error in this particular case. No recommendations.",
    "synopsis": "Tower Ground Controller reported a taxing aircraft began to stray from its clearance and caused a critical ground conflict with a landing craft. The Controller states there were several calls to the wayward aircraft before contact was made.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=23",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 23,
      "pageEnd": 24,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=23",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 23,
        "pageEnd": 24,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2081184 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Tower Ground Controller reported a taxing aircraft began to stray from its clearance and caused a critical ground conflict with a landing craft. The Controller states there were several calls to the wayward aircraft before contact was made.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2077050",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "A320",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While we were taxiing clear of the runway on a high speed exit the steering became very erratic and then we received a nose wheel steering fault ECAM. We stopped the aircraft immediately and called the tower to say that we were stuck on the runway for now and to send the aircraft behind us around. After looking at the systems page and noting that we just needed to taxi straight ahead 100 feet to clear the runway, we slowly cleared the runway and informed the tower. We then ran the Wheel NWS (Nose Wheel Steering) fault checklist and reset the anti-ski NWS switch which corrected the problem. We taxied uneventfully to the gate at or below 10 knots per the checklist, wrote up the fault, debriefed maintenance, and called the Chief Pilot."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile we were taxiing clear of the runway on a high speed exit the steering became very erratic and then we received a nose wheel steering fault ECAM. We stopped the aircraft immediately and called the tower to say that we were stuck on the runway for now and to send the aircraft behind us around. After looking at the systems page and noting that we just needed to taxi straight ahead 100 feet to clear the runway, we slowly cleared the runway and informed the tower. We then ran the Wheel NWS (Nose Wheel Steering) fault checklist and reset the anti-ski NWS switch which corrected the problem. We taxied uneventfully to the gate at or below 10 knots per the checklist, wrote up the fault, debriefed maintenance, and called the Chief Pilot.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew flying A320 aircraft reported runway incursion and loss of aircraft control during taxi off the runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=25",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 25,
      "pageEnd": 26,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=25",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 25,
        "pageEnd": 26,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2077050 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew flying A320 aircraft reported runway incursion and loss of aircraft control during taxi off the runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2077045",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "For performance reasons, we needed to use Rwy 20 instead of the landing runway of 02. We put in our request for that with Ground Control and they cleared us to taxi to Taxiway Uniform, short of west taxi. We held there as directed. After an aircraft landed on Runway 02, we were cleared by Ground Control “€œTaxi onto Runway 02, contact tower at the end.” We back taxied to the departure end of runway 20 and as we turned to line up, we heard “Aircraft Y, cleared to land runway 02.” We rolled out to see an aircraft on final for runway 02. Tower then announced, “Aircraft Y, prepare for go around, aircraft on runway.” They were sent around and the tower instructed us to clear the runway onto the west taxi area that was open. We were never instructed to either clear the runway or line up and wait when ground control cleared us onto the runway. It seemed as if ground control and tower had not fully coordinated the handoff."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nFor performance reasons, we needed to use Rwy 20 instead of the landing runway of 02. We put in our request for that with Ground Control and they cleared us to taxi to Taxiway Uniform, short of west taxi. We held there as directed. After an aircraft landed on Runway 02, we were cleared by Ground Control “€œTaxi onto Runway 02, contact tower at the end.” We back taxied to the departure end of runway 20 and as we turned to line up, we heard “Aircraft Y, cleared to land runway 02.” We rolled out to see an aircraft on final for runway 02. Tower then announced, “Aircraft Y, prepare for go around, aircraft on runway.” They were sent around and the tower instructed us to clear the runway onto the west taxi area that was open. We were never instructed to either clear the runway or line up and wait when ground control cleared us onto the runway. It seemed as if ground control and tower had not fully coordinated the handoff.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported conflicting ATC instructions regarding clearance to land while aircraft is on runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=27",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 27,
      "pageEnd": 28,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=27",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 27,
        "pageEnd": 28,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2077045 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported conflicting ATC instructions regarding clearance to land while aircraft is on runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2076916",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Single Engine Turboprop Undifferentiated"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Landing on Runway 07 at DUJ while snow plow truck is on the runway, weather is 3/4 miles visibility, clouds is ovc 003, after touching down and securing the landing I saw the snow plow truck on the second half of the runway. No injuries no damage. I made a few calls at 5 miles final and 3 miles final during the approach there were no answer."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nLanding on Runway 07 at DUJ while snow plow truck is on the runway, weather is 3/4 miles visibility, clouds is ovc 003, after touching down and securing the landing I saw the snow plow truck on the second half of the runway. No injuries no damage. I made a few calls at 5 miles final and 3 miles final during the approach there were no answer.",
    "synopsis": "Captain reported a near miss with a ground vehicle on the runway, while on landing rollout in reduced visibility conditions at a non-towered airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=29",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 29,
      "pageEnd": 30,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=29",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 29,
        "pageEnd": 30,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "Snowplow encountered during low-visibility landing",
    "summary": "A captain reported seeing a snowplow on the runway after touchdown at DUJ airport in reduced visibility. The pilot had made approach radio calls without receiving an answer and reported no injuries or damage.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Weather",
      "Communication"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2076379",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While flying, the ILS approach, tower sent us around because of another aircraft in front of us was still on the runway. We executed the procedures, and let the customers know we went around because of the other aircraft was still on the runway. The second approach was flown and landed uneventfully. However, upon rollout the number one engine shut down, and the ENG FAIL displayed on the ECAM. We quickly analyzed the situation, had no indication of fire or damage, so we elected to taxi off the runway. Once clear of the active runway, we reviewed the ENG FAIL checklist, and shut down the number one engine. We also coordinated with the team to ensure there is no visible damage or other indications of fire. Once we were confident that there was no danger we started the APU, and taxied on one engine to the gate where we shut down the number two engine, wrote up the engine failure and coordinated for maintenance to meet us at the jet."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile flying, the ILS approach, tower sent us around because of another aircraft in front of us was still on the runway. We executed the procedures, and let the customers know we went around because of the other aircraft was still on the runway. The second approach was flown and landed uneventfully. However, upon rollout the number one engine shut down, and the ENG FAIL displayed on the ECAM. We quickly analyzed the situation, had no indication of fire or damage, so we elected to taxi off the runway. Once clear of the active runway, we reviewed the ENG FAIL checklist, and shut down the number one engine. We also coordinated with the team to ensure there is no visible damage or other indications of fire. Once we were confident that there was no danger we started the APU, and taxied on one engine to the gate where we shut down the number two engine, wrote up the engine failure and coordinated for maintenance to meet us at the jet.",
    "synopsis": "Embraer 190 pilot reported an ATC directed go around due to a loss of separation with another aircraft not clearing the runway while on final approach for landing. The aircraft landed safely on the second approach and the number one engine failed as the aircraft rolled out on the runway and then safely taxied off the runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=31",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 31,
      "pageEnd": 32,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=31",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 31,
        "pageEnd": 32,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2076379 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Embraer 190 pilot reported an ATC directed go around due to a loss of separation with another aircraft not clearing the runway while on final approach for landing. The aircraft landed safely on the second approach and the number one engine failed as the aircraft rolled out on the runway and then safely taxied off the runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2075968",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After pushback and normal engine start, we requested for taxi. Active runway was 10. Tower instructions were taxi via Bravo left on Alpha and hold short of Runway 10. After clearing the Ramp area, we proceeded to Runway 10 via Bravo and Alpha. Captain called for “below the line” while on Alpha. While running the checklist during taxi, we inadvertently crossed the displaced threshold of Runway 10. I informed Tower of the situation, and we were given further instructions to taxi via Alpha right onto Runway 18 right on Bravo, right on Alpha, and short of Runway 10. Whiles holding short, we both recognized the poor hold-short markings for Runway 10. There wasn’t a clear color distinction between the hold-short line, the taxiway, and the displaced threshold for Runway 10, which made it difficult to distinguish. We departed to ZZZ with no further incident. Cause: Poor hold-short makings, poor color distinction between, hold-short line, Taxiway Alpha, and displaced threshold for Runway 10. Solution: Re-paint all runway markings, especially the hold-short lines."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Normal operations during preflight and pushback in MID from Gate XX. Briefed short taxi so did Before Takeoff Checklist down to the line after pushback and engine start while on the Ramp. Cleared to taxi to Runway 10 via out Taxiway Bravo and left on Alfa to hold short of Runway 10. Turning on to Alfa, called for and started to run “below the line” items. While taxiing and running checklist, realized that we had crossed over halfway across the displaced threshold area of Runway 10. We continued to cross and clear the runway area and then stopped. We advised ATC and they calmly replied continue taxi on Alfa, hold short of Runway 18. We complied. ATC then had us taxi down Runway 18 to turn right on Taxiway Bravo and right on Alfa to hold short of Runway 10’s displaced threshold again. We were then cleared for takeoff on Runway 10. Cause: Language barrier - speaking Spanish to all aircraft except ours. Airport markings near runway threshold and hold-short area were very poorly delineated and faded. Mind cluttered due to earlier sorting out of issues with crew schedule over an erroneous assignment. iPad zoomed in too far at start of taxi. Had runways mixed up in my mind and had been cleared to 10, so assumed to cross runways all the way to 10. Airport unfamiliarity - small and assumed to be easy. Solution: Always verify taxi clearances with a visual on the iPad taxi diagram. Never divert attention until I have recognized my hold-short point and have a plan of when and where I will stop. Spend more time especially at unfamiliar airports establishing a “plan.”"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter pushback and normal engine start, we requested for taxi. Active runway was 10. Tower instructions were taxi via Bravo left on Alpha and hold short of Runway 10. After clearing the Ramp area, we proceeded to Runway 10 via Bravo and Alpha. Captain called for “below the line” while on Alpha. While running the checklist during taxi, we inadvertently crossed the displaced threshold of Runway 10. I informed Tower of the situation, and we were given further instructions to taxi via Alpha right onto Runway 18 right on Bravo, right on Alpha, and short of Runway 10. Whiles holding short, we both recognized the poor hold-short markings for Runway 10. There wasn’t a clear color distinction between the hold-short line, the taxiway, and the displaced threshold for Runway 10, which made it difficult to distinguish. We departed to ZZZ with no further incident. Cause: Poor hold-short makings, poor color distinction between, hold-short line, Taxiway Alpha, and displaced threshold for Runway 10. Solution: Re-paint all runway markings, especially the hold-short lines.\n\nNarrative 2\nNormal operations during preflight and pushback in MID from Gate XX. Briefed short taxi so did Before Takeoff Checklist down to the line after pushback and engine start while on the Ramp. Cleared to taxi to Runway 10 via out Taxiway Bravo and left on Alfa to hold short of Runway 10. Turning on to Alfa, called for and started to run “below the line” items. While taxiing and running checklist, realized that we had crossed over halfway across the displaced threshold area of Runway 10. We continued to cross and clear the runway area and then stopped. We advised ATC and they calmly replied continue taxi on Alfa, hold short of Runway 18. We complied. ATC then had us taxi down Runway 18 to turn right on Taxiway Bravo and right on Alfa to hold short of Runway 10’s displaced threshold again. We were then cleared for takeoff on Runway 10. Cause: Language barrier - speaking Spanish to all aircraft except ours. Airport markings near runway threshold and hold-short area were very poorly delineated and faded. Mind cluttered due to earlier sorting out of issues with crew schedule over an erroneous assignment. iPad zoomed in too far at start of taxi. Had runways mixed up in my mind and had been cleared to 10, so assumed to cross runways all the way to 10. Airport unfamiliarity - small and assumed to be easy. Solution: Always verify taxi clearances with a visual on the iPad taxi diagram. Never divert attention until I have recognized my hold-short point and have a plan of when and where I will stop. Spend more time especially at unfamiliar airports establishing a “plan.”",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported crossing over the displaced threshold area of MMMD Runway 10 without clearance. The crew stated it was hard to distinguish the hold-short line, taxiway, and displaced threshold of the runway, and suggested that the runway markings to be repainted for better clarity.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=33",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 33,
      "pageEnd": 35,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=33",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 33,
        "pageEnd": 35,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2075968 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported crossing over the displaced threshold area of MMMD Runway 10 without clearance. The crew stated it was hard to distinguish the hold-short line, taxiway, and displaced threshold of the runway, and suggested that the runway markings to be repainted for better clarity.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2075781",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Aircraft was located on the ramp at BUR for an night departure. SIC called for taxi clearance after crew completed the After Start checklist. ATC cleared us to taxi to runway 33 for departure via D8 - D - B - hold short of runway 26. Crew briefed the taxi route, noted no hotspots along the cleared route and departed the ramp. The taxi checklist was completed while on D and shortly after ATC cleared us across runway 26. The crew did not see the turn onto B as the markings were very poor or non-existent (I don't recall seeing any lighted signs and there was no center line taxi lighting on D or B) and continued to taxi on D. There were no other aircraft on the ground control frequency. Upon reaching the intersection of runway 33 (which neither crew member realized was the wrong runway to be crossing) the SIC turned on all strobes and landing lights per SOP. The PIC checked the runway to the left for traffic on the runway and final and the SIC checked the runway and final to the right. Both stated verbally that the runway was clear as per SOP. Shortly after crossing the runway ATC called to say we were not cleared to cross the runway. The PIC stopped the aircraft east of runway 33 on taxiway D to sort out the situation. After some discussions with ATC the PIC asked for progressive taxi instructions to the approach end of runway 33. ATC instructed us to taxi southbound on taxiway A, westbound on runway 26 and turn left onto runway 33. We were subsequently told to turn right onto taxiway C, and after doing that ATC instructed us to turn left onto taxiway G and continue to the approach end of runway 33. We departed without further incident. This report has been reviewed by the SIC and he reports that, while he had Ownship position enabled for his iPad it was behaving erratically and not reliable. Tower controller said there was no loss of separation between our aircraft and any landing/departing/ taxiing aircraft."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Initially I instructed the pilot to Taxi to RWY 33 via D hold short of RWY 26 at B. Once the aircraft was on Taxiway D, I've coordinated with LC (Local Control) and got the RWY 26 crossing at B. I instructed Aircraft X to Cross RWY 26 at B and taxi via Charlie, Golf. The pilot read back correctly. However, the pilot never made the right turn to cross RWY 26, and it looked like he was going Straight ahead. I saw that there was no traffic to RWY 33, so I called LC to cross RWY 33 at D. However, by the time I could give the pilot the RWY 33 crossing he was already on RWY 33. So, once he crossed the RWY 33 with no harm, I told him to hold short. It was a pilot deviation that occurred so I do not think there could have been any recommendation to prevent."
      },
      {
        "number": 3,
        "text": "[Report narrative contained no additional information.]"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAircraft was located on the ramp at BUR for an night departure. SIC called for taxi clearance after crew completed the After Start checklist. ATC cleared us to taxi to runway 33 for departure via D8 - D - B - hold short of runway 26. Crew briefed the taxi route, noted no hotspots along the cleared route and departed the ramp. The taxi checklist was completed while on D and shortly after ATC cleared us across runway 26. The crew did not see the turn onto B as the markings were very poor or non-existent (I don't recall seeing any lighted signs and there was no center line taxi lighting on D or B) and continued to taxi on D. There were no other aircraft on the ground control frequency. Upon reaching the intersection of runway 33 (which neither crew member realized was the wrong runway to be crossing) the SIC turned on all strobes and landing lights per SOP. The PIC checked the runway to the left for traffic on the runway and final and the SIC checked the runway and final to the right. Both stated verbally that the runway was clear as per SOP. Shortly after crossing the runway ATC called to say we were not cleared to cross the runway. The PIC stopped the aircraft east of runway 33 on taxiway D to sort out the situation. After some discussions with ATC the PIC asked for progressive taxi instructions to the approach end of runway 33. ATC instructed us to taxi southbound on taxiway A, westbound on runway 26 and turn left onto runway 33. We were subsequently told to turn right onto taxiway C, and after doing that ATC instructed us to turn left onto taxiway G and continue to the approach end of runway 33. We departed without further incident. This report has been reviewed by the SIC and he reports that, while he had Ownship position enabled for his iPad it was behaving erratically and not reliable. Tower controller said there was no loss of separation between our aircraft and any landing/departing/ taxiing aircraft.\n\nNarrative 2\nInitially I instructed the pilot to Taxi to RWY 33 via D hold short of RWY 26 at B. Once the aircraft was on Taxiway D, I've coordinated with LC (Local Control) and got the RWY 26 crossing at B. I instructed Aircraft X to Cross RWY 26 at B and taxi via Charlie, Golf. The pilot read back correctly. However, the pilot never made the right turn to cross RWY 26, and it looked like he was going Straight ahead. I saw that there was no traffic to RWY 33, so I called LC to cross RWY 33 at D. However, by the time I could give the pilot the RWY 33 crossing he was already on RWY 33. So, once he crossed the RWY 33 with no harm, I told him to hold short. It was a pilot deviation that occurred so I do not think there could have been any recommendation to prevent.\n\nNarrative 3\n[Report narrative contained no additional information.]",
    "synopsis": "Captain reported a runway and taxiway incursion at BUR due to inadequate markings. ATC provided further taxi instructions to the runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=36",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 36,
      "pageEnd": 38,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=36",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 36,
        "pageEnd": 38,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2075781 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Captain reported a runway and taxiway incursion at BUR due to inadequate markings. ATC provided further taxi instructions to the runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2071723",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was the Pilot Monitoring on takeoff in ZZZ Runway XXC with strong winds. During initial takeoff roll, we experienced directional control difficulty which caused us to veer to the left. I took control of the aircraft with nose wheel steering and brakes to stay on the runway. We successfully rejected the takeoff roll then continued to taxi to clear the runway because there was an aircraft on short final, and we felt a bit rushed. We never exceeded 30 knots. While we were handling the after reject procedures and clearing the runway, we thought we heard (misunderstood) the Controller say, \"clear left on Taxiway 1 and left on XY left.\" We turned left on Taxiway 1 then immediately left on Runway XXL and held our position. We then realized that we could not use Taxiway 2 to clear XXL since our wingspan was too big and I was not comfortable doing a 180 degree turn on XXL. The Tower was quick and professional to help us get a tug to push us backwards on XXL onto Taxiway 1. It took 30 minutes for the push back tug and for us to clear Runway XXL. We taxied back to XXC and took off uneventfully. Suggestions: During times of extreme workload, such as a RTO, issued instructions should be slow and methodical from the Pilot to ATC and ATC to the Pilot. We just finished an RTO, were busy completing the RTO procedures while clearing the runway for arriving traffic. We should have slowed our process down and clarified any taxi instructions."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I was the Pilot Flying on takeoff Runway XXC in ZZZ. The takeoff weight was around 150.000lbs and the RCR (Runway Condition Reading) was 5 with strong winds. Performance data required a bleed off takeoff. After the aircraft lineup on Runway XXC, the Captain gave me control of the aircraft for takeoff. I applied initial thrust of approximately 40 percent and after stabilization of the engines, I advanced the thrust levers. The aircraft immediately started to veer to the left. I reduced the thrust and disengaged the auto throttles. The Captain took control of the aircraft and I made the transmission to Tower stating the takeoff reject. Tower instructed us to clear Runway XXC via Taxiway 1. On Taxiway 1 we immediately turned left on Runway XXL and realized that we were stuck on Runway XXL. Tower instructed us to hold our position and was very professional and helpful organizing a tug to move us back in order to taxi via Taxiway 1 to Runway XXC. After discussing the possible reasons for our directional problems during takeoff and contacting Dispatch, we both agreed to attempt another takeoff. We departed Runway XXC uneventfully. The feeling of self-induced rush to clear the runway for the landing traffic after the takeoff reject, the unaccustomed environment in ZZZ and the high workload after the reject procedure might have contributed to the expectation bias resulting in misinterpretation/ incorrect execution of the Tower instructions. Inappropriate task management and channelized attention has led to the situation. Proper workload prioritization would have been the key to handle the situation correctly. The feeling of self- induced rush to clear the runway for the landing traffic after the takeoff reject, the unaccustomed environment in ZZZ and the high workload after the reject procedure might have contributed to the expectation bias resulting in misinterpretation/ incorrect execution of the Tower instructions. Inappropriate task management and channelized attention has led to the situation. Proper workload prioritization would have been the key to handle the situation correctly."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was the Pilot Monitoring on takeoff in ZZZ Runway XXC with strong winds. During initial takeoff roll, we experienced directional control difficulty which caused us to veer to the left. I took control of the aircraft with nose wheel steering and brakes to stay on the runway. We successfully rejected the takeoff roll then continued to taxi to clear the runway because there was an aircraft on short final, and we felt a bit rushed. We never exceeded 30 knots. While we were handling the after reject procedures and clearing the runway, we thought we heard (misunderstood) the Controller say, \"clear left on Taxiway 1 and left on XY left.\" We turned left on Taxiway 1 then immediately left on Runway XXL and held our position. We then realized that we could not use Taxiway 2 to clear XXL since our wingspan was too big and I was not comfortable doing a 180 degree turn on XXL. The Tower was quick and professional to help us get a tug to push us backwards on XXL onto Taxiway 1. It took 30 minutes for the push back tug and for us to clear Runway XXL. We taxied back to XXC and took off uneventfully. Suggestions: During times of extreme workload, such as a RTO, issued instructions should be slow and methodical from the Pilot to ATC and ATC to the Pilot. We just finished an RTO, were busy completing the RTO procedures while clearing the runway for arriving traffic. We should have slowed our process down and clarified any taxi instructions.\n\nNarrative 2\nI was the Pilot Flying on takeoff Runway XXC in ZZZ. The takeoff weight was around 150.000lbs and the RCR (Runway Condition Reading) was 5 with strong winds. Performance data required a bleed off takeoff. After the aircraft lineup on Runway XXC, the Captain gave me control of the aircraft for takeoff. I applied initial thrust of approximately 40 percent and after stabilization of the engines, I advanced the thrust levers. The aircraft immediately started to veer to the left. I reduced the thrust and disengaged the auto throttles. The Captain took control of the aircraft and I made the transmission to Tower stating the takeoff reject. Tower instructed us to clear Runway XXC via Taxiway 1. On Taxiway 1 we immediately turned left on Runway XXL and realized that we were stuck on Runway XXL. Tower instructed us to hold our position and was very professional and helpful organizing a tug to move us back in order to taxi via Taxiway 1 to Runway XXC. After discussing the possible reasons for our directional problems during takeoff and contacting Dispatch, we both agreed to attempt another takeoff. We departed Runway XXC uneventfully. The feeling of self-induced rush to clear the runway for the landing traffic after the takeoff reject, the unaccustomed environment in ZZZ and the high workload after the reject procedure might have contributed to the expectation bias resulting in misinterpretation/ incorrect execution of the Tower instructions. Inappropriate task management and channelized attention has led to the situation. Proper workload prioritization would have been the key to handle the situation correctly. The feeling of self- induced rush to clear the runway for the landing traffic after the takeoff reject, the unaccustomed environment in ZZZ and the high workload after the reject procedure might have contributed to the expectation bias resulting in misinterpretation/ incorrect execution of the Tower instructions. Inappropriate task management and channelized attention has led to the situation. Proper workload prioritization would have been the key to handle the situation correctly.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported the aircraft veered left during takeoff resulting in a rejected takeoff. Confusing taxi instructions during the reject caused them to taxi onto a parallel runway which was too small to accommodate them.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=39",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 39,
      "pageEnd": 41,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=39",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 39,
        "pageEnd": 41,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2071723 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported the aircraft veered left during takeoff resulting in a rejected takeoff. Confusing taxi instructions during the reject caused them to taxi onto a parallel runway which was too small to accommodate them.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2071061",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After landing at DCA, we were instructed to leave Runway 01 via Taxiway S, then to continue via Taxiway J to the HOLD BAY 19. We were subsequently instructed to make a left turn, to continue via Taxiway K and hold short Runway 33. In that position we maintained until they gave us instructions to continue to our ramp. When we arrived at the ramp, the gate agent gave us the Control Tower's phone number, informing me that ATC wanted to talk to me. The person who answered my call told me that they had seen the video of our airplane after landing and that unfortunately we went over the HOLD LINE on Taxiway S, I explained to him that the instruction was to taxi via Taxiway k, I told him that two HOLD LINES are depicted on the Jeppesen Airport Moving Map, and it seems that both HOLD LINES refer to Taxiway S and Runway 33. As soon as we arrived at the beginning of Taxiway K, we stopped the airplane following the instructions that ATC gave us. We stopped the airplane between Taxiway S and Taxiway K. Until that moment everything seemed to be in accordance with the instructions received, nobody told us that we had done something wrong; no plane had to reject the takeoff or do a go around because [of] us. At the end, the person from the Control Tower told me that they were going to investigate and asked for my phone number to contact me. Cause: The instruction received was not appropriate, the Controller should have told us to hold before Taxiway S, or instruct us to turn left and continue along Taxiway S and then Taxiway K. When taxiing from bay 19 to Taxiway K the hold marking lines were not in front of us, they were more likely to be seen to our left and it was clear that they are there to avoid crossing Runway 33 through Taxiway S and not through Taxiway K. Suggestions: The holding line markings should be perpendicular to the taxi line coming from hold bay 19, but from my view one was parallel to my line and the other one was diagonal to my taxi line, that is confusing specially if you are focus looking for the Taxiway K."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "After completing the Mt Vernon visual runway 01 we taxied off the active runway with a left turn on Sierra with instructions from tower to taxi to “19” holding pad. Immediately after turning right off of taxiway Sierra we were instructed to turn left into the pad, then following read back instructions we were told to continue left turn in the holding pad to face south. Subsequently commanded to “hold short of Runway 33 via Kilo.” So we taxied south across the hold short line on Sierra to converge onto Kilo where we stopped our aircraft following the exact command from tower holding short of Runway 33 on Taxiway Kilo and waited further instructions. Moments later instructed to taxi across Runway 33 to rejoin Kilo and turn right onto November. After that command also told to copy down Washington Tower telephone number. After a successful read back we continued to taxi as instructed to holding pad 15, waiting for our gate to become free. No go arounds or instructions to other aircraft as result. Cause: Wrongly depicted taxi diagram, nonstandard phraseology from tower, incorrect taxi instructions. Suggestions: Fix taxi diagram at DCA."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter landing at DCA, we were instructed to leave Runway 01 via Taxiway S, then to continue via Taxiway J to the HOLD BAY 19. We were subsequently instructed to make a left turn, to continue via Taxiway K and hold short Runway 33. In that position we maintained until they gave us instructions to continue to our ramp. When we arrived at the ramp, the gate agent gave us the Control Tower's phone number, informing me that ATC wanted to talk to me. The person who answered my call told me that they had seen the video of our airplane after landing and that unfortunately we went over the HOLD LINE on Taxiway S, I explained to him that the instruction was to taxi via Taxiway k, I told him that two HOLD LINES are depicted on the Jeppesen Airport Moving Map, and it seems that both HOLD LINES refer to Taxiway S and Runway 33. As soon as we arrived at the beginning of Taxiway K, we stopped the airplane following the instructions that ATC gave us. We stopped the airplane between Taxiway S and Taxiway K. Until that moment everything seemed to be in accordance with the instructions received, nobody told us that we had done something wrong; no plane had to reject the takeoff or do a go around because [of] us. At the end, the person from the Control Tower told me that they were going to investigate and asked for my phone number to contact me. Cause: The instruction received was not appropriate, the Controller should have told us to hold before Taxiway S, or instruct us to turn left and continue along Taxiway S and then Taxiway K. When taxiing from bay 19 to Taxiway K the hold marking lines were not in front of us, they were more likely to be seen to our left and it was clear that they are there to avoid crossing Runway 33 through Taxiway S and not through Taxiway K. Suggestions: The holding line markings should be perpendicular to the taxi line coming from hold bay 19, but from my view one was parallel to my line and the other one was diagonal to my taxi line, that is confusing specially if you are focus looking for the Taxiway K.\n\nNarrative 2\nAfter completing the Mt Vernon visual runway 01 we taxied off the active runway with a left turn on Sierra with instructions from tower to taxi to “19” holding pad. Immediately after turning right off of taxiway Sierra we were instructed to turn left into the pad, then following read back instructions we were told to continue left turn in the holding pad to face south. Subsequently commanded to “hold short of Runway 33 via Kilo.” So we taxied south across the hold short line on Sierra to converge onto Kilo where we stopped our aircraft following the exact command from tower holding short of Runway 33 on Taxiway Kilo and waited further instructions. Moments later instructed to taxi across Runway 33 to rejoin Kilo and turn right onto November. After that command also told to copy down Washington Tower telephone number. After a successful read back we continued to taxi as instructed to holding pad 15, waiting for our gate to become free. No go arounds or instructions to other aircraft as result. Cause: Wrongly depicted taxi diagram, nonstandard phraseology from tower, incorrect taxi instructions. Suggestions: Fix taxi diagram at DCA.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported an incorrect depiction of hold short lines at DCA coupled with confusing ATC instructions resulted in the aircraft crossing hold short lines creating a runway incursion.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=42",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
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        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
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    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2071061 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported an incorrect depiction of hold short lines at DCA coupled with confusing ATC instructions resulted in the aircraft crossing hold short lines creating a runway incursion.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
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  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2070087",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800",
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were given Taxi [Runway] XXR, hold short of ILS Critical Zone. Due to obscuration from snow the surface markings were obscured. When the Captain stopped the aircraft, we questioned the position of the aircraft. We alerted Tower and an inbound (other carrier) aircraft was given go-around instructions."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "After many changes of runways/weather unable to see taxi lines due to snow coverage, was cleared to taxi to runway but hold short of the ILS critical area. All was going great. I heard Tower clear the aircraft to land with aircraft in position holding. The aircraft holding was going to be us. I asked for the Before Takeoff Checklist. At this point, I knew we were getting very close to the holdover times. I asked the FO (First Officer), \"How are we sitting on time?\" We had 30-seconds remaining. At that point, I noticed we just passed the ILS hold-line. I stopped the aircraft about 20 feet past the sign. I saw the aircraft on TCAS. I told the FO to let Tower know we just taxied past the line. Tower sent the aircraft on final around. We did the cabin check and then cleared for takeoff."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were given Taxi [Runway] XXR, hold short of ILS Critical Zone. Due to obscuration from snow the surface markings were obscured. When the Captain stopped the aircraft, we questioned the position of the aircraft. We alerted Tower and an inbound (other carrier) aircraft was given go-around instructions.\n\nNarrative 2\nAfter many changes of runways/weather unable to see taxi lines due to snow coverage, was cleared to taxi to runway but hold short of the ILS critical area. All was going great. I heard Tower clear the aircraft to land with aircraft in position holding. The aircraft holding was going to be us. I asked for the Before Takeoff Checklist. At this point, I knew we were getting very close to the holdover times. I asked the FO (First Officer), \"How are we sitting on time?\" We had 30-seconds remaining. At that point, I noticed we just passed the ILS hold-line. I stopped the aircraft about 20 feet past the sign. I saw the aircraft on TCAS. I told the FO to let Tower know we just taxied past the line. Tower sent the aircraft on final around. We did the cabin check and then cleared for takeoff.",
    "synopsis": "An air carrier flight crew reported they taxied past the ILS critical area hold line due to snow obscuring their view.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=45",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
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      "pageEnd": 47,
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      "Runway Incursions"
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    "title": "ASRS 2070087 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "An air carrier flight crew reported they taxied past the ILS critical area hold line due to snow obscuring their view.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
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      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2068164",
    "date": "2024-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Falcon 7X",
      "B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch",
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Was told to line up and wait runway XXR at intersection 1. Then was cleared for take off. After passing 80 kts, the PIC and pilot flying rejected the takeoff due to a B777 in tow crossing the approach end of [Runway] XXL. The sight picture looked like the aircraft in tow was crossing mid runway. After rejected the takeoff, the PIC and pilot flying exited the runway on Taxiway 2. Taxied back to run checklist. ZZZ Tower might have wanted to advise us that there would be a crossing aircraft in tow on the approach end of the runways before clearing us to takeoff. Or the tug towing the aircraft might have not been cleared at the time of our takeoff. We are unsure of that due to us being on tower frequency and not ground frequency."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Crew was preparing for departure to ZZZ1. The aircraft underwent a normal power up and taxi. The crew requested to depart [Runway] XXR instead of XR/L with the intent to shorten taxi time. The crew took the runway and started a rolling takeoff. Passing 80 knots, a tug pulling a Company 777 pulled through the approach area of [Runway] XXL. The captain, myself, decided to reject takeoff as the sight picture appeared that the 777 was crossing mid runway. We exited the runway, consulted brake cooling charts, and took off again with no other issues. The problem likely could have been prevented had tower control notified the crew that there was a 777 on a tug on the [Runway] XXL approach end passing in front of the runway. Also, there was no clear markings or barriers indicating that he was not on our runway at the time. For this reason along with the sight picture, we decided to take a precautionary rejected takeoff."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWas told to line up and wait runway XXR at intersection 1. Then was cleared for take off. After passing 80 kts, the PIC and pilot flying rejected the takeoff due to a B777 in tow crossing the approach end of [Runway] XXL. The sight picture looked like the aircraft in tow was crossing mid runway. After rejected the takeoff, the PIC and pilot flying exited the runway on Taxiway 2. Taxied back to run checklist. ZZZ Tower might have wanted to advise us that there would be a crossing aircraft in tow on the approach end of the runways before clearing us to takeoff. Or the tug towing the aircraft might have not been cleared at the time of our takeoff. We are unsure of that due to us being on tower frequency and not ground frequency.\n\nNarrative 2\nCrew was preparing for departure to ZZZ1. The aircraft underwent a normal power up and taxi. The crew requested to depart [Runway] XXR instead of XR/L with the intent to shorten taxi time. The crew took the runway and started a rolling takeoff. Passing 80 knots, a tug pulling a Company 777 pulled through the approach area of [Runway] XXL. The captain, myself, decided to reject takeoff as the sight picture appeared that the 777 was crossing mid runway. We exited the runway, consulted brake cooling charts, and took off again with no other issues. The problem likely could have been prevented had tower control notified the crew that there was a 777 on a tug on the [Runway] XXL approach end passing in front of the runway. Also, there was no clear markings or barriers indicating that he was not on our runway at the time. For this reason along with the sight picture, we decided to take a precautionary rejected takeoff.",
    "synopsis": "DA-7X flight crew rejected a takeoff due to an aircraft under tow looked to be crossing mid-runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=48",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
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    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2068164 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "DA-7X flight crew rejected a takeoff due to an aircraft under tow looked to be crossing mid-runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2065242",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was operating Aircraft X out of PWM on at approximately XA30Z. We were parked at the gate and had requested push back on ground frequency because we needed clearance to be pushed onto the taxiway. Ground control cleared us for the pushback and we began our push, started the #1 engine and waived the push crew off once disconnected. At this point we discussed changing the departure runway due to the high gusting winds that favored Runway 36 (350 @ 15/ gusts 22). We had initially selected Runway 29 because we had be cleared on the NUBLE4 departure which only allows selection of runways. We then proceeded to do the flight control check and when the First Officer moved the control wheel left and right the inboard aileron control surface boxes were highlighted with yellow X’s. We had performed the hydraulic warm-up when getting to the plane because of the low outside air temperature and the hydraulic pumps were in the correct positions. I checked the hydraulic temperatures via the synoptics page and all were showing an adequate temperature and pressure as well. I turned the pumps on for a few minutes to see if that would fix the issue and it did not this first time. At this point Ground control asked if we preferred Runway 36 for departure. We agreed that was the better choice and I requested a new clearance. Ground gave us a clearance of “on departure fly runway heading up to 3000 ft, expect to rejoin the NUBLE4 departure at the NUBLE intersection. We then selected Runway 36 in the FMS and we had to input the departure fixes manually because we were unable to select the NUBLE4 when departing 36. We had the FMS updated, received new ACARS takeoff data and had checked/briefed the new clearance/routing. At this point I had let the hydraulic pumps run a little longer because it was so cold out and I knew this would eventually fix our issue. At this point we had been sitting on the taxiway just off the gate for quite some time. Aircraft Y had taxied out and we were blocking them from continuing to Runway 36. Ground asked if we were ready to move because of this and we replied that we had to manually input all the departure fixes and run a checklist and that we were addressing an issue. At this point we had been quite task saturated between the weather updates, the flight control issue, the updated clearance, manual input of departure fixes, sending for and updating ACARS takeoff data, and now being asked to move so Aircraft Y could depart. We still hadn’t had a good flight control check but we elected to move out of Aircraft Y’s way so they could get on their way. We notified ground that we could move but needed to address an issue still. Ground control instructed us to taxi straight ahead, left on Alpha, and hold short Runway 36 on Alpha and the First Officer read this back. Ground then instructed Aircraft Y to turn left on Charlie and cross Runway 29. We cleared our left and right side and we started to move ahead on Taxiway Charlie and I believe that I briefed the first officer out loud saying left on Alpha to cross 36. At this point he read back the same thing. I misinterpreted Grounds instructions because they had cleared Aircraft Y to cross a runway right after giving us taxi instructions. I had it in my head that they had also instructed us to cross Runway 36 in order to get out of their way because that intersection at Taxiway Alpha and Charlie is a little congested and noted on the chart as Hot Spot 1. We turned onto Alpha and I turned on all the lights and said clear left cleared to cross. The first officer said clear right clear to cross. At this point I had all the momentum I needed to cross the runway and was committed to crossing. We had visually cleared the runway making sure there was no traffic conflict. I had already crossed the 36 hold short line on Taxiway Alpha when ground instructed us to “hold short right there”. I hesitated due to the fact that we were already partially on the runway and realized we had not followed grounds initial instructions properly. I visually cleared the runway again and elected to fully cross because there was no traffic conflict and I didn’t want to stop partially on the runway surface. Ground then said \"anywhere there just stop moving”. We then addressed the flight control issue while stopped and successfully completed a flight control check with no further issues. Ground control then got back to us with a possible pilot deviation and gave us a number to call once arriving in ZZZ1. We complied and I briefly asked what our initial instruction was because I obviously interpreted their instructions incorrectly. The controller informed us that he had “just came upstairs so he didn't know how things transpired” and was unaware of the initial instruction. We then received instruction to continue via Alpha and hold short Runway 29. we were then instructed to cross 29 to Alpha, Bravo, hold short 36. we were then instructed to cross 36 at bravo, left Charlie. We then took off on Runway 36 and commenced the rest of the flight uneventfully. I, the Captain take full responsibility and accountability for my actions and mistake in unknowingly starting to cross and fully crossing Runway 36 without proper clearance from ground control. Safety is a big concern of mine while operating an aircraft and unfortunately I didn’t perform to my personal standards yesterday. I increased the risk level by not properly confirming our initial taxi instructions. I also failed to write down those taxi instructions. After contemplating and reflecting on the events that occurred yesterday, I have discovered several things that I can improve upon. Firstly, my task management skills. We were heavily task saturated in a short amount of time and I should have taken a pause to fully asses the situation and communicate a plan of action with my first officer. Secondly, my time management. I was feeling slightly rushed with the aircraft waiting for us to move while we still had several tasks to complete. We were safe to move, however, looking back I would’ve been more assertive in my requests to ATC to find a good spot to move to and hold. ATC did nothing wrong in their instruction but I believe there was maybe a better spot to move to in order to address our situation. I was more concerned with letting Aircraft Y get past us to depart than where I was taxiing to. Thirdly, my taxi brief and confirmation of instructions. We had such a short distance to move and I believe this also played a factor in our mistake. Typically we are used to getting on several taxiways before having to cross a runway. I do not recall if I properly briefed our change in taxi instructions with my first officer. Altogether I have learned a great deal from this mistake and will be more vigilant of my actions moving forward. Especially at airports that I am less familiar with like PWM. One thing I would like to add are some discrepancies on the PWM 10-9 and 10-9C diagrams. While these discrepancies did not dictate the outcome of my mistake I would like to bring them to light for other crews. On the northwest corner of taxiway intersection Alpha and Charlie there is an \"Island\" with signage that is not properly depicted on either the 10-9 or 10-9C charts. Also, on the 10-9C chart there is a lead-in line to gate off of Taxiway Alpha depicted. This specific line is not depicted on the actual pavement and may cause confusion when attempting to taxi in this area or into gate. Overall, this mistake has resulted in a lot of contemplation on how I can be a better pilot, communicator, and Captain. While not an excuse, I am still learning and adjusting to my new role as Captain. Again, I take full responsibility and accountability for the mistakes that I accidentally made yesterday."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was operating Aircraft X out of PWM on at approximately XA30Z. We were parked at the gate and had requested push back on ground frequency because we needed clearance to be pushed onto the taxiway. Ground control cleared us for the pushback and we began our push, started the #1 engine and waived the push crew off once disconnected. At this point we discussed changing the departure runway due to the high gusting winds that favored Runway 36 (350 @ 15/ gusts 22). We had initially selected Runway 29 because we had be cleared on the NUBLE4 departure which only allows selection of runways. We then proceeded to do the flight control check and when the First Officer moved the control wheel left and right the inboard aileron control surface boxes were highlighted with yellow X’s. We had performed the hydraulic warm-up when getting to the plane because of the low outside air temperature and the hydraulic pumps were in the correct positions. I checked the hydraulic temperatures via the synoptics page and all were showing an adequate temperature and pressure as well. I turned the pumps on for a few minutes to see if that would fix the issue and it did not this first time. At this point Ground control asked if we preferred Runway 36 for departure. We agreed that was the better choice and I requested a new clearance. Ground gave us a clearance of “on departure fly runway heading up to 3000 ft, expect to rejoin the NUBLE4 departure at the NUBLE intersection. We then selected Runway 36 in the FMS and we had to input the departure fixes manually because we were unable to select the NUBLE4 when departing 36. We had the FMS updated, received new ACARS takeoff data and had checked/briefed the new clearance/routing. At this point I had let the hydraulic pumps run a little longer because it was so cold out and I knew this would eventually fix our issue. At this point we had been sitting on the taxiway just off the gate for quite some time. Aircraft Y had taxied out and we were blocking them from continuing to Runway 36. Ground asked if we were ready to move because of this and we replied that we had to manually input all the departure fixes and run a checklist and that we were addressing an issue. At this point we had been quite task saturated between the weather updates, the flight control issue, the updated clearance, manual input of departure fixes, sending for and updating ACARS takeoff data, and now being asked to move so Aircraft Y could depart. We still hadn’t had a good flight control check but we elected to move out of Aircraft Y’s way so they could get on their way. We notified ground that we could move but needed to address an issue still. Ground control instructed us to taxi straight ahead, left on Alpha, and hold short Runway 36 on Alpha and the First Officer read this back. Ground then instructed Aircraft Y to turn left on Charlie and cross Runway 29. We cleared our left and right side and we started to move ahead on Taxiway Charlie and I believe that I briefed the first officer out loud saying left on Alpha to cross 36. At this point he read back the same thing. I misinterpreted Grounds instructions because they had cleared Aircraft Y to cross a runway right after giving us taxi instructions. I had it in my head that they had also instructed us to cross Runway 36 in order to get out of their way because that intersection at Taxiway Alpha and Charlie is a little congested and noted on the chart as Hot Spot 1. We turned onto Alpha and I turned on all the lights and said clear left cleared to cross. The first officer said clear right clear to cross. At this point I had all the momentum I needed to cross the runway and was committed to crossing. We had visually cleared the runway making sure there was no traffic conflict. I had already crossed the 36 hold short line on Taxiway Alpha when ground instructed us to “hold short right there”. I hesitated due to the fact that we were already partially on the runway and realized we had not followed grounds initial instructions properly. I visually cleared the runway again and elected to fully cross because there was no traffic conflict and I didn’t want to stop partially on the runway surface. Ground then said \"anywhere there just stop moving”. We then addressed the flight control issue while stopped and successfully completed a flight control check with no further issues. Ground control then got back to us with a possible pilot deviation and gave us a number to call once arriving in ZZZ1. We complied and I briefly asked what our initial instruction was because I obviously interpreted their instructions incorrectly. The controller informed us that he had “just came upstairs so he didn't know how things transpired” and was unaware of the initial instruction. We then received instruction to continue via Alpha and hold short Runway 29. we were then instructed to cross 29 to Alpha, Bravo, hold short 36. we were then instructed to cross 36 at bravo, left Charlie. We then took off on Runway 36 and commenced the rest of the flight uneventfully. I, the Captain take full responsibility and accountability for my actions and mistake in unknowingly starting to cross and fully crossing Runway 36 without proper clearance from ground control. Safety is a big concern of mine while operating an aircraft and unfortunately I didn’t perform to my personal standards yesterday. I increased the risk level by not properly confirming our initial taxi instructions. I also failed to write down those taxi instructions. After contemplating and reflecting on the events that occurred yesterday, I have discovered several things that I can improve upon. Firstly, my task management skills. We were heavily task saturated in a short amount of time and I should have taken a pause to fully asses the situation and communicate a plan of action with my first officer. Secondly, my time management. I was feeling slightly rushed with the aircraft waiting for us to move while we still had several tasks to complete. We were safe to move, however, looking back I would’ve been more assertive in my requests to ATC to find a good spot to move to and hold. ATC did nothing wrong in their instruction but I believe there was maybe a better spot to move to in order to address our situation. I was more concerned with letting Aircraft Y get past us to depart than where I was taxiing to. Thirdly, my taxi brief and confirmation of instructions. We had such a short distance to move and I believe this also played a factor in our mistake. Typically we are used to getting on several taxiways before having to cross a runway. I do not recall if I properly briefed our change in taxi instructions with my first officer. Altogether I have learned a great deal from this mistake and will be more vigilant of my actions moving forward. Especially at airports that I am less familiar with like PWM. One thing I would like to add are some discrepancies on the PWM 10-9 and 10-9C diagrams. While these discrepancies did not dictate the outcome of my mistake I would like to bring them to light for other crews. On the northwest corner of taxiway intersection Alpha and Charlie there is an \"Island\" with signage that is not properly depicted on either the 10-9 or 10-9C charts. Also, on the 10-9C chart there is a lead-in line to gate off of Taxiway Alpha depicted. This specific line is not depicted on the actual pavement and may cause confusion when attempting to taxi in this area or into gate. Overall, this mistake has resulted in a lot of contemplation on how I can be a better pilot, communicator, and Captain. While not an excuse, I am still learning and adjusting to my new role as Captain. Again, I take full responsibility and accountability for the mistakes that I accidentally made yesterday.",
    "synopsis": "Captain reported a runway incursion during taxi out at PWM, citing airport signage as contributing.",
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    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2065242 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Captain reported a runway incursion during taxi out at PWM, citing airport signage as contributing.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2063332",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Light Transport",
      "Small Aircraft"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach",
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On short final we noticed departing traffic was across the hold short line and was proceeding to the runway. We went around, announced our situation on frequency XXX.XX, then proceeded to a normal traffic pattern and uneventful landing. Suggestions: Continue to listen on backup freq. inbound as soon as practical and exercise CRM delegating radio work as necessary and practical. In our case at this uncontrolled field the departing aircraft was either on the wrong frequency (their words) or not using their radios. Would also exercise extreme vigilance at this critical phase of flight at all airports but even more so at uncontrolled fields."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Was flying to CEU and got transferred to CTAF for the airport by ATC. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) was making the necessary calls on CTAF to advise traffic we were inbound. We entered the pattern on a left down wind for runway 25 and when entering we saw another plane short and final landing not making any calls on the radio. We made several calls on downwind, base, base to final and final. Upon inbound I saw a smaller GA plane taxing towards 25 and never heard any radio calls. At about 400 feet AGL I started to level out because I was unsure what the other planes intentions were as he started to creep up to and past the hold short line of 25. Once I saw he was about to take the runway I executed a go around and the PM made the announcement over CTAF. Upon entering left crosswind the other pilot got on frequency and said, “Jet coming into land, I’m so sorry I thought I was on the right frequency. I have been making calls on the wrong frequency by a decimal.” He continued to profusely apologize and then took off and left the area. We came back into to land with no other problems. Suggestions: I feel we did everything procedurally correct from making calls at 20/10/5 miles away and on downwind, base, base to final and finals calls. Upon talking to the FBO this plane was doing touch/stop and goes and wasn’t saying anything on frequency for a bit of time before we got there."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn short final we noticed departing traffic was across the hold short line and was proceeding to the runway. We went around, announced our situation on frequency XXX.XX, then proceeded to a normal traffic pattern and uneventful landing. Suggestions: Continue to listen on backup freq. inbound as soon as practical and exercise CRM delegating radio work as necessary and practical. In our case at this uncontrolled field the departing aircraft was either on the wrong frequency (their words) or not using their radios. Would also exercise extreme vigilance at this critical phase of flight at all airports but even more so at uncontrolled fields.\n\nNarrative 2\nWas flying to CEU and got transferred to CTAF for the airport by ATC. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) was making the necessary calls on CTAF to advise traffic we were inbound. We entered the pattern on a left down wind for runway 25 and when entering we saw another plane short and final landing not making any calls on the radio. We made several calls on downwind, base, base to final and final. Upon inbound I saw a smaller GA plane taxing towards 25 and never heard any radio calls. At about 400 feet AGL I started to level out because I was unsure what the other planes intentions were as he started to creep up to and past the hold short line of 25. Once I saw he was about to take the runway I executed a go around and the PM made the announcement over CTAF. Upon entering left crosswind the other pilot got on frequency and said, “Jet coming into land, I’m so sorry I thought I was on the right frequency. I have been making calls on the wrong frequency by a decimal.” He continued to profusely apologize and then took off and left the area. We came back into to land with no other problems. Suggestions: I feel we did everything procedurally correct from making calls at 20/10/5 miles away and on downwind, base, base to final and finals calls. Upon talking to the FBO this plane was doing touch/stop and goes and wasn’t saying anything on frequency for a bit of time before we got there.",
    "synopsis": "Air taxi flight crew reported that during short final approach an aircraft entered the runway for takeoff without making any radio calls requiring the flight crew to go around.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=55",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 55,
      "pageEnd": 56,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=55",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 55,
        "pageEnd": 56,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2063332 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air taxi flight crew reported that during short final approach an aircraft entered the runway for takeoff without making any radio calls requiring the flight crew to go around.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2062021",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was Local Control, training in progress. Weather VFR. Ground was split off, Controller in Charge was standalone. Aircraft X was in left traffic for Runway 19 and had been cleared for the option on Runway 19 and told they were inside of Aircraft Y. Aircraft X indicated they would be a full stop. Aircraft Y was cleared for the option number 2. Aircraft X landed and I was giving turn and taxi instructions when I and my trainer noticed the aircraft was smoking and had rolled into the intersection of Runway 19 and Runway 7/25. The Controller in Charge was alert to the situation and pulled the crash phone. I sent Aircraft Y around and gave him his VFR departure clearance. I asked Aircraft X if he required assistance. He informed me that they had flamed out and there was smoke, but the flames were out and they were fine. I informed him that Airport Operations was on the on the way. Operations and ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting) arrived quickly. Both runways were closed and the aircraft required a tow back to the hangars. A FOD sweep was conducted after the aircraft was towed off the runways and taxiways."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was Local Control, training in progress. Weather VFR. Ground was split off, Controller in Charge was standalone. Aircraft X was in left traffic for Runway 19 and had been cleared for the option on Runway 19 and told they were inside of Aircraft Y. Aircraft X indicated they would be a full stop. Aircraft Y was cleared for the option number 2. Aircraft X landed and I was giving turn and taxi instructions when I and my trainer noticed the aircraft was smoking and had rolled into the intersection of Runway 19 and Runway 7/25. The Controller in Charge was alert to the situation and pulled the crash phone. I sent Aircraft Y around and gave him his VFR departure clearance. I asked Aircraft X if he required assistance. He informed me that they had flamed out and there was smoke, but the flames were out and they were fine. I informed him that Airport Operations was on the on the way. Operations and ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting) arrived quickly. Both runways were closed and the aircraft required a tow back to the hangars. A FOD sweep was conducted after the aircraft was towed off the runways and taxiways.",
    "synopsis": "Local Control trainee reported a small aircraft landed and was smoking. The trainee sent another aircraft around and provided assistance to the aircraft that was smoking.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=57",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 57,
      "pageEnd": 58,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=57",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 57,
        "pageEnd": 58,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2062021 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Local Control trainee reported a small aircraft landed and was smoking. The trainee sent another aircraft around and provided assistance to the aircraft that was smoking.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2059892",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG",
      "PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch",
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On Day 0 approximately XA:50pm local I was operating Aircraft X. I taxied from the northwest apron via Taxiways 1, 2 and held short of Runway XXR. I received takeoff clearance, read it back, and began the take off roll. As I was rotating to climb, I observed an aircraft ahead and to the left crossing the hold short area on Taxiway 3 and continuing to enter the runway environment from left to right. I chose to continue climbing straight ahead, and announced the issue on frequency. I was then handed to the XXL Controller and continued the flight to ZZZ1 normally. I spoke by phone with the Tower Manager who apologized and regrets the trainee mistake. ZZZ Tower is performing their investigation, review of audio, and lessons learned for improvement. The other aircraft, Aircraft Y was cleared by XXL local Controller after landing XXL to cross XXR. A missed memory aid by the XXR Controller caused for the Runway incursion."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn Day 0 approximately XA:50pm local I was operating Aircraft X. I taxied from the northwest apron via Taxiways 1, 2 and held short of Runway XXR. I received takeoff clearance, read it back, and began the take off roll. As I was rotating to climb, I observed an aircraft ahead and to the left crossing the hold short area on Taxiway 3 and continuing to enter the runway environment from left to right. I chose to continue climbing straight ahead, and announced the issue on frequency. I was then handed to the XXL Controller and continued the flight to ZZZ1 normally. I spoke by phone with the Tower Manager who apologized and regrets the trainee mistake. ZZZ Tower is performing their investigation, review of audio, and lessons learned for improvement. The other aircraft, Aircraft Y was cleared by XXL local Controller after landing XXL to cross XXR. A missed memory aid by the XXR Controller caused for the Runway incursion.",
    "synopsis": "A high wing single engine aircraft pilot reported during initial climb they observed a low wing single engine aircraft taxi across the runway in front of them.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=59",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 59,
      "pageEnd": 60,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=59",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 59,
        "pageEnd": 60,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2059892 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "A high wing single engine aircraft pilot reported during initial climb they observed a low wing single engine aircraft taxi across the runway in front of them.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2059712",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "A321",
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch",
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "When departing full length off of Runway XXR in ZZZ we were cleared to line up and wait. The Captain handed over control as ATC cleared us for takeoff with instruction to climb via SID. I pushed the power up to 1.05 Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) and before it had a chance to stabilize and before advancing thrust, ATC cancelled our takeoff clearance. We were no faster than 20 knots. I brought the power back down to idle as the Captain said “Reject, my Aircraft”. After I got through my startle reflex I saw a 737 crossing the runway in front of us. The tower then cleared us for takeoff again, but the Captain declined and had me ask to go somewhere where we could run a checklist. ATC instructed us to exit left and hold short of Runway XYR. There we debriefed each other, ran the rejected takeoff below 80 knots QRH and attempted to contact the Duty pilot to ensure we had complied with all procedures. We got the concurrence from all flight deck crew and maintenance that it was safe to continue and departed Runway XXR. It seemed to be an honest mistake by ATC. They acted professionally and responded immediately. Unfortunately I don't know what you do to prevent human error."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Departed the gate and taxied to Runway XXR for departure. We were given a “line up and wait” clearance for XXR, and we complied. Shortly thereafter, we received our “takeoff” clearance for XXR. Then, a short time after the “takeoff” clearance was given we received tower instruction to “cancel take off.” Our engines were spooled and we were rolling, but were below 20 knots. We executed the “rejected takeoff” procedure. We did not reply immediately to the first “rejected takeoff” clearance due to us actively executing the “rejected takeoff” procedure. A few seconds later we were issued a second “cancel takeoff” clearance. We replied to the “cancel takeoff” clearance, and by then we were already stopped on the runway. We observed a aircraft crossing XXR, left to right, downfield approximately 5,000 ft. from our aircraft position. After the aircraft was clear of the runway we were given another “cleared for takeoff” clearance. We declined that clearance and elected to clear the runway to run QRH procedures and verify procedures were accurately followed. Complied with: operating manual sections, and QRH XX-XX. Additionally I reached out to our dispatcher, maintenance desk, and duty pilot (did not reply before we departed). All parties conferenced in and all flight deck crew agreed aircraft was safe to continue and legal to continue without returning to gate for a documented Maintenance Task Card (MTC) discrepancy. After a 15 minute delay, we departed XXR uneventfully. Without removing the magnitude of the obvious potential threat of a runway incursion, I would like to include in this report that ATC tower controller was professional, he acted with urgency when needed, and complied with our request to exit, and didn’t rush us to complete appropriate checklists and procedures. I would like to add a recommendation to a procedure change and highlight a discrepancy in our manuals. In our QRH, in the index, the appropriate action is listed as “Rejected Takeoff.” However when you go to QRH XX-XX, the title of the procedure to accomplish is titled “Takeoff After Rejected Takeoff Below 80 Knots.” My suggestion is to have the procedure be called “Rejected Takeoff.” Then the first question is, “Was the take off rejected above or below 80 knots? Note: Often pilots understate when a rejected takeoff was initiated. Was the 80 knot call made? Etc...If yes, Action: return to gate, discrepancy must be entered, Etc.\" Ultimately I am suggesting you incorporate most FOM and AOM information and include all rejected takeoff’s into the QRH, just low speed."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhen departing full length off of Runway XXR in ZZZ we were cleared to line up and wait. The Captain handed over control as ATC cleared us for takeoff with instruction to climb via SID. I pushed the power up to 1.05 Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) and before it had a chance to stabilize and before advancing thrust, ATC cancelled our takeoff clearance. We were no faster than 20 knots. I brought the power back down to idle as the Captain said “Reject, my Aircraft”. After I got through my startle reflex I saw a 737 crossing the runway in front of us. The tower then cleared us for takeoff again, but the Captain declined and had me ask to go somewhere where we could run a checklist. ATC instructed us to exit left and hold short of Runway XYR. There we debriefed each other, ran the rejected takeoff below 80 knots QRH and attempted to contact the Duty pilot to ensure we had complied with all procedures. We got the concurrence from all flight deck crew and maintenance that it was safe to continue and departed Runway XXR. It seemed to be an honest mistake by ATC. They acted professionally and responded immediately. Unfortunately I don't know what you do to prevent human error.\n\nNarrative 2\nDeparted the gate and taxied to Runway XXR for departure. We were given a “line up and wait” clearance for XXR, and we complied. Shortly thereafter, we received our “takeoff” clearance for XXR. Then, a short time after the “takeoff” clearance was given we received tower instruction to “cancel take off.” Our engines were spooled and we were rolling, but were below 20 knots. We executed the “rejected takeoff” procedure. We did not reply immediately to the first “rejected takeoff” clearance due to us actively executing the “rejected takeoff” procedure. A few seconds later we were issued a second “cancel takeoff” clearance. We replied to the “cancel takeoff” clearance, and by then we were already stopped on the runway. We observed a aircraft crossing XXR, left to right, downfield approximately 5,000 ft. from our aircraft position. After the aircraft was clear of the runway we were given another “cleared for takeoff” clearance. We declined that clearance and elected to clear the runway to run QRH procedures and verify procedures were accurately followed. Complied with: operating manual sections, and QRH XX-XX. Additionally I reached out to our dispatcher, maintenance desk, and duty pilot (did not reply before we departed). All parties conferenced in and all flight deck crew agreed aircraft was safe to continue and legal to continue without returning to gate for a documented Maintenance Task Card (MTC) discrepancy. After a 15 minute delay, we departed XXR uneventfully. Without removing the magnitude of the obvious potential threat of a runway incursion, I would like to include in this report that ATC tower controller was professional, he acted with urgency when needed, and complied with our request to exit, and didn’t rush us to complete appropriate checklists and procedures. I would like to add a recommendation to a procedure change and highlight a discrepancy in our manuals. In our QRH, in the index, the appropriate action is listed as “Rejected Takeoff.” However when you go to QRH XX-XX, the title of the procedure to accomplish is titled “Takeoff After Rejected Takeoff Below 80 Knots.” My suggestion is to have the procedure be called “Rejected Takeoff.” Then the first question is, “Was the take off rejected above or below 80 knots? Note: Often pilots understate when a rejected takeoff was initiated. Was the 80 knot call made? Etc...If yes, Action: return to gate, discrepancy must be entered, Etc.\" Ultimately I am suggesting you incorporate most FOM and AOM information and include all rejected takeoff’s into the QRH, just low speed.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported a rejected takeoff when ATC cancelled their takeoff clearance due to traffic taxiing across the runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=61",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 61,
      "pageEnd": 63,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=61",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 61,
        "pageEnd": 63,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2059712 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported a rejected takeoff when ATC cancelled their takeoff clearance due to traffic taxiing across the runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2059477",
    "date": "2023-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Following a VFR landing into ZZZ on Runway XX, I exited at [Taxiway] 1 and contacted ground. The controller gave taxi instructions to the FBO but he spoke so fast that I could not understand him at all. I asked him repeat the instructions and to please speak slowly. He repeated the instructions to taxi along Taxiway 2 and turn on 3 to the FBO. Again, he spoke fairly quickly though I thought I understood him. As I taxied along southeast along Taxiway 3, I saw FBOs to my left, which is where I thought my requested FBO was. Having heard a clearance to FBO in his taxi instructions, I turned toward the FBOs. When I approached Runway XX, I looked to my right and saw an aircraft on final which appeared to be around four or five miles out. Believing I was cleared to the FBO and that it was safe to cross, I proceeded to the east side of the runway. Seconds later I was informed by ground control of a possible deviation and that I was instructed to turn RIGHT on [Taxiway] 2 not LEFT. I realized then that the FBO I requested was in fact on the WEST side of the runway. The controller pointed me toward, and cleared me, to taxi to the correct FBO. In retrospect I believe several things went wrong, mostly on my part. The few times I have been to ZZZ, I bought fuel at an FBO on the EAST side of Runway XX. The controller spoke so fast that I didn't get any of it, and even after asking him to speak slowly, he spoke fast, but somewhat slower, and I believed I understood him, Because I remembered that the FBO was on the East side, and because I believed I was cleared to the FBO, I crossed Runway XX and was quickly informed of a possible pilot deviation. The above represents what I did wrong. My planning of exactly where the FBO was should have better, not relying on memory. The crossing of an active runway, even believing I was cleared to the FBO should have rung bells. Seeing traffic a safe distance away I crossed. I remember slowing at the runway, thinking maybe I should confirm, but let it go knowing that the landing traffic was far off and the controller knew what he was doing. What I learned and will change: Do not continue taxiing as the controller is giving me my complete instructions, I made the left turn onto [Taxiway] 3 as instructed before he finished. I should have waited until the instructions were clear to me, I should have asked him to repeat a third time, so no mistakes were made when transcribing. In the future I will not begin my ground taxi during the readout. I tend to do this at home airports which are smaller and more familiar. ZZZ is a busy airport. I usually stay close to home in my area. Things always happen faster there, and flying single pilot is probably not the best choice for going there. On the few trips I make there yearly. I will try to take a second pilot with me. Lastly, I would like to say that the controller truly should have spoken slow enough for a pilot to understand the first time. Perhaps the local pilots understand better when controllers talk fast because they are used to it. But this is not good for folks who speak slower. In this particular case the interaction definitely made me somewhat nervous. My mindset during the taxi was definitely rankled after the first and second taxi instructions that were given, once way too fast, and the second just fast. I should have stopped and collected myself."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nFollowing a VFR landing into ZZZ on Runway XX, I exited at [Taxiway] 1 and contacted ground. The controller gave taxi instructions to the FBO but he spoke so fast that I could not understand him at all. I asked him repeat the instructions and to please speak slowly. He repeated the instructions to taxi along Taxiway 2 and turn on 3 to the FBO. Again, he spoke fairly quickly though I thought I understood him. As I taxied along southeast along Taxiway 3, I saw FBOs to my left, which is where I thought my requested FBO was. Having heard a clearance to FBO in his taxi instructions, I turned toward the FBOs. When I approached Runway XX, I looked to my right and saw an aircraft on final which appeared to be around four or five miles out. Believing I was cleared to the FBO and that it was safe to cross, I proceeded to the east side of the runway. Seconds later I was informed by ground control of a possible deviation and that I was instructed to turn RIGHT on [Taxiway] 2 not LEFT. I realized then that the FBO I requested was in fact on the WEST side of the runway. The controller pointed me toward, and cleared me, to taxi to the correct FBO. In retrospect I believe several things went wrong, mostly on my part. The few times I have been to ZZZ, I bought fuel at an FBO on the EAST side of Runway XX. The controller spoke so fast that I didn't get any of it, and even after asking him to speak slowly, he spoke fast, but somewhat slower, and I believed I understood him, Because I remembered that the FBO was on the East side, and because I believed I was cleared to the FBO, I crossed Runway XX and was quickly informed of a possible pilot deviation. The above represents what I did wrong. My planning of exactly where the FBO was should have better, not relying on memory. The crossing of an active runway, even believing I was cleared to the FBO should have rung bells. Seeing traffic a safe distance away I crossed. I remember slowing at the runway, thinking maybe I should confirm, but let it go knowing that the landing traffic was far off and the controller knew what he was doing. What I learned and will change: Do not continue taxiing as the controller is giving me my complete instructions, I made the left turn onto [Taxiway] 3 as instructed before he finished. I should have waited until the instructions were clear to me, I should have asked him to repeat a third time, so no mistakes were made when transcribing. In the future I will not begin my ground taxi during the readout. I tend to do this at home airports which are smaller and more familiar. ZZZ is a busy airport. I usually stay close to home in my area. Things always happen faster there, and flying single pilot is probably not the best choice for going there. On the few trips I make there yearly. I will try to take a second pilot with me. Lastly, I would like to say that the controller truly should have spoken slow enough for a pilot to understand the first time. Perhaps the local pilots understand better when controllers talk fast because they are used to it. But this is not good for folks who speak slower. In this particular case the interaction definitely made me somewhat nervous. My mindset during the taxi was definitely rankled after the first and second taxi instructions that were given, once way too fast, and the second just fast. I should have stopped and collected myself.",
    "synopsis": "General aviation pilot reported turning incorrectly on a taxiway and crossed an active runway without clearance. The pilot contacted ATC for further clearance to the FBO.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=64",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 64,
      "pageEnd": 66,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=64",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 64,
        "pageEnd": 66,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2059477 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "General aviation pilot reported turning incorrectly on a taxiway and crossed an active runway without clearance. The pilot contacted ATC for further clearance to the FBO.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2059370",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "DA40 Diamond Star"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "My student was taking off on [Runway] XX and around 50 knots the plane begin to pull left. He tried to apply more right rudder and nothing happened. He aborted his takeoff and still with no control of the rudder went off the runway on the left side. He crossed a grass area and stopped the plane on Runway XY/XZ."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nMy student was taking off on [Runway] XX and around 50 knots the plane begin to pull left. He tried to apply more right rudder and nothing happened. He aborted his takeoff and still with no control of the rudder went off the runway on the left side. He crossed a grass area and stopped the plane on Runway XY/XZ.",
    "synopsis": "A Flight Instructor reported their student lost control of the rudder during takeoff and the aircraft veered off the runway onto an intersecting runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=67",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 67,
      "pageEnd": 68,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=67",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 67,
        "pageEnd": 68,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "Student takeoff veers onto an intersecting runway",
    "summary": "A flight instructor reported that a student's DA40 pulled left during takeoff and did not respond to additional right rudder. The student rejected the takeoff, left the runway across grass, and stopped on an intersecting runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Equipment"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2058147",
    "date": "2023-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng",
      "Widebody, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While in a line up for departure on XXL (approx number 4) the active takeoff runway was changed to XYR. Instruction was given to about 10 aircraft to follow each other to XYR. We were taxied down XXL, left on XZL to exit at Taxiway 1 and left on Taxiway 2. While taxiing down XZL in poor visibility conditions Aircraft Z was given clearance to line up and wait on XYR. The controller seemed overworked. We exited the runway on Taxiway 1. When approaching number 2 in the line up on Taxiway 2 for XYR we asked the tower to get out of the line up for operational reasons (fuel below min take off fuel and flight planned into severe). Aircraft Y behind us requested the same. The instructions to us were \"taxi on to XYR, exit at Taxiway 3 and hold short of Taxiway 2, make sure your tail is clear of XYR\". Holding short of Taxiway 2 we were not certain that it was possible to have adequate clearance of aircraft taxiing on Taxiway 2 and being clear of XYR. Aircraft Y went by, the wing of the aircraft was within feet of our cockpit window. Aircraft Z was about to be next. We informed the tower that we felt unsafe. Aircraft Z was told to stop. At the same time Aircraft Y was given \"taxi on to XYR, exit at Taxiway 4 and hold short of Taxiway 2. Aircraft Y extended from the XAR exit to the tail of the aircraft on to runway XYR. We immediately informed the tower. In an abrupt tone we were told not to intervene and that it did not matter what we saw. We were told that it goes by what the controller sees on the radar. Aircraft Z was cleared for take off on XYR while Aircraft Y had not fully cleared the runway. Cause: Controller overload, carelessness and disregard for pilot safety concerns. No aircraft should be cleared to line up and wait in poor visibility while aircraft are taxiing down the runway in the opposite direction. Suggestion: No aircraft should be cleared for take off while a significant portion of another aircraft is on the runway. No pilot advising the tower of an unsafe situation should be dismissed."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile in a line up for departure on XXL (approx number 4) the active takeoff runway was changed to XYR. Instruction was given to about 10 aircraft to follow each other to XYR. We were taxied down XXL, left on XZL to exit at Taxiway 1 and left on Taxiway 2. While taxiing down XZL in poor visibility conditions Aircraft Z was given clearance to line up and wait on XYR. The controller seemed overworked. We exited the runway on Taxiway 1. When approaching number 2 in the line up on Taxiway 2 for XYR we asked the tower to get out of the line up for operational reasons (fuel below min take off fuel and flight planned into severe). Aircraft Y behind us requested the same. The instructions to us were \"taxi on to XYR, exit at Taxiway 3 and hold short of Taxiway 2, make sure your tail is clear of XYR\". Holding short of Taxiway 2 we were not certain that it was possible to have adequate clearance of aircraft taxiing on Taxiway 2 and being clear of XYR. Aircraft Y went by, the wing of the aircraft was within feet of our cockpit window. Aircraft Z was about to be next. We informed the tower that we felt unsafe. Aircraft Z was told to stop. At the same time Aircraft Y was given \"taxi on to XYR, exit at Taxiway 4 and hold short of Taxiway 2. Aircraft Y extended from the XAR exit to the tail of the aircraft on to runway XYR. We immediately informed the tower. In an abrupt tone we were told not to intervene and that it did not matter what we saw. We were told that it goes by what the controller sees on the radar. Aircraft Z was cleared for take off on XYR while Aircraft Y had not fully cleared the runway. Cause: Controller overload, carelessness and disregard for pilot safety concerns. No aircraft should be cleared to line up and wait in poor visibility while aircraft are taxiing down the runway in the opposite direction. Suggestion: No aircraft should be cleared for take off while a significant portion of another aircraft is on the runway. No pilot advising the tower of an unsafe situation should be dismissed.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier pilot reported they were instructed to hold short of a runway but the taxiway was not long enough for their aircraft to remain clear of the runway. The reporter stated the departing aircraft was within feet of their aircraft. The reporter also observed an aircraft taking off with an additional aircraft holding on an adjacent taxiway but not clear of the runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=69",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 69,
      "pageEnd": 71,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=69",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 69,
        "pageEnd": 71,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2058147 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier pilot reported they were instructed to hold short of a runway but the taxiway was not long enough for their aircraft to remain clear of the runway. The reporter stated the departing aircraft was within feet of their aircraft. The reporter also observed an aircraft taking off with an additional aircraft holding on an adjacent taxiway but not clear of the runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2054966",
    "date": "2023-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model",
      "Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "At the end of my solo commercial lesson, I was doing a taxing back and I got instruction's from ATC to hold short of Runway XR and I Repeated back instructions but in my mind I thought they wanted me to line up and wait on the runway so I mistakenly lined up and waited for ATC instructions, A Skyhawk on a 0.5 miles final was issued a go around from Tower and immediately said they wanted to file a complaint. So Tower issued a possible pilot deviation to me and had me contact to give them to give my information. I believe that after nearly two hours of pattern and doing a 5.4hr cross country earlier in the day I was fatigued and my quality on performance was slowing. In future I will apply my IMSAFE & PAVE checklist more thoroughly before choosing to do night solo pattern after a day of flying."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAt the end of my solo commercial lesson, I was doing a taxing back and I got instruction's from ATC to hold short of Runway XR and I Repeated back instructions but in my mind I thought they wanted me to line up and wait on the runway so I mistakenly lined up and waited for ATC instructions, A Skyhawk on a 0.5 miles final was issued a go around from Tower and immediately said they wanted to file a complaint. So Tower issued a possible pilot deviation to me and had me contact to give them to give my information. I believe that after nearly two hours of pattern and doing a 5.4hr cross country earlier in the day I was fatigued and my quality on performance was slowing. In future I will apply my IMSAFE & PAVE checklist more thoroughly before choosing to do night solo pattern after a day of flying.",
    "synopsis": "Piper pilot reported a critical ground conflict by violating the clearance to hold short of the runway with an aircraft on short final. The Tower issued the landing aircraft a go around clearance to avoid a collision.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=72",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 72,
      "pageEnd": 73,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=72",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 72,
        "pageEnd": 73,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2054966 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Piper pilot reported a critical ground conflict by violating the clearance to hold short of the runway with an aircraft on short final. The Tower issued the landing aircraft a go around clearance to avoid a collision.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2054827",
    "date": "2023-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While holding short of the runway at an uncontrolled airport, we saw no plane on final while listing to the CTAF and monitoring the TCAS. we weren’t able to identify any aircraft on short final. After making a radio call and rolling past the hold short line an aircraft made a radio call that they were executing a go around. we immediately stopped before entering the runway but were already past the hold short line. The pilot that executed the go around voiced that his radio hasn’t been working great and was possible it wasn’t transmitted that he was coming in to land. Cause: Inadequate communication from pilot on short final and unable to see the traffic on final before rolling past hold short line. Suggestions: ATC when issuing a clearance from a non towered airport advising any traffic that might be going into the airport to land."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We stopped in ZZZ for fuel and to wait for low visibility in ZZZ1 to come up before departing. We had a wheels up time from ATC we were trying to meet. One IFR Aircraft landed and ZZZ1 gave us our clearance. We broadcasted taxi/runway intentions on CTAF also while listening for ZZZ1 ATC to give the final release following the IFR landing in ZZZ. That aircraft broadcast clear of the runway the contacted ATC to close their flight. ZZZ1 then gave us the immediate departure clearance. Before take off check list was done above and below the line, a CTAF broadcast was made for Runway XX, I checked final and it appeared clear. Note, the sun was partially in our eyes looking south. I also did not notice anyone on final approach on TCAS. As we entered the runway I heard the other aircraft say they were on final. I stopped forward movement and at that time I noticed the aircraft. I was not on the runway but had crossed over the hold short line. The aircraft on approach advised they were on final and would go around. I told them via CTAF that I did not hear or see them prior to taking the runway and thanked them for their broadcast and for going around. They said they had some issues with their radio and tried com 2 after that and I could hear them. Note ATC also did not mention any other arriving aircraft to the ZZZ airport when we received our clearance. We were up very early that day for a XA:00 central time zone show time. We had deteriorating weather in ZZZ1, did a CATII, RVR dropped below mins prior to FAP (Final Approach Point) and we went missed. Held for a short time and calculated fuel while monitoring ZZZ1 weather. Diverted, sat for approximately 90 min and departed with some sense of urgency from ATC. I checked final and did not see or hear anyone on the radio, (I was also monitoring multiple frequencies) see anyone on final, see anyone on TCAS or advised by ATC of any IFR arrivals or VFR targets in the area. I probably allowed the rush of ATC for a wheels up time lure me into working items quicker than I normally do. I was also acting as a Line Check Airmen for a CRJ 200 check out. I should have focused on one frequency rather than listen to both due to a new hire pilot running the radios."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile holding short of the runway at an uncontrolled airport, we saw no plane on final while listing to the CTAF and monitoring the TCAS. we weren’t able to identify any aircraft on short final. After making a radio call and rolling past the hold short line an aircraft made a radio call that they were executing a go around. we immediately stopped before entering the runway but were already past the hold short line. The pilot that executed the go around voiced that his radio hasn’t been working great and was possible it wasn’t transmitted that he was coming in to land. Cause: Inadequate communication from pilot on short final and unable to see the traffic on final before rolling past hold short line. Suggestions: ATC when issuing a clearance from a non towered airport advising any traffic that might be going into the airport to land.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe stopped in ZZZ for fuel and to wait for low visibility in ZZZ1 to come up before departing. We had a wheels up time from ATC we were trying to meet. One IFR Aircraft landed and ZZZ1 gave us our clearance. We broadcasted taxi/runway intentions on CTAF also while listening for ZZZ1 ATC to give the final release following the IFR landing in ZZZ. That aircraft broadcast clear of the runway the contacted ATC to close their flight. ZZZ1 then gave us the immediate departure clearance. Before take off check list was done above and below the line, a CTAF broadcast was made for Runway XX, I checked final and it appeared clear. Note, the sun was partially in our eyes looking south. I also did not notice anyone on final approach on TCAS. As we entered the runway I heard the other aircraft say they were on final. I stopped forward movement and at that time I noticed the aircraft. I was not on the runway but had crossed over the hold short line. The aircraft on approach advised they were on final and would go around. I told them via CTAF that I did not hear or see them prior to taking the runway and thanked them for their broadcast and for going around. They said they had some issues with their radio and tried com 2 after that and I could hear them. Note ATC also did not mention any other arriving aircraft to the ZZZ airport when we received our clearance. We were up very early that day for a XA:00 central time zone show time. We had deteriorating weather in ZZZ1, did a CATII, RVR dropped below mins prior to FAP (Final Approach Point) and we went missed. Held for a short time and calculated fuel while monitoring ZZZ1 weather. Diverted, sat for approximately 90 min and departed with some sense of urgency from ATC. I checked final and did not see or hear anyone on the radio, (I was also monitoring multiple frequencies) see anyone on final, see anyone on TCAS or advised by ATC of any IFR arrivals or VFR targets in the area. I probably allowed the rush of ATC for a wheels up time lure me into working items quicker than I normally do. I was also acting as a Line Check Airmen for a CRJ 200 check out. I should have focused on one frequency rather than listen to both due to a new hire pilot running the radios.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier pilots reported a critical ground conflict at a non-towered airport. After receiving takeoff clearance from ATC and crossing the hold line, an unseen and unheard aircraft announced a go around.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=74",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 74,
      "pageEnd": 76,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=74",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 74,
        "pageEnd": 76,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2054827 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier pilots reported a critical ground conflict at a non-towered airport. After receiving takeoff clearance from ATC and crossing the hold line, an unseen and unheard aircraft announced a go around.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2052622",
    "date": "2023-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Tower cleared me for takeoff on Runway XXL without delay while a Piper Cub was cleared to land. I could not visually acquire the Cub due to the poor angle and placement of the Runway XXL hold-short line, but was listening to their progress on final and they were slow moving. As I crossed the hold-short line with clearance for takeoff, I was told to \"Cancel Takeoff Clearance\" and the Cub was told to \"Go-Around.\" This situation could have been mitigated by organizing the ATC operation at this airport. This airport has been the scene of numerous runway incursions and air traffic control's prioritizing speed over safety. Part of what occurred here is the constant switching of parallel runways for arrivals and departures. Also, the [1] Taxiway approaches the Runway XXL threshold at an angle where you are unable to see traffic on final making clearing the final hazardous and this scenario could have possibly been prevented if there was more of a 90 degree angle to the runway. The angle of the taxiway coupled with ATC at this particular control tower's desire for speed and efficiency over safety is a very dangerous situation. Widening [Runway] XXL and using it exclusively for landings while using [Runway] XXR for takeoffs would make this operation safer since the predominant direction of operation is south."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nTower cleared me for takeoff on Runway XXL without delay while a Piper Cub was cleared to land. I could not visually acquire the Cub due to the poor angle and placement of the Runway XXL hold-short line, but was listening to their progress on final and they were slow moving. As I crossed the hold-short line with clearance for takeoff, I was told to \"Cancel Takeoff Clearance\" and the Cub was told to \"Go-Around.\" This situation could have been mitigated by organizing the ATC operation at this airport. This airport has been the scene of numerous runway incursions and air traffic control's prioritizing speed over safety. Part of what occurred here is the constant switching of parallel runways for arrivals and departures. Also, the [1] Taxiway approaches the Runway XXL threshold at an angle where you are unable to see traffic on final making clearing the final hazardous and this scenario could have possibly been prevented if there was more of a 90 degree angle to the runway. The angle of the taxiway coupled with ATC at this particular control tower's desire for speed and efficiency over safety is a very dangerous situation. Widening [Runway] XXL and using it exclusively for landings while using [Runway] XXR for takeoffs would make this operation safer since the predominant direction of operation is south.",
    "synopsis": "PA-32 pilot reported a conflict while beginning the takeoff roll with an aircraft on final. ATC abruptly cancelled the takeoff and sent the other aircraft on a go-around.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=77",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 77,
      "pageEnd": 78,
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=77",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 77,
        "pageEnd": 78,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2052622 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "PA-32 pilot reported a conflict while beginning the takeoff roll with an aircraft on final. ATC abruptly cancelled the takeoff and sent the other aircraft on a go-around.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2050639",
    "date": "2023-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior",
      "Lancair Undifferentiated"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Student training flight. Landed full stop on Runway XX and was instructed to taxi via Taxiway 1 and hold short Runway XY. After holding short for several minutes we were instructed on Tower frequency to cross Runway XY at Taxiway 1 and contact Ground on the other side. Before moving we looked left and saw a Lancair who looked to be landing Runway XY so we held position. As soon as Tower gave us that crossing clearance, he said to cancel the clearance and hold short of [Runway] XY at Taxiway 1, to which we read back we saw the landing traffic and would continue to hold short. The next clearance we received was that we were cleared to cross [Runway] XY at [Taxiway] 1 and the Lancair would be exiting at [Taxiway] 2 off Runway XY. As we pulled forward we could tell the Lancair was not going to take the exit he was instructed to so we stopped the airplane on the west half of the runway and told Tower that we were going to get off the runway via [Taxiway] 2, reverse high speed exit. The idea behind this was that the Lancair would clear the runway at [Taxiway] 1 but because we would be behind it we would be unable to clear the hold-short if he was stopped off of [Taxiway] 1 and Taxiway 2 intersection. The Tower quickly approved our taxi to [Taxiway] 2. The airspace was very busy at the time with lots of training aircraft and more helicopter training traffic than I ever seen in my time at ZZZ. I believe the Tower was task saturated and in the process of having a control on another frequency to control the west side of the airport. The Lancair pilot read back the taxi instruction but did not comply with the instructed exit nor did he immediately get on the radio to say unable or anything of that sort, which played a contributing factor. Luckily we saw him and could tell he wasn't going to make the turn at [Taxiway] 3 but had it been a jet I dont know that we wouldn't have had a collision with larger wingspan and much faster response time requirement, closure rate, etc. The ZZZ Tower folks are a great group and usually have a very good handle on the air traffic."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nStudent training flight. Landed full stop on Runway XX and was instructed to taxi via Taxiway 1 and hold short Runway XY. After holding short for several minutes we were instructed on Tower frequency to cross Runway XY at Taxiway 1 and contact Ground on the other side. Before moving we looked left and saw a Lancair who looked to be landing Runway XY so we held position. As soon as Tower gave us that crossing clearance, he said to cancel the clearance and hold short of [Runway] XY at Taxiway 1, to which we read back we saw the landing traffic and would continue to hold short. The next clearance we received was that we were cleared to cross [Runway] XY at [Taxiway] 1 and the Lancair would be exiting at [Taxiway] 2 off Runway XY. As we pulled forward we could tell the Lancair was not going to take the exit he was instructed to so we stopped the airplane on the west half of the runway and told Tower that we were going to get off the runway via [Taxiway] 2, reverse high speed exit. The idea behind this was that the Lancair would clear the runway at [Taxiway] 1 but because we would be behind it we would be unable to clear the hold-short if he was stopped off of [Taxiway] 1 and Taxiway 2 intersection. The Tower quickly approved our taxi to [Taxiway] 2. The airspace was very busy at the time with lots of training aircraft and more helicopter training traffic than I ever seen in my time at ZZZ. I believe the Tower was task saturated and in the process of having a control on another frequency to control the west side of the airport. The Lancair pilot read back the taxi instruction but did not comply with the instructed exit nor did he immediately get on the radio to say unable or anything of that sort, which played a contributing factor. Luckily we saw him and could tell he wasn't going to make the turn at [Taxiway] 3 but had it been a jet I dont know that we wouldn't have had a collision with larger wingspan and much faster response time requirement, closure rate, etc. The ZZZ Tower folks are a great group and usually have a very good handle on the air traffic.",
    "synopsis": "PA-28 Flight Instructor reported a runway incursion occurred as an aircraft that was landing did not comply with ATC’s instruction to exit the runway at a specific taxiway. To ensure there was proper clearance between aircraft, the Flight Instructor requested a different taxiway to safely exit off the runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=79",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 79,
      "pageEnd": 80,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=79",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 79,
        "pageEnd": 80,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2050639 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "PA-28 Flight Instructor reported a runway incursion occurred as an aircraft that was landing did not comply with ATC’s instruction to exit the runway at a specific taxiway. To ensure there was proper clearance between aircraft, the Flight Instructor requested a different taxiway to safely exit off the runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2049698",
    "date": "2023-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "MD Helicopter 500/C/D/E/L"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Vehicle asked to proceed onto Taxiway 1 and Runway XX from the old hangars. Vehicle was given clearance to proceed onto Taxiway 1 and Runway XX and instructed to hold short Taxiway 2. Vehicle was at operating on the end of Taxiway 1 and on the extended portion of Runway XX. Runway incursion lights and board were utilized. Approximately 20 minutes later Aircraft X called from the new hangars requesting to enter pattern for Runway XX. Aircraft X was instructed to depart the new hangars at his own risk and enter a right base Runway XX. Aircraft X was cleared for the option Runway XX with vehicle still operating on extended portion of Runway XX and Taxiway 1. Aircraft X made a full stop and taxied back to the new hangars via Taxiway 3. Remember to scan runway incursion lights/board prior to giving runway clearances. The RID (Runway Incursion Device) lights are not bright enough during daytime operations and make it easier to pass over by accident."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nVehicle asked to proceed onto Taxiway 1 and Runway XX from the old hangars. Vehicle was given clearance to proceed onto Taxiway 1 and Runway XX and instructed to hold short Taxiway 2. Vehicle was at operating on the end of Taxiway 1 and on the extended portion of Runway XX. Runway incursion lights and board were utilized. Approximately 20 minutes later Aircraft X called from the new hangars requesting to enter pattern for Runway XX. Aircraft X was instructed to depart the new hangars at his own risk and enter a right base Runway XX. Aircraft X was cleared for the option Runway XX with vehicle still operating on extended portion of Runway XX and Taxiway 1. Aircraft X made a full stop and taxied back to the new hangars via Taxiway 3. Remember to scan runway incursion lights/board prior to giving runway clearances. The RID (Runway Incursion Device) lights are not bright enough during daytime operations and make it easier to pass over by accident.",
    "synopsis": "Tower Controller reported clearing a helicopter to enter the pattern for the runway while there was a vehicle operating on the runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=81",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 81,
      "pageEnd": 82,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=81",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 81,
        "pageEnd": 82,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2049698 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Tower Controller reported clearing a helicopter to enter the pattern for the runway while there was a vehicle operating on the runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2047330",
    "date": "2023-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "Military"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During this event I was working Ground Control, Clearance Delivery and Flight DATA. I was informed by Ops that a vehicle had crossed Runway XXR from Taxiway 1 and Taxiway 2 heading eastbound and joined the vehicles staged at Taxiway 2. Vehicle returned crossing XXR again at the same intersection heading westbound, narrowly missing the landing of a [priority handling] Aircraft X on RWY XXR. It was reported by Ops that the driver of the vehicle had to \"slam their brakes\" to avoid a collision with Aircraft X. At no point in time during the two XXR incursions was the vehicle in communication with ground control or the local controller when utilizing the taxiways or crossing XXR. Vehicle was not visible from the tower due to nighttime conditions and no vehicle flashing lights were observed. Time of events as observed in ASCC (Airport Surface Surveillance Capability) playback: XA:40:32z - Vehicle 2 + 3 cross Rwy XXR at Taxiway 2 intersection XA:41:07z - Vehicle 2 + 3 are clear of RWY XXR on Taxiway 2 XA:41:24z - Vehicle target appears on ASCC on the West Ramp XA:41:53z - Vehicle crossed RWY XXR at Taxiway 2 eastbound XA:43:34z - Vehicle reappears on ASCC heading westbound attempting to cross RWY XXR and is within 200 ft of Aircraft X [priority handling] landing. XA:43:36z - Vehicle crosses RWY XXR behind Aircraft X and returns to the west ramp The second vehicles in this report were Aircraft Tow + 1. Tow was accompanied by another vehicle and exited the east ramp via Taxiway 4 and was instructed to proceed Taxiway 4 southbound and to hold short of RWY XXL. Tow acknowledged the transmission but failed to provide a correct readback. Tow proceeded southbound on Taxiway 4 and crossed RWY XXL without authorization and proceeded onto Taxiway 5. Local control had given a RWY XXL landing clearance to Aircraft Y. Tow +1 had cleared RWY XXL prior to Aircraft Y crossing RWY XXL threshold, as observed in the ASCC playback. Time of events as observed in the ASCC playback: XB:04:46z - Tow + 1 crosses RWY XXL at Taxiway 4 South intersection XB:04:59z - Tow + 1 clear of RWY XXL on Taxiway 5 XB:05:15z - Aircraft Y helicopter crosses RWY XXL landing threshold. Recommend all personnel/vehicles utilizing taxiways/runways be equipped with transponders, flashing lights and be in direct communication with the ground control or local control. Direct line to the fire department was OTS (Out of service) during the time of event. Fire department did not answer the crash phone. Due to low visibility at night, vehicle was not visible from tower."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "On Day 1 we had Aircraft X land at approximately XA:42Z after requesting priority handling. Aircraft X successfully landed and positioned itself on Taxiway 5 for inspection from response vehicles. After the response the aircraft remained on the taxiway, awaiting to be towed back its hangar. A vehicle, Tow, was dispatched from the East Ramp and authorized onto Taxiway 4 by the Ground Controller. Prior to me receiving a request from the Ground Controller for the vehicle to cross RWY XXL at Taxiway 4 (to proceed onto Taxiway 5), I was informed by the Ground Controller that the vehicle had crossed the runway without permission. We also received a call from a representative from Operations that they had witnessed the vehicle cross the runway without permission. Later on that evening I received another call from Operations at XB:31Z in which a representative questioned if I was aware of a situation involving a vehicle that had to slam on its brakes to avoid an aircraft. Unsure of any situation I asked for more questions and was told the event happened on Taxiway 1, and then told it was Taxiway 1/Taxiway 2 and that it occurred during the time of the earlier Aircraft X response. Later after receiving more information, I was informed that a vehicle potentially crossed RWY XXR at Taxiway 2 before and after Aircraft X landed, approximately XA:43Z. Immediately before and after Aircraft X landed I never authorized any vehicles to cross RWY XXR at Taxiway 2. Once the aircraft landed and began its taxi roll, control of the RWY was released to the Ground Controller. While I attempted to maintain a continual scan of the airfield there, during the Tow incident I was on dual positions, LC and CIC. It was nighttime and vehicles can be hard to see, especially those without flashing/strobe lights. Additionally, vehicles on our airfield are not equipped with transponders which would make them more identifiable on ground radar. The ground radar is also a new system for us which was certified recently. Recommendation: Ground vehicles should have transponders and flashing lights for visibility."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring this event I was working Ground Control, Clearance Delivery and Flight DATA. I was informed by Ops that a vehicle had crossed Runway XXR from Taxiway 1 and Taxiway 2 heading eastbound and joined the vehicles staged at Taxiway 2. Vehicle returned crossing XXR again at the same intersection heading westbound, narrowly missing the landing of a [priority handling] Aircraft X on RWY XXR. It was reported by Ops that the driver of the vehicle had to \"slam their brakes\" to avoid a collision with Aircraft X. At no point in time during the two XXR incursions was the vehicle in communication with ground control or the local controller when utilizing the taxiways or crossing XXR. Vehicle was not visible from the tower due to nighttime conditions and no vehicle flashing lights were observed. Time of events as observed in ASCC (Airport Surface Surveillance Capability) playback: XA:40:32z - Vehicle 2 + 3 cross Rwy XXR at Taxiway 2 intersection XA:41:07z - Vehicle 2 + 3 are clear of RWY XXR on Taxiway 2 XA:41:24z - Vehicle target appears on ASCC on the West Ramp XA:41:53z - Vehicle crossed RWY XXR at Taxiway 2 eastbound XA:43:34z - Vehicle reappears on ASCC heading westbound attempting to cross RWY XXR and is within 200 ft of Aircraft X [priority handling] landing. XA:43:36z - Vehicle crosses RWY XXR behind Aircraft X and returns to the west ramp The second vehicles in this report were Aircraft Tow + 1. Tow was accompanied by another vehicle and exited the east ramp via Taxiway 4 and was instructed to proceed Taxiway 4 southbound and to hold short of RWY XXL. Tow acknowledged the transmission but failed to provide a correct readback. Tow proceeded southbound on Taxiway 4 and crossed RWY XXL without authorization and proceeded onto Taxiway 5. Local control had given a RWY XXL landing clearance to Aircraft Y. Tow +1 had cleared RWY XXL prior to Aircraft Y crossing RWY XXL threshold, as observed in the ASCC playback. Time of events as observed in the ASCC playback: XB:04:46z - Tow + 1 crosses RWY XXL at Taxiway 4 South intersection XB:04:59z - Tow + 1 clear of RWY XXL on Taxiway 5 XB:05:15z - Aircraft Y helicopter crosses RWY XXL landing threshold. Recommend all personnel/vehicles utilizing taxiways/runways be equipped with transponders, flashing lights and be in direct communication with the ground control or local control. Direct line to the fire department was OTS (Out of service) during the time of event. Fire department did not answer the crash phone. Due to low visibility at night, vehicle was not visible from tower.\n\nNarrative 2\nOn Day 1 we had Aircraft X land at approximately XA:42Z after requesting priority handling. Aircraft X successfully landed and positioned itself on Taxiway 5 for inspection from response vehicles. After the response the aircraft remained on the taxiway, awaiting to be towed back its hangar. A vehicle, Tow, was dispatched from the East Ramp and authorized onto Taxiway 4 by the Ground Controller. Prior to me receiving a request from the Ground Controller for the vehicle to cross RWY XXL at Taxiway 4 (to proceed onto Taxiway 5), I was informed by the Ground Controller that the vehicle had crossed the runway without permission. We also received a call from a representative from Operations that they had witnessed the vehicle cross the runway without permission. Later on that evening I received another call from Operations at XB:31Z in which a representative questioned if I was aware of a situation involving a vehicle that had to slam on its brakes to avoid an aircraft. Unsure of any situation I asked for more questions and was told the event happened on Taxiway 1, and then told it was Taxiway 1/Taxiway 2 and that it occurred during the time of the earlier Aircraft X response. Later after receiving more information, I was informed that a vehicle potentially crossed RWY XXR at Taxiway 2 before and after Aircraft X landed, approximately XA:43Z. Immediately before and after Aircraft X landed I never authorized any vehicles to cross RWY XXR at Taxiway 2. Once the aircraft landed and began its taxi roll, control of the RWY was released to the Ground Controller. While I attempted to maintain a continual scan of the airfield there, during the Tow incident I was on dual positions, LC and CIC. It was nighttime and vehicles can be hard to see, especially those without flashing/strobe lights. Additionally, vehicles on our airfield are not equipped with transponders which would make them more identifiable on ground radar. The ground radar is also a new system for us which was certified recently. Recommendation: Ground vehicles should have transponders and flashing lights for visibility.",
    "synopsis": "Tower Controllers reported ground vehicles failed to communicate and follow hold short instructions resulted in taking evasive action to avoid landing traffic.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=83",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 83,
      "pageEnd": 85,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=83",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 83,
        "pageEnd": 85,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2047330 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Tower Controllers reported ground vehicles failed to communicate and follow hold short instructions resulted in taking evasive action to avoid landing traffic.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2046993",
    "date": "2023-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was operating in the role of a Multi-Engine Flight instructor at Chino, California Airport in Aircraft X. An ATP-rated pilot, who I have known for about a year requested I provide initial multi-engine flight instruction to a student who is instrument and commercial rated in a single engine aircraft with approximately XXX hours. The ATP pilot requested my service because he was aware that I had been providing instruction in an Aircraft X Type X and he owned an Aircraft X Type Y, so I met their insurance requirements. We agreed it would be a good opportunity for the student to get used to flying that aircraft with a current flight instructor. Before we actually got in the aircraft, I conducted almost two hours of multi-engine ground instruction describing aerodynamic principals to include Vmc and all emergency procedures. I informed the student that any aircraft emergencies encountered during the flight today would be handled as real emergencies. Typically on a first flight, I want the student to be the sole manipulator of the controls to get a feel for a larger, faster and heavier aircraft. The ATP-rated pilot sat in the back of the airplane to help provide guidance on the flight profiles he wanted us to maintain when it came to performance and engine maintenance. For instance, he closely monitored the temperatures of the cylinders and repeatedly asked what the temperatures were anytime we were conducting multi-engine maneuvers. As I quickly learned, this became a distraction to not only myself as trying to instruct the student but also to the student flying the plane. After a little over an hour of air work we decided to return to Chino to practice several landings. During the descent, the student started to become overwhelmed with the workload and requested me to handle the radio work. As we descended, the ATP pilot again began to ensure we were properly monitoring the engine gauges and the student was engaging with him more on the performance of the airplane and monitoring the engines than what I believed was necessary. I contacted Chino Tower with the proper ATIS and advised we were inbound for landing. We were given instructions to make a left base for Runway 26L, which we had requested. We proceeded into landing and exited left from the runway onto Taxiway Echo. Although this landing was conducted safely, I noticed the airplane landed near the beginning of the threshold for the 7000 feet runway and we rolled an excessive distance with minimal braking before exiting the runway. However, I did not mention anything as the instructor since we exited taxiway Echo which is the normal taxiway I safely use when instructing in the Aircraft X Type Y. Due to limited data, I'm unable to calculate the distance to Taxiway Echo from the threshold of 26L, however, I was able to interpolate the distance to Taxiway Papa with the data with the length of Runway 26R which is 4858 feet. I can estimate the first taxiway which is Papa would be at approximately 2142 feet. I reviewed the POH charts for normal landing distance data for the Aircraft X Type X. Utilizing the current conditions, the landing roll should be approximately 1200 feet with full flaps and maximum braking. An exit at Taxiway Papa which is at 2142 feet would safely be within the POH landing roll. However, the student rolled the airplane with minimal braking to Taxiway Echo which I would estimate to be another 2000 feet giving a landing roll of over 4000 feet when only 1200 feet is needed. Of note, the ATP pilot advised that they only use a maximum of 25 degrees of flaps, not 40 degrees. After exiting the runway we contacted ground and requested to taxi back to 26L for another traffic pattern. During taxi, I discussed approach speeds and to ensure maintaining above blue line speed at all times while in the traffic pattern in case of sudden engine failure. I then advised as part of the lesson, I would reduce the left throttle after takeoff and only when above at least 500 feet AGL. I explained that I wanted to demonstrate the climb capabilities of the aircraft while having an engine at zero thrust and once we reach traffic pattern altitude, the student would be given both engines in order to conduct a normal landing. Additionally, we agreed this would be the last flight for the day. As I had briefed, after takeoff and at approximately 800 feet AGL, I reduced the power on the left engine and we climbed to traffic pattern altitude. The flight was very normal and we were cleared to land and I believe we might of even advised it would be a full stop landing. The student's approach speeds were exactly at blue line, 89 knots and the student had full control of the aircraft. Touchdown occurred a few hundred feet past the threshold and before Taxiway Papa, which is normal after a proper flare. Upon touchdown, the student immediately retracted the flaps to a zero setting and pulled back on the yoke to ensure the weight of the aircraft had transferred to the wheels. As we quickly passed Taxiway Papa and then Echo where we had last exited, the student had not yet applied any braking. It was after we passed Echo I stated \"Feel free to use some brakes to help us slow down\". The student then replied that the \"other\" pilot instructed the student to only use very minimal braking to prevent wearing the brakes. The ATP pilot also stated they normally land at their home airport ZZZ1 and always roll to the end of the runway without using brakes. As the plane continued to roll past Runway 3-21 the Chino tower instructed us to exit the runway which was due to landing traffic behind us. After clear of Runway 3- 21 the student exited Taxiway Delta which is the final Taxiway prior to the end of the runway. I would estimate this was approximately a 6000 feet landing roll with no braking. Although I understand the concept behind landing and rolling long to prevent wear and tear on the braking system, I believe this landing was excessively long and also placed me in a location on the airport I had never been and was unfamiliar. As noted on the airport diagram, Taxiway Delta has a small \"pie shaped\" area to stop in before crossing the hold lines of Runway 3-21. I estimate this area to be only large enough to safely stop a smaller type aircraft in order to maintain clearance from both hold short lines. With the student being the sole manipulator of the controls and turning left off the runway following the inner yellow taxi way line, I was not able to see the hold short lines for Runway 3-21 since I was in the right seat and my view is obstructed. The hold short lines for Runway 3-21 are immediately off to the left side of the aircraft and at an angle that doesn't allow me to be able to see it until the aircraft makes the turn onto Taxiway Charlie. After clearing the runway and within seconds of coming to a complete stop, we were contacted by ground control and informed that we had gone past the Runway 3-21 hold short lines without clearance. We were told to contact the tower for a possible Pilot Deviation and promptly given taxi clearance to cross Runway 3-21. Fortunately, this indicated that Runway 3-21 was not active and we did not interfere with any landing traffic or cause any further hazards. When conducting my normal multi engine flight training, I routinely go to Chino airport from ZZZ2 due to the close proximity X practice area, availability of practice precision instrument approaches but primarily due to the long and wide 26L runway which is safer for practicing single engine maneuvers. I have 23 separate flights to include solo and as an instructor in a Aircraft X Type X into or out of Chino Airport. Not one time have I exited the 26L runway past the intersection of Runway 3-21. In order to eliminate this from happening again, I will ensure that I am more familiar with all aspects of the airport to include airport diagrams. Also, I will strive to eliminate distractions from external influences such as passengers on the aircraft that might create intimidation to the pilots. I believe this was an isolated incident due to contributing factors of the student not being familiar with the aircraft and airport and pressure applied by having the ATP-rated pilot in the back creating stress which caused both the student and myself to not see the hold short lines of Runway 3-21. I was advised there is only a hold short marking painted on the ground and no flashing lights."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I completed my first official multi-engine lesson in a Aircraft X Type X. We moved the Aircraft X Type X from ZZZ1 to Chino (CNO) for the lesson. I had flown in and out of the airport multiple times that day to move the aircrafts, but was not entirely familiar with the field as I would be my own. I had a X hour ground and then an approximately X hour flying lesson, where we did air work, stalls, and some single engine work with a new instructor. At the time my instructor and I had come into the pattern to do two full stop landings. After the first landing we taxied back to takeoff and proceeded to a simulated single engine (only on downwind) landing. We took off and did one lap in the pattern. I landed and rolled long, briefed by the ATP pilot in the aircraft to go easy on the brakes when able. Tower instructed me to exit Runway 26L at the upcoming exit D. I exited the runway, making sure to clear the hold short bars since I was in a lot larger of an aircraft than I was used to. I cleaned up the airplane and went over to ground frequency. They instructed me to cross Runway 21, which they alerted me that my nose was past the hold short bars, and taxi via C to the FBO where we requested to park. I looked down and noticed my nose was in fact about a foot past the hold short bar. I repeated back the instruction and continued taxiing. Ground then advised me of the possible runway incursion and provided me with a phone number. My instructor read the number back. Upon returning to the FBO my instructor and I debriefed the event. He explained that he usually does not roll as long and that he is not as familiar with the other exits. We agreed at new airports it is important to brief an exit plan especially if I intent to roll long. We also studied the airport diagram and noted that it was not an airport hotspot and that it may be good to notify airport management about the possible confusion for other pilots. The distance between the two hold short bars is just barely enough for an Aircraft X Type X to fit and if unfamiliar it is easy to miss. Many contributing factors led to this event; both my and my instructor's unfamiliarity with CNO, me being in a new, larger aircraft, and possible fatigue from the long lesson. In the future, I plan to set aside more time to review the airport diagram and really be familiar with my possible exits before flying and especially training out of an airport."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was operating in the role of a Multi-Engine Flight instructor at Chino, California Airport in Aircraft X. An ATP-rated pilot, who I have known for about a year requested I provide initial multi-engine flight instruction to a student who is instrument and commercial rated in a single engine aircraft with approximately XXX hours. The ATP pilot requested my service because he was aware that I had been providing instruction in an Aircraft X Type X and he owned an Aircraft X Type Y, so I met their insurance requirements. We agreed it would be a good opportunity for the student to get used to flying that aircraft with a current flight instructor. Before we actually got in the aircraft, I conducted almost two hours of multi-engine ground instruction describing aerodynamic principals to include Vmc and all emergency procedures. I informed the student that any aircraft emergencies encountered during the flight today would be handled as real emergencies. Typically on a first flight, I want the student to be the sole manipulator of the controls to get a feel for a larger, faster and heavier aircraft. The ATP-rated pilot sat in the back of the airplane to help provide guidance on the flight profiles he wanted us to maintain when it came to performance and engine maintenance. For instance, he closely monitored the temperatures of the cylinders and repeatedly asked what the temperatures were anytime we were conducting multi-engine maneuvers. As I quickly learned, this became a distraction to not only myself as trying to instruct the student but also to the student flying the plane. After a little over an hour of air work we decided to return to Chino to practice several landings. During the descent, the student started to become overwhelmed with the workload and requested me to handle the radio work. As we descended, the ATP pilot again began to ensure we were properly monitoring the engine gauges and the student was engaging with him more on the performance of the airplane and monitoring the engines than what I believed was necessary. I contacted Chino Tower with the proper ATIS and advised we were inbound for landing. We were given instructions to make a left base for Runway 26L, which we had requested. We proceeded into landing and exited left from the runway onto Taxiway Echo. Although this landing was conducted safely, I noticed the airplane landed near the beginning of the threshold for the 7000 feet runway and we rolled an excessive distance with minimal braking before exiting the runway. However, I did not mention anything as the instructor since we exited taxiway Echo which is the normal taxiway I safely use when instructing in the Aircraft X Type Y. Due to limited data, I'm unable to calculate the distance to Taxiway Echo from the threshold of 26L, however, I was able to interpolate the distance to Taxiway Papa with the data with the length of Runway 26R which is 4858 feet. I can estimate the first taxiway which is Papa would be at approximately 2142 feet. I reviewed the POH charts for normal landing distance data for the Aircraft X Type X. Utilizing the current conditions, the landing roll should be approximately 1200 feet with full flaps and maximum braking. An exit at Taxiway Papa which is at 2142 feet would safely be within the POH landing roll. However, the student rolled the airplane with minimal braking to Taxiway Echo which I would estimate to be another 2000 feet giving a landing roll of over 4000 feet when only 1200 feet is needed. Of note, the ATP pilot advised that they only use a maximum of 25 degrees of flaps, not 40 degrees. After exiting the runway we contacted ground and requested to taxi back to 26L for another traffic pattern. During taxi, I discussed approach speeds and to ensure maintaining above blue line speed at all times while in the traffic pattern in case of sudden engine failure. I then advised as part of the lesson, I would reduce the left throttle after takeoff and only when above at least 500 feet AGL. I explained that I wanted to demonstrate the climb capabilities of the aircraft while having an engine at zero thrust and once we reach traffic pattern altitude, the student would be given both engines in order to conduct a normal landing. Additionally, we agreed this would be the last flight for the day. As I had briefed, after takeoff and at approximately 800 feet AGL, I reduced the power on the left engine and we climbed to traffic pattern altitude. The flight was very normal and we were cleared to land and I believe we might of even advised it would be a full stop landing. The student's approach speeds were exactly at blue line, 89 knots and the student had full control of the aircraft. Touchdown occurred a few hundred feet past the threshold and before Taxiway Papa, which is normal after a proper flare. Upon touchdown, the student immediately retracted the flaps to a zero setting and pulled back on the yoke to ensure the weight of the aircraft had transferred to the wheels. As we quickly passed Taxiway Papa and then Echo where we had last exited, the student had not yet applied any braking. It was after we passed Echo I stated \"Feel free to use some brakes to help us slow down\". The student then replied that the \"other\" pilot instructed the student to only use very minimal braking to prevent wearing the brakes. The ATP pilot also stated they normally land at their home airport ZZZ1 and always roll to the end of the runway without using brakes. As the plane continued to roll past Runway 3-21 the Chino tower instructed us to exit the runway which was due to landing traffic behind us. After clear of Runway 3- 21 the student exited Taxiway Delta which is the final Taxiway prior to the end of the runway. I would estimate this was approximately a 6000 feet landing roll with no braking. Although I understand the concept behind landing and rolling long to prevent wear and tear on the braking system, I believe this landing was excessively long and also placed me in a location on the airport I had never been and was unfamiliar. As noted on the airport diagram, Taxiway Delta has a small \"pie shaped\" area to stop in before crossing the hold lines of Runway 3-21. I estimate this area to be only large enough to safely stop a smaller type aircraft in order to maintain clearance from both hold short lines. With the student being the sole manipulator of the controls and turning left off the runway following the inner yellow taxi way line, I was not able to see the hold short lines for Runway 3-21 since I was in the right seat and my view is obstructed. The hold short lines for Runway 3-21 are immediately off to the left side of the aircraft and at an angle that doesn't allow me to be able to see it until the aircraft makes the turn onto Taxiway Charlie. After clearing the runway and within seconds of coming to a complete stop, we were contacted by ground control and informed that we had gone past the Runway 3-21 hold short lines without clearance. We were told to contact the tower for a possible Pilot Deviation and promptly given taxi clearance to cross Runway 3-21. Fortunately, this indicated that Runway 3-21 was not active and we did not interfere with any landing traffic or cause any further hazards. When conducting my normal multi engine flight training, I routinely go to Chino airport from ZZZ2 due to the close proximity X practice area, availability of practice precision instrument approaches but primarily due to the long and wide 26L runway which is safer for practicing single engine maneuvers. I have 23 separate flights to include solo and as an instructor in a Aircraft X Type X into or out of Chino Airport. Not one time have I exited the 26L runway past the intersection of Runway 3-21. In order to eliminate this from happening again, I will ensure that I am more familiar with all aspects of the airport to include airport diagrams. Also, I will strive to eliminate distractions from external influences such as passengers on the aircraft that might create intimidation to the pilots. I believe this was an isolated incident due to contributing factors of the student not being familiar with the aircraft and airport and pressure applied by having the ATP-rated pilot in the back creating stress which caused both the student and myself to not see the hold short lines of Runway 3-21. I was advised there is only a hold short marking painted on the ground and no flashing lights.\n\nNarrative 2\nI completed my first official multi-engine lesson in a Aircraft X Type X. We moved the Aircraft X Type X from ZZZ1 to Chino (CNO) for the lesson. I had flown in and out of the airport multiple times that day to move the aircrafts, but was not entirely familiar with the field as I would be my own. I had a X hour ground and then an approximately X hour flying lesson, where we did air work, stalls, and some single engine work with a new instructor. At the time my instructor and I had come into the pattern to do two full stop landings. After the first landing we taxied back to takeoff and proceeded to a simulated single engine (only on downwind) landing. We took off and did one lap in the pattern. I landed and rolled long, briefed by the ATP pilot in the aircraft to go easy on the brakes when able. Tower instructed me to exit Runway 26L at the upcoming exit D. I exited the runway, making sure to clear the hold short bars since I was in a lot larger of an aircraft than I was used to. I cleaned up the airplane and went over to ground frequency. They instructed me to cross Runway 21, which they alerted me that my nose was past the hold short bars, and taxi via C to the FBO where we requested to park. I looked down and noticed my nose was in fact about a foot past the hold short bar. I repeated back the instruction and continued taxiing. Ground then advised me of the possible runway incursion and provided me with a phone number. My instructor read the number back. Upon returning to the FBO my instructor and I debriefed the event. He explained that he usually does not roll as long and that he is not as familiar with the other exits. We agreed at new airports it is important to brief an exit plan especially if I intent to roll long. We also studied the airport diagram and noted that it was not an airport hotspot and that it may be good to notify airport management about the possible confusion for other pilots. The distance between the two hold short bars is just barely enough for an Aircraft X Type X to fit and if unfamiliar it is easy to miss. Many contributing factors led to this event; both my and my instructor's unfamiliarity with CNO, me being in a new, larger aircraft, and possible fatigue from the long lesson. In the future, I plan to set aside more time to review the airport diagram and really be familiar with my possible exits before flying and especially training out of an airport.",
    "synopsis": "Multi-engine Flight Instructor and student reported a runway incursion at CNO airport after landing on an intersecting runway. The CFI reported difficulty seeing painted markings due to the geometry of the turn when exiting. Student recommended making airport management aware of the potential for incursions due to the short distance between hold short bars and no additional lights or markings to indicate hold short.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=86",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 86,
      "pageEnd": 90,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=86",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 86,
        "pageEnd": 90,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2046993 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Multi-engine Flight Instructor and student reported a runway incursion at CNO airport after landing on an intersecting runway. The CFI reported difficulty seeing painted markings due to the geometry of the turn when exiting. Student recommended making airport management aware of the potential for incursions due to the short distance between hold short bars and no additional lights or markings to indicate hold short.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2045362",
    "date": "2023-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "There is a new hold short line for Runway 7. There was no NOTAM that I could find on this and the sun angle made it hard to see on the pavement. There was also no mention of the new hold short line on the 10-9 Page and nothing on the company information page. We taxied slightly past the new line before discovering the error. Suggestion: Put out a NOTAM on the new hold short line and add a mention of it for taxi out on the company page for MBJ."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Taxing out for departure from Montego Bay after taking a XX minute delay for a passenger that checked X bags but did not board the aircraft. We crossed the hold short line. The new line is significantly further from the runway than the original hold short. The original hold short lines are still visible albeit painted black. I was distracted by my frustration with the handling of the missing passenger situation. Suggestion: If there was a note in the company page, this could help with SA."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nThere is a new hold short line for Runway 7. There was no NOTAM that I could find on this and the sun angle made it hard to see on the pavement. There was also no mention of the new hold short line on the 10-9 Page and nothing on the company information page. We taxied slightly past the new line before discovering the error. Suggestion: Put out a NOTAM on the new hold short line and add a mention of it for taxi out on the company page for MBJ.\n\nNarrative 2\nTaxing out for departure from Montego Bay after taking a XX minute delay for a passenger that checked X bags but did not board the aircraft. We crossed the hold short line. The new line is significantly further from the runway than the original hold short. The original hold short lines are still visible albeit painted black. I was distracted by my frustration with the handling of the missing passenger situation. Suggestion: If there was a note in the company page, this could help with SA.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported a runway incursion after failing to see the location of a recently moved hold short line.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=91",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 91,
      "pageEnd": 92,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=91",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 91,
        "pageEnd": 92,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2045362 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported a runway incursion after failing to see the location of a recently moved hold short line.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2042931",
    "date": "2023-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800",
      "A330"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch",
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Tower gave us line up and wait, for multiple aircraft crossing downfield on runway XX. Two heavy aircraft crossed runway XX downfield. After the two aircraft had cleared [runway] XX, tower then cleared us for takeoff. I initiated the take off sequence and executed standard procedures to the point where I noticed an Airbus (321) about to cross the runway and then proceeding on to runway XX. Approaching 80 kts, tower transmits “Aircraft X cancel take off clearance. CA (Captain) then initiated RTO (Rejected Take Off) with standard procedures. We exited about halfway down the runway with minimal brake application on taxiway 1. I clarified with tower for taxi clearance and again for takeoff clearance, while re accomplishing takeoff checklist. Cause: Non compliance to clearance by aircraft taxiing and crossing active runway. Suggestions: Compliance to ATC clearance by aircrew"
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were given a line up and wait traffic will cross clearance onto runway XX. We watched two heavy aircraft aircraft cross at the far end of the runway. Tower then gave us clearance to take off. My first officer commenced the takeoff. I was pilot monitoring. The tower said Aircraft X cancel take off clearance. I looked up to see a heavy was crossing runway XX. This occurred about. 75 knots as I did not make the 80 knot call out. I did the reject procedure, exited the runway on taxiway 1 about halfway down the runway. Cause: My guess is the heavy had a language barrier and thought he/she had clearance to cross. Suggestions: Maybe better communication for clearances."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nTower gave us line up and wait, for multiple aircraft crossing downfield on runway XX. Two heavy aircraft crossed runway XX downfield. After the two aircraft had cleared [runway] XX, tower then cleared us for takeoff. I initiated the take off sequence and executed standard procedures to the point where I noticed an Airbus (321) about to cross the runway and then proceeding on to runway XX. Approaching 80 kts, tower transmits “Aircraft X cancel take off clearance. CA (Captain) then initiated RTO (Rejected Take Off) with standard procedures. We exited about halfway down the runway with minimal brake application on taxiway 1. I clarified with tower for taxi clearance and again for takeoff clearance, while re accomplishing takeoff checklist. Cause: Non compliance to clearance by aircraft taxiing and crossing active runway. Suggestions: Compliance to ATC clearance by aircrew\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were given a line up and wait traffic will cross clearance onto runway XX. We watched two heavy aircraft aircraft cross at the far end of the runway. Tower then gave us clearance to take off. My first officer commenced the takeoff. I was pilot monitoring. The tower said Aircraft X cancel take off clearance. I looked up to see a heavy was crossing runway XX. This occurred about. 75 knots as I did not make the 80 knot call out. I did the reject procedure, exited the runway on taxiway 1 about halfway down the runway. Cause: My guess is the heavy had a language barrier and thought he/she had clearance to cross. Suggestions: Maybe better communication for clearances.",
    "synopsis": "B737 flight crew reported observing traffic entering runway while accelerating for takeoff resulted in ATC clearance to cancel takeoff and a rejected takeoff.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=93",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 93,
      "pageEnd": 94,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=93",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 93,
        "pageEnd": 94,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2042931 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "B737 flight crew reported observing traffic entering runway while accelerating for takeoff resulted in ATC clearance to cancel takeoff and a rejected takeoff.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2042812",
    "date": "2023-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was cleared for immediate takeoff on Runway 14. Upon response, I added throttle to promptly enter the Runway and safely take off. Tower advised me there was traffic on a 1 1/2 mile final. Upon crossing threshold, my takeoff clearance was cancelled, then immediately pulled power to idle and proceeded with maximum breaking. After coming to a complete stop, I was beyond the hold short bars, I was waiting for further instructions. The aircraft on the short final proceeded to land with me passed the hold short line, on the Runway. After he exited the Runway, I was then cleared for takeoff again."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was cleared for immediate takeoff on Runway 14. Upon response, I added throttle to promptly enter the Runway and safely take off. Tower advised me there was traffic on a 1 1/2 mile final. Upon crossing threshold, my takeoff clearance was cancelled, then immediately pulled power to idle and proceeded with maximum breaking. After coming to a complete stop, I was beyond the hold short bars, I was waiting for further instructions. The aircraft on the short final proceeded to land with me passed the hold short line, on the Runway. After he exited the Runway, I was then cleared for takeoff again.",
    "synopsis": "General aviation pilot reported a near miss on a training flight while receiving an ATC clearance to takeoff, then ATC cancelling the takeoff clearance as the pilot was crossing the runway hold line. Once the aircraft on final landed, the general aviation pilot received another takeoff clearance.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=95",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 95,
      "pageEnd": 96,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=95",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 95,
        "pageEnd": 96,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "Canceled takeoff clearance leaves aircraft beyond the hold line",
    "summary": "After receiving an immediate-takeoff clearance, a pilot accelerated toward the runway and then received a cancellation with another aircraft on final. The pilot stopped beyond the hold line while the approaching aircraft landed, then received a new takeoff clearance.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Communication"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2042483",
    "date": "2023-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were holding short of Runway 36 waiting for our takeoff clearance. We were then cleared for a no delay takeoff 090 as we taxied across the hold short line I looked up to double check for traffic and saw Aircraft Y on short final. I slammed the brakes just passed the whole short line as the plane came into land in front of us. During the entirety of the flight there was only one controller who seemed overwhelmed dealing with ground clearances, takeoff clearances and landing clearances."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were holding short of Runway 36 waiting for our takeoff clearance. We were then cleared for a no delay takeoff 090 as we taxied across the hold short line I looked up to double check for traffic and saw Aircraft Y on short final. I slammed the brakes just passed the whole short line as the plane came into land in front of us. During the entirety of the flight there was only one controller who seemed overwhelmed dealing with ground clearances, takeoff clearances and landing clearances.",
    "synopsis": "Flight instructor reported a near miss while entering a runway for takeoff with an aircraft on short final. Flight instructor stopped past the hold short line and another aircraft landed.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=97",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 97,
      "pageEnd": 98,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=97",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 97,
        "pageEnd": 98,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "Aircraft on short final spotted after takeoff clearance",
    "summary": "A flight instructor reported entering past the hold line after a no-delay takeoff clearance and then seeing another aircraft on short final. The instructor braked and the other aircraft landed in front; the reporter described one controller managing several duties and appearing overwhelmed.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Communication",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2040516",
    "date": "2023-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "PA-46 Malibu Meridian"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Runway Incursion Incident at ZZZ at XB30. Arrived ZZZ at XA40. Removed aircraft from hangar and proceeded to fuel pumps. Topped off both inner tanks of Aircraft X, A Piper PA46 Malibu based at ZZZ. A flight plan was filed to ZZZ2 from ZZZ1. ZZZ1 was selected so that the clearance could be picked up by ZZZ Approach, rather than ZZZ1 TRACON. ATIS reported wind at 190 and 4 knots. After fueling, I selected runway XX for departure. I taxied to the Runway XX threshold and performed a full checklist. This took perhaps 2 minutes. I turned on strobes as well as taxi lighting. These are high intensity wingtip forward lamps. This is done due to the high volume of westbound traffic heading to ZZZ3 and many of them using ZZZZZ intersection at 6,000 ft. After checklisting, I announced my departure on runway XX on the Unicom frequency and after looking carefully for approaching traffic in both directions, proceeded to enter the runway. The time is exactly XB13. The sun is up, but the sun is very low in the east and pretty much right in my face. After a slight overshoot of the centerline on the turn, I aligned on the centerline and applied takeoff power. After about perhaps about 1,000 feet of takeoff roll I spotted a dark shape on the left part of the runway. The sun is directly in front of me. It was a very small shape. Actually looked like groundwater at first. In the next second or two, I interpreted it in my mind as a small animal, perhaps a coyote. Then it became clearer that it was a golf cart with a person in it driving westbound on the runway to the left/north of the centerline. The bright green safety vest was the most visible aspect. My choice was to abort the takeoff and possibly strike the golf cart or rotate the plane immediately. The plane was far under gross weight and I had accelerated to 68 knots, so I decided to rotate the aircraft. As I passed over the golf cart at perhaps by 10-20 feet, the Golf cart steered off of the runway to the north and into the grass. I observed a person wearing the bright green safety vest. After cleaning up the plane (wheels, flaps, power), I texted two people to contact the airport and notify them of the runway incursion incident."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nRunway Incursion Incident at ZZZ at XB30. Arrived ZZZ at XA40. Removed aircraft from hangar and proceeded to fuel pumps. Topped off both inner tanks of Aircraft X, A Piper PA46 Malibu based at ZZZ. A flight plan was filed to ZZZ2 from ZZZ1. ZZZ1 was selected so that the clearance could be picked up by ZZZ Approach, rather than ZZZ1 TRACON. ATIS reported wind at 190 and 4 knots. After fueling, I selected runway XX for departure. I taxied to the Runway XX threshold and performed a full checklist. This took perhaps 2 minutes. I turned on strobes as well as taxi lighting. These are high intensity wingtip forward lamps. This is done due to the high volume of westbound traffic heading to ZZZ3 and many of them using ZZZZZ intersection at 6,000 ft. After checklisting, I announced my departure on runway XX on the Unicom frequency and after looking carefully for approaching traffic in both directions, proceeded to enter the runway. The time is exactly XB13. The sun is up, but the sun is very low in the east and pretty much right in my face. After a slight overshoot of the centerline on the turn, I aligned on the centerline and applied takeoff power. After about perhaps about 1,000 feet of takeoff roll I spotted a dark shape on the left part of the runway. The sun is directly in front of me. It was a very small shape. Actually looked like groundwater at first. In the next second or two, I interpreted it in my mind as a small animal, perhaps a coyote. Then it became clearer that it was a golf cart with a person in it driving westbound on the runway to the left/north of the centerline. The bright green safety vest was the most visible aspect. My choice was to abort the takeoff and possibly strike the golf cart or rotate the plane immediately. The plane was far under gross weight and I had accelerated to 68 knots, so I decided to rotate the aircraft. As I passed over the golf cart at perhaps by 10-20 feet, the Golf cart steered off of the runway to the north and into the grass. I observed a person wearing the bright green safety vest. After cleaning up the plane (wheels, flaps, power), I texted two people to contact the airport and notify them of the runway incursion incident.",
    "synopsis": "Pilot departing a non-towered airport reported during takeoff roll they saw a golf cart driving on the runway and decided to rotate early to avoid hitting the cart.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=99",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 99,
      "pageEnd": 100,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=99",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 99,
        "pageEnd": 100,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2040516 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Pilot departing a non-towered airport reported during takeoff roll they saw a golf cart driving on the runway and decided to rotate early to avoid hitting the cart.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2037027",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach",
      "Landing",
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After myself entering the 45 (I am Aircraft X) following Aircraft Y, turning downwind, Aircraft Z not making many calls tries to come in midfield 200 ft. below and starts to turn downwind. I am on top of the aircraft and lets the pilot know on the comms. He does a 360 and I request not to pull up in the event of a mid air collision. I extend my downwind for Aircraft Y to land, once Aircraft Y turns final I start to turn base and Aircraft Z also turns base to go final cutting off Aircraft Y. Myself and Aircraft Y lets him know which he does a 360 on base and flies on what he thinks is a downwind but is still close off to my right wing when im on final. Upon me and my student landing, while we are still on the runway I turn around and see Aircraft Z also lands on the runway while im still well within the protected runway environment. I was clearing at taxiway Charlie and he looked to land by taxiway Delta."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter myself entering the 45 (I am Aircraft X) following Aircraft Y, turning downwind, Aircraft Z not making many calls tries to come in midfield 200 ft. below and starts to turn downwind. I am on top of the aircraft and lets the pilot know on the comms. He does a 360 and I request not to pull up in the event of a mid air collision. I extend my downwind for Aircraft Y to land, once Aircraft Y turns final I start to turn base and Aircraft Z also turns base to go final cutting off Aircraft Y. Myself and Aircraft Y lets him know which he does a 360 on base and flies on what he thinks is a downwind but is still close off to my right wing when im on final. Upon me and my student landing, while we are still on the runway I turn around and see Aircraft Z also lands on the runway while im still well within the protected runway environment. I was clearing at taxiway Charlie and he looked to land by taxiway Delta.",
    "synopsis": "Instructor pilot reported a near miss in the traffic pattern on a training flight at a non- towered airport, during day, VMC conditions. The Instructor pilot maneuvered to remain clear of the other aircraft, and landed safely, with the other aircraft also landing while the instructor aircraft was still on the runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=101",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 101,
      "pageEnd": 102,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=101",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 101,
        "pageEnd": 102,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2037027 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Instructor pilot reported a near miss in the traffic pattern on a training flight at a non- towered airport, during day, VMC conditions. The Instructor pilot maneuvered to remain clear of the other aircraft, and landed safely, with the other aircraft also landing while the instructor aircraft was still on the runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2036038",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On short final to Runway 32 at VDI, a vehicle belonging to an onsite construction contractor entered the runway and proceed to drive northwest on the runway. A go- around was executed and an uneventful return to landing then occurred. According to an FBO employee, this was not the first occurrence during the construction project. The contractor needs training on required safety procedures at uncontrolled airports."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn short final to Runway 32 at VDI, a vehicle belonging to an onsite construction contractor entered the runway and proceed to drive northwest on the runway. A go- around was executed and an uneventful return to landing then occurred. According to an FBO employee, this was not the first occurrence during the construction project. The contractor needs training on required safety procedures at uncontrolled airports.",
    "synopsis": "Small transport pilot reported a construction vehicle entered and remained on the runway while the aircraft was on short final necessitating a low level go around.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=103",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 103,
      "pageEnd": 104,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=103",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 103,
        "pageEnd": 104,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "Construction vehicle on runway prompts a go-around",
    "summary": "A pilot on short final at VDI saw a construction vehicle enter and drive along the runway, then went around and returned for an uneventful landing. An airport employee reportedly said similar entries had happened before during the project.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Procedures"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2034969",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Bonanza 35",
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Landing Runway XX at ZZZ upon landing advised to exit via Taxiway 1. I exited Runway X/XY the right hand turn before taxiway. A jet was landing behind me so I was unable to re-enter Runway XX to exit. I held short Runway XX. Aircraft Y went around and I re entered Runway XX and exited on taxiway without incident to FBO. In a single pilot task saturated environment and a landing Jet it may have been better to go around and not be rushed to exit runway. In order to avoid the GO around ATC could have advised Taxiway without interference. Thank you."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nLanding Runway XX at ZZZ upon landing advised to exit via Taxiway 1. I exited Runway X/XY the right hand turn before taxiway. A jet was landing behind me so I was unable to re-enter Runway XX to exit. I held short Runway XX. Aircraft Y went around and I re entered Runway XX and exited on taxiway without incident to FBO. In a single pilot task saturated environment and a landing Jet it may have been better to go around and not be rushed to exit runway. In order to avoid the GO around ATC could have advised Taxiway without interference. Thank you.",
    "synopsis": "Pilot flying Beech v35 aircraft reported exiting onto a runway instead of taxiway per clearance resulting in a go-around by another aircraft on approach.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=105",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 105,
      "pageEnd": 106,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=105",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 105,
        "pageEnd": 106,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "Wrong runway exit leads to another aircraft going around",
    "summary": "A single pilot exited onto a runway instead of the assigned taxiway after landing. With a jet approaching behind, the pilot held position until that aircraft went around, then reentered and exited correctly; the reporter described being overloaded and rushed.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2032138",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "PA-24 Comanche",
      "Small Aircraft"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing",
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During takeoff and upon raising the landing gear, I had a complete electrical power failure. All radios, including the code squawker, were lost. I was in Delta airspace, under Bravo airspace. After visually clearing the airspace, I decided to make left traffic back to the runway. During downwind, I assessed that I did still have landing gear in the down position. I did not have power to deploy flaps. I also saw that the runway was without approaching or takeoff traffic. After passing the key position, I again verified that there was not any traffic in the the right or left pattern in front of me or on final. There was not any traffic on the runway either. I began my approach to land. While in base, I noticed a small piston airplane approaching the hold short line of Runway XX, which was my intended runway for a [priority] landing. As I turned final, the small piston airplane, crossed the hold short line. I began to evaluate a possible go-around, but immediately, the other aircraft turned around and headed away from the runway. He was never on the runway and was now departing away from the runway and back towards the taxiway. I decided that it was safe to proceed and land. I safely landed."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring takeoff and upon raising the landing gear, I had a complete electrical power failure. All radios, including the code squawker, were lost. I was in Delta airspace, under Bravo airspace. After visually clearing the airspace, I decided to make left traffic back to the runway. During downwind, I assessed that I did still have landing gear in the down position. I did not have power to deploy flaps. I also saw that the runway was without approaching or takeoff traffic. After passing the key position, I again verified that there was not any traffic in the the right or left pattern in front of me or on final. There was not any traffic on the runway either. I began my approach to land. While in base, I noticed a small piston airplane approaching the hold short line of Runway XX, which was my intended runway for a [priority] landing. As I turned final, the small piston airplane, crossed the hold short line. I began to evaluate a possible go-around, but immediately, the other aircraft turned around and headed away from the runway. He was never on the runway and was now departing away from the runway and back towards the taxiway. I decided that it was safe to proceed and land. I safely landed.",
    "synopsis": "Piper 24 pilot reported complete electrical failure after takeoff resulting in an immediate return to the airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=107",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 107,
      "pageEnd": 108,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=107",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 107,
        "pageEnd": 108,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2032138 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Piper 24 pilot reported complete electrical failure after takeoff resulting in an immediate return to the airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2032094",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "No wind conditions and planned eastbound route, planned to launch on 06. Announced back-taxi 06, as approach and crossing Runway 31 observed Aircraft Y executing go- around above me, then observed radio mis-tuned to 123.8, not 122.8, tuned correctly and responded to Aircraft Y inquiry apology and would wait for him to land before departure. Had been using frequencies in the 123.## range, human error did not verify correct frequency. Tuning error unnoticed on original approach, no traffic observed on ADS-B in vicinity during approach and landing."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nNo wind conditions and planned eastbound route, planned to launch on 06. Announced back-taxi 06, as approach and crossing Runway 31 observed Aircraft Y executing go- around above me, then observed radio mis-tuned to 123.8, not 122.8, tuned correctly and responded to Aircraft Y inquiry apology and would wait for him to land before departure. Had been using frequencies in the 123.## range, human error did not verify correct frequency. Tuning error unnoticed on original approach, no traffic observed on ADS-B in vicinity during approach and landing.",
    "synopsis": "GA pilot reported as they crossed the runway at a non-towered airport, another aircraft executed a go-around above them. Reporter noticed they were communicating on the wrong frequency and the other aircraft had not heard reporter's announced intentions to cross the runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=109",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 109,
      "pageEnd": 110,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=109",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 109,
        "pageEnd": 110,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "Wrong radio frequency hides a runway-crossing conflict",
    "summary": "While back-taxiing and crossing a runway at a non-towered airport, a pilot saw another aircraft go around overhead. The pilot then discovered the radio was tuned to 123.8 instead of 122.8, corrected the frequency, apologized, and said they would wait for the other aircraft to land.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Communication",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2030251",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach",
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While on final approach to runway 27L at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, we were fully configured and cleared to land. Downfield Aircraft Z had just finished crossing the 27L runway, when the First Officer and I noticed Aircraft Y on taxi northbound, nearing the approach end of our landing runway. As they began crossing 27L, they did not appear to be taxiing fast enough to clear the runway before we would land. I do not recall ever hearing from the tower that Aircraft Y would be crossing 27L; we may have missed the call if it was made, perhaps while we were busy configuring our aircraft for the landing and didn’t hear it. At less than a mile from the runway, we queried the tower, “Is Aircraft X still cleared to land?”, upon which the immediate response from the tower was “Aircraft X, go around”. On frequency right after, we heard “Good call”. I’m not sure who made it. We conducted a normal go around, followed by a normal landing at ATL."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Uneventful flight to ATL. While on short final to 27L (fully configured and stable and descending through 1000 ft), Aircraft Y began crossing the approach end (from left to right from our perspective). It seemed close and I’m not sure if I heard ATC give them clearance to cross. I told the CA (Captain), “this looks close” and he agreed so I queried the tower asking “Are we still cleared to land?” They hesitated a second and then directed us to go around, which we were just about to initiate on our own as well. We completed a normal go around as the tail of Aircraft Y cleared the runway. We then returned for an uneventful landing on runway 28."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile on final approach to runway 27L at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, we were fully configured and cleared to land. Downfield Aircraft Z had just finished crossing the 27L runway, when the First Officer and I noticed Aircraft Y on taxi northbound, nearing the approach end of our landing runway. As they began crossing 27L, they did not appear to be taxiing fast enough to clear the runway before we would land. I do not recall ever hearing from the tower that Aircraft Y would be crossing 27L; we may have missed the call if it was made, perhaps while we were busy configuring our aircraft for the landing and didn’t hear it. At less than a mile from the runway, we queried the tower, “Is Aircraft X still cleared to land?”, upon which the immediate response from the tower was “Aircraft X, go around”. On frequency right after, we heard “Good call”. I’m not sure who made it. We conducted a normal go around, followed by a normal landing at ATL.\n\nNarrative 2\nUneventful flight to ATL. While on short final to 27L (fully configured and stable and descending through 1000 ft), Aircraft Y began crossing the approach end (from left to right from our perspective). It seemed close and I’m not sure if I heard ATC give them clearance to cross. I told the CA (Captain), “this looks close” and he agreed so I queried the tower asking “Are we still cleared to land?” They hesitated a second and then directed us to go around, which we were just about to initiate on our own as well. We completed a normal go around as the tail of Aircraft Y cleared the runway. We then returned for an uneventful landing on runway 28.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier crew reported a conflict while on final approach with another aircraft taxing across the landing runway at a tower controlled airport in VMC. ATC directed the air carrier crew to go around when the other aircraft did not clear the runway, then returned for a safe landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=111",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 111,
      "pageEnd": 113,
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=111",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 111,
        "pageEnd": 113,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
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    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2030251 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier crew reported a conflict while on final approach with another aircraft taxing across the landing runway at a tower controlled airport in VMC. ATC directed the air carrier crew to go around when the other aircraft did not clear the runway, then returned for a safe landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2030139",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172",
      "Cessna 152"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch",
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was holding short of Runway XXR at the intersection of ZZZ in a Cessna 172, on a sunny afternoon in good weather and fair visibility. The Tower controller was working two frequencies, and we called holding short and requested a departure. The controller immediately cleared us for takeoff on [Runway] XXR, which my Private Pilot student read back correctly. We started moving across the hold short bars when another aircraft in the pattern, a Cessna 152, called \"Aircraft Y on short final.\" I slammed on the brakes, and a few seconds later the Cessna crossed over the numbers directly in front of me at approximately 40 feet in front of my nose and 50 ft. AGL. At this point we were inside the Runway Safety Area (RSA) and about halfway past the hold short markings about to enter the landing surface. If I had not slammed on the brakes, the short final traffic had not called on frequency, and/or there had not been a displaced threshold a collision may have occurred. The geometry was such that I was not able to see the aircraft on short final before moving into the RSA. This was the nearest miss of my piloting career and was a result of the Tower controller clearing me for takeoff with another aircraft on short final."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was holding short of Runway XXR at the intersection of ZZZ in a Cessna 172, on a sunny afternoon in good weather and fair visibility. The Tower controller was working two frequencies, and we called holding short and requested a departure. The controller immediately cleared us for takeoff on [Runway] XXR, which my Private Pilot student read back correctly. We started moving across the hold short bars when another aircraft in the pattern, a Cessna 152, called \"Aircraft Y on short final.\" I slammed on the brakes, and a few seconds later the Cessna crossed over the numbers directly in front of me at approximately 40 feet in front of my nose and 50 ft. AGL. At this point we were inside the Runway Safety Area (RSA) and about halfway past the hold short markings about to enter the landing surface. If I had not slammed on the brakes, the short final traffic had not called on frequency, and/or there had not been a displaced threshold a collision may have occurred. The geometry was such that I was not able to see the aircraft on short final before moving into the RSA. This was the nearest miss of my piloting career and was a result of the Tower controller clearing me for takeoff with another aircraft on short final.",
    "synopsis": "Flight Instructor on a training flight with student were cleared for takeoff by the tower when another aircraft was on short final. This resulted in a near miss between these two aircraft.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=114",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 114,
      "pageEnd": 115,
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=114",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 114,
        "pageEnd": 115,
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        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2030139 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Flight Instructor on a training flight with student were cleared for takeoff by the tower when another aircraft was on short final. This resulted in a near miss between these two aircraft.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2030103",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172",
      "Cessna 152"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Around XA30 local time, I was in Aircraft X doing full stop taxi-backs. Tower was closed by now and there were 4 aircraft total in the pattern for [Runway] XXL. I was in front of a Cirrus (Aircraft Z) who was doing a full stop, and behind the Cirrus was a Cessna 152 (Aircraft Y). On my third taxi-back I heard Aircraft Y announce right downwind for XXL and the Cirrus announce base, once I got to the hold short line at [Taxiway] 1 was ready to go I heard the Cirrus call final and I visually identified them on final. I decided to hold in position and since I had yet to hear Aircraft Y call base and I could not see anybody on base or final behind the Cirrus I figured I had time to takeoff after the Cirrus. As the Cirrus was touching down for their full stop I announced my intention to take the runway and re- enter the pattern at XA26. Having not heard a base or final call from Aircraft Y and still not having any visual on them, I began moving and proceeded across the hold short markings, As I crossed them I checked final one more time and saw Aircraft Y rolling out on final from what appeared to be a relatively short approach (ADSB data looks like around 1/3mi from the runway threshold). I immediately came to a stop halfway between the runway and the hold-short markings at [Taxiway] 1. I called on the radio and indicated my intention to just hold in position as I thought that by the time I had managed to get the plane turned around and out of the runway area (i.e. back behind the hold-short markings) Aircraft Y would already have gone past us. Once they had done their touch and go I then continued onto the runway and reentered the pattern without incident. After reviewing the ATC archive there was no base, final, or short final call made by Aircraft Y. The last call they had made was a right downwind call. The severity of this incident was that there were two aircraft in the critical area of Runway XXL and when they passed me we were probably separated 300 ft. horizontally and 0 ft. vertically. The only thing that prevented a go-around or even potentially a collision was that I was trained to check final multiple times when entering a runway. What I could have done better: I could have been more cautious about taking the runway since I knew that Aircraft Y should probably have been coming around to land quite soon and I was expecting to hear them. I should have announced that I was entering Runway XXL again when I began moving, rather than just indicating my intentions to enter after the Cirrus was clear of XXL. I should be more diligent about checking visually for aircraft on base. The placement of buildings between left base and my location at [Taxiway] 1 made it difficult to clearly see an aircraft if they had just turned onto right base or were int the middle of the right downwind-base turn. I could have recognized that there were obstructions and just held my position until I had sight of Aircraft Y. I could have also called Aircraft Y and asked about their location. What Aircraft Y could have done better: they should make sure they make all necessary radio calls (crosswind, downwind, base, final, short-final)."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAround XA30 local time, I was in Aircraft X doing full stop taxi-backs. Tower was closed by now and there were 4 aircraft total in the pattern for [Runway] XXL. I was in front of a Cirrus (Aircraft Z) who was doing a full stop, and behind the Cirrus was a Cessna 152 (Aircraft Y). On my third taxi-back I heard Aircraft Y announce right downwind for XXL and the Cirrus announce base, once I got to the hold short line at [Taxiway] 1 was ready to go I heard the Cirrus call final and I visually identified them on final. I decided to hold in position and since I had yet to hear Aircraft Y call base and I could not see anybody on base or final behind the Cirrus I figured I had time to takeoff after the Cirrus. As the Cirrus was touching down for their full stop I announced my intention to take the runway and re- enter the pattern at XA26. Having not heard a base or final call from Aircraft Y and still not having any visual on them, I began moving and proceeded across the hold short markings, As I crossed them I checked final one more time and saw Aircraft Y rolling out on final from what appeared to be a relatively short approach (ADSB data looks like around 1/3mi from the runway threshold). I immediately came to a stop halfway between the runway and the hold-short markings at [Taxiway] 1. I called on the radio and indicated my intention to just hold in position as I thought that by the time I had managed to get the plane turned around and out of the runway area (i.e. back behind the hold-short markings) Aircraft Y would already have gone past us. Once they had done their touch and go I then continued onto the runway and reentered the pattern without incident. After reviewing the ATC archive there was no base, final, or short final call made by Aircraft Y. The last call they had made was a right downwind call. The severity of this incident was that there were two aircraft in the critical area of Runway XXL and when they passed me we were probably separated 300 ft. horizontally and 0 ft. vertically. The only thing that prevented a go-around or even potentially a collision was that I was trained to check final multiple times when entering a runway. What I could have done better: I could have been more cautious about taking the runway since I knew that Aircraft Y should probably have been coming around to land quite soon and I was expecting to hear them. I should have announced that I was entering Runway XXL again when I began moving, rather than just indicating my intentions to enter after the Cirrus was clear of XXL. I should be more diligent about checking visually for aircraft on base. The placement of buildings between left base and my location at [Taxiway] 1 made it difficult to clearly see an aircraft if they had just turned onto right base or were int the middle of the right downwind-base turn. I could have recognized that there were obstructions and just held my position until I had sight of Aircraft Y. I could have also called Aircraft Y and asked about their location. What Aircraft Y could have done better: they should make sure they make all necessary radio calls (crosswind, downwind, base, final, short-final).",
    "synopsis": "Pilot flying C-172 aircraft entered the runway environment while another aircraft was on short final.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=116",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 116,
      "pageEnd": 118,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=116",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 116,
        "pageEnd": 118,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2030103 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Pilot flying C-172 aircraft entered the runway environment while another aircraft was on short final.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2029895",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "A321"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "At approximately XA30, ZZZ ATC cleared us for takeoff runway XXC. During the takeoff we noticed an airport vehicle approaching the runway at a high speed. A few seconds later, when it became clear that the vehicle was not stopping, I decided to stop the takeoff. We rejected the takeoff around 100 knots. Just a moment after the takeoff was rejected, the airport vehicle entered the runway and subsequently stopped in the middle of the runway after ATC issued a stop, stop, stop command. After accomplishing our duties, we taxied back to the gate for maintenance to perform their inspections. No damage or injuries were reported. The local controller and airport vehicle may have had a lapse of concentration and some expectation bias from the airport vehicle that the runway was still closed. The local controller should ensure that all airport vehicles are aware of the status of an active runway. These events are happening to often for comfort. Kudos to my crew for their vigilance and professionalism for the safe outcome of this event."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "At the time of pushback, XXR was the only runway open for departure. We were one of the first, if not the first departure of the day at XA20. As we were taxiing out, the ground controller said she just received a phone call that XXC had just opened and offered it to us. We accepted the change because we were closer to that runway. During our take off roll, just after the 80 kt call, we both noticed an airport vehicle traveling eastbound on what looked like taxiway 1 toward our runway. They did not stop, the red stop bar lights illuminated and we rejected takeoff at approximately 100kts. During the same time, the tower controller was yelling at the airport vehicle to stop and instructed us to cancel our takeoff clearance which we were already doing. Our gross weight was approximately 175k. We exited the runway at taxiway 2. After determining everyone in the cabin was ok and the airplane was safe to taxi, we taxied back to the gate for a maintenance inspection. We did not hear anything on the radio from the local controller about the vehicle or anything from the vehicle itself about crossing the runway. I do not know why the airport vehicle crossed our runway without a clearance, but I assume it's because they thought the runway was still closed and was free to cross at will. The local controller told us directly that they just opened XXC, but there was never an official announcement made to all vehicles that the runway was open."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAt approximately XA30, ZZZ ATC cleared us for takeoff runway XXC. During the takeoff we noticed an airport vehicle approaching the runway at a high speed. A few seconds later, when it became clear that the vehicle was not stopping, I decided to stop the takeoff. We rejected the takeoff around 100 knots. Just a moment after the takeoff was rejected, the airport vehicle entered the runway and subsequently stopped in the middle of the runway after ATC issued a stop, stop, stop command. After accomplishing our duties, we taxied back to the gate for maintenance to perform their inspections. No damage or injuries were reported. The local controller and airport vehicle may have had a lapse of concentration and some expectation bias from the airport vehicle that the runway was still closed. The local controller should ensure that all airport vehicles are aware of the status of an active runway. These events are happening to often for comfort. Kudos to my crew for their vigilance and professionalism for the safe outcome of this event.\n\nNarrative 2\nAt the time of pushback, XXR was the only runway open for departure. We were one of the first, if not the first departure of the day at XA20. As we were taxiing out, the ground controller said she just received a phone call that XXC had just opened and offered it to us. We accepted the change because we were closer to that runway. During our take off roll, just after the 80 kt call, we both noticed an airport vehicle traveling eastbound on what looked like taxiway 1 toward our runway. They did not stop, the red stop bar lights illuminated and we rejected takeoff at approximately 100kts. During the same time, the tower controller was yelling at the airport vehicle to stop and instructed us to cancel our takeoff clearance which we were already doing. Our gross weight was approximately 175k. We exited the runway at taxiway 2. After determining everyone in the cabin was ok and the airplane was safe to taxi, we taxied back to the gate for a maintenance inspection. We did not hear anything on the radio from the local controller about the vehicle or anything from the vehicle itself about crossing the runway. I do not know why the airport vehicle crossed our runway without a clearance, but I assume it's because they thought the runway was still closed and was free to cross at will. The local controller told us directly that they just opened XXC, but there was never an official announcement made to all vehicles that the runway was open.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew on take off roll reported an airport vehicle drove onto the runway. Flight crew rejected the takeoff.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=119",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 119,
      "pageEnd": 121,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=119",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 119,
        "pageEnd": 121,
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    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2029895 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew on take off roll reported an airport vehicle drove onto the runway. Flight crew rejected the takeoff.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2027232",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "At roughly XA:55 my PA-28 was leaving the ramp from the FBO at (ZZZ) after getting gas. After making a call to state my intentions to taxi from the FBO to Runway XX I quietly hear a long final call for Runway XX, although wind favored XY \"the adjacent runway\" the traffic on long final gave me some form of assurance. (Pilots Note this was my first time ever at (ZZZ) I was unfamiliar and it was only used as a fuel stop so I had little briefing but when I diverted Center set me up for (Vis) XX. XX is also a longer and much more well kelp runway so there were multiple layers of assurance that XX was going to be the only one used. When coming up to the intersection of XY/XZ I stopped looking and made a call over the radio saying my intentions to cross what I thought at the time was an inactive runway. This was further assured as I could see the traffic on final for XX(landing light). I will note my glacé when I looked down Runway XY it was aimed down looking mostly at the runways surface and adjacent taxi ways. (In my mind no one would be approaching for this detection) so I did look up but I made no note of aircraft on final. I then proceeded to cross the runway looking mostly to my right looking for the landing traffic on XX. It wasn't till I was about half way across XY when I noticed a PA-28 touch down at the end of the runway and quickly take off. I the moment I realized the aircraft was there, I quickly added full power and got off the runway as soon as I could. I cleared safely and didn't see the aircraft even take off. Our distant over 500 ft. at all times but it definitely shook me up. I stayed on the taxi for a couple minutes just assessing what happen about 45 seconds later the landing traffic on XX landed safely. But the aircraft the did a Touch and Go called calmly said did you see me. I said not until you touched down and I did hear you either. I apologized for the situation and the Pilot said it's okay and he departed to the south. This is my best recollection. I will say this was my fault but I think the use of two intersecting runways less than a minute apart is also worrisome. I may have missed a call but the Pilot never only asked if he could see not hear so there's a chance a call was never made."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAt roughly XA:55 my PA-28 was leaving the ramp from the FBO at (ZZZ) after getting gas. After making a call to state my intentions to taxi from the FBO to Runway XX I quietly hear a long final call for Runway XX, although wind favored XY \"the adjacent runway\" the traffic on long final gave me some form of assurance. (Pilots Note this was my first time ever at (ZZZ) I was unfamiliar and it was only used as a fuel stop so I had little briefing but when I diverted Center set me up for (Vis) XX. XX is also a longer and much more well kelp runway so there were multiple layers of assurance that XX was going to be the only one used. When coming up to the intersection of XY/XZ I stopped looking and made a call over the radio saying my intentions to cross what I thought at the time was an inactive runway. This was further assured as I could see the traffic on final for XX(landing light). I will note my glacé when I looked down Runway XY it was aimed down looking mostly at the runways surface and adjacent taxi ways. (In my mind no one would be approaching for this detection) so I did look up but I made no note of aircraft on final. I then proceeded to cross the runway looking mostly to my right looking for the landing traffic on XX. It wasn't till I was about half way across XY when I noticed a PA-28 touch down at the end of the runway and quickly take off. I the moment I realized the aircraft was there, I quickly added full power and got off the runway as soon as I could. I cleared safely and didn't see the aircraft even take off. Our distant over 500 ft. at all times but it definitely shook me up. I stayed on the taxi for a couple minutes just assessing what happen about 45 seconds later the landing traffic on XX landed safely. But the aircraft the did a Touch and Go called calmly said did you see me. I said not until you touched down and I did hear you either. I apologized for the situation and the Pilot said it's okay and he departed to the south. This is my best recollection. I will say this was my fault but I think the use of two intersecting runways less than a minute apart is also worrisome. I may have missed a call but the Pilot never only asked if he could see not hear so there's a chance a call was never made.",
    "synopsis": "PA-28 pilot reported a runway incursion and a conflict with an airplane on short final while taxiing to an intersecting runway. Reporter stated they thought the runway they were crossing was inactive and they did not see the landing traffic.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=122",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
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      "pageEnd": 123,
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=122",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 122,
        "pageEnd": 123,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2027232 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "PA-28 pilot reported a runway incursion and a conflict with an airplane on short final while taxiing to an intersecting runway. Reporter stated they thought the runway they were crossing was inactive and they did not see the landing traffic.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2026223",
    "date": "2023-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Helicopter",
      "Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was a student pilot preparing for my private helicopter rating at ZZZ airport, when this incident occurred. While at the south end of Runway XX at ZZZ, my instructor and I were preparing to engage in a maximum performance takeoff. While clearing the area for traffic, I looked on ForeFlight and saw that an aircraft was coming down the runway from behind us. I looked over my left shoulder and saw the airplane taking off from behind us on the same runway without yielding the right of way and without making a radio call on the CTAF. When airborne, the airplane went to its left and our left to go around us, then turned right over and in front of us before we began our maneuver. The pilot of Aircraft Y never announced or responded on the CTAF and proceeded on to ZZZ1 from ZZZ. My instructor spoke with a board member of the association who then spoke with the pilot. I was not a party to either conversation, but it was reported back that the pilot of Aircraft Y made a comment about his age and that it may have played a part in him not seeing us."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was a student pilot preparing for my private helicopter rating at ZZZ airport, when this incident occurred. While at the south end of Runway XX at ZZZ, my instructor and I were preparing to engage in a maximum performance takeoff. While clearing the area for traffic, I looked on ForeFlight and saw that an aircraft was coming down the runway from behind us. I looked over my left shoulder and saw the airplane taking off from behind us on the same runway without yielding the right of way and without making a radio call on the CTAF. When airborne, the airplane went to its left and our left to go around us, then turned right over and in front of us before we began our maneuver. The pilot of Aircraft Y never announced or responded on the CTAF and proceeded on to ZZZ1 from ZZZ. My instructor spoke with a board member of the association who then spoke with the pilot. I was not a party to either conversation, but it was reported back that the pilot of Aircraft Y made a comment about his age and that it may have played a part in him not seeing us.",
    "synopsis": "Helicopter pilot reported a near miss while preparing for takeoff as the other aircraft took off behind the reporter’s aircraft without making any radio calls.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=124",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 124,
      "pageEnd": 125,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=124",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 124,
        "pageEnd": 125,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2026223 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Helicopter pilot reported a near miss while preparing for takeoff as the other aircraft took off behind the reporter’s aircraft without making any radio calls.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2022593",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "Aero Commander 695",
      "Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After landing on Runway X, made radio call on UNICOM that we had cleared the runway. We were taxiing with bright landing lights and taxi lights, very brightly illuminated, and heard a low volume radio call on UNICOM we believed said the aircraft was 15 miles north and inbound. While taxiing we announced we would be crossing Runway XX-XY on the ground, heard no response, paused to make sure no one was using the runway, when a Piper went by in front of us, apparently taking off on Runway XX. We braked, separation was ~250 ft., the Piper took off successfully. We received no conflict warning on our ADS- B Traffic screen, which was displayed on a MFD (Multifunction Flight Display). While a non- event, a few seconds difference in timing could have resulted in a collision. In retrospect there was a conversation going on in our aircraft that may have interfered with our understanding of the radio call, and the call was very low volume and brief. We also expected activity would be on the runway we had just used (X), and were not expecting a departure on XX. Finally, we are now modifying our behavior to keep a sterile cockpit when a taxi route might possible involve a runway crossing."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter landing on Runway X, made radio call on UNICOM that we had cleared the runway. We were taxiing with bright landing lights and taxi lights, very brightly illuminated, and heard a low volume radio call on UNICOM we believed said the aircraft was 15 miles north and inbound. While taxiing we announced we would be crossing Runway XX-XY on the ground, heard no response, paused to make sure no one was using the runway, when a Piper went by in front of us, apparently taking off on Runway XX. We braked, separation was ~250 ft., the Piper took off successfully. We received no conflict warning on our ADS- B Traffic screen, which was displayed on a MFD (Multifunction Flight Display). While a non- event, a few seconds difference in timing could have resulted in a collision. In retrospect there was a conversation going on in our aircraft that may have interfered with our understanding of the radio call, and the call was very low volume and brief. We also expected activity would be on the runway we had just used (X), and were not expecting a departure on XX. Finally, we are now modifying our behavior to keep a sterile cockpit when a taxi route might possible involve a runway crossing.",
    "synopsis": "Pilot crossing a runway at a non-towered airport reported a near collision with another aircraft taking off on the same runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=126",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 126,
      "pageEnd": 127,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=126",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 126,
        "pageEnd": 127,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2022593 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "Pilot crossing a runway at a non-towered airport reported a near collision with another aircraft taking off on the same runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2022586",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was doing an instructional flight in Aircraft X. I was holding short Runway 4 full length, and after doing my engine runup, I called the Tower to request a takeoff clearance for a VFR northern departure. Tower cleared me to takeoff on Runway 4 and read back the instructions for the same. I lined up on the centerline with Runway 4, and as I was about to add full power, I saw/heard another aircraft fly over me and then eventually land on Runway 4. I held my position on the runway and called Tower informing them about the situation. The tower then cleared me to take off Runway 4. The takeoff and rest of the flight was uneventful. I remember clearing the final before I entered the runway, but due to trees and possibly the cloud coverage, I didn't see the oncoming aircraft on final. Corrective action: I will be more careful moving forward with clearing my final and also try to listen to the tower conversations with other traffic before I make my call for a take off request."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was doing an instructional flight in Aircraft X. I was holding short Runway 4 full length, and after doing my engine runup, I called the Tower to request a takeoff clearance for a VFR northern departure. Tower cleared me to takeoff on Runway 4 and read back the instructions for the same. I lined up on the centerline with Runway 4, and as I was about to add full power, I saw/heard another aircraft fly over me and then eventually land on Runway 4. I held my position on the runway and called Tower informing them about the situation. The tower then cleared me to take off Runway 4. The takeoff and rest of the flight was uneventful. I remember clearing the final before I entered the runway, but due to trees and possibly the cloud coverage, I didn't see the oncoming aircraft on final. Corrective action: I will be more careful moving forward with clearing my final and also try to listen to the tower conversations with other traffic before I make my call for a take off request.",
    "synopsis": "GA Instructor with student reported a conflict event when they entered Runway 4 at CDW with an aircraft on final to the same runway.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=128",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 128,
      "pageEnd": 129,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=128",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 128,
        "pageEnd": 129,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2022586 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "GA Instructor with student reported a conflict event when they entered Runway 4 at CDW with an aircraft on final to the same runway.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2019514",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng",
      "Widebody, Low Wing, 4 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was working Ground Control 1 and Ground Control 3 combined at the time of the event. Aircraft X called me on the south route, en route to Company aviation. I instructed Aircraft X to turn right on taxiway 1 and taxi via [Taxiway] 1, [Taxiway] 2 onto [Taxiway] 3 and hold short of [Taxiway] 4. Aircraft X read back the instructions correctly. I went on to talk to other aircraft and take flight strips to the north Ground Controller. I continued to taxi aircraft out and update data tags on the ASDE-X that keep dropping off. Local 1 was departing Aircraft Y at the time. After Aircraft Y rotated, the local team and I observed Aircraft X data tag reappear on taxiway in between Runway XXL and Runway XXR. I instructed Aircraft X to hold position and contact Tower. At no time did I observe a data tag crossing the runway and no safety logic alarm went off. The ASDE-X has been dropping data tags and does not show primary targets. This has been an issue since about Day 0. A lot of extra time is spent re-typing in call signs and gate numbers of aircraft after they drop off. The weather here in the summer months produce foggy conditions and at times, the runway exits are obscured. Aircraft X is a smaller white jet that can blend into the foggy background at the departure end. The ASDE-X is a vital piece of safety equipment that needs to be working fully, 100% of the time."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Aircraft X had landed the north complex Runway YYR and was taxiing to parking with Ground Control 1. I had put Aircraft Y into position and had coordinated a south flow departure. I was doing my final scan of the runway and the ASDE-X as I was issuing the take-off clearance with the new departure instructions. Aircraft Y started the take-off roll. I then crossed Aircraft Z at taxiway and Aircraft A at another taxiway after the departure had gone past the respective taxiways. I then talked to Aircraft B exiting the runway and had them hold short. At this time, Local Controller 2 coordinated with me for 2 crossovers aircraft which were approved. I looked for the departure to verify the turn, but could not see the aircraft due to the cloud layer. I then looked at the radar to reissue the turn and confirm. That is when I noticed Aircraft X tag appeared on the taxiway in between Runway XXR/L. I looked out and confirmed visually that there was now an aircraft at that location. The Aircraft X was painted white and being a small aircraft a mile away from the Tower, it did blend in with the white cloud layer at the west end of the airport. Looking back on the replay, Aircraft Y had been cleared for take-off when Aircraft X was still on taxiway. Aircraft X was on Ground Control 1 frequency the entire time. The instructions for Aircraft X were \"taxi 1-2-3 hold short of 4\". Aircraft X tag had dropped off of the ASDE-X due to it being in limited multilateration (MLAT) mode. It was not the only tag that had dropped as I had multiple tags also drop off throughout the day. Because the Aircraft X tag had dropped off, the ASDE-X did not alarm. According to replay, Aircraft Y was passing taxiway when Aircraft X had entered Runway XXR. Aircraft X had vacated the Runway XXR when Aircraft Y had passed [Taxiway] 1. The ASDE-X has been in the limited MLAT mode since at least Day 0 waiting to be fixed this entire time with still no fix date set. The ASDE-X never should be out of service for this long even in limited mode. All GA and Cargo aircraft should land on Runway XXL. This will eliminate 3 runway's that they have to cross when the land on the north side Runway YYR."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was working Ground Control 1 and Ground Control 3 combined at the time of the event. Aircraft X called me on the south route, en route to Company aviation. I instructed Aircraft X to turn right on taxiway 1 and taxi via [Taxiway] 1, [Taxiway] 2 onto [Taxiway] 3 and hold short of [Taxiway] 4. Aircraft X read back the instructions correctly. I went on to talk to other aircraft and take flight strips to the north Ground Controller. I continued to taxi aircraft out and update data tags on the ASDE-X that keep dropping off. Local 1 was departing Aircraft Y at the time. After Aircraft Y rotated, the local team and I observed Aircraft X data tag reappear on taxiway in between Runway XXL and Runway XXR. I instructed Aircraft X to hold position and contact Tower. At no time did I observe a data tag crossing the runway and no safety logic alarm went off. The ASDE-X has been dropping data tags and does not show primary targets. This has been an issue since about Day 0. A lot of extra time is spent re-typing in call signs and gate numbers of aircraft after they drop off. The weather here in the summer months produce foggy conditions and at times, the runway exits are obscured. Aircraft X is a smaller white jet that can blend into the foggy background at the departure end. The ASDE-X is a vital piece of safety equipment that needs to be working fully, 100% of the time.\n\nNarrative 2\nAircraft X had landed the north complex Runway YYR and was taxiing to parking with Ground Control 1. I had put Aircraft Y into position and had coordinated a south flow departure. I was doing my final scan of the runway and the ASDE-X as I was issuing the take-off clearance with the new departure instructions. Aircraft Y started the take-off roll. I then crossed Aircraft Z at taxiway and Aircraft A at another taxiway after the departure had gone past the respective taxiways. I then talked to Aircraft B exiting the runway and had them hold short. At this time, Local Controller 2 coordinated with me for 2 crossovers aircraft which were approved. I looked for the departure to verify the turn, but could not see the aircraft due to the cloud layer. I then looked at the radar to reissue the turn and confirm. That is when I noticed Aircraft X tag appeared on the taxiway in between Runway XXR/L. I looked out and confirmed visually that there was now an aircraft at that location. The Aircraft X was painted white and being a small aircraft a mile away from the Tower, it did blend in with the white cloud layer at the west end of the airport. Looking back on the replay, Aircraft Y had been cleared for take-off when Aircraft X was still on taxiway. Aircraft X was on Ground Control 1 frequency the entire time. The instructions for Aircraft X were \"taxi 1-2-3 hold short of 4\". Aircraft X tag had dropped off of the ASDE-X due to it being in limited multilateration (MLAT) mode. It was not the only tag that had dropped as I had multiple tags also drop off throughout the day. Because the Aircraft X tag had dropped off, the ASDE-X did not alarm. According to replay, Aircraft Y was passing taxiway when Aircraft X had entered Runway XXR. Aircraft X had vacated the Runway XXR when Aircraft Y had passed [Taxiway] 1. The ASDE-X has been in the limited MLAT mode since at least Day 0 waiting to be fixed this entire time with still no fix date set. The ASDE-X never should be out of service for this long even in limited mode. All GA and Cargo aircraft should land on Runway XXL. This will eliminate 3 runway's that they have to cross when the land on the north side Runway YYR.",
    "synopsis": "A Tower Local Controller and Ground Controller reported an aircraft taxied across a runway without a clearance the same time as another aircraft was departing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=130",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 130,
      "pageEnd": 132,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=130",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 130,
        "pageEnd": 132,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2019514 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "A Tower Local Controller and Ground Controller reported an aircraft taxied across a runway without a clearance the same time as another aircraft was departing.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2019190",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "SR20"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While Departing Runway XX at ZZZ, a Gray truck Crossed Runway XY/XX while driving down runway X/XZ with no radio call. Causing a early rotation to avoid conflict with the ground vehicle."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile Departing Runway XX at ZZZ, a Gray truck Crossed Runway XY/XX while driving down runway X/XZ with no radio call. Causing a early rotation to avoid conflict with the ground vehicle.",
    "synopsis": "SR-20 Flight Instructor reported a near ground collision with a truck while on takeoff roll at a non-towered airport. Reportedly, the truck crossed the runway without communications resulting in an early rotation to avoid a collision.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=133",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 133,
      "pageEnd": 134,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=133",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 133,
        "pageEnd": 134,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "Truck crossing prompts early rotation on takeoff",
    "summary": "An SR-20 flight instructor reported that a truck crossed the departure runway without a radio call during the takeoff roll. The crew rotated early to avoid a conflict with the vehicle.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Communication"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2017436",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Recip Eng",
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Aircraft X was rolling out after landing Runway 20L. He came to a complete stop on the runway next to two \"access roads\" that many aircraft continually confuse with taxiways. This caused Aircraft Y to have to go around since Aircraft X came to a complete stop and had another 2000 ft.+ to go before he came to an actual taxiway. This is not the first instance that this has happened. Numerous aircraft confuse these access roads with taxiways ever since the airport re-did the runways and put in these roads. I have seen it at least 10-15 times since they put in these roads. They need to have updated markings, painted a different color, something that can be easily identified to pilots that they are not taxiways."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAircraft X was rolling out after landing Runway 20L. He came to a complete stop on the runway next to two \"access roads\" that many aircraft continually confuse with taxiways. This caused Aircraft Y to have to go around since Aircraft X came to a complete stop and had another 2000 ft.+ to go before he came to an actual taxiway. This is not the first instance that this has happened. Numerous aircraft confuse these access roads with taxiways ever since the airport re-did the runways and put in these roads. I have seen it at least 10-15 times since they put in these roads. They need to have updated markings, painted a different color, something that can be easily identified to pilots that they are not taxiways.",
    "synopsis": "BNA Tower Controller reported an aircraft stopped on the runway after confusing two unmarked access roads for possible taxiways causing another aircraft on final approach to go around. The Controller stated this is a common occurrence with these unmarked access roads.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=135",
      "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
      "pageStart": 135,
      "pageEnd": 136,
      "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/rwy_incur.pdf#page=135",
        "reportSet": "Runway Incursions",
        "pageStart": 135,
        "pageEnd": 136,
        "fileName": "rwy_incur.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "d0e7b7039becf6e3fa9de8debd3a49e21d0bb9b664f023a64ac7bed65b1fb843",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Runway Incursions"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2017436 · Runway Incursions",
    "summary": "BNA Tower Controller reported an aircraft stopped on the runway after confusing two unmarked access roads for possible taxiways causing another aircraft on final approach to go around. The Controller stated this is a common occurrence with these unmarked access roads.",
    "themes": [
      "Runway safety"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2003314",
    "date": "2023-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model",
      "Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Training my CPC-IT on Ground Control (GC) we taxied Aircraft X via [Taxiway] 1-2-3 to [Runway] XXL. At the top of the alley west line there was an Aircraft Y that the CPC-IT taxied left on 4, with no traffic call to give way to Aircraft X. At the time I had my attention on the north side of the airfield. I heard the transmission the CPC-IT made but since I was looking to the north, I did not immediately asses the instruction he gave. When I turned back to face the 2/4 intersection I saw Aircraft Y crossing very closely in front of Aircraft X. Aircraft X stopped to let Aircraft Y pass, and then the pilot commented that Aircraft Y had cut them off, almost clipping their nose. The CPC-IT apologized on frequency admitting fault for the missed traffic call. The two aircraft went on to depart without further incident. The CPC-IT I was working with is doing very well and I probably allowed that to relax my focus to some extent, however, it is not possible to simultaneously scan the north airfield, where multiple runway crossings are taking place, and the south side traffic leaving the alleys. This limitation will result in something getting missed from time to time. Perhaps instituting a regular 3rd Ground Control position could help alleviate this problem."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I am a CPC-IT that was training on this outbound ground position. Aircraft X was taxing to Runway XXL at 1 via Taxiway 2 for departure as instructed by me. I gave taxi instructions to Aircraft Y out of the alley to Runway XC a XY via left turn on [Taxiway] 4. I was switching other aircraft to their appropriate Tower frequencies and did not notice and expect Aircraft Y to taxi out that quick and turn left on [Taxiway] 4 from [Runway] XXY. At the same time Aircraft X has reached [Taxiway] 2 and was crossing the 4 taxiway with Aircraft Y going in front of him. Aircraft X pilot keyed up saying that Aircraft Y cut them off on [Taxiway] 4 at 2. Both of those aircraft were on my frequency and I told them that it was my fault and I missed a traffic call. Aircraft X should have been instructed to cross [Taxiway] 4 behind Aircraft Y. Aircraft X did not appear to want to slow down and tried to get in front of the Aircraft Y. As I saw that happening another aircraft was in the middle of their read back to me. I did not think keying up over the read back would have gotten thru to any of these two that were a factor and possibly avoiding a close situation. I would recommend to be more vigilant of this intersection on our airfield and scan more frequently to avoid another close call. Also look ahead and tell those that cross Taxiway 4 to cross behind the traffic before they reach that point on the airfield."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nTraining my CPC-IT on Ground Control (GC) we taxied Aircraft X via [Taxiway] 1-2-3 to [Runway] XXL. At the top of the alley west line there was an Aircraft Y that the CPC-IT taxied left on 4, with no traffic call to give way to Aircraft X. At the time I had my attention on the north side of the airfield. I heard the transmission the CPC-IT made but since I was looking to the north, I did not immediately asses the instruction he gave. When I turned back to face the 2/4 intersection I saw Aircraft Y crossing very closely in front of Aircraft X. Aircraft X stopped to let Aircraft Y pass, and then the pilot commented that Aircraft Y had cut them off, almost clipping their nose. The CPC-IT apologized on frequency admitting fault for the missed traffic call. The two aircraft went on to depart without further incident. The CPC-IT I was working with is doing very well and I probably allowed that to relax my focus to some extent, however, it is not possible to simultaneously scan the north airfield, where multiple runway crossings are taking place, and the south side traffic leaving the alleys. This limitation will result in something getting missed from time to time. Perhaps instituting a regular 3rd Ground Control position could help alleviate this problem.\n\nNarrative 2\nI am a CPC-IT that was training on this outbound ground position. Aircraft X was taxing to Runway XXL at 1 via Taxiway 2 for departure as instructed by me. I gave taxi instructions to Aircraft Y out of the alley to Runway XC a XY via left turn on [Taxiway] 4. I was switching other aircraft to their appropriate Tower frequencies and did not notice and expect Aircraft Y to taxi out that quick and turn left on [Taxiway] 4 from [Runway] XXY. At the same time Aircraft X has reached [Taxiway] 2 and was crossing the 4 taxiway with Aircraft Y going in front of him. Aircraft X pilot keyed up saying that Aircraft Y cut them off on [Taxiway] 4 at 2. Both of those aircraft were on my frequency and I told them that it was my fault and I missed a traffic call. Aircraft X should have been instructed to cross [Taxiway] 4 behind Aircraft Y. Aircraft X did not appear to want to slow down and tried to get in front of the Aircraft Y. As I saw that happening another aircraft was in the middle of their read back to me. I did not think keying up over the read back would have gotten thru to any of these two that were a factor and possibly avoiding a close situation. I would recommend to be more vigilant of this intersection on our airfield and scan more frequently to avoid another close call. Also look ahead and tell those that cross Taxiway 4 to cross behind the traffic before they reach that point on the airfield.",
    "synopsis": "A Tower Ground Control trainee and their instructor reported the instructor did not notice the trainee assign conflicting taxi routes to two aircraft resulting in one of the aircraft taking evasive action.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=16",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 16,
      "pageEnd": 18,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=16",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 16,
        "pageEnd": 18,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2003314 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "A Tower Ground Control trainee and their instructor reported the instructor did not notice the trainee assign conflicting taxi routes to two aircraft resulting in one of the aircraft taking evasive action.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2003270",
    "date": "2023-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were cleared for the visual Runway 09. Upon crossing the threshold, I noticed a 6- wheeled green gator on the LH side of the runway, just outside the runway lights heading downwind alongside the runway. He was approximately 1000-1500 ft. down the runway from the threshold but within the touchdown zone safety area. Our left wing cleared him by approximately 25-30 ft. at about 135-140 kts. right after touchdown. After shutdown at the FBO, I checked the NOTAMs again and no NOTAMs existed for men or equipment working alongside the active runway. I queried the Ground Controller and asked if there had been a NOTAM issued and stated \"NO.\" Then indicated to me that they were people with the airport spraying for weeds controlled by the airport authority. There isn't much we could do since the equipment was green and blended into the green grass. By the time either of us noticed the person and equipment, we were far too late into the landing to initiate the go-around and clear the equipment by any better margin. We should have been at least alerted to their presence and they need to have flags to improve visibility."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I was landing on Runway 9 at AHN. Upon touchdown, I noticed a person riding a tractor on the left edge of the runway in the grass and in the safety area approximately 1500 ft. from the approach end. We landed and taxied to parking normally. We queried the Ground Controller and asked if there was a NOTAM for this activity, and it was stated that people had been working all day and no NOTAM was issued. ATC never informed us that there were people or equipment in the safety area. We calculated that our wingtip missed the tractor by approximately 25-30 ft."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were cleared for the visual Runway 09. Upon crossing the threshold, I noticed a 6- wheeled green gator on the LH side of the runway, just outside the runway lights heading downwind alongside the runway. He was approximately 1000-1500 ft. down the runway from the threshold but within the touchdown zone safety area. Our left wing cleared him by approximately 25-30 ft. at about 135-140 kts. right after touchdown. After shutdown at the FBO, I checked the NOTAMs again and no NOTAMs existed for men or equipment working alongside the active runway. I queried the Ground Controller and asked if there had been a NOTAM issued and stated \"NO.\" Then indicated to me that they were people with the airport spraying for weeds controlled by the airport authority. There isn't much we could do since the equipment was green and blended into the green grass. By the time either of us noticed the person and equipment, we were far too late into the landing to initiate the go-around and clear the equipment by any better margin. We should have been at least alerted to their presence and they need to have flags to improve visibility.\n\nNarrative 2\nI was landing on Runway 9 at AHN. Upon touchdown, I noticed a person riding a tractor on the left edge of the runway in the grass and in the safety area approximately 1500 ft. from the approach end. We landed and taxied to parking normally. We queried the Ground Controller and asked if there was a NOTAM for this activity, and it was stated that people had been working all day and no NOTAM was issued. ATC never informed us that there were people or equipment in the safety area. We calculated that our wingtip missed the tractor by approximately 25-30 ft.",
    "synopsis": "Light Transport flight crew reported upon landing at AHN there were ground personnel and equipment in the grass safety area adjacent to the runway, operating in close proximity to landing aircraft, near the touchdown zone. No NOTAM was issued, the equipment was unmarked, and ATC did not alert the landing aircraft of the hazard.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=19",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 19,
      "pageEnd": 21,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=19",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 19,
        "pageEnd": 21,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2003270 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Light Transport flight crew reported upon landing at AHN there were ground personnel and equipment in the grass safety area adjacent to the runway, operating in close proximity to landing aircraft, near the touchdown zone. No NOTAM was issued, the equipment was unmarked, and ATC did not alert the landing aircraft of the hazard.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2002361",
    "date": "2023-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model",
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were climbing out on the ZZZZZ departure, tower handed us off to departure. When we checked on with departure, we were given traffic advisory, company traffic at 2 o'clock level at 9,000 feet. We acknowledge and said traffic in sight. We got \"traffic\" on the TCAS, so I begin to decrease my climb rate to less than 1,000 feet per minute. At 7,900 feet we got \"TCAS RA DESCEND\", I complied with the \"TCAS RA DESCEND\" and through 7,800 feet we got clear of conflict. I looked out and saw an aircraft passing right to left, less than 500 feet at our altitude. We questioned ATC, to make sure we heard that they were supposed to have been level at 9,000 feet, and he said they we're supposed to be level at 9,000, and then he said I guess they started down early. Didn't quite know what that meant, but this was definitely a near miss. ATC should pay closer attention when you've got converging traffic in a situation like this, which could result in a serious accident or incident. The other aircraft definitely was not at their assigned altitude, and ATC should have gotten some warning that they were descending. This was a real event, and shouldn't be taken lightly. I know we are human and make mistakes, but there have to be some safeguards."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "[Report narrative contained no additional information]"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were climbing out on the ZZZZZ departure, tower handed us off to departure. When we checked on with departure, we were given traffic advisory, company traffic at 2 o'clock level at 9,000 feet. We acknowledge and said traffic in sight. We got \"traffic\" on the TCAS, so I begin to decrease my climb rate to less than 1,000 feet per minute. At 7,900 feet we got \"TCAS RA DESCEND\", I complied with the \"TCAS RA DESCEND\" and through 7,800 feet we got clear of conflict. I looked out and saw an aircraft passing right to left, less than 500 feet at our altitude. We questioned ATC, to make sure we heard that they were supposed to have been level at 9,000 feet, and he said they we're supposed to be level at 9,000, and then he said I guess they started down early. Didn't quite know what that meant, but this was definitely a near miss. ATC should pay closer attention when you've got converging traffic in a situation like this, which could result in a serious accident or incident. The other aircraft definitely was not at their assigned altitude, and ATC should have gotten some warning that they were descending. This was a real event, and shouldn't be taken lightly. I know we are human and make mistakes, but there have to be some safeguards.\n\nNarrative 2\n[Report narrative contained no additional information]",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported an NMAC during departure climb when another aircraft apparently departed their cleared altitude prematurely.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=22",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 22,
      "pageEnd": 23,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=22",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 22,
        "pageEnd": 23,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "Collision-avoidance descent during departure climb",
    "summary": "A departing crew received a collision-avoidance command to descend after being advised that nearby traffic was level at 9,000 feet. The crew followed the command and reported seeing the other aircraft pass nearby at its altitude; the report attributes the conflict to the other aircraft apparently descending early.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Communication",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2001577",
    "date": "2023-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Weather bases were at approximately 7k to 8k, vis about 4 miles in rain and haze. We had been flying the LIVRI 1D to Runway 29, with a couple shortcuts and ATC directed altitudes, after an initial descend via. We discussed the terrain and had terrain on Navigation Display (ND), and were both trying to use the min vector chart and terrain depictions on the approach and STAR plates to back-up the controller. We had been given 11k at around GL824, and then at GL825 were given direct PLADE and a descent to 10k. While descent to PLADE we were given a 9k descent and “cleared for the approach\". while discussing setting the FAF altitude (managed descent), we were then given direct to GL981 (FAF) and a descent to 7700. I queried the controller if we were still cleared for the approach and was told \"yes\". At this point we began to configure, and while I was engaged in this, the First Officer (FO) stated that he felt ATC was setting us up for a GPWS event due to the terrain at GL980. I looked back at the chart, and the ND, and our position and agreed with him. Before I could query ATC on the wisdom of a 7700 descent, EGPWS announced \"Terrain, Terrain\". FO immediately executed the escape maneuver. ATC immediately tried to re-clear us for the approach, but we elected to transition to a go- around due to the fact that although we were now underneath the weather, the aircraft was in go around phase and we had insufficient time to clean up the box, reinstall the approach and safely execute it, and the visibility precluded an immediate transition to a visual approach. We were vectored around for an uneventful ILS to Runway 29."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "On the LIVRI 1D, around GL824 Aircraft X was told to descend to 11,000. Around GL825, Aircraft X was given direct to PLADE and to descend to 10,000. No brown peaks/terrain were depicted on the arrival chart between those points. About halfway in between those points, we were instructed to descend to 9,000 for PLADE and subsequently cleared the approach. Enroute to PLADE, Approach gave Aircraft X direct to GL981 on the ILS Z Runway 29 and to descend to 7700. As the flight went direct to GL981, the pilot flying (PF)/First Officer (FO) noticed the terrain on the approach chart and stated that it appeared to be close to terrain and that their instructions were putting us into a GPWS event. Shortly after that, the Captain who was engaged in a configuration change, concurred, the audible Terrain went off, and the PF complied with the Escape. The Approach Controller gave follow on instructions and tried to re clear Aircraft X for the approach, however, there was insufficient time to allow the crew to complete all required checklists and re-engage the FMGC. The Captain asked for vectors around to attempt another approach, via APRIM, ensuring that there would be no shortcuts. The crew finished all checklists, completed the approach with no further events."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWeather bases were at approximately 7k to 8k, vis about 4 miles in rain and haze. We had been flying the LIVRI 1D to Runway 29, with a couple shortcuts and ATC directed altitudes, after an initial descend via. We discussed the terrain and had terrain on Navigation Display (ND), and were both trying to use the min vector chart and terrain depictions on the approach and STAR plates to back-up the controller. We had been given 11k at around GL824, and then at GL825 were given direct PLADE and a descent to 10k. While descent to PLADE we were given a 9k descent and “cleared for the approach\". while discussing setting the FAF altitude (managed descent), we were then given direct to GL981 (FAF) and a descent to 7700. I queried the controller if we were still cleared for the approach and was told \"yes\". At this point we began to configure, and while I was engaged in this, the First Officer (FO) stated that he felt ATC was setting us up for a GPWS event due to the terrain at GL980. I looked back at the chart, and the ND, and our position and agreed with him. Before I could query ATC on the wisdom of a 7700 descent, EGPWS announced \"Terrain, Terrain\". FO immediately executed the escape maneuver. ATC immediately tried to re-clear us for the approach, but we elected to transition to a go- around due to the fact that although we were now underneath the weather, the aircraft was in go around phase and we had insufficient time to clean up the box, reinstall the approach and safely execute it, and the visibility precluded an immediate transition to a visual approach. We were vectored around for an uneventful ILS to Runway 29.\n\nNarrative 2\nOn the LIVRI 1D, around GL824 Aircraft X was told to descend to 11,000. Around GL825, Aircraft X was given direct to PLADE and to descend to 10,000. No brown peaks/terrain were depicted on the arrival chart between those points. About halfway in between those points, we were instructed to descend to 9,000 for PLADE and subsequently cleared the approach. Enroute to PLADE, Approach gave Aircraft X direct to GL981 on the ILS Z Runway 29 and to descend to 7700. As the flight went direct to GL981, the pilot flying (PF)/First Officer (FO) noticed the terrain on the approach chart and stated that it appeared to be close to terrain and that their instructions were putting us into a GPWS event. Shortly after that, the Captain who was engaged in a configuration change, concurred, the audible Terrain went off, and the PF complied with the Escape. The Approach Controller gave follow on instructions and tried to re clear Aircraft X for the approach, however, there was insufficient time to allow the crew to complete all required checklists and re-engage the FMGC. The Captain asked for vectors around to attempt another approach, via APRIM, ensuring that there would be no shortcuts. The crew finished all checklists, completed the approach with no further events.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier pilot crew reported a EGWPS terrain warning created by ATC. The pilots took evasive action and returned for a normal landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=24",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 24,
      "pageEnd": 26,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=24",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 24,
        "pageEnd": 26,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2001577 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air carrier pilot crew reported a EGWPS terrain warning created by ATC. The pilots took evasive action and returned for a normal landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2001061",
    "date": "2023-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After landing [Runway] XXR, held short [Runway] XXL on high speed Taxiway 1. Cleared by Tower to expedite crossing [Runway] XXL and contact Ground once clear. Approximately 50 ft. past hold-short and accelerating, Aircraft Y appears approaching quickly from the left on [Runway] XXL. Aggressive stop by us. Aircraft Y kept right on rolling up to left turnoff. ATC declared, \"Aircraft Y was supposed to turn off on [Taxiway] 2.\" Uneventful taxi continued to [Gate] XX."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Upon landing [Runway] XXR in ZZZ, we vacated on [Taxiway] 1 and held short of Runway XXL on [Taxiway] 1 as instructed by ATC. We waited for our clearance to cross the runway. We then received a clearance to cross [Runway] XXL without delay since traffic was holding in position to depart. As we commenced crossing the runway, we noticed previously landed traffic, Aircraft Y, was still on the runway slowing to exit and had not cleared. This caused a conflict as we commenced to cross the runway. Realizing this, we brought the aircraft to a stop as Aircraft Y exited in front of us. This definitely caused some startle since ATC, to our knowledge, had not advised us of traffic exiting before us, only traffic holding in position. The Tower then realized we stopped and told us that the Aircraft Y was supposed to exit on Taxiway 2 instead of [Taxiway] 3 and told us to continue on [Taxiway] 1. I then re-read the clearance and asked for ATC clarification if Aircraft Y would give way to us as we crossed the runway over to Taxiway 4 and onwards to [Taxiway] 5. The controller re-iterated the fact that the Aircraft Y was supposed to exit on [Taxiway] 2 and that they missed the turnoff and that they should give way as we crossed. Due to the close proximity of the taxiways, errors from Aircraft Y and ATC caused a conflict."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter landing [Runway] XXR, held short [Runway] XXL on high speed Taxiway 1. Cleared by Tower to expedite crossing [Runway] XXL and contact Ground once clear. Approximately 50 ft. past hold-short and accelerating, Aircraft Y appears approaching quickly from the left on [Runway] XXL. Aggressive stop by us. Aircraft Y kept right on rolling up to left turnoff. ATC declared, \"Aircraft Y was supposed to turn off on [Taxiway] 2.\" Uneventful taxi continued to [Gate] XX.\n\nNarrative 2\nUpon landing [Runway] XXR in ZZZ, we vacated on [Taxiway] 1 and held short of Runway XXL on [Taxiway] 1 as instructed by ATC. We waited for our clearance to cross the runway. We then received a clearance to cross [Runway] XXL without delay since traffic was holding in position to depart. As we commenced crossing the runway, we noticed previously landed traffic, Aircraft Y, was still on the runway slowing to exit and had not cleared. This caused a conflict as we commenced to cross the runway. Realizing this, we brought the aircraft to a stop as Aircraft Y exited in front of us. This definitely caused some startle since ATC, to our knowledge, had not advised us of traffic exiting before us, only traffic holding in position. The Tower then realized we stopped and told us that the Aircraft Y was supposed to exit on Taxiway 2 instead of [Taxiway] 3 and told us to continue on [Taxiway] 1. I then re-read the clearance and asked for ATC clarification if Aircraft Y would give way to us as we crossed the runway over to Taxiway 4 and onwards to [Taxiway] 5. The controller re-iterated the fact that the Aircraft Y was supposed to exit on [Taxiway] 2 and that they missed the turnoff and that they should give way as we crossed. Due to the close proximity of the taxiways, errors from Aircraft Y and ATC caused a conflict.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported abruptly stopping to avoid a jet that had just landed and was exiting on the wrong taxiway, which caused a conflict as the flight crew just began to cross the runway after receiving clearance from ATC.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=27",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 27,
      "pageEnd": 29,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=27",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 27,
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    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2001061 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported abruptly stopping to avoid a jet that had just landed and was exiting on the wrong taxiway, which caused a conflict as the flight crew just began to cross the runway after receiving clearance from ATC.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
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      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1999417",
    "date": "2023-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "Citation Excel (C560XL)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Descending into ZZZ 9,000 ft. was assigned. Before reaching 9,000 ft. we requested ZZZZZ on the VISUAL Runway XX backed up with RNAV X Runway XX. There was discussion with ATC what type of approach we were requesting. We made it clear we wanted the visual starting at ZZZZZ. We were given direct ZZZZZ for the visual. We dialed in 8,600 ft. to cross ZZZZZ. After flying at 8,600 ft. we were told by ATC he had a low altitude alert climb to 9,000 ft. I initiated a climb. Shortly thereafter we saw the field. Notified ATC and cancelled IFR. Flight landed without incident. As a crew we were focused on a mountain airport and the correct procedures. We reviewed feasibility and all the Company pages enroute. The arrival and approach briefs were thorough. We were ready for the approach in all respects. Our error came in both of us hearing ZZZZZ and VISUAL and believing we were cleared. We thought we were. That is why we agreed 8,600 ft. SET 8,600 ft. SEEN was correct and we went down. We were wanting to be at approach plate altitudes early as well as configured early. I think that is why our collective mindset was hearing cleared for the visual whereas ATC has the tapes that prove we were mistaken. I haven't made this particular mistake since flying cargo a million years ago. I will be more cognizant of setting the altitude alert in the future."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Upon descent into ZZZ we were cleared to 9,000 ft. and direct to ZZZ1, around 11,000 ft. we requested direct to ZZZZZ for the RNAV X XX. The controller questioned if we were still wanting the visual approach explaining that he'd have to reassign us higher which is where the first point of confusion began. We confirmed that we wanted the visual approach but fly the RNAV per company recommendation, terrain avoidance, as well as to gain a better visual sight of the runway as the ZZZ track and our altitude wasn't giving us the best chance to see the runway. Upon getting clearance to ZZZZZ we proceeded down to 8,600 ft. in confusion thinking that we had a visual approach clearance and wanting to get lower and be configure earlier with the steeper approach, high altitude, and tail wind. Upon leveling at 8,600 ft. we gained visual of Runway XX, at the same moment ZZZ Center informed us of the low altitude alert as their bottom IFR altitude was 9,000 ft. We immediately cancelled IFR and proceeded to commence the Company XX visual. The entire time we were in visual conditions and ensured the we were not in any threat from terrain or traffic."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDescending into ZZZ 9,000 ft. was assigned. Before reaching 9,000 ft. we requested ZZZZZ on the VISUAL Runway XX backed up with RNAV X Runway XX. There was discussion with ATC what type of approach we were requesting. We made it clear we wanted the visual starting at ZZZZZ. We were given direct ZZZZZ for the visual. We dialed in 8,600 ft. to cross ZZZZZ. After flying at 8,600 ft. we were told by ATC he had a low altitude alert climb to 9,000 ft. I initiated a climb. Shortly thereafter we saw the field. Notified ATC and cancelled IFR. Flight landed without incident. As a crew we were focused on a mountain airport and the correct procedures. We reviewed feasibility and all the Company pages enroute. The arrival and approach briefs were thorough. We were ready for the approach in all respects. Our error came in both of us hearing ZZZZZ and VISUAL and believing we were cleared. We thought we were. That is why we agreed 8,600 ft. SET 8,600 ft. SEEN was correct and we went down. We were wanting to be at approach plate altitudes early as well as configured early. I think that is why our collective mindset was hearing cleared for the visual whereas ATC has the tapes that prove we were mistaken. I haven't made this particular mistake since flying cargo a million years ago. I will be more cognizant of setting the altitude alert in the future.\n\nNarrative 2\nUpon descent into ZZZ we were cleared to 9,000 ft. and direct to ZZZ1, around 11,000 ft. we requested direct to ZZZZZ for the RNAV X XX. The controller questioned if we were still wanting the visual approach explaining that he'd have to reassign us higher which is where the first point of confusion began. We confirmed that we wanted the visual approach but fly the RNAV per company recommendation, terrain avoidance, as well as to gain a better visual sight of the runway as the ZZZ track and our altitude wasn't giving us the best chance to see the runway. Upon getting clearance to ZZZZZ we proceeded down to 8,600 ft. in confusion thinking that we had a visual approach clearance and wanting to get lower and be configure earlier with the steeper approach, high altitude, and tail wind. Upon leveling at 8,600 ft. we gained visual of Runway XX, at the same moment ZZZ Center informed us of the low altitude alert as their bottom IFR altitude was 9,000 ft. We immediately cancelled IFR and proceeded to commence the Company XX visual. The entire time we were in visual conditions and ensured the we were not in any threat from terrain or traffic.",
    "synopsis": "CE-560XLS flight crew reported descending below minimum altitude on approach. The flight crew followed ATC instructions and climbed back above minimum altitude and continued the approach to land uneventfully.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=30",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 30,
      "pageEnd": 32,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=30",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 30,
        "pageEnd": 32,
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1999417 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "CE-560XLS flight crew reported descending below minimum altitude on approach. The flight crew followed ATC instructions and climbed back above minimum altitude and continued the approach to land uneventfully.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1996166",
    "date": "2023-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On taxi out from D1 in BNA, we were told to follow (other carrier) on L to H to [Runway] 2R. We turned on to H to 2R and Ground said hold short of [Runway] 31 threshold. The 10-9 of Jepps does not show a hold line for 31 landing traffic, but the AMM does as soon as you make turn on to H for 2R. By the time we figured it out, we had just passed the hold line and there is no signage that says 31 threshold on H taxiway. By the time we were going to stop he said continue on to 2R. We check the current ATIS at the time and it said only 2R for takeoff and 2C for landings and 2L was closed. So, we continued on and departed 2R for ZZZ."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were cleared by Ground to taxi behind (other carrier) aircraft to [Runway] 2R. We were not issued any hold short instructions. Upon crossing the portion of H that passes Runway 31, Approach Ground told us to hold short of it. At the time of the instruction we were already crossing this area. Additionally, there was no sign on the airport depicting this area and it was not on the 10-9 airport diagram. After issuing the instruction, Ground told us to continue taxi down H."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn taxi out from D1 in BNA, we were told to follow (other carrier) on L to H to [Runway] 2R. We turned on to H to 2R and Ground said hold short of [Runway] 31 threshold. The 10-9 of Jepps does not show a hold line for 31 landing traffic, but the AMM does as soon as you make turn on to H for 2R. By the time we figured it out, we had just passed the hold line and there is no signage that says 31 threshold on H taxiway. By the time we were going to stop he said continue on to 2R. We check the current ATIS at the time and it said only 2R for takeoff and 2C for landings and 2L was closed. So, we continued on and departed 2R for ZZZ.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were cleared by Ground to taxi behind (other carrier) aircraft to [Runway] 2R. We were not issued any hold short instructions. Upon crossing the portion of H that passes Runway 31, Approach Ground told us to hold short of it. At the time of the instruction we were already crossing this area. Additionally, there was no sign on the airport depicting this area and it was not on the 10-9 airport diagram. After issuing the instruction, Ground told us to continue taxi down H.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier flight crew reported there is no signage for the hold short line for Runway 31 on Taxiway H at BNA airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=33",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 33,
      "pageEnd": 35,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=33",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 33,
        "pageEnd": 35,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "Unclear runway-threshold hold point during taxi",
    "summary": "A crew taxiing at BNA reported receiving a hold-short instruction near the Runway 31 threshold when already crossing or close to the hold line. The accounts describe missing signage and differences between airport displays; ground control then told the crew to continue taxiing.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Communication",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1996154",
    "date": "2023-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700",
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Cleared for takeoff from Runway 4R. Tower cleared previous aircraft to take off approximately one minute prior to clearing us to take off. Shortly after takeoff, we experienced some wake turbulence from the aircraft in front of us. I elected to keep the wings level and delayed our turn until the wake turbulence dissipated. Initially, I started the turn using a bank angle of about 15 to 20 degrees in the event we encountered any additional wake turbulence. Departure asked us to tighten up the turn to heading of 230 degree. Departure cleared us to 4,000 ft. and asked up to expedite the climb. Departure then called out traffic, which I visually acquired off my left (about my 9 o'clock position). We received a TA (no RA) Alert while in the turn to a heading of 240 degrees. I had the traffic in sight and saw that the traffic was not a factor due to us climbing and increasing separation laterally. After switching frequency, we were told to call Chicago Approach when on the ground. After landing, I called Chicago Approach and they stated that we did not complete our turn within the required four miles. I explained our situation to Chicago Approach and why we had delayed our turn. Perhaps ATC could provide a little more spacing/timing between takeoffs. I should have mentioned why our turn was delayed to Chicago Approach prior to switching to the next frequency. Callback: 1 Reporter stated more spacing between takeoffs would be appreciated."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 4R in MDW in between an aircraft that had departed less than a minute prior and another aircraft on final approach. Spacing was sufficient to be legal, but the timing was tight, as is so often the case in MDW. Our clearance was left turn 250, maintain 3,000 ft. Shortly after rotating, probably 400 ft. or 500 ft. AGL, we experienced a \"bump\" and the tell-tale \"wing-dip\" of wake turbulence from the aircraft ahead of us. The Captain, who was Pilot Flying (PF), opted to stay wings level for a moment to stabilize the aircraft, then gently rolled into a slightly shallower than normal turn to our cleared heading to prevent an undesired aircraft state, should the wake turbulence worsen. During this time, Tower handed us off to Departure and I checked in with our altitude and heading clearances. Once it smoothed out and we had reasonable assurance it was safe to do so, the Captain began to tighten the turn from about 20 degrees to the standard 30. As he was doing that, ATC asked us to verify that we were on a 250 heading. I replied that we were still in the turn to 250, which we were. He asked us to tighten up the turn and continue it to 230 because we were getting close to \"O'Hare's stuff\". I replied with the new heading, saying we'd tighten it up, which had already done. Somewhere around then, we leveled at 3,000 ft., and ATC gave us a climb to 4,000 ft. As we were dialing that in, he called back and mentioned traffic to our left and asked us to expedite our climb and assigned us 13,000 ft. We did so, and did not receive an RA from the other aircraft. As we were climbing, he turned us slightly back to the right, heading 240, then eventually on course. No further mention of the event was made by that Controller and he handed us off to Center. Several minutes after checking in with the next Controller, he informed us of a possible Pilot Deviation and gave us a phone number. The rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully. This one's difficult, because closely spaced operations are common here, and I, myself, have departed MDW multiple times with no issues. ATC has no way of knowing what the weight/flap settings are of any aircraft that's taking off ahead of any other, and of course, we as Pilots have no way of knowing that either. I would suggest increasing space between aircraft, but I know that would have significant consequences in surface congestion, which may lead to unforeseen safety issues too. For myself, I will figure out some way to increase my awareness of where the 4 NM limit is from MDW. This too is tricky, because we had the 3.8 NM ring for the engine- out procedure depicted on the Navigational Display (ND), and as we were busy cleaning up the aircraft, climbing, responding to wake turbulence, turning, switching frequencies, communicating, leveling off, and looking for traffic, I honestly couldn't say that I ever even noticed that green ring on the ND moving past us. I think probably the most important thing that I should have done better, and will in the future, is to say something promptly to ATC, when we experience wake, especially when it affects our compliance with their clearance. Maybe if I had said something right away, they could have coordinated to allow us into ORD's airspace for a moment, and this whole thing would not have been an issue at all."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nCleared for takeoff from Runway 4R. Tower cleared previous aircraft to take off approximately one minute prior to clearing us to take off. Shortly after takeoff, we experienced some wake turbulence from the aircraft in front of us. I elected to keep the wings level and delayed our turn until the wake turbulence dissipated. Initially, I started the turn using a bank angle of about 15 to 20 degrees in the event we encountered any additional wake turbulence. Departure asked us to tighten up the turn to heading of 230 degree. Departure cleared us to 4,000 ft. and asked up to expedite the climb. Departure then called out traffic, which I visually acquired off my left (about my 9 o'clock position). We received a TA (no RA) Alert while in the turn to a heading of 240 degrees. I had the traffic in sight and saw that the traffic was not a factor due to us climbing and increasing separation laterally. After switching frequency, we were told to call Chicago Approach when on the ground. After landing, I called Chicago Approach and they stated that we did not complete our turn within the required four miles. I explained our situation to Chicago Approach and why we had delayed our turn. Perhaps ATC could provide a little more spacing/timing between takeoffs. I should have mentioned why our turn was delayed to Chicago Approach prior to switching to the next frequency. Callback: 1 Reporter stated more spacing between takeoffs would be appreciated.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were cleared for takeoff on Runway 4R in MDW in between an aircraft that had departed less than a minute prior and another aircraft on final approach. Spacing was sufficient to be legal, but the timing was tight, as is so often the case in MDW. Our clearance was left turn 250, maintain 3,000 ft. Shortly after rotating, probably 400 ft. or 500 ft. AGL, we experienced a \"bump\" and the tell-tale \"wing-dip\" of wake turbulence from the aircraft ahead of us. The Captain, who was Pilot Flying (PF), opted to stay wings level for a moment to stabilize the aircraft, then gently rolled into a slightly shallower than normal turn to our cleared heading to prevent an undesired aircraft state, should the wake turbulence worsen. During this time, Tower handed us off to Departure and I checked in with our altitude and heading clearances. Once it smoothed out and we had reasonable assurance it was safe to do so, the Captain began to tighten the turn from about 20 degrees to the standard 30. As he was doing that, ATC asked us to verify that we were on a 250 heading. I replied that we were still in the turn to 250, which we were. He asked us to tighten up the turn and continue it to 230 because we were getting close to \"O'Hare's stuff\". I replied with the new heading, saying we'd tighten it up, which had already done. Somewhere around then, we leveled at 3,000 ft., and ATC gave us a climb to 4,000 ft. As we were dialing that in, he called back and mentioned traffic to our left and asked us to expedite our climb and assigned us 13,000 ft. We did so, and did not receive an RA from the other aircraft. As we were climbing, he turned us slightly back to the right, heading 240, then eventually on course. No further mention of the event was made by that Controller and he handed us off to Center. Several minutes after checking in with the next Controller, he informed us of a possible Pilot Deviation and gave us a phone number. The rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully. This one's difficult, because closely spaced operations are common here, and I, myself, have departed MDW multiple times with no issues. ATC has no way of knowing what the weight/flap settings are of any aircraft that's taking off ahead of any other, and of course, we as Pilots have no way of knowing that either. I would suggest increasing space between aircraft, but I know that would have significant consequences in surface congestion, which may lead to unforeseen safety issues too. For myself, I will figure out some way to increase my awareness of where the 4 NM limit is from MDW. This too is tricky, because we had the 3.8 NM ring for the engine- out procedure depicted on the Navigational Display (ND), and as we were busy cleaning up the aircraft, climbing, responding to wake turbulence, turning, switching frequencies, communicating, leveling off, and looking for traffic, I honestly couldn't say that I ever even noticed that green ring on the ND moving past us. I think probably the most important thing that I should have done better, and will in the future, is to say something promptly to ATC, when we experience wake, especially when it affects our compliance with their clearance. Maybe if I had said something right away, they could have coordinated to allow us into ORD's airspace for a moment, and this whole thing would not have been an issue at all.",
    "synopsis": "B737-700 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred on departure from MDW as a result of a wake turbulence encounter from the preceding aircraft.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=36",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 36,
      "pageEnd": 38,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=36",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 36,
        "pageEnd": 38,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1996154 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "B737-700 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred on departure from MDW as a result of a wake turbulence encounter from the preceding aircraft.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1995544",
    "date": "2023-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "Light Transport"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While descending in NY airspace, we were instructed to maintain 240 kts and head to VINGS Intersection for the approach to Runway 06. I read back the instructions before I realized we were going below the Class B. We were cleared to 2,000 feet, the floor in that area is 3,000 feet. The PF (Pilot Flying) realized this as well and began slowing to 200 knots. The Controller inquired about our speed and reiterated that he gave us 240 knots. I replied that we were unable due to the 200 knot FAR requirement. He replied that his instructions \"supersede\" those of the regulations and to do 240 knots. I didn't reply, as the PF and I were in surprised discussion and in agreement with the 200 knot requirement. We maintained 200 knots until we re-entered the B, then picked the speed back up to comply with the original instruction. The remainder of the flight was uneventful and TCAS-free despite the Controller's assertion that another aircraft was about to hit us due to our brief and annoying speed reduction. Pilots need a published clarification about this \"NY exception\" to a long-standing FAR. If it's inconvenient, then get rid of it in the FARs. When I finish this report I will be looking at the NY area SIDs, STARs, and NOTAMs for anything IN WRITING about this special rule. Either most pilots or some NY controllers need retraining. One of us is wrong."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were at 3,000 feet, about 10 miles from VINGS for the ILS 6, inside the Class B airspace at the 3,000 feet floor, instructed by NY Approach to maintain 240 knots, which we did. We then were instructed to descend to 2,000 feet and maintain 240 knots. Once we descended below the floor of the Class B airspace, we slowed to 200 knots as required by FAR. Soon thereafter, the Controller asked our speed, and we told him 200. He said he instructed us to maintain 240, and we responded that we were required to be 200 or less below the Class B. He then said \"If I give you an airspeed, that's supersedes the rule.\" We did not respond, and shortly thereafter entered a lower shelf of the Class B and accelerated to the requested 240 KIAS. The rest of the flight was uneventful. We need clarification on this, as it happens on a regular basis going through NY airspace into TEB. It is my understanding that the Controller cannot issue a direction in contradiction to a FAR. Either we as pilots, or the NY Approach controllers need to be retrained on the proper rules and procedure."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile descending in NY airspace, we were instructed to maintain 240 kts and head to VINGS Intersection for the approach to Runway 06. I read back the instructions before I realized we were going below the Class B. We were cleared to 2,000 feet, the floor in that area is 3,000 feet. The PF (Pilot Flying) realized this as well and began slowing to 200 knots. The Controller inquired about our speed and reiterated that he gave us 240 knots. I replied that we were unable due to the 200 knot FAR requirement. He replied that his instructions \"supersede\" those of the regulations and to do 240 knots. I didn't reply, as the PF and I were in surprised discussion and in agreement with the 200 knot requirement. We maintained 200 knots until we re-entered the B, then picked the speed back up to comply with the original instruction. The remainder of the flight was uneventful and TCAS-free despite the Controller's assertion that another aircraft was about to hit us due to our brief and annoying speed reduction. Pilots need a published clarification about this \"NY exception\" to a long-standing FAR. If it's inconvenient, then get rid of it in the FARs. When I finish this report I will be looking at the NY area SIDs, STARs, and NOTAMs for anything IN WRITING about this special rule. Either most pilots or some NY controllers need retraining. One of us is wrong.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were at 3,000 feet, about 10 miles from VINGS for the ILS 6, inside the Class B airspace at the 3,000 feet floor, instructed by NY Approach to maintain 240 knots, which we did. We then were instructed to descend to 2,000 feet and maintain 240 knots. Once we descended below the floor of the Class B airspace, we slowed to 200 knots as required by FAR. Soon thereafter, the Controller asked our speed, and we told him 200. He said he instructed us to maintain 240, and we responded that we were required to be 200 or less below the Class B. He then said \"If I give you an airspeed, that's supersedes the rule.\" We did not respond, and shortly thereafter entered a lower shelf of the Class B and accelerated to the requested 240 KIAS. The rest of the flight was uneventful. We need clarification on this, as it happens on a regular basis going through NY airspace into TEB. It is my understanding that the Controller cannot issue a direction in contradiction to a FAR. Either we as pilots, or the NY Approach controllers need to be retrained on the proper rules and procedure.",
    "synopsis": "Light Transport aircraft flight crew reported ATC told them they had to maintain 240 knots even though they were flying below NYC Class B Airspace.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=39",
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      {
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    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1995544 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Light Transport aircraft flight crew reported ATC told them they had to maintain 240 knots even though they were flying below NYC Class B Airspace.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
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  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1994221",
    "date": "2023-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Landing Runway 35L, I saw Aircraft Y on the taxiway adjacent to the runway, as Taxiway H3 was approaching. It appeared stationary; I can't say with a 100% confidence, but his taxi light was not on. In either case, as I was committing to exit the runway at the high speed Taxiway H3, Ground gave us instruction to take the next Taxiway H2. We were unable to comply, since the clearance was too late. I [saw] Aircraft Y moving slowly and my exit speed was too high to slam on the brakes. I continued my exit by making the right turn on Taxiway Hotel from H3, since that was the safest course of action at that time. I don't know if Aircraft Y was moving slowly or at all, but it appeared to me that he was not. Better planning between Tower and Ground Control would have helped in communicating the exit point. In the future, in the absence of a clearance, I will assume he is moving and take the next high speed."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While landing Runway 35L at MCO, following a bird strike in the middle of my windscreen at 800 ft. on the roll-out, we planned our exit for Taxiway H3, approximately two-thirds of the way down the runway, on the high speed exit. As we exited, Aircraft Y on parallel on H, after landing ahead of us same runway, had not received a taxi clearance and their landing light was off, were stopped on H facing northbound. As we crossed the runway edge line on H3, Tower Controller called and asked us to roll to H2 much further down the runway. We had not slowed to a speed that would have permitted a safe turn back on to the runway and continued to H2 as the request from ATC was too late into our exit. We continued taxi to park. We could have slowed down with minimal braking and exit closer to the far end of the runway, However, usually this would be an annoyance to the Local Controller, due to aircraft in trail behind us landing having to go-around if we were still on the runway."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nLanding Runway 35L, I saw Aircraft Y on the taxiway adjacent to the runway, as Taxiway H3 was approaching. It appeared stationary; I can't say with a 100% confidence, but his taxi light was not on. In either case, as I was committing to exit the runway at the high speed Taxiway H3, Ground gave us instruction to take the next Taxiway H2. We were unable to comply, since the clearance was too late. I [saw] Aircraft Y moving slowly and my exit speed was too high to slam on the brakes. I continued my exit by making the right turn on Taxiway Hotel from H3, since that was the safest course of action at that time. I don't know if Aircraft Y was moving slowly or at all, but it appeared to me that he was not. Better planning between Tower and Ground Control would have helped in communicating the exit point. In the future, in the absence of a clearance, I will assume he is moving and take the next high speed.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile landing Runway 35L at MCO, following a bird strike in the middle of my windscreen at 800 ft. on the roll-out, we planned our exit for Taxiway H3, approximately two-thirds of the way down the runway, on the high speed exit. As we exited, Aircraft Y on parallel on H, after landing ahead of us same runway, had not received a taxi clearance and their landing light was off, were stopped on H facing northbound. As we crossed the runway edge line on H3, Tower Controller called and asked us to roll to H2 much further down the runway. We had not slowed to a speed that would have permitted a safe turn back on to the runway and continued to H2 as the request from ATC was too late into our exit. We continued taxi to park. We could have slowed down with minimal braking and exit closer to the far end of the runway, However, usually this would be an annoyance to the Local Controller, due to aircraft in trail behind us landing having to go-around if we were still on the runway.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported being unable to comply with a late clearance from ATC due to being on the high speed exit after landing, and exited the runway in close proximity to another aircraft.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=42",
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      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=42",
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    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1994221 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported being unable to comply with a late clearance from ATC due to being on the high speed exit after landing, and exited the runway in close proximity to another aircraft.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
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      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
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  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1988358",
    "date": "2023-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were descending into ZZZ on a flight from ZZZ1. We knew there would be moderate turbulence in the area and experienced at least occasional moderate on our descent below 16,000 ft. There were clouds in the area that indicated moderate turbulence and passed through a portion of them on our descent at about 16,000 ft. This turbulence was greater- than-moderate. Maybe not quite severe, but as you'll see we did not want to go back through them again. We were given a visual approach to Runway XXL and experienced moderate turbulence on the approach. In the flare the main wheels barely touched down, and we got a gust that picked us back up. After realizing the landing could not be made safely, we accomplished a normal go-around. On the go around we were given a climb to 11,000 ft. and a heading of 170. We complied with these instructions. Then as we were still cleaning up the airplane, ATC gave us a left turn to a heading of 070. Turbulence at the time was moderate and just bordering on, but not quite, severe. We told ATC that we wanted to maintain our heading and climb as the vector would have put us directly in the nearly severe turbulence in the clouds we flew through descending into ZZZ. The conditions were VMC on the west side of those clouds and we monitored clearance from the terrain. ATC gave us another easterly heading which, again, would have taken us through possibly severe turbulence; and we asked to maintain heading and climb above the turbulence so we could evaluate fuel and whether another approach could be made. Maintaining terrain clearance and using Captain's emergency authority, I elected to maintain heading and we told ATC we could not comply with the turn and requested a climb. ATC gave further instructions which we complied with that didn't require a heading into the turbulence, but no further climb was given. I assessed our fuel and made a decision at that time to divert to our alternate of ZZZ2. We requested the diversion. We were given a heading and altitude toward ZZZ2 and proceeded and landed. En route we were given a number to call for a \"possible deviation.\" We acknowledged the number and landed without incident at ZZZ2. I probably should have declared an emergency for fuel. In hindsight ATC was probably vectoring us back for another approach. We were still evaluating whether that was possible. But ATC, I think, misunderstood our request to stay out of potentially severe turbulence. Better communication between us and ATC might have helped the situation. ATC's intent to keep us in their airspace while try to vector us back and our intent to avoid severe turbulence (while maintaining terrain clearance) and evaluate whether a return was possible conflicted."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "ZZZ1 to ZZZ for visual, Runway XXL. For context: 1) I'm on Day 2 out of IOE. I know where information is available to me in the flight deck, but my scan is not innate, yet. As much as I'd like to have better numbers for what the winds were doing at each spot and exactly what our assigned headings and altitudes were, I'm just not there, yet. I'm very much using conscious brainpower to gather and process info. 2) On our way into ZZZ, we were vectored north along the eastern edge of a mountain ridge southeast of the city and clipped the easternmost edge of the clouds over those peaks. There was immediate moderate turbulence (closer to severe than light) just clipping the edge of those clouds. I'll call them the \"turbulent clouds.\" At the time, they looked like a collection of several merged cumulous clouds. We were warned of gains/losses of airspeed 10-15 kts. by PIREPS in front of us and the crosswinds were pretty strong from west-to-east. Just about at touchdown, we got a gust of wind and the Captain executed a \"go-around.\" We climbed out in VMC, on runway heading, roughly following the southbound valley that the interstate follows. We had unlimited visibility along our path to the south and clear awareness of the terrain on both sides. Departure gave us a level off at 11,000 ft., which ended up being right in moderate (nearly severe) turbulence as we were level with the mountain peaks to our west (only a couple miles away), and downwind of the west-to-east winds. I asked for an immediate climb to get out of the turbulence, and the controller issued it with a turn to the east, directly towards the turbulent clouds over the city. I informed the Controller we were unable the turn to the east because of the weather, at which point he stated we were below MVA and needed to turn in order for him to climb us. After a couple of radio exchanges, it was clear we only had to climb 100 ft. on an easterly heading before we could request a turn to the south again, so we attempted that. Ultimately, we ended up on a 170 heading and climbed above the turbulence (though I tried to get further to the right/west because we were brushing right up against the turbulent clouds). Somewhere in the exchanges, Departure did ask for our intentions; and I let them know we wanted to continue south for about 10 more miles. At the time, that was to get around the turbulent clouds and give us time to analyze/discuss our next decisions (try again or divert). Ultimately, the Captain decided we needed to divert because of our fuel state, and that process went smoothly. This was a very compressed timeline with highs winds, terrain, and turbulence, and a challenging mental model to share with the Controller who couldn't see or experience what we could. I was confident then, and now, that the safest actions we needed take at that time were to continue climbing out of the turbulence in the direction where we had great visibility and terrain clearance, while NOT turning directly into the heart of the clouds to our east that we already knew had strong, moderate turbulence on its fringes. Of note, on our return flight from ZZZ2 to ZZZ about two hours later, the clouds over the city appeared as a collection of several standing lenticular clouds, interconnected along the spine of the mountains underneath them. The only options I can think of that would have allowed us to continue with our own terrain clearance and climb in VMC would have been to declare an emergency or cancel IFR for two minutes then pick it back up. I don't know of an in- between way to concisely communicate to ATC that we were in a great spot to take responsibility for terrain clearance while on a south ground track that would avoid the turbulent clouds. I think the Controller was trying to vector us back for another approach and/or shortest direction back into an area where we would be above the MVA. If there's a way to relieve the Controller of his/her terrain clearance responsibility without saying \"emergency\" or \"cancel,\" I don't know what it is. It would have been nice to be able to say something like, \"We got terrain clearance, continuing 180, climbing to ___ (assigned), let us know when you can turn us west to go to ZZZ2."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were descending into ZZZ on a flight from ZZZ1. We knew there would be moderate turbulence in the area and experienced at least occasional moderate on our descent below 16,000 ft. There were clouds in the area that indicated moderate turbulence and passed through a portion of them on our descent at about 16,000 ft. This turbulence was greater- than-moderate. Maybe not quite severe, but as you'll see we did not want to go back through them again. We were given a visual approach to Runway XXL and experienced moderate turbulence on the approach. In the flare the main wheels barely touched down, and we got a gust that picked us back up. After realizing the landing could not be made safely, we accomplished a normal go-around. On the go around we were given a climb to 11,000 ft. and a heading of 170. We complied with these instructions. Then as we were still cleaning up the airplane, ATC gave us a left turn to a heading of 070. Turbulence at the time was moderate and just bordering on, but not quite, severe. We told ATC that we wanted to maintain our heading and climb as the vector would have put us directly in the nearly severe turbulence in the clouds we flew through descending into ZZZ. The conditions were VMC on the west side of those clouds and we monitored clearance from the terrain. ATC gave us another easterly heading which, again, would have taken us through possibly severe turbulence; and we asked to maintain heading and climb above the turbulence so we could evaluate fuel and whether another approach could be made. Maintaining terrain clearance and using Captain's emergency authority, I elected to maintain heading and we told ATC we could not comply with the turn and requested a climb. ATC gave further instructions which we complied with that didn't require a heading into the turbulence, but no further climb was given. I assessed our fuel and made a decision at that time to divert to our alternate of ZZZ2. We requested the diversion. We were given a heading and altitude toward ZZZ2 and proceeded and landed. En route we were given a number to call for a \"possible deviation.\" We acknowledged the number and landed without incident at ZZZ2. I probably should have declared an emergency for fuel. In hindsight ATC was probably vectoring us back for another approach. We were still evaluating whether that was possible. But ATC, I think, misunderstood our request to stay out of potentially severe turbulence. Better communication between us and ATC might have helped the situation. ATC's intent to keep us in their airspace while try to vector us back and our intent to avoid severe turbulence (while maintaining terrain clearance) and evaluate whether a return was possible conflicted.\n\nNarrative 2\nZZZ1 to ZZZ for visual, Runway XXL. For context: 1) I'm on Day 2 out of IOE. I know where information is available to me in the flight deck, but my scan is not innate, yet. As much as I'd like to have better numbers for what the winds were doing at each spot and exactly what our assigned headings and altitudes were, I'm just not there, yet. I'm very much using conscious brainpower to gather and process info. 2) On our way into ZZZ, we were vectored north along the eastern edge of a mountain ridge southeast of the city and clipped the easternmost edge of the clouds over those peaks. There was immediate moderate turbulence (closer to severe than light) just clipping the edge of those clouds. I'll call them the \"turbulent clouds.\" At the time, they looked like a collection of several merged cumulous clouds. We were warned of gains/losses of airspeed 10-15 kts. by PIREPS in front of us and the crosswinds were pretty strong from west-to-east. Just about at touchdown, we got a gust of wind and the Captain executed a \"go-around.\" We climbed out in VMC, on runway heading, roughly following the southbound valley that the interstate follows. We had unlimited visibility along our path to the south and clear awareness of the terrain on both sides. Departure gave us a level off at 11,000 ft., which ended up being right in moderate (nearly severe) turbulence as we were level with the mountain peaks to our west (only a couple miles away), and downwind of the west-to-east winds. I asked for an immediate climb to get out of the turbulence, and the controller issued it with a turn to the east, directly towards the turbulent clouds over the city. I informed the Controller we were unable the turn to the east because of the weather, at which point he stated we were below MVA and needed to turn in order for him to climb us. After a couple of radio exchanges, it was clear we only had to climb 100 ft. on an easterly heading before we could request a turn to the south again, so we attempted that. Ultimately, we ended up on a 170 heading and climbed above the turbulence (though I tried to get further to the right/west because we were brushing right up against the turbulent clouds). Somewhere in the exchanges, Departure did ask for our intentions; and I let them know we wanted to continue south for about 10 more miles. At the time, that was to get around the turbulent clouds and give us time to analyze/discuss our next decisions (try again or divert). Ultimately, the Captain decided we needed to divert because of our fuel state, and that process went smoothly. This was a very compressed timeline with highs winds, terrain, and turbulence, and a challenging mental model to share with the Controller who couldn't see or experience what we could. I was confident then, and now, that the safest actions we needed take at that time were to continue climbing out of the turbulence in the direction where we had great visibility and terrain clearance, while NOT turning directly into the heart of the clouds to our east that we already knew had strong, moderate turbulence on its fringes. Of note, on our return flight from ZZZ2 to ZZZ about two hours later, the clouds over the city appeared as a collection of several standing lenticular clouds, interconnected along the spine of the mountains underneath them. The only options I can think of that would have allowed us to continue with our own terrain clearance and climb in VMC would have been to declare an emergency or cancel IFR for two minutes then pick it back up. I don't know of an in- between way to concisely communicate to ATC that we were in a great spot to take responsibility for terrain clearance while on a south ground track that would avoid the turbulent clouds. I think the Controller was trying to vector us back for another approach and/or shortest direction back into an area where we would be above the MVA. If there's a way to relieve the Controller of his/her terrain clearance responsibility without saying \"emergency\" or \"cancel,\" I don't know what it is. It would have been nice to be able to say something like, \"We got terrain clearance, continuing 180, climbing to ___ (assigned), let us know when you can turn us west to go to ZZZ2.",
    "synopsis": "B737-700 Flight Crew reported moderate turbulence during the final approach resulting in a go around in which ATC assigned an unsuitable heading due to weather and terrain restrictions. Captain invoked Captain's authority to maintain heading and altitude clearance and also requested clearance to the alternate airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=45",
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    "collections": [
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    "title": "ASRS 1988358 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "B737-700 Flight Crew reported moderate turbulence during the final approach resulting in a go around in which ATC assigned an unsuitable heading due to weather and terrain restrictions. Captain invoked Captain's authority to maintain heading and altitude clearance and also requested clearance to the alternate airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
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      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1987530",
    "date": "2023-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was the instructor at position X, training a CPC-IT on his first day at the sector. This was our third session of the day, and we had previously discussed the fact that position X has frequent pilot deviations, mostly with the ZZZ1 departure. We discussed the importance of issuing the BRASHER statement, not to get pilots in trouble, but to educate the pilots and ensure the unsafe situation isn't repeated. ZZZ Tower called to request a release from Runway XX for a ZZZ One departure. Off Runway XX, the aircraft should turn northbound to heading XXX once they are through 5000 ft. The aircraft was released and departed shortly thereafter. The aircraft checked in climbing to 10,000 ft. on the ZZZ One and was radar identified. After some time and additional transmissions to other aircraft, we noticed the aircraft was still westbound as if on runway heading. The CPC-IT asked the pilot to verify they were on the ZZZ One departure, to which they responded \"affirmative, vectors to ZZZZZ.\" I understand the intent behind asking if the pilot was on the departure. An expected possible response could've been \"Affirmative, in the right turn now,\" as some pilots don't make this turn right away. Unfortunately, this aircraft continued into higher MVAs and a low altitude alert was never issued. The next departure from Runway XX, also on the ZZZ One, went into a higher MVA, but they were following the departure procedure correctly and made the turn appropriately. In most cases, 'appropriately' still leads to the aircraft getting into a higher MVA before making the turn northbound. I believe it could help to have ZZZ Tower reiterate what the departure procedure is read it line by line if necessary."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Aircraft X was released from ZZZ on an IFR flight plan coordinated from Runway XX on the ZZZ 1 departure, which required a turn to heading XXX after crossing 5000 ft. Aircraft continued straight on runway heading, when queried leaving 7400 ft. as to the departure procedure assigned, pilot responded that he was assigned a heading to expect direct ZZZZZ, which is the normal route assigned for Runway XXL. Aircraft climbed and was turned on course upon reaching a higher altitude above the MVA (12000). Due to the issues related to giving or implying a heading below the MVA, I opted to allow the aircraft to climb above the MVA before issuing a turn on course. I hesitated giving the pilot deviation advisory due to the aircraft still being in a climb underneath the flight levels but was instructed to by my trainer. It is still my belief that such instruction should be delayed until the aircraft is in level flight and on course or already on the ground. Unknown what communication error upon departure allowed the pilot to believe he was supposed to fly runway heading instead of complying with the issued departure procedure."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was the instructor at position X, training a CPC-IT on his first day at the sector. This was our third session of the day, and we had previously discussed the fact that position X has frequent pilot deviations, mostly with the ZZZ1 departure. We discussed the importance of issuing the BRASHER statement, not to get pilots in trouble, but to educate the pilots and ensure the unsafe situation isn't repeated. ZZZ Tower called to request a release from Runway XX for a ZZZ One departure. Off Runway XX, the aircraft should turn northbound to heading XXX once they are through 5000 ft. The aircraft was released and departed shortly thereafter. The aircraft checked in climbing to 10,000 ft. on the ZZZ One and was radar identified. After some time and additional transmissions to other aircraft, we noticed the aircraft was still westbound as if on runway heading. The CPC-IT asked the pilot to verify they were on the ZZZ One departure, to which they responded \"affirmative, vectors to ZZZZZ.\" I understand the intent behind asking if the pilot was on the departure. An expected possible response could've been \"Affirmative, in the right turn now,\" as some pilots don't make this turn right away. Unfortunately, this aircraft continued into higher MVAs and a low altitude alert was never issued. The next departure from Runway XX, also on the ZZZ One, went into a higher MVA, but they were following the departure procedure correctly and made the turn appropriately. In most cases, 'appropriately' still leads to the aircraft getting into a higher MVA before making the turn northbound. I believe it could help to have ZZZ Tower reiterate what the departure procedure is read it line by line if necessary.\n\nNarrative 2\nAircraft X was released from ZZZ on an IFR flight plan coordinated from Runway XX on the ZZZ 1 departure, which required a turn to heading XXX after crossing 5000 ft. Aircraft continued straight on runway heading, when queried leaving 7400 ft. as to the departure procedure assigned, pilot responded that he was assigned a heading to expect direct ZZZZZ, which is the normal route assigned for Runway XXL. Aircraft climbed and was turned on course upon reaching a higher altitude above the MVA (12000). Due to the issues related to giving or implying a heading below the MVA, I opted to allow the aircraft to climb above the MVA before issuing a turn on course. I hesitated giving the pilot deviation advisory due to the aircraft still being in a climb underneath the flight levels but was instructed to by my trainer. It is still my belief that such instruction should be delayed until the aircraft is in level flight and on course or already on the ground. Unknown what communication error upon departure allowed the pilot to believe he was supposed to fly runway heading instead of complying with the issued departure procedure.",
    "synopsis": "A TRACON Controller reported a corporate jet on departure did not fly the SID as published and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=49",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 49,
      "pageEnd": 51,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=49",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 49,
        "pageEnd": 51,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1987530 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "A TRACON Controller reported a corporate jet on departure did not fly the SID as published and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1987387",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "Falcon 2000"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was pilot flying. We were proceeding on the ZZZZZ arrival into ZZZ. We were in VMC conditions in the vicinity of ZZZ1 talking to ZZZ Control. The arrival states cross ZZZ1 below 13000. ZZZZZ has a hard crossing altitude of 8000. The Controller states we were given instructions to descend to 13000, then direct to ZZZZZ, cross 5 miles East of ZZZZZ at 8000. Direct ZZZZZ takes us off the arrival route. We read back what we thought were our instructions, cross ZZZZZ at 5000 and that was rogered. A short time later we were issued a low altitude alert and climbed to 8000. We then were switched to the next sector and continued our arrival without incident. I remember the frequency being busy, and there were similar call signs. We were both sure we had been cleared to 5000, and since we were in VMC and not \"descending via\" the arrival, there did not seem to be anything wrong with descending to 5000. Nothing more was said to us. We thought we were cleared direct to ZZZZZ and descend to five thousand ft. We rogered that clearance and were not contradicted. While we were wrong, we could clearly see the terrain and since we were off the STAR routing we saw nothing wrong. If we had heard the Controller more clearly, or if they had corrected our read back, as mentioned, the frequency was busy and evidently we missed the first instruction, to climb to 8000. At the start of this event we heard \"Direct to ZZZZZ”, out of \"Cross 5 miles East of ZZZZZ at 8000,\" and read back \"Cross ZZZZZ at 5000,\" or words to that effect. I won't try to justify that but evidently that is what happened."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Flying ZZZZZ arrivals into ZZZ, ZZZ ATC cleared Aircraft X to an altitude of 13000, the aircraft was on arrival outside of ZZZ1. A few moments later the Controller cleared Aircraft X direct to ZZZZZ off the arrival and to cross ZZZZZ, 5 miles before ZZZZZ at 5000 ft. was read back to Controller and confirmed by the other pilot. A few moments later the Controller notified Aircraft X of an altitude alert and was given clearance to climb to 8000 ft, which we did quickly. At no time was the aircraft in danger and the weather conditions were VFR. Nothing else was said and Aircraft X continued to ZZZ. I was a pilot not flying."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was pilot flying. We were proceeding on the ZZZZZ arrival into ZZZ. We were in VMC conditions in the vicinity of ZZZ1 talking to ZZZ Control. The arrival states cross ZZZ1 below 13000. ZZZZZ has a hard crossing altitude of 8000. The Controller states we were given instructions to descend to 13000, then direct to ZZZZZ, cross 5 miles East of ZZZZZ at 8000. Direct ZZZZZ takes us off the arrival route. We read back what we thought were our instructions, cross ZZZZZ at 5000 and that was rogered. A short time later we were issued a low altitude alert and climbed to 8000. We then were switched to the next sector and continued our arrival without incident. I remember the frequency being busy, and there were similar call signs. We were both sure we had been cleared to 5000, and since we were in VMC and not \"descending via\" the arrival, there did not seem to be anything wrong with descending to 5000. Nothing more was said to us. We thought we were cleared direct to ZZZZZ and descend to five thousand ft. We rogered that clearance and were not contradicted. While we were wrong, we could clearly see the terrain and since we were off the STAR routing we saw nothing wrong. If we had heard the Controller more clearly, or if they had corrected our read back, as mentioned, the frequency was busy and evidently we missed the first instruction, to climb to 8000. At the start of this event we heard \"Direct to ZZZZZ”, out of \"Cross 5 miles East of ZZZZZ at 8000,\" and read back \"Cross ZZZZZ at 5000,\" or words to that effect. I won't try to justify that but evidently that is what happened.\n\nNarrative 2\nFlying ZZZZZ arrivals into ZZZ, ZZZ ATC cleared Aircraft X to an altitude of 13000, the aircraft was on arrival outside of ZZZ1. A few moments later the Controller cleared Aircraft X direct to ZZZZZ off the arrival and to cross ZZZZZ, 5 miles before ZZZZZ at 5000 ft. was read back to Controller and confirmed by the other pilot. A few moments later the Controller notified Aircraft X of an altitude alert and was given clearance to climb to 8000 ft, which we did quickly. At no time was the aircraft in danger and the weather conditions were VFR. Nothing else was said and Aircraft X continued to ZZZ. I was a pilot not flying.",
    "synopsis": "Falcon 2000 Flight Crew reported an altitude deviation due to a communication breakdown regarding an ATC revised descent clearance. The flight crew read back an erroneous descent clearance which was corrected by ATC.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=52",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 52,
      "pageEnd": 53,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=52",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 52,
        "pageEnd": 53,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1987387 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Falcon 2000 Flight Crew reported an altitude deviation due to a communication breakdown regarding an ATC revised descent clearance. The flight crew read back an erroneous descent clearance which was corrected by ATC.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1985949",
    "date": "2023-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "A320",
      "Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Aircraft X, landed [Runway] XXL, exited Taxiway 1, possibly [Taxiway] 2, clear of runway, Tower instructed us to hold short of [Runway] XXR at [Taxiway] 3. As I was making a slow turn at [Taxiway] 3 to hold short of [Runway] XXR, Tower cleared us to cross [Runway] XXR at [Taxiway] 3. FO (First Officer) cleared right, I cleared left visually and verbalized, turned appropriate lights on, and intentionally did not disarm speed brakes to prevent FO from being distracted with after-landing flow. As we crossed the hold bars and I gained a better perspective to our right, of potential traffic on [Runway] XXR, Tower told us to hold position and I nearly simultaneously saw an aircraft approaching, potentially taking off, on [Runway] XXR. We of course immediately stopped. I quickly thought about reversing, but we had one reverser inoperative, and although across the hold bars, we were clear of the actual runway surface. Also, the departing aircraft was a narrow body, so geometrically a collision shouldn't occur. After the departing aircraft became airborne, Tower cleared us to cross again, and we confirmed they had initially cleared us to cross, which they confirmed."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Aircraft X. Upon landing on Runway XXL, we exited the runway at Taxiway 1 and were instructed by ATC to hold short [Runway] XXR at [Taxiway] 3. We did. Shortly after, ATC cleared us to cross [Runway] XXR at [Taxiway] 3. Both the Captain and I looked to make sure the runway was clear. On my side, I saw the lights of an aircraft at the end of the runway that appeared to be waiting ““ line up and wait. We started moving forward slowly at that time. Then I saw the aircraft appear to be moving, and at the same time, the controller told us to stop. By this time, we were past the hold-short line, but still short of the runway edge line. Too close for comfort, however. The departing aircraft lifted off prior to our intersection. Shortly after, ATC cleared us a second time to cross. I clarified with them that they cleared us to cross previously and they confirmed \"yes.\" After that, we taxied to the gate uneventfully."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAircraft X, landed [Runway] XXL, exited Taxiway 1, possibly [Taxiway] 2, clear of runway, Tower instructed us to hold short of [Runway] XXR at [Taxiway] 3. As I was making a slow turn at [Taxiway] 3 to hold short of [Runway] XXR, Tower cleared us to cross [Runway] XXR at [Taxiway] 3. FO (First Officer) cleared right, I cleared left visually and verbalized, turned appropriate lights on, and intentionally did not disarm speed brakes to prevent FO from being distracted with after-landing flow. As we crossed the hold bars and I gained a better perspective to our right, of potential traffic on [Runway] XXR, Tower told us to hold position and I nearly simultaneously saw an aircraft approaching, potentially taking off, on [Runway] XXR. We of course immediately stopped. I quickly thought about reversing, but we had one reverser inoperative, and although across the hold bars, we were clear of the actual runway surface. Also, the departing aircraft was a narrow body, so geometrically a collision shouldn't occur. After the departing aircraft became airborne, Tower cleared us to cross again, and we confirmed they had initially cleared us to cross, which they confirmed.\n\nNarrative 2\nAircraft X. Upon landing on Runway XXL, we exited the runway at Taxiway 1 and were instructed by ATC to hold short [Runway] XXR at [Taxiway] 3. We did. Shortly after, ATC cleared us to cross [Runway] XXR at [Taxiway] 3. Both the Captain and I looked to make sure the runway was clear. On my side, I saw the lights of an aircraft at the end of the runway that appeared to be waiting ““ line up and wait. We started moving forward slowly at that time. Then I saw the aircraft appear to be moving, and at the same time, the controller told us to stop. By this time, we were past the hold-short line, but still short of the runway edge line. Too close for comfort, however. The departing aircraft lifted off prior to our intersection. Shortly after, ATC cleared us a second time to cross. I clarified with them that they cleared us to cross previously and they confirmed \"yes.\" After that, we taxied to the gate uneventfully.",
    "synopsis": "A320 flight crew reported a critical ground conflict while taxiing to the gate. ATC cleared the flight crew to cross but there was another aircraft that was taking off on the runway prior to the intersection.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=54",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 54,
      "pageEnd": 56,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=54",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 54,
        "pageEnd": 56,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1985949 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "A320 flight crew reported a critical ground conflict while taxiing to the gate. ATC cleared the flight crew to cross but there was another aircraft that was taking off on the runway prior to the intersection.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1984404",
    "date": "2023-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "It was nighttime in EWR and after landing, Tower gave us clearance, something like cross Runway 22R, taxi RH to A, give way to company aircraft left to right. Because it was somewhat lengthy, the First Officer asked Tower to repeat the clearance. This time the clearance did not mention the aircraft to give way to, and since we saw a company aircraft crossing well ahead of us, we believed it was no longer a factor and that was why he omitted it in the second clearance. As we cleared the runway I noticed another company aircraft on the parallel and stopped the aircraft abruptly. Because it was dark, and because we thought there was not another aircraft to give way to, I didn't see it until the last second. I would estimate the clearance was 10 ““ 15 ft., at the most."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "After pushback in the RF alley, we contacted Ground for taxi. Ground cleared us to taxi to Runway 22R at Whiskey via Bravo and Romeo, and told to give way to an aircraft under tow on our right. This was the only instruction or advisory we received from Ground throughout the entire taxi. After becoming established on Bravo, behind the tug, the Captain called for the Before-Takeoff Checklist. Since this checklist requires us to reference paperwork and the FMC, the amount of time I was spending heads down was now increased. Approaching Taxiway Mike, the Captain noticed Aircraft Y on our right that was going to be crossing our path on the taxiway perpendicular to us, with no visible intent to stop. I was still in the process of completing the checklist, but at this point I focused my full attention outside. Understanding that Aircraft X was headed on a conflicting path with our taxi route, the Captain steered our aircraft slightly to the left, to provide extra clearance, and to ensure the two aircraft remained clear of each other. From what I could tell, Aircraft X eventually became aware of the conflict and stopped. During our taxi, we were never made aware by ATC that there was an aircraft crossing into our path, nor were we given instruction to give way to the crossing aircraft. Fortunately, the conflict was noticed early enough for both crews to react and avoid a more serious conflict. Furthermore, since we were on Ground frequency and Aircraft X was talking to Tower, we were not able to hear the clearance being given to Aircraft X. This occurred at night, which made it more challenging to see the other aircraft."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nIt was nighttime in EWR and after landing, Tower gave us clearance, something like cross Runway 22R, taxi RH to A, give way to company aircraft left to right. Because it was somewhat lengthy, the First Officer asked Tower to repeat the clearance. This time the clearance did not mention the aircraft to give way to, and since we saw a company aircraft crossing well ahead of us, we believed it was no longer a factor and that was why he omitted it in the second clearance. As we cleared the runway I noticed another company aircraft on the parallel and stopped the aircraft abruptly. Because it was dark, and because we thought there was not another aircraft to give way to, I didn't see it until the last second. I would estimate the clearance was 10 ““ 15 ft., at the most.\n\nNarrative 2\nAfter pushback in the RF alley, we contacted Ground for taxi. Ground cleared us to taxi to Runway 22R at Whiskey via Bravo and Romeo, and told to give way to an aircraft under tow on our right. This was the only instruction or advisory we received from Ground throughout the entire taxi. After becoming established on Bravo, behind the tug, the Captain called for the Before-Takeoff Checklist. Since this checklist requires us to reference paperwork and the FMC, the amount of time I was spending heads down was now increased. Approaching Taxiway Mike, the Captain noticed Aircraft Y on our right that was going to be crossing our path on the taxiway perpendicular to us, with no visible intent to stop. I was still in the process of completing the checklist, but at this point I focused my full attention outside. Understanding that Aircraft X was headed on a conflicting path with our taxi route, the Captain steered our aircraft slightly to the left, to provide extra clearance, and to ensure the two aircraft remained clear of each other. From what I could tell, Aircraft X eventually became aware of the conflict and stopped. During our taxi, we were never made aware by ATC that there was an aircraft crossing into our path, nor were we given instruction to give way to the crossing aircraft. Fortunately, the conflict was noticed early enough for both crews to react and avoid a more serious conflict. Furthermore, since we were on Ground frequency and Aircraft X was talking to Tower, we were not able to hear the clearance being given to Aircraft X. This occurred at night, which made it more challenging to see the other aircraft.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier Captain and another air carrier First Officer reported a critical ground conflict between the two aircraft during a taxi in night conditions. The former aircraft”™s Captain was able to abruptly stop the aircraft after noticing the other aircraft.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=57",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 57,
      "pageEnd": 59,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=57",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 57,
        "pageEnd": 59,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1984404 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air carrier Captain and another air carrier First Officer reported a critical ground conflict between the two aircraft during a taxi in night conditions. The former aircraft”™s Captain was able to abruptly stop the aircraft after noticing the other aircraft.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1981530",
    "date": "2023-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch",
      "Initial Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was landing RWY 10C and departing RWY 10L at the end of the evening. I issued Aircraft X a takeoff clearance with a right turn heading 180. The pilot read back \"right heading 180\". The aircraft rolled, and after 6,000 feet and airborne, I rolled Aircraft Y on a 090 heading. Meanwhile, the North Local Controller (NLC) Controller rolled Aircraft Z on a left 070 heading. I was looking at the radar when the Aircraft X tag acquired, and it looked a little north of the runway centerline depicted on the radar, and continuing to turn left, despite a correct readback of a right turn. It was IFR, and the plane was in the clouds. I immediately coordinated with the NLC Controller to stop their plane at 2,500 feet (underneath the altitude Aircraft X had climbed out of at that point) and stopped my own departure at 2,500 feet as well. I corrected Aircraft X's turn with a right turn to the south, and issued traffic to Aircraft Y. There was no loss of separation, but wrong direction turns are a chronic problem here, even when the pilot gives the correct readback. I have no idea. The pilot read back correct instructions, and then did an incorrect thing. Callback: 1 Reporter stated there is no obvious cause for this recurring issue."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I was working NLC, which at the time controlled departures off of Runway 9C. I cleared Aircraft Z for takeoff, on a 070 heading assigned. The weather was IFR, with ILS critical ceilings. As Aircraft Z was rolling, I noticed Aircraft X, a southbound departure off of Runway 10L, on the radar starting what appeared to be a wrong turn to the north, moving into the departure corridor of Runway 9C. I immediately began coordination with 3LC, who controlled Runway 10L, and instructed Aircraft Z to stop their climb at a safe altitude below Aircraft X. I then turned Aircraft Z to a 360 heading, to provide more airspace for 3LC to ensure separation with successive departures. Once 3LC had Aircraft X back on course, I turned Aircraft Z back to a 070 heading on course. No loss of separation was observed between any aircraft, and the review of the tapes determined it was a pilot deviation. Aircraft Z was issued and read back a right turn heading 180, but turned left. Wrong turn departures continue to be a chronic problem at ORD. Departing parallel runways, especially in IFR weather when the aircraft cannot be visually observed in the turns, continues to introduce a very high level of risk. It is my opinion, and the opinion of many at ORD, that the only way this process will be seriously addressed is AFTER a tragic event takes place. This is not an unknown issue, it is an extremely unsafe situation that has been brought up for years, and still no changes are in the works."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was landing RWY 10C and departing RWY 10L at the end of the evening. I issued Aircraft X a takeoff clearance with a right turn heading 180. The pilot read back \"right heading 180\". The aircraft rolled, and after 6,000 feet and airborne, I rolled Aircraft Y on a 090 heading. Meanwhile, the North Local Controller (NLC) Controller rolled Aircraft Z on a left 070 heading. I was looking at the radar when the Aircraft X tag acquired, and it looked a little north of the runway centerline depicted on the radar, and continuing to turn left, despite a correct readback of a right turn. It was IFR, and the plane was in the clouds. I immediately coordinated with the NLC Controller to stop their plane at 2,500 feet (underneath the altitude Aircraft X had climbed out of at that point) and stopped my own departure at 2,500 feet as well. I corrected Aircraft X's turn with a right turn to the south, and issued traffic to Aircraft Y. There was no loss of separation, but wrong direction turns are a chronic problem here, even when the pilot gives the correct readback. I have no idea. The pilot read back correct instructions, and then did an incorrect thing. Callback: 1 Reporter stated there is no obvious cause for this recurring issue.\n\nNarrative 2\nI was working NLC, which at the time controlled departures off of Runway 9C. I cleared Aircraft Z for takeoff, on a 070 heading assigned. The weather was IFR, with ILS critical ceilings. As Aircraft Z was rolling, I noticed Aircraft X, a southbound departure off of Runway 10L, on the radar starting what appeared to be a wrong turn to the north, moving into the departure corridor of Runway 9C. I immediately began coordination with 3LC, who controlled Runway 10L, and instructed Aircraft Z to stop their climb at a safe altitude below Aircraft X. I then turned Aircraft Z to a 360 heading, to provide more airspace for 3LC to ensure separation with successive departures. Once 3LC had Aircraft X back on course, I turned Aircraft Z back to a 070 heading on course. No loss of separation was observed between any aircraft, and the review of the tapes determined it was a pilot deviation. Aircraft Z was issued and read back a right turn heading 180, but turned left. Wrong turn departures continue to be a chronic problem at ORD. Departing parallel runways, especially in IFR weather when the aircraft cannot be visually observed in the turns, continues to introduce a very high level of risk. It is my opinion, and the opinion of many at ORD, that the only way this process will be seriously addressed is AFTER a tragic event takes place. This is not an unknown issue, it is an extremely unsafe situation that has been brought up for years, and still no changes are in the works.",
    "synopsis": "ORD Controllers reported an air carrier aircraft initiated a wrong turn resulting in controllers taking expedited measures to maintain separation with two other departing aircraft. Controller stated that this is an extremely unsafe situation that has become a chronic problem.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=60",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 60,
      "pageEnd": 62,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=60",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 60,
        "pageEnd": 62,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1981530 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "ORD Controllers reported an air carrier aircraft initiated a wrong turn resulting in controllers taking expedited measures to maintain separation with two other departing aircraft. Controller stated that this is an extremely unsafe situation that has become a chronic problem.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1981001",
    "date": "2023-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "Helicopter",
      "Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On final approach to ZZZ Runway XX, after performing practice LOC XX approach and cleared to land on Runway XX, at approximately 150 ft. and 200 ft. from Runway XX, we hear Aircraft Y call on the radio “going around.” At this moment, I notice off my right side, about 50 ft. below and 200 ft. or less laterally, the aircraft pass us at near 100 ft. It appeared ATC had not advised them of our position, and they had to take evasive action to avoid our aircraft. We did not recall hearing when they received clearance to land from ATC, but assume they were cleared behind us ““ but ATC must have not advised them of our position to maintain separation. The aircraft I was flying in is Aircraft X."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I, pilot of Aircraft Y, had a near miss with helicopter Aircraft X. I was cleared to land, number 2, behind helicopter. As I turned for final approach, I had eyes on the helicopter. Very quickly I caught up to helicopter with no warning from Control Tower. I took evasive action by side-stepping to the right and executing go-around, as well as letting Tower know I was going around. Helicopter called Tower and asked if he did anything wrong. Tower indicated to helicopter he approached too slow, and possibly too low. Helicopter pilot contacted me to discuss incident. Helicopter pilot believes ATC had ample time to warn both pilots and to instruct on aircraft separation."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn final approach to ZZZ Runway XX, after performing practice LOC XX approach and cleared to land on Runway XX, at approximately 150 ft. and 200 ft. from Runway XX, we hear Aircraft Y call on the radio “going around.” At this moment, I notice off my right side, about 50 ft. below and 200 ft. or less laterally, the aircraft pass us at near 100 ft. It appeared ATC had not advised them of our position, and they had to take evasive action to avoid our aircraft. We did not recall hearing when they received clearance to land from ATC, but assume they were cleared behind us ““ but ATC must have not advised them of our position to maintain separation. The aircraft I was flying in is Aircraft X.\n\nNarrative 2\nI, pilot of Aircraft Y, had a near miss with helicopter Aircraft X. I was cleared to land, number 2, behind helicopter. As I turned for final approach, I had eyes on the helicopter. Very quickly I caught up to helicopter with no warning from Control Tower. I took evasive action by side-stepping to the right and executing go-around, as well as letting Tower know I was going around. Helicopter called Tower and asked if he did anything wrong. Tower indicated to helicopter he approached too slow, and possibly too low. Helicopter pilot contacted me to discuss incident. Helicopter pilot believes ATC had ample time to warn both pilots and to instruct on aircraft separation.",
    "synopsis": "Helicopter pilot and single engine aircraft pilot reported a NMAC between the two aircraft when the single engine aircraft overtook the helicopter on short final during a visual approach.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=63",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 63,
      "pageEnd": 65,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=63",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 63,
        "pageEnd": 65,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1981001 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Helicopter pilot and single engine aircraft pilot reported a NMAC between the two aircraft when the single engine aircraft overtook the helicopter on short final during a visual approach.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1980154",
    "date": "2023-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Approach kept us high on the arrival into CHS. ATC issued a late descent and gave us and we read back an altimeter setting of 29.94. We transitioned to the RNAV RNP Z 15 in VMC conditions. We stayed on the vertical guidance until about 500 ft., we had the runway in sight but we looked low. We couldn't make out the PAPI until 500 ft., with the morning glare. Once we could, it confirmed we were low. We checked the descent and landed with no further issue. After [we were] on the ground we realized the altimeter was 29.84"
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While flying the AMYLU3 arrival into CHS airport, we picked up the local weather/ATIS information. The altimeter setting was 29.84 inches. We were then cleared for RNAV Z RWY 15 approach. Shortly after, we were transferred to CHS Tower. The Tower Controller advised us that ATIS was current, and the altimeter was 29.94. We both heard the transmission and the Pilot Monitoring read back 29.94. It did stand out to me that we were had a .10 difference. We configured to standard profile but inside 1,000 ft. while on glide path we looked a little low. Around 500 ft. we had roughly 3 red lights PAPI. Since I was hand flying, I leveled off. Transitioning from the outside view to the glide path. I announced leveling off or possibly correcting and the Captain acknowledged. After 500 ft. it was obvious that the outside view was the correct or safer path."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nApproach kept us high on the arrival into CHS. ATC issued a late descent and gave us and we read back an altimeter setting of 29.94. We transitioned to the RNAV RNP Z 15 in VMC conditions. We stayed on the vertical guidance until about 500 ft., we had the runway in sight but we looked low. We couldn't make out the PAPI until 500 ft., with the morning glare. Once we could, it confirmed we were low. We checked the descent and landed with no further issue. After [we were] on the ground we realized the altimeter was 29.84\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile flying the AMYLU3 arrival into CHS airport, we picked up the local weather/ATIS information. The altimeter setting was 29.84 inches. We were then cleared for RNAV Z RWY 15 approach. Shortly after, we were transferred to CHS Tower. The Tower Controller advised us that ATIS was current, and the altimeter was 29.94. We both heard the transmission and the Pilot Monitoring read back 29.94. It did stand out to me that we were had a .10 difference. We configured to standard profile but inside 1,000 ft. while on glide path we looked a little low. Around 500 ft. we had roughly 3 red lights PAPI. Since I was hand flying, I leveled off. Transitioning from the outside view to the glide path. I announced leveling off or possibly correcting and the Captain acknowledged. After 500 ft. it was obvious that the outside view was the correct or safer path.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported descending below glide path on approach to CHS after the altimeter was mis-set by 0.1 inches.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=66",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 66,
      "pageEnd": 67,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=66",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 66,
        "pageEnd": 67,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1980154 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported descending below glide path on approach to CHS after the altimeter was mis-set by 0.1 inches.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1979141",
    "date": "2023-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "A320"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "As we were getting ready for the approach and land in ZZZ, FL270, the cabin crew called us via interphone, notifying us about a [situation] in the mid-cabin. [The] Captain advised me about the event. The Captain immediately told me and communicated with ATC that we [were requesting priority handling] to ZZZ1 Airport. We both donned our masks and executed the [appropriate] descent procedure. As we were descending, ATC gave us a new instruction. Level off at FL250. We set that on the FCU. We had a traffic advisory, and ATC notified us about it. We dialed the VS on the FCU less than 1500 feet per minute to successfully avoid an RA. After crossing the traffic, we selected a lower altitude on the FCU (10000); as we were descending, both cockpit crews were having issues transmitting to ATC with our masks on. So I removed my mask and used the hand mike to communicate and reaffirm the [situation]. We requested the weather and runway in use at ZZZ1. The weather was provided for Runway XX. As we loaded the MCDU with all the details, we ran the [appropriate] checklist procedure. We loaded the flight [company software] with the landing details and proceeded with the approach checklist. On the final approach to Runway XX, we discussed the need to evacuate and confirmed that no actions were required. We did this twice. We review out loud the next course of action. Once on the ground and the aircraft stopped, I announced via the PA to the flight attendants at stations. After discussing with [the] Captain the state of the aircraft, the Captain communicated with the passengers the next course of action. The Captain informed the passengers we would taxi the airplane to the gate assigned. I announce three times passengers remain seated. We spoke with the fire chief and proceeded to taxi the aircraft. We Completed all checklists. Once at the gate and the parking checklist completed, the Captain gave the order to disembark the passengers as the residual smell was still present in the cabin. Two fire extinguishers bottles were used. One PBE (protective breathing equipment) and some passengers helped to combat the fire. A retired firefighter, deadheading crew members and Flight Attendant all went above and beyond."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I was conducting OE (Operational Evaluation) on a Captain upgrade and occupying the right seat, While in level flight at FL 270, I was the PM (pilot Monitoring), First Officer PF (Pilot Flying). Also onboard we had a Check FA (Flight Attendant) and two FAs receiving OE in the cabin, 4 jumpseaters onboard seated in the cabin not too far from the source of the fire. Approximately XA32 we received a call from the cabin, advising us of the [situation] with smoke coming out of an overhead bin mid cabin. She hung up, at the same time we got a frequency change from ATC that went unacknowledged, [FA] called back and confirmed an uncontrolled [situation] mid cabin from an overhead bin. As a cockpit crew we donned 02 masks and I attempted to respond to ATC, but the mask mic was transmitting poorly. After two attempts from myself and one from [PF], I took my mask back off and confirmed with ATC we had a [situation] and were diverting to ZZZ1. I instructed PF to keep his mask on during the descent while I worked the radios. We operated in this fashion until below 10,000 feet. Also during this time, Over the PA I briefed passengers on the diversion. FA called me at some point around 10,000 and said the [situation] was out and the cabin was prepared for landing. We completed the [appropriate], checklists for approach and landing, [PF] completed landing data for ZZZ1 on [Company system], and he confirmed again with FAs prior to landing that the [situation was contained]. We briefed ourselves and the FAs that we would stop and speak to the fire chief after landing, and that we did not anticipate evacuation. After landing, [PF] called FAs to stations, I spoke to the [ground personnel] and confirmed with them the [situation was contained] and established a plan for taxi to a gate. [PF], asked FAs to remain seated and we advised passengers that we were taxing to a gate to deplane. Once at the gate, I coordinated the deplaning as quickly as possible specifically due to the strong odor remaining in the cabin. Two of passengers were treated by paramedics on the aircraft and once all passengers had deplaned I made a gate announcement asking anyone who felt the need for medical care to please come forward and see paramedics. Several more passengers were cared for gate side, eventually the FAs were also taken to the hospital for evaluation. I was advised by jumpseater, and Lead FA that they along with a nearby passenger assisted in [controlling] the [electronic device] that was inside of a backpack. Passenger burns his hands while pulling the wet [electronic device] from the backpack. The device was placed in water per procedure and the fire source was isolated. Two halon extinguishers were used. A PBE was opened, but not used as the fire was already extinguished."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAs we were getting ready for the approach and land in ZZZ, FL270, the cabin crew called us via interphone, notifying us about a [situation] in the mid-cabin. [The] Captain advised me about the event. The Captain immediately told me and communicated with ATC that we [were requesting priority handling] to ZZZ1 Airport. We both donned our masks and executed the [appropriate] descent procedure. As we were descending, ATC gave us a new instruction. Level off at FL250. We set that on the FCU. We had a traffic advisory, and ATC notified us about it. We dialed the VS on the FCU less than 1500 feet per minute to successfully avoid an RA. After crossing the traffic, we selected a lower altitude on the FCU (10000); as we were descending, both cockpit crews were having issues transmitting to ATC with our masks on. So I removed my mask and used the hand mike to communicate and reaffirm the [situation]. We requested the weather and runway in use at ZZZ1. The weather was provided for Runway XX. As we loaded the MCDU with all the details, we ran the [appropriate] checklist procedure. We loaded the flight [company software] with the landing details and proceeded with the approach checklist. On the final approach to Runway XX, we discussed the need to evacuate and confirmed that no actions were required. We did this twice. We review out loud the next course of action. Once on the ground and the aircraft stopped, I announced via the PA to the flight attendants at stations. After discussing with [the] Captain the state of the aircraft, the Captain communicated with the passengers the next course of action. The Captain informed the passengers we would taxi the airplane to the gate assigned. I announce three times passengers remain seated. We spoke with the fire chief and proceeded to taxi the aircraft. We Completed all checklists. Once at the gate and the parking checklist completed, the Captain gave the order to disembark the passengers as the residual smell was still present in the cabin. Two fire extinguishers bottles were used. One PBE (protective breathing equipment) and some passengers helped to combat the fire. A retired firefighter, deadheading crew members and Flight Attendant all went above and beyond.\n\nNarrative 2\nI was conducting OE (Operational Evaluation) on a Captain upgrade and occupying the right seat, While in level flight at FL 270, I was the PM (pilot Monitoring), First Officer PF (Pilot Flying). Also onboard we had a Check FA (Flight Attendant) and two FAs receiving OE in the cabin, 4 jumpseaters onboard seated in the cabin not too far from the source of the fire. Approximately XA32 we received a call from the cabin, advising us of the [situation] with smoke coming out of an overhead bin mid cabin. She hung up, at the same time we got a frequency change from ATC that went unacknowledged, [FA] called back and confirmed an uncontrolled [situation] mid cabin from an overhead bin. As a cockpit crew we donned 02 masks and I attempted to respond to ATC, but the mask mic was transmitting poorly. After two attempts from myself and one from [PF], I took my mask back off and confirmed with ATC we had a [situation] and were diverting to ZZZ1. I instructed PF to keep his mask on during the descent while I worked the radios. We operated in this fashion until below 10,000 feet. Also during this time, Over the PA I briefed passengers on the diversion. FA called me at some point around 10,000 and said the [situation] was out and the cabin was prepared for landing. We completed the [appropriate], checklists for approach and landing, [PF] completed landing data for ZZZ1 on [Company system], and he confirmed again with FAs prior to landing that the [situation was contained]. We briefed ourselves and the FAs that we would stop and speak to the fire chief after landing, and that we did not anticipate evacuation. After landing, [PF] called FAs to stations, I spoke to the [ground personnel] and confirmed with them the [situation was contained] and established a plan for taxi to a gate. [PF], asked FAs to remain seated and we advised passengers that we were taxing to a gate to deplane. Once at the gate, I coordinated the deplaning as quickly as possible specifically due to the strong odor remaining in the cabin. Two of passengers were treated by paramedics on the aircraft and once all passengers had deplaned I made a gate announcement asking anyone who felt the need for medical care to please come forward and see paramedics. Several more passengers were cared for gate side, eventually the FAs were also taken to the hospital for evaluation. I was advised by jumpseater, and Lead FA that they along with a nearby passenger assisted in [controlling] the [electronic device] that was inside of a backpack. Passenger burns his hands while pulling the wet [electronic device] from the backpack. The device was placed in water per procedure and the fire source was isolated. Two halon extinguishers were used. A PBE was opened, but not used as the fire was already extinguished.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported a passenger's electronic device experienced a thermal runaway during cruise. The flight crew requested and was provided priority handling to a diversion airport where the flight landed safely.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=68",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 68,
      "pageEnd": 70,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=68",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 68,
        "pageEnd": 70,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1979141 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported a passenger's electronic device experienced a thermal runaway during cruise. The flight crew requested and was provided priority handling to a diversion airport where the flight landed safely.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1978509",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "B777-200"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were cleared to push out of Gate XX in ZZZ Cargo Ramp. After engine start Ramp Tower cleared us to taxi to Box XX and contact Ground. Ground then cleared us to taxi to Runway XYL via [Taxiway] 1. As we were leaving the ramp area we saw a ground vehicle, snow plow? moving at us left to right on the active Taxiway 2 at high speed. Ground did not alert us to the vehicle's presence. We began to slow the aircraft as the vehicle did not appear to see us. We were preparing to take potential action to prevent a possible collision when the vehicle slammed on his brakes and came to an abrupt stop just before crossing in front of our aircraft. We had sufficient clearance therefore, we continued an uneventful taxi to [Runway] XYL. Cause: possible training and lack of awareness on the part of the driver of the ground vehicle. Suggestions: Better communication between our aircraft and Ground. Better training of ground vehicle drivers."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Taxi clearance given exit point XX right turn [Taxiway] XX hold short [Runway] XYL. Taxiing out from Spot XX short of XX taxiway, with no notice from Ground, a snow plow / snow brush machine was traveling at high speed on taxiway 2. I had to slow aircraft and brake to avoid plow. Plow slammed on brakes and we proceeded out with over 15 ft. wingtip clearance. I don't know if training was occurring but no radio call from Ground and just bad driving from plow driver caused diminished safety margin. Cause: Too fast speed and lack of situational awareness by plow driver. Suggestions: Better training for plow crews. More communication from Ground controllers."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were cleared to push out of Gate XX in ZZZ Cargo Ramp. After engine start Ramp Tower cleared us to taxi to Box XX and contact Ground. Ground then cleared us to taxi to Runway XYL via [Taxiway] 1. As we were leaving the ramp area we saw a ground vehicle, snow plow? moving at us left to right on the active Taxiway 2 at high speed. Ground did not alert us to the vehicle's presence. We began to slow the aircraft as the vehicle did not appear to see us. We were preparing to take potential action to prevent a possible collision when the vehicle slammed on his brakes and came to an abrupt stop just before crossing in front of our aircraft. We had sufficient clearance therefore, we continued an uneventful taxi to [Runway] XYL. Cause: possible training and lack of awareness on the part of the driver of the ground vehicle. Suggestions: Better communication between our aircraft and Ground. Better training of ground vehicle drivers.\n\nNarrative 2\nTaxi clearance given exit point XX right turn [Taxiway] XX hold short [Runway] XYL. Taxiing out from Spot XX short of XX taxiway, with no notice from Ground, a snow plow / snow brush machine was traveling at high speed on taxiway 2. I had to slow aircraft and brake to avoid plow. Plow slammed on brakes and we proceeded out with over 15 ft. wingtip clearance. I don't know if training was occurring but no radio call from Ground and just bad driving from plow driver caused diminished safety margin. Cause: Too fast speed and lack of situational awareness by plow driver. Suggestions: Better training for plow crews. More communication from Ground controllers.",
    "synopsis": "B777-200 flight crew reported a ground vehicle was moving fast towards the aircraft on the taxiway as the flight crew was taxiing for takeoff. ATC provided no notification but the flight crew was aware of the vehicle. The vehicle braked before crossing the aircraft's path.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=71",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 71,
      "pageEnd": 72,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=71",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 71,
        "pageEnd": 72,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1978509 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "B777-200 flight crew reported a ground vehicle was moving fast towards the aircraft on the taxiway as the flight crew was taxiing for takeoff. ATC provided no notification but the flight crew was aware of the vehicle. The vehicle braked before crossing the aircraft's path.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1977785",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model",
      "Caravan Undifferentiated"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We pushed from Taxiway 1 with instruction to go to [cargo area]. We set up for departure on XXR @ Taxiway 7 but we also briefed for XYL. At [the cargo area] ATC cleared us to XYL via Taxiway 2, Taxiway 3. We are both familiar with ZZZ and so I asked the CA (Captain) if I could go heads down to make the changes and he agreed. I continued to scan outside while making the changes. We proceeded onto Taxiway 4 to make the left onto Taxiway 2. On Taxiway 4 ATC gave us information regarding conflicting traffic at Taxiway 5 (to our left). I believe they told us that we would give way to an [air carrier aircraft] outbound but I don't remember for sure. We both looked left for the traffic but as we approached the left turn on Taxiway 1 I looked right and saw a Cessna Caravan traveling at a high rate of speed on a direct collision course with us. I immediately commanded the CA to \"Stop! Stop! Stop!\" When I saw that he was unaware of the threat I took action applying heavy braking. We stopped in time for the caravan to pass without any corrective action on their part but it was a close call. I believe the caravan passed with 20 feet of our nose. Neither the Caravan pilot nor ATC appeared to have any idea of what just happened. After making ATC aware of the incident they informed us they were in the middle of a controller change. Their instruction for us to look left was the worst thing they could have done and almost doomed us."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Departed gate Taxiway 1 to the [cargo area] in ZZZ, on contact with ground we received taxi instructions \"Taxi Taxiway 2, Taxiway 3 to XYL\" We cleared, left, right, and forward, then began our taxi on Taxiway 4 to Taxiway 2. After looking for traffic and making sure I had identified the correct turn, the FO (First Officer) announced that he was going heads down to change the runway to XYL. I crossed Taxiway 6 and began my turn onto Taxiway 2 at between 8 and 10kts. Ground control contacted us with instructions or information about traffic at taxiway Taxiway 5 I don't remember exactly what they said. The FO came heads up and we both looked left into the turn for traffic at Taxiway 5. I then saw the FO turn his head to the right and then he shouted, STOP, STOP, STOP and immediately applied full brakes. As we came to a stop I saw a caravan taxi from right to left on Taxiway 2 in front of us at a high rate of speed. Our nose to the wingtip of the Caravan was about 20 feet. Ground control was going through a shift change and never mentioned the traffic conflict to either aircraft. Despite being heads up and scanning during the entire turn maneuver, I did not see the Caravan until my FO had resolved the situation. I believe that the caravan was traveling at a high enough rate of speed that they were continually in my blind spot. I also believe that the Caravan pilots never saw us, they were travelling extremely fast and never braked, maneuvered, or asked ATC about any potential traffic conflicts."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe pushed from Taxiway 1 with instruction to go to [cargo area]. We set up for departure on XXR @ Taxiway 7 but we also briefed for XYL. At [the cargo area] ATC cleared us to XYL via Taxiway 2, Taxiway 3. We are both familiar with ZZZ and so I asked the CA (Captain) if I could go heads down to make the changes and he agreed. I continued to scan outside while making the changes. We proceeded onto Taxiway 4 to make the left onto Taxiway 2. On Taxiway 4 ATC gave us information regarding conflicting traffic at Taxiway 5 (to our left). I believe they told us that we would give way to an [air carrier aircraft] outbound but I don't remember for sure. We both looked left for the traffic but as we approached the left turn on Taxiway 1 I looked right and saw a Cessna Caravan traveling at a high rate of speed on a direct collision course with us. I immediately commanded the CA to \"Stop! Stop! Stop!\" When I saw that he was unaware of the threat I took action applying heavy braking. We stopped in time for the caravan to pass without any corrective action on their part but it was a close call. I believe the caravan passed with 20 feet of our nose. Neither the Caravan pilot nor ATC appeared to have any idea of what just happened. After making ATC aware of the incident they informed us they were in the middle of a controller change. Their instruction for us to look left was the worst thing they could have done and almost doomed us.\n\nNarrative 2\nDeparted gate Taxiway 1 to the [cargo area] in ZZZ, on contact with ground we received taxi instructions \"Taxi Taxiway 2, Taxiway 3 to XYL\" We cleared, left, right, and forward, then began our taxi on Taxiway 4 to Taxiway 2. After looking for traffic and making sure I had identified the correct turn, the FO (First Officer) announced that he was going heads down to change the runway to XYL. I crossed Taxiway 6 and began my turn onto Taxiway 2 at between 8 and 10kts. Ground control contacted us with instructions or information about traffic at taxiway Taxiway 5 I don't remember exactly what they said. The FO came heads up and we both looked left into the turn for traffic at Taxiway 5. I then saw the FO turn his head to the right and then he shouted, STOP, STOP, STOP and immediately applied full brakes. As we came to a stop I saw a caravan taxi from right to left on Taxiway 2 in front of us at a high rate of speed. Our nose to the wingtip of the Caravan was about 20 feet. Ground control was going through a shift change and never mentioned the traffic conflict to either aircraft. Despite being heads up and scanning during the entire turn maneuver, I did not see the Caravan until my FO had resolved the situation. I believe that the caravan was traveling at a high enough rate of speed that they were continually in my blind spot. I also believe that the Caravan pilots never saw us, they were travelling extremely fast and never braked, maneuvered, or asked ATC about any potential traffic conflicts.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported a critical ground conflict while taxiing to the runway with another aircraft taxiing on a crossing taxiway. The First Officer abruptly applied brakes avoiding a collision and ATC later informed the pilots they were in the middle of shift change during the incident.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=73",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 73,
      "pageEnd": 75,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=73",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 73,
        "pageEnd": 75,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1977785 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported a critical ground conflict while taxiing to the runway with another aircraft taxiing on a crossing taxiway. The First Officer abruptly applied brakes avoiding a collision and ATC later informed the pilots they were in the middle of shift change during the incident.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1977439",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "[The flight] pushed on time. Ground Control instructed taxi to Runway XXL for departure and gave us a wheels up time of +15 min. We were then switched to Tower frequency with Aircraft Y holding short of Runway XXL full length and us as Aircraft X. Tower asked us to pull into the hold block for XXL to allow Aircraft Z behind us to access the runway via intersection Taxiway 1. Tower then gave Aircraft Z take off clearance from intersection Taxiway 1 but denied back taxi for full length. Aircraft Z then declined the takeoff clearance and informed Tower they would need to reload data and perform a checklist. After landing traffic on XXL, Tower asked Aircraft Z if they could move to give us access to the Runway via Taxiway 1, so we could make our wheels up time. Aircraft Y had a later wheels up time and was still holding short full length XXL. Aircraft Z was cleared to taxi down Runway XXL and clear Taxiway 2 back onto Taxiway 3. We were instructed to hold short of Runway XXL at Taxiway 1. I chose to hold our position in the hold block while we dealt with the additive condition of task loading with a runway change. Tower asked if we could take Taxiway 1. We replied on the radio that we needed a minute to load new data and run a checklist. Tower responded that we had 50 seconds to make our wheels up time or we would need a new wheels up time. I responded to please get us a new wheels up time. Traffic permitting, Tower then cleared Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z for departure, leaving us as the only aircraft in the holding block. Tower informed us of our new wheels up time. We asked Tower if we should now expect a full length departure from XXL to which they replied, \"Stand by.\" Approximately five minutes passed with no response from Tower on departure point. Approaching our new wheels up time, Tower instructed us to taxi up to and hold short of Runway XXL full length. With the intersection data loaded, I told Tower that each time they change our departure point, we need to load new data and run a checklist. Tower changed out taxi instructions to taxi up to and hold short of Runway XXL at Taxiway 1. As we taxied, the First Officer had deleted our data, when our clearance was for full length, but then reloaded when our taxi instructions changed to the intersection of Taxiway 1. As we approached XXL at Taxiway 1, Tower issued what we thought was position and hold on Runway XXL at Taxiway 1. With the additive conditions of task loading to accomplish the Before Take Off Checklist and the operational pressure to make our wheels up time along with meeting minimum fuel requirements for the flight, I was getting behind and did not hear Towers second clearance. I believe both the First Officers and I's expectation bias led us to believe that a second instruction from Tower would be a line up and wait. I did rely on my First Officers response to the call, which was line up and wait XXL at Taxiway 1. Tower did not catch our error nor make any correction. As I entered the runway at Taxiway 1, I cleared final and saw company aircraft at 800 ft on final approach. I thought it was tight but it fit into my expectation bias that Tower was trying to make our wheels up time since they had emphasized our first wheels up time. As I lined up on centerline for Runway XXL, I expected a takeoff clearance but none was received. After an awkward silence and glancing at the TCAS display and now seeing company at 600 ft on final I got the sinking feeling that there may have been a miscommunication. The next radio call was Tower instructing company to go around. Tower then asked us to copy down a phone number for possible pilot deviation. I think several things led to this communication error and runway incursion. I think the Tower Controller could understand the task loading created with multiple runway changes for intersection departures. Our error was allowing additive conditions to put us behind as a crew and then letting our expectation bias for making our wheels up time. This resulted in the communication error of reading back the wrong clearance. In the future I will not allow myself to take the runway if I feel behind for any reason regardless of a wheels up time."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While taxiing to Runway XXL for departure, Tower informed us of a flow time to ZZZ1 and instructed us to pull into the hold pad. There was an aircraft holding short of the runway at Taxiway 4 intersection for the full length. As our flow time approached, Tower told us that we would have to depart from Taxiway 1 intersection, and that we would not be able to back taxi. At this time we informed Tower that we would have to re-run our performance numbers and it would take a few minutes. Tower responded that they would have to get a new flow time for us, which we said was OK. After we had new performance numbers for the Taxiway 1 intersection departure, we let Tower know and received a new flow time. While we were waiting for our new flow time, the aircraft that was on Taxiway 4 for the full length departed. We asked which intersection we could plan on departing from, since we would have to re-run our numbers again for full length. Tower told us to standby, but never answered our question. As our new flow time approached, Tower told us to taxi to the full length intersection at Taxiway 4, at which time we informed them that we would have to change our performance numbers again. As we were in the process of changing our performance numbers, Tower instructed us to hold short of the runway at the Taxiway 1 intersection. It was during this time of high workload, while undoing the changes we had begun to make so we could meet our flow time, that we mistook Tower's instruction for a lineup and wait clearance. When reading back the instructions, we read back \"Runway XXL at Taxiway 1 lineup and wait,\" and did not get any response or challenge from Tower. After lining up on the runway at Taxiway 1, we expected immediate takeoff clearance as there was an aircraft on final, but the clearance didn't come and the landing aircraft was instructed to go around. Once that aircraft was clear we were informed of the possible pilot deviation. We were then given takeoff clearance. If we had gotten earlier communications from Tower about the sequence of aircraft and the need for an intersection departure, we could've avoided the additive conditions that led us to be behind. If Tower had answered our question of what takeoff point we could expect for our new sequence we could've re- programmed our performance numbers while we were waiting, and we wouldn't have been task loaded at the last minute approaching our flow time. If we had told Tower we could only accept a Taxiway 1 intersection departure, when Tower instructed us to taxi for the full length, we could have avoided another last second change, which led to us being task loaded and miss hearing the second taxi instruction from Tower. If Tower had clarified our clearance after we read back XXL at Taxiway 1 lineup and wait we wouldn't have deviated from the initial instructions we were given."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\n[The flight] pushed on time. Ground Control instructed taxi to Runway XXL for departure and gave us a wheels up time of +15 min. We were then switched to Tower frequency with Aircraft Y holding short of Runway XXL full length and us as Aircraft X. Tower asked us to pull into the hold block for XXL to allow Aircraft Z behind us to access the runway via intersection Taxiway 1. Tower then gave Aircraft Z take off clearance from intersection Taxiway 1 but denied back taxi for full length. Aircraft Z then declined the takeoff clearance and informed Tower they would need to reload data and perform a checklist. After landing traffic on XXL, Tower asked Aircraft Z if they could move to give us access to the Runway via Taxiway 1, so we could make our wheels up time. Aircraft Y had a later wheels up time and was still holding short full length XXL. Aircraft Z was cleared to taxi down Runway XXL and clear Taxiway 2 back onto Taxiway 3. We were instructed to hold short of Runway XXL at Taxiway 1. I chose to hold our position in the hold block while we dealt with the additive condition of task loading with a runway change. Tower asked if we could take Taxiway 1. We replied on the radio that we needed a minute to load new data and run a checklist. Tower responded that we had 50 seconds to make our wheels up time or we would need a new wheels up time. I responded to please get us a new wheels up time. Traffic permitting, Tower then cleared Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z for departure, leaving us as the only aircraft in the holding block. Tower informed us of our new wheels up time. We asked Tower if we should now expect a full length departure from XXL to which they replied, \"Stand by.\" Approximately five minutes passed with no response from Tower on departure point. Approaching our new wheels up time, Tower instructed us to taxi up to and hold short of Runway XXL full length. With the intersection data loaded, I told Tower that each time they change our departure point, we need to load new data and run a checklist. Tower changed out taxi instructions to taxi up to and hold short of Runway XXL at Taxiway 1. As we taxied, the First Officer had deleted our data, when our clearance was for full length, but then reloaded when our taxi instructions changed to the intersection of Taxiway 1. As we approached XXL at Taxiway 1, Tower issued what we thought was position and hold on Runway XXL at Taxiway 1. With the additive conditions of task loading to accomplish the Before Take Off Checklist and the operational pressure to make our wheels up time along with meeting minimum fuel requirements for the flight, I was getting behind and did not hear Towers second clearance. I believe both the First Officers and I's expectation bias led us to believe that a second instruction from Tower would be a line up and wait. I did rely on my First Officers response to the call, which was line up and wait XXL at Taxiway 1. Tower did not catch our error nor make any correction. As I entered the runway at Taxiway 1, I cleared final and saw company aircraft at 800 ft on final approach. I thought it was tight but it fit into my expectation bias that Tower was trying to make our wheels up time since they had emphasized our first wheels up time. As I lined up on centerline for Runway XXL, I expected a takeoff clearance but none was received. After an awkward silence and glancing at the TCAS display and now seeing company at 600 ft on final I got the sinking feeling that there may have been a miscommunication. The next radio call was Tower instructing company to go around. Tower then asked us to copy down a phone number for possible pilot deviation. I think several things led to this communication error and runway incursion. I think the Tower Controller could understand the task loading created with multiple runway changes for intersection departures. Our error was allowing additive conditions to put us behind as a crew and then letting our expectation bias for making our wheels up time. This resulted in the communication error of reading back the wrong clearance. In the future I will not allow myself to take the runway if I feel behind for any reason regardless of a wheels up time.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile taxiing to Runway XXL for departure, Tower informed us of a flow time to ZZZ1 and instructed us to pull into the hold pad. There was an aircraft holding short of the runway at Taxiway 4 intersection for the full length. As our flow time approached, Tower told us that we would have to depart from Taxiway 1 intersection, and that we would not be able to back taxi. At this time we informed Tower that we would have to re-run our performance numbers and it would take a few minutes. Tower responded that they would have to get a new flow time for us, which we said was OK. After we had new performance numbers for the Taxiway 1 intersection departure, we let Tower know and received a new flow time. While we were waiting for our new flow time, the aircraft that was on Taxiway 4 for the full length departed. We asked which intersection we could plan on departing from, since we would have to re-run our numbers again for full length. Tower told us to standby, but never answered our question. As our new flow time approached, Tower told us to taxi to the full length intersection at Taxiway 4, at which time we informed them that we would have to change our performance numbers again. As we were in the process of changing our performance numbers, Tower instructed us to hold short of the runway at the Taxiway 1 intersection. It was during this time of high workload, while undoing the changes we had begun to make so we could meet our flow time, that we mistook Tower's instruction for a lineup and wait clearance. When reading back the instructions, we read back \"Runway XXL at Taxiway 1 lineup and wait,\" and did not get any response or challenge from Tower. After lining up on the runway at Taxiway 1, we expected immediate takeoff clearance as there was an aircraft on final, but the clearance didn't come and the landing aircraft was instructed to go around. Once that aircraft was clear we were informed of the possible pilot deviation. We were then given takeoff clearance. If we had gotten earlier communications from Tower about the sequence of aircraft and the need for an intersection departure, we could've avoided the additive conditions that led us to be behind. If Tower had answered our question of what takeoff point we could expect for our new sequence we could've re- programmed our performance numbers while we were waiting, and we wouldn't have been task loaded at the last minute approaching our flow time. If we had told Tower we could only accept a Taxiway 1 intersection departure, when Tower instructed us to taxi for the full length, we could have avoided another last second change, which led to us being task loaded and miss hearing the second taxi instruction from Tower. If Tower had clarified our clearance after we read back XXL at Taxiway 1 lineup and wait we wouldn't have deviated from the initial instructions we were given.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported a communication breakdown between flight crew and ATC which resulted in a critical ground conflict.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=76",
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    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=76",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1977439 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported a communication breakdown between flight crew and ATC which resulted in a critical ground conflict.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
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      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1977434",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Due to insufficient stopping margin for Runway X, but insufficient weather to land on Runway XX, we decided we needed to shoot the ILS to Runway X and circle to land XX in ZZZ. We both thought that we heard ATC descend us to 4200 ft. MSL from 5200 ft. We began descending and asked Approach to clarify the circling altitude for the approach. ATC advised us that the minimum vectoring altitude was 5000 ft., and asked us to climb back to 5000 ft. (we were descending through 4600 ft. MSL). We climbed back up to 5000 ft. promptly. We are not sure if we misheard the Controller's radio call and descended in error, or if the Controller actually gave us the descent in error. We are both fairly confident we heard the call correctly but were task saturated at the time and recognize that it could have been our fault. The rest of the flight transpired without issue."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "[Report narrative contained no additional information.]"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDue to insufficient stopping margin for Runway X, but insufficient weather to land on Runway XX, we decided we needed to shoot the ILS to Runway X and circle to land XX in ZZZ. We both thought that we heard ATC descend us to 4200 ft. MSL from 5200 ft. We began descending and asked Approach to clarify the circling altitude for the approach. ATC advised us that the minimum vectoring altitude was 5000 ft., and asked us to climb back to 5000 ft. (we were descending through 4600 ft. MSL). We climbed back up to 5000 ft. promptly. We are not sure if we misheard the Controller's radio call and descended in error, or if the Controller actually gave us the descent in error. We are both fairly confident we heard the call correctly but were task saturated at the time and recognize that it could have been our fault. The rest of the flight transpired without issue.\n\nNarrative 2\n[Report narrative contained no additional information.]",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported a CFIT event during approach after descending from the assigned altitude. The flight crew climbed to the assigned altitude and the flight continued without issues.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=80",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 80,
      "pageEnd": 81,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
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        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=80",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
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      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "Uncertain descent clearance leads below vectoring altitude",
    "summary": "A B737 crew planning a circling approach believed it had been cleared down to 4,200 feet, then was told the minimum vectoring altitude was 5,000 feet. The crew climbed back promptly and could not determine whether it had misheard the clearance or the controller had issued it incorrectly.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Communication",
      "Procedures",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1977107",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800",
      "Helicopter"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On an ILS approach to Runway XX in ZZZ. Cleared to land by Tower, VMC conditions. They informed us of of a Military helicopter working to the east of final and that they would remain there. The helo was close to the water as you could see the spray. As we got closer to the runway, it turned west. We watched the helo and expected it to turn east again. It never did. We went around visually at approximately 500 [ft.] AGL. There were no TCAS indications. We don't think their TCAS was turned on. The helo was encroaching on the final of the ILS. We missed it by a few hundred ft. as it went under us. I don't think either helo pilot ever saw us. We brought up our dissatisfaction with Tower on the go-around and called Dispatch when we landed. I also spoke to the Chief Pilot and the ATC Representative on duty."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were on final approach into ZZZ cleared on the ILS Runway XX to ZZZ. Approach switched us to Tower and I checked in. Tower cleared us to land and notified us of a pair of Military helicopters east of the final approach course performing maneuvers. Tower also said that they should remain to the east of the final approach course. I told Tower we were looking and continued the approach. Neither of the helicopters showed up on our TCAS. The Captain was the first to see the helicopters and told me where they were. I finally saw them and reported them insight to Tower as he had told us where they were again. Tower said they should stay over to the east. We continued the approach. Probably around our 1000 [ft.] call, we noticed one of the helicopters had started to climb and was heading towards the final approach corridor for [Runway] XX which we were on. We both noted it and both expected the helicopter to start a turn east bound. Instead, the helicopter continued straight on a course that would have put him on a collision course with us, my guess is around 300 [ft.] MSL. Very shortly afterward, we were at about 500 [ft.] when the Captain called for the go-around as I had started to say it as well. We executed the go-around. I lost sight of the helicopter as we pitched up, but the Captain told me it never changed course and flew directly beneath us. We executed the missed approach and circled back around for a visual approach, which was successful and taxied to the gate with no further incidents. We told both Tower and Approach what happened and the Captain called it in to the Company Operations Center once we were parked at the gate. We never had the helicopter on TCAS and never received a TA or RA. We had the helicopter visually and executed the go-around based on our visual with the helicopter."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn an ILS approach to Runway XX in ZZZ. Cleared to land by Tower, VMC conditions. They informed us of of a Military helicopter working to the east of final and that they would remain there. The helo was close to the water as you could see the spray. As we got closer to the runway, it turned west. We watched the helo and expected it to turn east again. It never did. We went around visually at approximately 500 [ft.] AGL. There were no TCAS indications. We don't think their TCAS was turned on. The helo was encroaching on the final of the ILS. We missed it by a few hundred ft. as it went under us. I don't think either helo pilot ever saw us. We brought up our dissatisfaction with Tower on the go-around and called Dispatch when we landed. I also spoke to the Chief Pilot and the ATC Representative on duty.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were on final approach into ZZZ cleared on the ILS Runway XX to ZZZ. Approach switched us to Tower and I checked in. Tower cleared us to land and notified us of a pair of Military helicopters east of the final approach course performing maneuvers. Tower also said that they should remain to the east of the final approach course. I told Tower we were looking and continued the approach. Neither of the helicopters showed up on our TCAS. The Captain was the first to see the helicopters and told me where they were. I finally saw them and reported them insight to Tower as he had told us where they were again. Tower said they should stay over to the east. We continued the approach. Probably around our 1000 [ft.] call, we noticed one of the helicopters had started to climb and was heading towards the final approach corridor for [Runway] XX which we were on. We both noted it and both expected the helicopter to start a turn east bound. Instead, the helicopter continued straight on a course that would have put him on a collision course with us, my guess is around 300 [ft.] MSL. Very shortly afterward, we were at about 500 [ft.] when the Captain called for the go-around as I had started to say it as well. We executed the go-around. I lost sight of the helicopter as we pitched up, but the Captain told me it never changed course and flew directly beneath us. We executed the missed approach and circled back around for a visual approach, which was successful and taxied to the gate with no further incidents. We told both Tower and Approach what happened and the Captain called it in to the Company Operations Center once we were parked at the gate. We never had the helicopter on TCAS and never received a TA or RA. We had the helicopter visually and executed the go-around based on our visual with the helicopter.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier B737-800 flight crew reported a NMAC when military helicopter deviated from ATC coordinated flight path into the air carrier's approach path, without TCAS warning. Air carrier Captain performed an evasive go around to maintain visual separation, then landed.",
    "source": {
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      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
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      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1977107 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air Carrier B737-800 flight crew reported a NMAC when military helicopter deviated from ATC coordinated flight path into the air carrier's approach path, without TCAS warning. Air carrier Captain performed an evasive go around to maintain visual separation, then landed.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1974847",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Aircraft X Flight ZZZ to ZZZ1. Uneventful departure, climb and en route phase of flight. We were in contact with ZZZ Center when cleared direct ZZZZZ for RNAV GPS Runway XX into ZZZ1. We had already setup, reviewed and briefed the RNAV GPS XX approach into ZZZ1 when we received clearance to cross ZZZZZ at or above 11000 ft, cleared RNAV GPS Runway XX into ZZZ1. First Officer (FO) had the terrain feature selected so we could monitor our position in relation with the rising terrain that was soon to be off of our left, east side, of the aircraft to ensure we maintained high situational awareness during the turn. Everything in the \"box\" looked correct and was depicting a smart turn to cross ZZZZZ and then proceed inbound on course to ZZZZZ1. Just prior to ZZZZZ we entered IMC, 11000 and 210 KIAS, as the plane began its right turn. We encountered moderate chop to light turbulence in the turn along with a gusting tailwind. This caused us to overshoot the turn and we were unable to stay on course to ZZZZZ1. At this time I was looking at the potential of reversing our turn to then complete the full approach with procedure turn. This was not remotely feasible and I requested to continue our turn direct to ZZZZZ1. ZZZ Center came over the radio, informed us of the minimum VFR terrain clearance altitude, cancelled our approach clearance and instructed us to continue our right turn back to ZZZZZ, climb and maintain 14000 ft. with which we complied. We then proceeded direct ZZZZZ for RNAV GPS Runway XX with full procedure turn. We successfully executed the approach, landing and taxi to the gate without issue. Automation limitations given current weather and meteorological conditions coupled with unfamiliarity with the arrival/approach. Expectations of ATC and our own with conducting the approach. ATC expected us to do the full approach with procedure turn and we were setup and briefed to conduct the approach without it. The clearance received was cross ZZZZZ at or above 11000 ft, cleared RNAV GPS Runway XX to ZZZ1."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Arrivals from the south, landing Runway XX should conduct the approach with procedure turn to ensure they remain clear of terrain on both sides of the arrival corridor."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAircraft X Flight ZZZ to ZZZ1. Uneventful departure, climb and en route phase of flight. We were in contact with ZZZ Center when cleared direct ZZZZZ for RNAV GPS Runway XX into ZZZ1. We had already setup, reviewed and briefed the RNAV GPS XX approach into ZZZ1 when we received clearance to cross ZZZZZ at or above 11000 ft, cleared RNAV GPS Runway XX into ZZZ1. First Officer (FO) had the terrain feature selected so we could monitor our position in relation with the rising terrain that was soon to be off of our left, east side, of the aircraft to ensure we maintained high situational awareness during the turn. Everything in the \"box\" looked correct and was depicting a smart turn to cross ZZZZZ and then proceed inbound on course to ZZZZZ1. Just prior to ZZZZZ we entered IMC, 11000 and 210 KIAS, as the plane began its right turn. We encountered moderate chop to light turbulence in the turn along with a gusting tailwind. This caused us to overshoot the turn and we were unable to stay on course to ZZZZZ1. At this time I was looking at the potential of reversing our turn to then complete the full approach with procedure turn. This was not remotely feasible and I requested to continue our turn direct to ZZZZZ1. ZZZ Center came over the radio, informed us of the minimum VFR terrain clearance altitude, cancelled our approach clearance and instructed us to continue our right turn back to ZZZZZ, climb and maintain 14000 ft. with which we complied. We then proceeded direct ZZZZZ for RNAV GPS Runway XX with full procedure turn. We successfully executed the approach, landing and taxi to the gate without issue. Automation limitations given current weather and meteorological conditions coupled with unfamiliarity with the arrival/approach. Expectations of ATC and our own with conducting the approach. ATC expected us to do the full approach with procedure turn and we were setup and briefed to conduct the approach without it. The clearance received was cross ZZZZZ at or above 11000 ft, cleared RNAV GPS Runway XX to ZZZ1.\n\nNarrative 2\nArrivals from the south, landing Runway XX should conduct the approach with procedure turn to ensure they remain clear of terrain on both sides of the arrival corridor.",
    "synopsis": "EMB-175 flight crew reported a communications breakdown between flight crew, who planned to fly the approach without the procedure turn, and ATC who expected the flight crew to fly the approach with the procedure. ATC ultimately cancelled the approach and assigned the procedure turn which landed safely.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=85",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 85,
      "pageEnd": 87,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=85",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 85,
        "pageEnd": 87,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1974847 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "EMB-175 flight crew reported a communications breakdown between flight crew, who planned to fly the approach without the procedure turn, and ATC who expected the flight crew to fly the approach with the procedure. ATC ultimately cancelled the approach and assigned the procedure turn which landed safely.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1970251",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "B777-200"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We flew into the ZZZ terminal area via the ZZZZZ 3 RNAV arrival, ZZZ1 transition, cleared direct to ZZZZZ1 prior to being given a clearance to descend via the ZZZZZ 3 landing north for the ILS XXC. We monitored the ZZZ ATIS closely throughout the flight and called our Dispatcher for realtime info when we were about 3 hours out. The latest ATIS stated multiple taxiway closures but did not list any specific ones. We knew about the severe weather that had passed through and were concerned about the runway condition codes published. We were descending to 3000 ft. and were heading south approximately 10 miles from the runway when we were cleared to 2000 ft. and given a right turn to 270 followed by another right turn to intercept the localizer and then cleared for the ILS XXC. I was the pilot monitoring (PM), the First Officer (FO) was the pilot flying (PF) and we had a Relief Pilot (Captain) on the jumpseat. At 2000 ft. we were IMC however it did not take long breakout on the glideslope. Approach was uneventful, and stable flown by the FO. The runway CC (condition codes) was recently updated to 5,5,5,5 and we discussed cleaning up on the runway at the end of the rollout if it appeared the taxiways contained clutter. The FO had selected autobrakes 3 for landing and we said we would exit the runway at a logical point depending on the condition of the runway as well as the taxiways. We also discussed allowing the jet to slow completely to taxi speed utilizing the autobrakes. On final, I queried the Tower regarding where they preferred we exit the runway and they said we could roll to the end and exit at the Taxiway X highspeed. I knew we had Taxiway XX, the other highspeed taxiway on the right side of XXC available to us as well. All of these contingencies were discussed among the 3 of us. Also, this was the only operating runway at the time and we could see airplanes lined up for takeoff and de ice. As stated, the approach was flown uneventfully to touchdown by the FO. On rollout, spoilers deployed normally and the airplane slowed nicely. The first 2/3 of the runway was dry and free of clutter. As we rolled out I could make out either snow, frost, ice or something glistening on the last approximately 1/3 of the runway. By this time we were approaching 50 knots and we were only a little past 1/2 down the runway. I mentioned in the cockpit that we have Taxiway XX available if the stuff on the runway looked problematic. At this time I queried Tower regarding where they wanted us to exit. They said we could exit right at the end of the runway which would be Taxiway X. I took control of the jet from the FO and instructed him to clean up the flight controls so they would not be contaminated by what I could tell was heavily cluttered taxi ways. Then the Tower came on the radio and told us to exit right on Taxiway XY. I was expecting to go to the end of the runway by now so I started wondering why the last second change and then could not see and XY taxiway sign. I asked the crew where XY is and they said we just passed it. OK, time for a clarification note. At this time the FO and Relief Pilot thought we passed XY when we actually passed XX. We landed on Runway XXC and XY does not touch XXC, it touches XXR, so Tower told us to exit on a Taxiway that did not touch our runway. The FO told Tower we missed XY and stated we can take Taxiway Y which the Tower then instructed us to do. The braking action on the runway the whole time was good. Taxiway Y is a 90 degree taxiway and there was a line of snow across the entrance from the runway being cleared. I slowed to the minimum speed I could use to make my right 90 degree turn and then planned to make the next left 90 degree turn onto Taxiway Z to proceed north toward our ramp. When I began to make my left 90 degree turn onto Taxiway Z, the nose of the airplane moved a little left and I could feel the nosegear turn but the jet was essentially going straight forward. I announced something like we aren't turning and immediately straightened the nosegear and stood on the brakes. Then I announced that we aren't stopping. We did eventually come to a stop on the Taxiway Y centerline with the nose of the jet facing east and oriented slightly east of Taxiway Z. I set the brake and the FO informed Ground that we were unable to negotiate a left turn onto Taxiway Z due to ice and snow and that we would require assistance. There was discussions with ground regarding if I wanted to try taxiing onto Runway XXR to attempt to turn around and we all agreed that the appearance of that runway was unsuitable for taxi. We told Ground Control that we would call our company to bring a tug to pull us out and take to the ramp. Airplanes were still taking off of Runway XXC when the Tower asked us if we could pull up 20 feet or so because our tail was hanging over the XXC holdshort at Taxiway Y. I was dumbfounded that we could be over the hold short because I saw 1 or 2 airplanes take off Runway XXC. I had one of our Maintenance crew visually check our position and he confirmed that we were in fact over the hold short about 20 feet and monitored my very slow pull forward and let me know what I was clear of the hold short. Then our Maintenance attempted to join a lift tug with our nose gear to move the airplane but he was unable to get sufficient traction with the tug to engage the nose gear due to ice. There was some discussion of taxiing forward across Runway XXR and proceeding north on Taxiway A however one brake check by the Operations vehicle proved that the ice on the runway would not allow taxi. It was decided then that we would have to wait for liquid de ice to come and spray the taxiway and end of Runway XXR to allow me to taxi. The plan was to deice the route and taxi on Taxi Y onto Runway XXR, turn right and proceed approximately 50m south on Runway XXR and make a right turn on Taxiway XY and then another right turn onto Taxiway Z to proceed north to our ramp. A lot of time elapsed while waiting on the liquid deice when a dumptruck showed up with a broadcast spreader on the back and after some coordination with our Maintenance, he spread some material all over the area approximately 50m in front of the jet. Whatever he used, it worked great and the tug was able to hook up within 15-20 minutes. The airport had a truck with a rep onsite for consult however their communication was poor as the Tower/Ground had constant trouble communicating with him and we missed several opportunities for the tug to attempt a pushback onto Taxiway Z. With Runway XXC being the only operating runway, the Tower was reluctant to have us push back and possible render that runway unusable. While waiting for an opportunity to move, the same man who drove the dumptruck with the broadcast spreader showed up with a front end loader and proceeded to scrape the area infront of the jet so the tug could have traction as well as remove the ice/snow that bordered Taxiway Z that may hinder the pushback of the tug. Once he finished that, Runway XXC was closed and the airport began cleaning it up again and ops moved to XXL. Our tug then had no problem pushing us back onto Taxiway Z and then towed us north on Z to our ramp., Cause: Inadequate information regarding taxiway condition and which were best suited for runway exit. Short fused change in runway exit instructions from Tower. Told to do one thing and then told to do something different with little time. Instructed to exit via a taxiway that did not exist for the runway in use. Solution: Publish standard taxi routes, publish taxiway condition and limit which taxiways are used to only the ones cleared, in this case, it appeared none of the exit taxiways had been cleared. We were cleared to exit at the runway end, once that instruction was given, because of the nature of the adverse conditions, the clearance should not have been changed in close, unless there is a safety of flight issue which is why I was thinking our instructions changed."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Uneventful flight from ZZZZ-ZZZ until landing rollout and clearing XXC after landing from a normal flight, approach, and hand flow ILS landing. We had discussed rolling all the way to the end to clear the runway at Taxiway X which ZZZ Tower approved. On landing roll, after the aircraft was at a taxi speed, we were is a position to safety exit at Taxiway XX, but before we could coordinate with ATC ZZZ Tower asked us to clear at XY. I told them \"WILCO\", and the Captain, Relief Pilot, and I started looking for Taxiway XY as we taxied past XX. We recognized some signage pointing to XY, but did not realize at the time Taxiway XY did not connect to Runway XXC. We told ZZZ Tower we were unable to clear at XY, but could exit the runway at Taxiway Y. They approved, and we exited XXC at Taxiway Y. After clearing at Taxiway Y, Taxiway Z was too icy to turn the aircraft north to taxi to the gate. The Captain stopped the aircraft in the Taxiway Y and Taxiway Z intersection slightly north of the taxi line facing east. We were unable to steer or reliably stop the aircraft, so we elected to set the parking break and wait for a tow-in to the gate. ZZZ Tower cleared an aircraft to take-off as we cleared the runway, but did not realize our tail was still in the runway clear zone by approximately 5 feet. ZZZ Tower asked us to pull forward, so we coordinated with ZZZ Tower and airfield management truck to clear the runway and then re-set the parking break to continue waiting for a tow-in. We started the APU and waited over 3 hours for Company Maintenance and airfield operations to remove enough ice from the taxiway in order for the tug to get enough leverage to back us onto XXC and then forward onto Taxiway Z and then to our parking spot. Cause: The confusion from the ZZZ Tower Controller about Taxiway XY being attached to Runway XXC, and the lack of communication about the condition of Taxiway Y and Z for our runway exit. Nowhere in the NOTAMs do they mention Taxiway Y or Z's condition. Solution: Better communication from the ground handler about adverse airfield conditions, and real time information from ZZZ Tower via ATIS about taxiway closures. Controllers should also be proactive about proper taxiways to use in adverse weather."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe flew into the ZZZ terminal area via the ZZZZZ 3 RNAV arrival, ZZZ1 transition, cleared direct to ZZZZZ1 prior to being given a clearance to descend via the ZZZZZ 3 landing north for the ILS XXC. We monitored the ZZZ ATIS closely throughout the flight and called our Dispatcher for realtime info when we were about 3 hours out. The latest ATIS stated multiple taxiway closures but did not list any specific ones. We knew about the severe weather that had passed through and were concerned about the runway condition codes published. We were descending to 3000 ft. and were heading south approximately 10 miles from the runway when we were cleared to 2000 ft. and given a right turn to 270 followed by another right turn to intercept the localizer and then cleared for the ILS XXC. I was the pilot monitoring (PM), the First Officer (FO) was the pilot flying (PF) and we had a Relief Pilot (Captain) on the jumpseat. At 2000 ft. we were IMC however it did not take long breakout on the glideslope. Approach was uneventful, and stable flown by the FO. The runway CC (condition codes) was recently updated to 5,5,5,5 and we discussed cleaning up on the runway at the end of the rollout if it appeared the taxiways contained clutter. The FO had selected autobrakes 3 for landing and we said we would exit the runway at a logical point depending on the condition of the runway as well as the taxiways. We also discussed allowing the jet to slow completely to taxi speed utilizing the autobrakes. On final, I queried the Tower regarding where they preferred we exit the runway and they said we could roll to the end and exit at the Taxiway X highspeed. I knew we had Taxiway XX, the other highspeed taxiway on the right side of XXC available to us as well. All of these contingencies were discussed among the 3 of us. Also, this was the only operating runway at the time and we could see airplanes lined up for takeoff and de ice. As stated, the approach was flown uneventfully to touchdown by the FO. On rollout, spoilers deployed normally and the airplane slowed nicely. The first 2/3 of the runway was dry and free of clutter. As we rolled out I could make out either snow, frost, ice or something glistening on the last approximately 1/3 of the runway. By this time we were approaching 50 knots and we were only a little past 1/2 down the runway. I mentioned in the cockpit that we have Taxiway XX available if the stuff on the runway looked problematic. At this time I queried Tower regarding where they wanted us to exit. They said we could exit right at the end of the runway which would be Taxiway X. I took control of the jet from the FO and instructed him to clean up the flight controls so they would not be contaminated by what I could tell was heavily cluttered taxi ways. Then the Tower came on the radio and told us to exit right on Taxiway XY. I was expecting to go to the end of the runway by now so I started wondering why the last second change and then could not see and XY taxiway sign. I asked the crew where XY is and they said we just passed it. OK, time for a clarification note. At this time the FO and Relief Pilot thought we passed XY when we actually passed XX. We landed on Runway XXC and XY does not touch XXC, it touches XXR, so Tower told us to exit on a Taxiway that did not touch our runway. The FO told Tower we missed XY and stated we can take Taxiway Y which the Tower then instructed us to do. The braking action on the runway the whole time was good. Taxiway Y is a 90 degree taxiway and there was a line of snow across the entrance from the runway being cleared. I slowed to the minimum speed I could use to make my right 90 degree turn and then planned to make the next left 90 degree turn onto Taxiway Z to proceed north toward our ramp. When I began to make my left 90 degree turn onto Taxiway Z, the nose of the airplane moved a little left and I could feel the nosegear turn but the jet was essentially going straight forward. I announced something like we aren't turning and immediately straightened the nosegear and stood on the brakes. Then I announced that we aren't stopping. We did eventually come to a stop on the Taxiway Y centerline with the nose of the jet facing east and oriented slightly east of Taxiway Z. I set the brake and the FO informed Ground that we were unable to negotiate a left turn onto Taxiway Z due to ice and snow and that we would require assistance. There was discussions with ground regarding if I wanted to try taxiing onto Runway XXR to attempt to turn around and we all agreed that the appearance of that runway was unsuitable for taxi. We told Ground Control that we would call our company to bring a tug to pull us out and take to the ramp. Airplanes were still taking off of Runway XXC when the Tower asked us if we could pull up 20 feet or so because our tail was hanging over the XXC holdshort at Taxiway Y. I was dumbfounded that we could be over the hold short because I saw 1 or 2 airplanes take off Runway XXC. I had one of our Maintenance crew visually check our position and he confirmed that we were in fact over the hold short about 20 feet and monitored my very slow pull forward and let me know what I was clear of the hold short. Then our Maintenance attempted to join a lift tug with our nose gear to move the airplane but he was unable to get sufficient traction with the tug to engage the nose gear due to ice. There was some discussion of taxiing forward across Runway XXR and proceeding north on Taxiway A however one brake check by the Operations vehicle proved that the ice on the runway would not allow taxi. It was decided then that we would have to wait for liquid de ice to come and spray the taxiway and end of Runway XXR to allow me to taxi. The plan was to deice the route and taxi on Taxi Y onto Runway XXR, turn right and proceed approximately 50m south on Runway XXR and make a right turn on Taxiway XY and then another right turn onto Taxiway Z to proceed north to our ramp. A lot of time elapsed while waiting on the liquid deice when a dumptruck showed up with a broadcast spreader on the back and after some coordination with our Maintenance, he spread some material all over the area approximately 50m in front of the jet. Whatever he used, it worked great and the tug was able to hook up within 15-20 minutes. The airport had a truck with a rep onsite for consult however their communication was poor as the Tower/Ground had constant trouble communicating with him and we missed several opportunities for the tug to attempt a pushback onto Taxiway Z. With Runway XXC being the only operating runway, the Tower was reluctant to have us push back and possible render that runway unusable. While waiting for an opportunity to move, the same man who drove the dumptruck with the broadcast spreader showed up with a front end loader and proceeded to scrape the area infront of the jet so the tug could have traction as well as remove the ice/snow that bordered Taxiway Z that may hinder the pushback of the tug. Once he finished that, Runway XXC was closed and the airport began cleaning it up again and ops moved to XXL. Our tug then had no problem pushing us back onto Taxiway Z and then towed us north on Z to our ramp., Cause: Inadequate information regarding taxiway condition and which were best suited for runway exit. Short fused change in runway exit instructions from Tower. Told to do one thing and then told to do something different with little time. Instructed to exit via a taxiway that did not exist for the runway in use. Solution: Publish standard taxi routes, publish taxiway condition and limit which taxiways are used to only the ones cleared, in this case, it appeared none of the exit taxiways had been cleared. We were cleared to exit at the runway end, once that instruction was given, because of the nature of the adverse conditions, the clearance should not have been changed in close, unless there is a safety of flight issue which is why I was thinking our instructions changed.\n\nNarrative 2\nUneventful flight from ZZZZ-ZZZ until landing rollout and clearing XXC after landing from a normal flight, approach, and hand flow ILS landing. We had discussed rolling all the way to the end to clear the runway at Taxiway X which ZZZ Tower approved. On landing roll, after the aircraft was at a taxi speed, we were is a position to safety exit at Taxiway XX, but before we could coordinate with ATC ZZZ Tower asked us to clear at XY. I told them \"WILCO\", and the Captain, Relief Pilot, and I started looking for Taxiway XY as we taxied past XX. We recognized some signage pointing to XY, but did not realize at the time Taxiway XY did not connect to Runway XXC. We told ZZZ Tower we were unable to clear at XY, but could exit the runway at Taxiway Y. They approved, and we exited XXC at Taxiway Y. After clearing at Taxiway Y, Taxiway Z was too icy to turn the aircraft north to taxi to the gate. The Captain stopped the aircraft in the Taxiway Y and Taxiway Z intersection slightly north of the taxi line facing east. We were unable to steer or reliably stop the aircraft, so we elected to set the parking break and wait for a tow-in to the gate. ZZZ Tower cleared an aircraft to take-off as we cleared the runway, but did not realize our tail was still in the runway clear zone by approximately 5 feet. ZZZ Tower asked us to pull forward, so we coordinated with ZZZ Tower and airfield management truck to clear the runway and then re-set the parking break to continue waiting for a tow-in. We started the APU and waited over 3 hours for Company Maintenance and airfield operations to remove enough ice from the taxiway in order for the tug to get enough leverage to back us onto XXC and then forward onto Taxiway Z and then to our parking spot. Cause: The confusion from the ZZZ Tower Controller about Taxiway XY being attached to Runway XXC, and the lack of communication about the condition of Taxiway Y and Z for our runway exit. Nowhere in the NOTAMs do they mention Taxiway Y or Z's condition. Solution: Better communication from the ground handler about adverse airfield conditions, and real time information from ZZZ Tower via ATIS about taxiway closures. Controllers should also be proactive about proper taxiways to use in adverse weather.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier Pilot Crew reported during the landing roll-out ATC changed the taxiway they were to use to exit the runway. The problem, as reported by the pilots, the runway was much slicker than advertised and the jet began to slide out of control. The taxiway given by ATC does not have a connection to the runway and once stopped the jet needed a ground tug and snow removal equipment to proceed. The pilots stated, lack of information regarding runway condition and the late taxiway change complicated the situation.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=88",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 88,
      "pageEnd": 92,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=88",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 88,
        "pageEnd": 92,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1970251 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air Carrier Pilot Crew reported during the landing roll-out ATC changed the taxiway they were to use to exit the runway. The problem, as reported by the pilots, the runway was much slicker than advertised and the jet began to slide out of control. The taxiway given by ATC does not have a connection to the runway and once stopped the jet needed a ground tug and snow removal equipment to proceed. The pilots stated, lack of information regarding runway condition and the late taxiway change complicated the situation.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1970208",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "When we were with Center they gave us a heading for separation, and they told us direct to ZZZZZ. I confirmed with the First Officer (FO) that was the correct fix, and we went direct to ZZZZZ. We were then switched over to Approach Control, and they said descend via the ZZZZZ1 RNAV. Later as we were descending, Controller, asked, “Where are you going? Are you going direct ZZZZZ1?” We stated “we were going direct to ZZZZZ from Center before we switched with you.\" Controller then said we are getting close to the mountain, and then gave us a heading, and altitude. Once established on that heading, Approach Control, gave us direct to ZZZZZ1 and descend via. We landed and taxi to the gate without any other issues."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "During the descent phase of flight, ZZZ to ZZZ1, Center gave us a heading. Then we were given direct ZZZZZ, a fix on the ZZZZZ1 STAR, and descend via the ZZZZZ1 arrival. The next Controller asked us if we were direct ZZZZZ1. I replied no and told them we were told direct ZZZZZ. The Controller told us we were approaching the mountain and turned us to a new heading and level off at 13000 ft. They then gave us direct ZZZZZ1 and descend via the ZZZZZ1 arrival. We landed without further incident."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhen we were with Center they gave us a heading for separation, and they told us direct to ZZZZZ. I confirmed with the First Officer (FO) that was the correct fix, and we went direct to ZZZZZ. We were then switched over to Approach Control, and they said descend via the ZZZZZ1 RNAV. Later as we were descending, Controller, asked, “Where are you going? Are you going direct ZZZZZ1?” We stated “we were going direct to ZZZZZ from Center before we switched with you.\" Controller then said we are getting close to the mountain, and then gave us a heading, and altitude. Once established on that heading, Approach Control, gave us direct to ZZZZZ1 and descend via. We landed and taxi to the gate without any other issues.\n\nNarrative 2\nDuring the descent phase of flight, ZZZ to ZZZ1, Center gave us a heading. Then we were given direct ZZZZZ, a fix on the ZZZZZ1 STAR, and descend via the ZZZZZ1 arrival. The next Controller asked us if we were direct ZZZZZ1. I replied no and told them we were told direct ZZZZZ. The Controller told us we were approaching the mountain and turned us to a new heading and level off at 13000 ft. They then gave us direct ZZZZZ1 and descend via the ZZZZZ1 arrival. We landed without further incident.",
    "synopsis": "B737 flight crew reported after changing to the next Controller they were ask which fix they were flying too. The Controller changed the fix on the STAR and said you are getting too close to high terrain.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=93",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 93,
      "pageEnd": 95,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=93",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 93,
        "pageEnd": 95,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "Arrival-fix misunderstanding near high terrain",
    "summary": "After a controller handoff, a B737 crew continued toward the fix it understood had been assigned by the previous controller. The next controller questioned the routing, warned of nearby mountainous terrain, and issued a new heading and altitude; the flight then continued and landed.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Communication",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1969944",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb",
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were cleared for takeoff on Runway XX on departure. As we were making the left turn we had TA followed immediately by an RA that we complied with. We advised ATC that we were complying with an RA. After complying with the RA we received a frequency change and resumed with the flight. After taking off we encountered and complied with an RA for an aircraft that was around 3,000 feet off the departure end of Runway XX. The aircraft came within about 300 feet horizontally of our flight. Better communication plan between tower and departure to assure lengthy time and distance between aircraft in the airspace."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "[Reporter provided no additional information]."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were cleared for takeoff on Runway XX on departure. As we were making the left turn we had TA followed immediately by an RA that we complied with. We advised ATC that we were complying with an RA. After complying with the RA we received a frequency change and resumed with the flight. After taking off we encountered and complied with an RA for an aircraft that was around 3,000 feet off the departure end of Runway XX. The aircraft came within about 300 feet horizontally of our flight. Better communication plan between tower and departure to assure lengthy time and distance between aircraft in the airspace.\n\nNarrative 2\n[Reporter provided no additional information].",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported an NMAC after takeoff and during the initial climb. They reported a TA then RA from an aircraft departing from another runway. The pilot's reported following the RA commands.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=96",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 96,
      "pageEnd": 98,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=96",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 96,
        "pageEnd": 98,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "Traffic conflict immediately after takeoff",
    "summary": "An EMB-170/175 crew reported a traffic alert followed by a collision-avoidance command during the initial climb. The crew followed the command and advised air traffic control, reporting another aircraft about 300 feet away horizontally before continuing the flight.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Communication",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1969688",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On takeoff I thought I heard \"fly heading 180\". I read back \"180\" without being corrected and the Captain concurred with the heading. After takeoff the Tower told us to turn to 040 and the Captain inquired about our original heading. We were later told to contact the tower for a possible deviation. It was a short and fast taxi with no other aircraft in sequence for takeoff. I'm not sure if I read back the wrong initial heading or we were given it in error. I felt a little rushed and had just finishing a checklist as we were cleared for takeoff. We should have taxied slower and been more methodical in preparation for takeoff to reduce task saturation."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were cleared line up and wait 28R. While still taking 28R, then cleared for takeoff, before we got on the runway (Aircraft X heading 180 cleared for takeoff) I selected 180 and pointed to the heading, and accepted the clearance. The First Officer repeated clearance to ORD Tower. After takeoff I started a left turn to 180, Tower then instructed us to turn right to 040. After the turn I inquired about the 180 heading. I was asked what I was given and replied 180. We checked on with Departure and later they told us to call ORD tower to inquire for a possible deviation. No correction from Tower was given by Tower after accepting and repeating the 180 heading. No conflict with other aircraft was reported or experienced. We were running late because of maintenance, ACARS was on MEL. Was given line up and wait while still on Taxiway N, cleared for takeoff while taxiing on to runway. We were just finishing the checklist before we entered the runway when they cleared us for takeoff. We paused takeoff for a moment to check winds and make sure before takeoff check was complete. I didn't hear before takeoff check complete because of Tower clearing us for takeoff. I then started takeoff roll. I as Captain and flying pilot should have waited to set my heading when we stopped before takeoff roll. I may have inadvertently caused the First Officer to acknowledge the takeoff clearance while he was stating the before takeoff check was complete."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn takeoff I thought I heard \"fly heading 180\". I read back \"180\" without being corrected and the Captain concurred with the heading. After takeoff the Tower told us to turn to 040 and the Captain inquired about our original heading. We were later told to contact the tower for a possible deviation. It was a short and fast taxi with no other aircraft in sequence for takeoff. I'm not sure if I read back the wrong initial heading or we were given it in error. I felt a little rushed and had just finishing a checklist as we were cleared for takeoff. We should have taxied slower and been more methodical in preparation for takeoff to reduce task saturation.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were cleared line up and wait 28R. While still taking 28R, then cleared for takeoff, before we got on the runway (Aircraft X heading 180 cleared for takeoff) I selected 180 and pointed to the heading, and accepted the clearance. The First Officer repeated clearance to ORD Tower. After takeoff I started a left turn to 180, Tower then instructed us to turn right to 040. After the turn I inquired about the 180 heading. I was asked what I was given and replied 180. We checked on with Departure and later they told us to call ORD tower to inquire for a possible deviation. No correction from Tower was given by Tower after accepting and repeating the 180 heading. No conflict with other aircraft was reported or experienced. We were running late because of maintenance, ACARS was on MEL. Was given line up and wait while still on Taxiway N, cleared for takeoff while taxiing on to runway. We were just finishing the checklist before we entered the runway when they cleared us for takeoff. We paused takeoff for a moment to check winds and make sure before takeoff check was complete. I didn't hear before takeoff check complete because of Tower clearing us for takeoff. I then started takeoff roll. I as Captain and flying pilot should have waited to set my heading when we stopped before takeoff roll. I may have inadvertently caused the First Officer to acknowledge the takeoff clearance while he was stating the before takeoff check was complete.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported ORD Tower assigned them a 180 heading after departure, but were later advised they had been assigned a right turn heading 040.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=99",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 99,
      "pageEnd": 101,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=99",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 99,
        "pageEnd": 101,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1969688 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported ORD Tower assigned them a 180 heading after departure, but were later advised they had been assigned a right turn heading 040.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1969524",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Flight training operation with instructor pilot and student pilot. At the time the Tower Controller was working both Tower and Ground frequencies with 5+ aircraft in the airspace and numerous others calling Ground. Student pilot checked in over the VFR reporting point requesting a full stop landing at the MLB airport. Tower Controller proceeded to reprimand the student pilot for \"stepping on\" someone completing a read back. The read back was being broadcasted on MLB Ground, so we had no way of knowing someone else was communicating on Ground frequency as we were monitoring Tower. This is often a problem when the Tower is working both frequencies. The student pilot proceeded to repeat the call to Tower. Tower instructed the student pilot to enter a right base and report a two-mile base for Runway 9R. The student pilot read that back. Approaching a two-mile base the combined frequencies were so busy that we were unable to get a word in to report the two-mile right base. Approaching the extended centerlines for Runways 9L and 9R, the instructor (myself) and student noticed an aircraft on the opposite base heading directly at us. Two aircraft were approaching head on for opposite bases for parallel runways with no traffic advisory by ATC. The Controller seemed task saturated at the moment and multiple aircraft were not receiving clearances until short final. I (the instructor pilot) took over and deviated to the west to avoid a traffic conflict. At this point, we were trying to get in touch with Tower to notify the Controller of our position and that we were deviating for traffic. I got on the radio and called Tower notifying the Controller that we were approaching final for 9L deviating for traffic. Tower proceeded to reprimand us saying that deviation was unnecessary and that we were assigned the parallel Runway \"9R\". I then initiated a right turn to reestablish on the final for Runway 9R with the opposing traffic in sight at all times, however this brought us close to the opposing traffic. It was determined that both myself and the student pilot believed we were cleared to approach Runway 9L when we were actually given 9R. At MLB, pilots are used to being given the same runway 95% of the time, so complacency played a role in us assuming we were supposed to approach Runway 9L. Additionally, we were distracted and startled as we were accepting the clearance for right base 9R after we got reprimanded for inadvertently stepping on an aircraft transmitting on a frequency that we were not required to monitor. This disturbance likely interfered with us mentally processing the non- standard approach clearance to Runway 9R. As we approached the two-mile reporting point, the Controller was so busy such that we could not get a word in to confirm our two- mile base and landing clearance. This led to the pressure and distraction that caused our brain's to default to the usual approach clearance to land 9L. To prevent a recurrence, pilots need to be vigilant when assigned approach clearances at VFR airports where they are complacent with getting the exact same clearance multiple times a day. Also, when a traffic conflict is present, pilots need to do everything possible to stay well clear of conflict. Additionally, Controllers should not reprimand pilots unnecessarily during critical phases of flight as this causes significant distraction in the cockpit that heightens the risk of pilot error. To ensure traffic de-confliction, the Controller workload and frequency should not get so busy as to prevent effective communication."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "This event started at the visual reporting point for using \"9R and 9L\" at MLB. We reported at the point and were gripped at for stepping on someone else on frequency. The other aircraft we \"stepped on\" was on the Ground frequency so we had no way of knowing as we were tuned into Tower. We then got clearance for 9R and report a 2 mile right base. Once we reached the reporting point the frequency was so busy we were unable to get any word. We continued on our base leg until we noticed another aircraft also on base leg from the other direction, while MLB does have parallel Runways 9R and 9L we got no traffic alerts for this traffic. The instructor took control and attempted to deviate west. The instructor notified Tower and told us to continue to 9R. The instructor then proceeded to intercept the final approach for 9R. During all of this we did come close to other traffic with having them in sight the whole time. We then proceeded to come to 9R where we asked Tower if we were still clear to land but he never gave us a response as the frequency was so busy. We ended up going around and landing on 9L. In order, to prevent situations like this happening again pilots need to make sure that they don't get complacent in critical phases of flight. Also, traffic alerts when 2 planes are both on base legs from opposite directions would be helpful so there is no confusion on where the other plane is going and everyone is going to the right runway."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nFlight training operation with instructor pilot and student pilot. At the time the Tower Controller was working both Tower and Ground frequencies with 5+ aircraft in the airspace and numerous others calling Ground. Student pilot checked in over the VFR reporting point requesting a full stop landing at the MLB airport. Tower Controller proceeded to reprimand the student pilot for \"stepping on\" someone completing a read back. The read back was being broadcasted on MLB Ground, so we had no way of knowing someone else was communicating on Ground frequency as we were monitoring Tower. This is often a problem when the Tower is working both frequencies. The student pilot proceeded to repeat the call to Tower. Tower instructed the student pilot to enter a right base and report a two-mile base for Runway 9R. The student pilot read that back. Approaching a two-mile base the combined frequencies were so busy that we were unable to get a word in to report the two-mile right base. Approaching the extended centerlines for Runways 9L and 9R, the instructor (myself) and student noticed an aircraft on the opposite base heading directly at us. Two aircraft were approaching head on for opposite bases for parallel runways with no traffic advisory by ATC. The Controller seemed task saturated at the moment and multiple aircraft were not receiving clearances until short final. I (the instructor pilot) took over and deviated to the west to avoid a traffic conflict. At this point, we were trying to get in touch with Tower to notify the Controller of our position and that we were deviating for traffic. I got on the radio and called Tower notifying the Controller that we were approaching final for 9L deviating for traffic. Tower proceeded to reprimand us saying that deviation was unnecessary and that we were assigned the parallel Runway \"9R\". I then initiated a right turn to reestablish on the final for Runway 9R with the opposing traffic in sight at all times, however this brought us close to the opposing traffic. It was determined that both myself and the student pilot believed we were cleared to approach Runway 9L when we were actually given 9R. At MLB, pilots are used to being given the same runway 95% of the time, so complacency played a role in us assuming we were supposed to approach Runway 9L. Additionally, we were distracted and startled as we were accepting the clearance for right base 9R after we got reprimanded for inadvertently stepping on an aircraft transmitting on a frequency that we were not required to monitor. This disturbance likely interfered with us mentally processing the non- standard approach clearance to Runway 9R. As we approached the two-mile reporting point, the Controller was so busy such that we could not get a word in to confirm our two- mile base and landing clearance. This led to the pressure and distraction that caused our brain's to default to the usual approach clearance to land 9L. To prevent a recurrence, pilots need to be vigilant when assigned approach clearances at VFR airports where they are complacent with getting the exact same clearance multiple times a day. Also, when a traffic conflict is present, pilots need to do everything possible to stay well clear of conflict. Additionally, Controllers should not reprimand pilots unnecessarily during critical phases of flight as this causes significant distraction in the cockpit that heightens the risk of pilot error. To ensure traffic de-confliction, the Controller workload and frequency should not get so busy as to prevent effective communication.\n\nNarrative 2\nThis event started at the visual reporting point for using \"9R and 9L\" at MLB. We reported at the point and were gripped at for stepping on someone else on frequency. The other aircraft we \"stepped on\" was on the Ground frequency so we had no way of knowing as we were tuned into Tower. We then got clearance for 9R and report a 2 mile right base. Once we reached the reporting point the frequency was so busy we were unable to get any word. We continued on our base leg until we noticed another aircraft also on base leg from the other direction, while MLB does have parallel Runways 9R and 9L we got no traffic alerts for this traffic. The instructor took control and attempted to deviate west. The instructor notified Tower and told us to continue to 9R. The instructor then proceeded to intercept the final approach for 9R. During all of this we did come close to other traffic with having them in sight the whole time. We then proceeded to come to 9R where we asked Tower if we were still clear to land but he never gave us a response as the frequency was so busy. We ended up going around and landing on 9L. In order, to prevent situations like this happening again pilots need to make sure that they don't get complacent in critical phases of flight. Also, traffic alerts when 2 planes are both on base legs from opposite directions would be helpful so there is no confusion on where the other plane is going and everyone is going to the right runway.",
    "synopsis": "Flight Instructor with student reported NMAC with another aircraft in traffic pattern that was complicated by a congested traffic pattern and busy tower frequency.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=102",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 102,
      "pageEnd": 105,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=102",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 102,
        "pageEnd": 105,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1969524 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Flight Instructor with student reported NMAC with another aircraft in traffic pattern that was complicated by a congested traffic pattern and busy tower frequency.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1966386",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear",
      "Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach",
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Aircraft X on the final approach course for the VOR approach to Runway XX circle to Runway YY. Aircraft Y was executing climb out which was issued as runway heading and VFR but only read back to the radar Controller as VFR without a restriction. Aircraft Y was switched to Departure prior to us noticing that they had turned southeast bound. I was no longer talking to Aircraft Y but Aircraft X was on my frequency so I cancelled their approach clearance and turned them to a 220 heading however I didn't give them an altitude to maintain and they were below the minimum vectoring altitude. I was not aware that Aircraft Y was VFR on their climb out so there was no loss of separation. Better communication between the radar and local Controller. Another Controller called down to the TRACON and was coordinating and relaying information instead of me directly. I was hesitant to assign an altitude when I wasn't sure what Aircraft Y was doing but I should have assigned the MVA as soon as I vectored them off the approach and canceled their approach clearance. I wasn't aware the aircraft was VFR and if I would have known I wouldn't have cancelled the approach clearance."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I had several practice approaches. Aircraft Y was doing a circle to Runway YY, followed by another Aircraft Z doing same approach, followed by an Aircraft X doing a VOR/DME XX circle to Runway YY. Aircraft Y said they wanted to fly VFR to ZZZ1 on the go. I issued \"fly runway heading, maintain VFR\". I misheard read back, they read back \"maintain VFR\". Aircraft Y, on departure, turned southeast towards the Aircraft X. They were maintaining VFR and the closest they got was 500 ft. and 3.1 miles. The Local Controller issued a turn to the Aircraft X at 1600 ft. busting MVA. Missing the read back was primary cause of the event. I also issued the runway heading speaking faster than I normally would, which was mainly due to being busier than I have been in last couple of months. I will also say that a lot of Controllers would have issued \"turn left to ZZZ1, maintain VFR\" for the climb out. If that was issued the Aircraft Z would have did the same thing. I wanted to keep it simple since I was busy. The military quite often as of late says they want to depart VFR to one destination then flies to random waypoints."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAircraft X on the final approach course for the VOR approach to Runway XX circle to Runway YY. Aircraft Y was executing climb out which was issued as runway heading and VFR but only read back to the radar Controller as VFR without a restriction. Aircraft Y was switched to Departure prior to us noticing that they had turned southeast bound. I was no longer talking to Aircraft Y but Aircraft X was on my frequency so I cancelled their approach clearance and turned them to a 220 heading however I didn't give them an altitude to maintain and they were below the minimum vectoring altitude. I was not aware that Aircraft Y was VFR on their climb out so there was no loss of separation. Better communication between the radar and local Controller. Another Controller called down to the TRACON and was coordinating and relaying information instead of me directly. I was hesitant to assign an altitude when I wasn't sure what Aircraft Y was doing but I should have assigned the MVA as soon as I vectored them off the approach and canceled their approach clearance. I wasn't aware the aircraft was VFR and if I would have known I wouldn't have cancelled the approach clearance.\n\nNarrative 2\nI had several practice approaches. Aircraft Y was doing a circle to Runway YY, followed by another Aircraft Z doing same approach, followed by an Aircraft X doing a VOR/DME XX circle to Runway YY. Aircraft Y said they wanted to fly VFR to ZZZ1 on the go. I issued \"fly runway heading, maintain VFR\". I misheard read back, they read back \"maintain VFR\". Aircraft Y, on departure, turned southeast towards the Aircraft X. They were maintaining VFR and the closest they got was 500 ft. and 3.1 miles. The Local Controller issued a turn to the Aircraft X at 1600 ft. busting MVA. Missing the read back was primary cause of the event. I also issued the runway heading speaking faster than I normally would, which was mainly due to being busier than I have been in last couple of months. I will also say that a lot of Controllers would have issued \"turn left to ZZZ1, maintain VFR\" for the climb out. If that was issued the Aircraft Z would have did the same thing. I wanted to keep it simple since I was busy. The military quite often as of late says they want to depart VFR to one destination then flies to random waypoints.",
    "synopsis": "A Tower Local Controller and TRACON Departure Controller reported the Local Controller issued a vector off course to an aircraft on short final which placed it below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=110",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 110,
      "pageEnd": 112,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=110",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 110,
        "pageEnd": 112,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1966386 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "A Tower Local Controller and TRACON Departure Controller reported the Local Controller issued a vector off course to an aircraft on short final which placed it below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1963705",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We requested the RNP approach. ATC vectored us off arrival and descended us to 6000 ft. ATC gave us a 150 heading to intercept the course between LIPTE (IF) and WASON. The crossing altitude for WASON is 5500 ft. As we were intercepting the course we started descending to cross WASON at 5500 ft. because we were too high for the approach. ATC told us we were below MVA."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "RNAV APPROACH. On check-in with approach controller in Tucson, requested the RNAV RNP Y 11L. Controller approved and then gave us vectors. This was a bit confusing since the waypoint that we were heading to was the start of the approach. After vectors and descents the controller vectored us on the approach inside the IAF. The altitude assigned was 6000 ft. until intercept. On the profile view the altitude was 5500 ft. We began the descent and was questioned on the descent. Stated that we were cleared inside the IAF and descent was so that we would be stable for the approach. I also stated that we were visual and could accept a visual approach if that was below his MVA. I do not think the controller should vector inside the IAF on an RNP."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe requested the RNP approach. ATC vectored us off arrival and descended us to 6000 ft. ATC gave us a 150 heading to intercept the course between LIPTE (IF) and WASON. The crossing altitude for WASON is 5500 ft. As we were intercepting the course we started descending to cross WASON at 5500 ft. because we were too high for the approach. ATC told us we were below MVA.\n\nNarrative 2\nRNAV APPROACH. On check-in with approach controller in Tucson, requested the RNAV RNP Y 11L. Controller approved and then gave us vectors. This was a bit confusing since the waypoint that we were heading to was the start of the approach. After vectors and descents the controller vectored us on the approach inside the IAF. The altitude assigned was 6000 ft. until intercept. On the profile view the altitude was 5500 ft. We began the descent and was questioned on the descent. Stated that we were cleared inside the IAF and descent was so that we would be stable for the approach. I also stated that we were visual and could accept a visual approach if that was below his MVA. I do not think the controller should vector inside the IAF on an RNP.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported ATC Low Altitude Advisory on approach to PHX airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=116",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 116,
      "pageEnd": 117,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized.",
      "notes": "Source inconsistency retained: the narrative names Tucson; the NASA synopsis says PHX. No airport field is inferred."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=116",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 116,
        "pageEnd": 117,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized.",
        "notes": "Source inconsistency retained: the narrative names Tucson; the NASA synopsis says PHX. No airport field is inferred."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "Approach profile and assigned altitude create confusion",
    "summary": "A crew vectored onto an RNAV approach began descending from 6,000 feet toward the charted 5,500-foot crossing altitude. Air traffic control questioned the descent as below its minimum vectoring altitude. The narratives describe confusion over the vectors and intercept clearance; the source synopsis and narrative name different airports.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Communication",
      "Procedures",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1962880",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Cruising at 28,000 ft., I noticed an air movement sound and identified a rapid rate of cabin depressurization at 2,100 ft. per minutes as indicted on the cabin pressure gauge. Simultaneously the Captain, noticed the same rate and begin an immediate descent and called for donning of oxygen mask. Due to radio traffic, I was unable to make immediate contact with ATC as the event occurred during change over from ZZZ to Center. Upon contact with Center I notified them we were in a descent, requested priority handling and was unable to honor their level instructions at 25,000 ft. Due to TCAS alert during descent, we had to slow the descent around 25,000 ft. until alert cleared and then we descended to 11,000 ft. During descent, cabin altitude climbed to above 17,000 ft. and the passenger oxygen mask automatically deployed as designed. Upon reaching 11,000 ft. we consulted the checklist and completed all steps as required. With immediate situation, over we verified remaining fuel and terrain clearance and determined we could continue safely to ZZZ1 in a depressurized cabin. We landed safely in ZZZ1 40 minutes later with no other issues."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While in cruise flight at FL280 both Crew Members noticed that the cabin pressure had suddenly started to reduce, both by a noticeable noise of 'rushing air' and the cabin pressure gauge showing the cabin climbing at 2,100 ft./minute. Oxygen masks were donned, I initiated an immediate descent, and the Copilot attempted to make a request for priority handling descent to ATC (Center). Due to frequency congestion the Center Controller wasn't able to hear our initial call, but subsequent attempts clarified our situation. Center Controller told us to stop our descent at FL250 due to a traffic conflict. As I initiated the immediate descent, I had noticed that there was one aircraft that would likely be a conflict so I had already initiated a shallowing of our descent. Our TCAS depiction of the conflicting aircraft turned \"AMBER\", but we were never closer than 1,000 ft. above the other aircraft. as soon as the conflict cleared, we continued the immediate descent to 11,000 ft. The cabin altitude warning light came on during our descent, the cabin overhead oxygen masks automatically deployed (X passenger on board). The cabin altitude never rose above 17,000 ft., and once we leveled off at 11,000 ft. the cabin stabilized at a 3,000 ft. indication on the gauge and maintained a 3.2 PSI differential. All appropriate checklist items were accomplished and we determined that there was no structural cause (most likely an outflow valve had failed) and ascertained that our passenger had suffered no stress, we elected to continue to destination."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nCruising at 28,000 ft., I noticed an air movement sound and identified a rapid rate of cabin depressurization at 2,100 ft. per minutes as indicted on the cabin pressure gauge. Simultaneously the Captain, noticed the same rate and begin an immediate descent and called for donning of oxygen mask. Due to radio traffic, I was unable to make immediate contact with ATC as the event occurred during change over from ZZZ to Center. Upon contact with Center I notified them we were in a descent, requested priority handling and was unable to honor their level instructions at 25,000 ft. Due to TCAS alert during descent, we had to slow the descent around 25,000 ft. until alert cleared and then we descended to 11,000 ft. During descent, cabin altitude climbed to above 17,000 ft. and the passenger oxygen mask automatically deployed as designed. Upon reaching 11,000 ft. we consulted the checklist and completed all steps as required. With immediate situation, over we verified remaining fuel and terrain clearance and determined we could continue safely to ZZZ1 in a depressurized cabin. We landed safely in ZZZ1 40 minutes later with no other issues.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile in cruise flight at FL280 both Crew Members noticed that the cabin pressure had suddenly started to reduce, both by a noticeable noise of 'rushing air' and the cabin pressure gauge showing the cabin climbing at 2,100 ft./minute. Oxygen masks were donned, I initiated an immediate descent, and the Copilot attempted to make a request for priority handling descent to ATC (Center). Due to frequency congestion the Center Controller wasn't able to hear our initial call, but subsequent attempts clarified our situation. Center Controller told us to stop our descent at FL250 due to a traffic conflict. As I initiated the immediate descent, I had noticed that there was one aircraft that would likely be a conflict so I had already initiated a shallowing of our descent. Our TCAS depiction of the conflicting aircraft turned \"AMBER\", but we were never closer than 1,000 ft. above the other aircraft. as soon as the conflict cleared, we continued the immediate descent to 11,000 ft. The cabin altitude warning light came on during our descent, the cabin overhead oxygen masks automatically deployed (X passenger on board). The cabin altitude never rose above 17,000 ft., and once we leveled off at 11,000 ft. the cabin stabilized at a 3,000 ft. indication on the gauge and maintained a 3.2 PSI differential. All appropriate checklist items were accomplished and we determined that there was no structural cause (most likely an outflow valve had failed) and ascertained that our passenger had suffered no stress, we elected to continue to destination.",
    "synopsis": "C525 flight crew reported loss of Cabin Pressure Control during climb. The flight crew requested priority handling and immediately descended. Oxygen masks were deployed and donned. The flight crew was unable to control the cabin pressure and elected to continue at a lower altitude with a depressurized cabin to destination airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=118",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 118,
      "pageEnd": 120,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=118",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 118,
        "pageEnd": 120,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1962880 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "C525 flight crew reported loss of Cabin Pressure Control during climb. The flight crew requested priority handling and immediately descended. Oxygen masks were deployed and donned. The flight crew was unable to control the cabin pressure and elected to continue at a lower altitude with a depressurized cabin to destination airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1961816",
    "date": "2022-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach",
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "My student and I were on approach to land after a training flight. We contacted Tower 10 NM from the airport and were told to report 5 NM Left Base for the Runway in use. When we reported 5NM from the airport, we received a landing clearance. There was another aircraft in the pattern practicing touch and goes, who I believe was cleared to land #2 behind us. As we were on approximately a 1 NM Final for Runway XX, the aircraft in the pattern turned onto Final in front of us. My student immediately executed a go-around to the right side of the runway, and the other aircraft executed a go-around a few moments later. In this situation, I believe the aircraft in the pattern thought the aircraft they were cleared to land behind was already on the ground, instead of still being in the air. I believe ATC should have done a better job at tracking inbound aircraft, and as the pilot not flying of the aircraft, I could have done a better job at monitoring the ADS-B Receiver data."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were in the traffic pattern and were instructed to stay left traffic for runway XX and report left base for each landing. While setting up for our second landing in the downwind we were given clearance to land number two. The aircraft we thought we were following was on short final and we proceeded to turn left base to follow them. When we turned left base there was another aircraft on final that we could not see and were completely unaware of. We were unaware of the near mid-air collision until landing and having another instructor inform my student and I that we had nearly collided. ATC gave no indication to be looking for another aircraft on final and gave no indication to us that there was a near miss. It seemed like ATC might have forgotten that they had cleared both of us to land."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nMy student and I were on approach to land after a training flight. We contacted Tower 10 NM from the airport and were told to report 5 NM Left Base for the Runway in use. When we reported 5NM from the airport, we received a landing clearance. There was another aircraft in the pattern practicing touch and goes, who I believe was cleared to land #2 behind us. As we were on approximately a 1 NM Final for Runway XX, the aircraft in the pattern turned onto Final in front of us. My student immediately executed a go-around to the right side of the runway, and the other aircraft executed a go-around a few moments later. In this situation, I believe the aircraft in the pattern thought the aircraft they were cleared to land behind was already on the ground, instead of still being in the air. I believe ATC should have done a better job at tracking inbound aircraft, and as the pilot not flying of the aircraft, I could have done a better job at monitoring the ADS-B Receiver data.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were in the traffic pattern and were instructed to stay left traffic for runway XX and report left base for each landing. While setting up for our second landing in the downwind we were given clearance to land number two. The aircraft we thought we were following was on short final and we proceeded to turn left base to follow them. When we turned left base there was another aircraft on final that we could not see and were completely unaware of. We were unaware of the near mid-air collision until landing and having another instructor inform my student and I that we had nearly collided. ATC gave no indication to be looking for another aircraft on final and gave no indication to us that there was a near miss. It seemed like ATC might have forgotten that they had cleared both of us to land.",
    "synopsis": "GA pilots reported a NMAC while in the airport traffic pattern and cited communication issues with ATC contributed to the event.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=121",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 121,
      "pageEnd": 123,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=121",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 121,
        "pageEnd": 123,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1961816 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "GA pilots reported a NMAC while in the airport traffic pattern and cited communication issues with ATC contributed to the event.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1958829",
    "date": "2022-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I initially climbed aircraft Y to 35000 ft. (their requested final), but realized, at the time, they weren't climbing that well and I had some traffic that needed descending into ZZZ. I issued aircraft Y direct routing to pull them to the north and issued an amended altitude of 25000 ft. for the aircraft X ZZZ arrivals, who I proceeded to descend to 26000 ft. I called traffic and received no response from aircraft Y. Aircraft X and the first ZZZ began flashing which does happen on occasion when aircraft are climbing and descending towards each other but they were tail to tail and I didn't think anything of it. Aircraft Y's next altitude showed 25500 ft. I issued a 30 degree left turn and stop climb to aircraft Y and went to aircraft X and issued a 30 degree left turn and stop descent. Aircraft X stopped their descent and made the turn while aircraft Y just turned and continued climbing and extra 1500 to 2000 ft. through aircraft X. When I went to issue a brasher warning to aircraft Y it took two calls to get a response. I was partially distracted as we were discussing our lack of staffing and trying to develop a plan with Traffic Management Unit on how to implement Traffic Management Initiatives. Ultimately I missed the read back of the altitude, but I feel like the pilots of aircraft Y were also not engaged or paying attention. Almost every time I made a transmission to them they either didn't respond or missed part of it. Remove the masks while working traffic. I had said, and have meant to, file reports that since Day 0 after masks being implemented again. I and others have noticed a significant increase in the number of issues with communication. Where I would experience 2 to 5 instances a shift of aircraft not responding, asking for clarification or clearances again, or giving bad read backs, I have been experiencing 3 to 10+ instances a session of these issues since implementation of the masks again. There have been multiple other controllers that have complained about similar issues since the mask mandate's return."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I was Controller in Command looking at staffing for the day as well as a previous radio issue with another sector. I heard from across the room the XXX [sector] controller exclaim something, and the XXY controller sitting right next to him) suggest that he tells the Aircraft X to stop descent. XXX said to Aircraft Y \"stop your climb\" and turned them 30 degrees left. Then he told Aircraft X to stop their descent and turn 30 degrees left. While I heard this, I quick looked Sector XXX on the See All Scope. I saw Aircraft Y continue to climb after he was told to stop, and Aircraft X stop their descent. Once the aircraft were safe, XXX sent them both back on course and recovered well. I was not able to grab a handset to listen in quickly, so I only heard the controller's side of the conversation. Later, he told me that he is sure he issued 25000 ft. to Aircraft Y, but he was not sure if the altitude was read back correctly. I have no recommendations."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI initially climbed aircraft Y to 35000 ft. (their requested final), but realized, at the time, they weren't climbing that well and I had some traffic that needed descending into ZZZ. I issued aircraft Y direct routing to pull them to the north and issued an amended altitude of 25000 ft. for the aircraft X ZZZ arrivals, who I proceeded to descend to 26000 ft. I called traffic and received no response from aircraft Y. Aircraft X and the first ZZZ began flashing which does happen on occasion when aircraft are climbing and descending towards each other but they were tail to tail and I didn't think anything of it. Aircraft Y's next altitude showed 25500 ft. I issued a 30 degree left turn and stop climb to aircraft Y and went to aircraft X and issued a 30 degree left turn and stop descent. Aircraft X stopped their descent and made the turn while aircraft Y just turned and continued climbing and extra 1500 to 2000 ft. through aircraft X. When I went to issue a brasher warning to aircraft Y it took two calls to get a response. I was partially distracted as we were discussing our lack of staffing and trying to develop a plan with Traffic Management Unit on how to implement Traffic Management Initiatives. Ultimately I missed the read back of the altitude, but I feel like the pilots of aircraft Y were also not engaged or paying attention. Almost every time I made a transmission to them they either didn't respond or missed part of it. Remove the masks while working traffic. I had said, and have meant to, file reports that since Day 0 after masks being implemented again. I and others have noticed a significant increase in the number of issues with communication. Where I would experience 2 to 5 instances a shift of aircraft not responding, asking for clarification or clearances again, or giving bad read backs, I have been experiencing 3 to 10+ instances a session of these issues since implementation of the masks again. There have been multiple other controllers that have complained about similar issues since the mask mandate's return.\n\nNarrative 2\nI was Controller in Command looking at staffing for the day as well as a previous radio issue with another sector. I heard from across the room the XXX [sector] controller exclaim something, and the XXY controller sitting right next to him) suggest that he tells the Aircraft X to stop descent. XXX said to Aircraft Y \"stop your climb\" and turned them 30 degrees left. Then he told Aircraft X to stop their descent and turn 30 degrees left. While I heard this, I quick looked Sector XXX on the See All Scope. I saw Aircraft Y continue to climb after he was told to stop, and Aircraft X stop their descent. Once the aircraft were safe, XXX sent them both back on course and recovered well. I was not able to grab a handset to listen in quickly, so I only heard the controller's side of the conversation. Later, he told me that he is sure he issued 25000 ft. to Aircraft Y, but he was not sure if the altitude was read back correctly. I have no recommendations.",
    "synopsis": "A Center Controller and the Controller in Charge reported an aircraft did not respond to an assigned altitude or the Controller missed the readback and aircraft flew into confliction with descending traffic. The Center Controller stated wearing a mask caused the communication difficulties.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=124",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 124,
      "pageEnd": 126,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=124",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 124,
        "pageEnd": 126,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1958829 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "A Center Controller and the Controller in Charge reported an aircraft did not respond to an assigned altitude or the Controller missed the readback and aircraft flew into confliction with descending traffic. The Center Controller stated wearing a mask caused the communication difficulties.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1958407",
    "date": "2022-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "BAe 125 Series 1000 (Hawker Horizon)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While being vectored for a visual approach Runway XX into ZZZ we were stepped down 15000, then 14000, then 13000 ft. and then 12000 ft. I read back each altitude as it was given as well as direction of flight. As we were given a turn to the left and asked if we had the runway in sight I responded \"NO\". That there was a few clouds between us and the airport and we couldn't quite see it yet. We then were given a turn and asked to climb to 13000 ft. We complied. I asked if the Controller indeed wanted us to climb to 13000 ft. and Controller said yes because it was the minimum vectoring altitude in that this area. We continued being vectored, picked up the runway, was cleared for the visual and landed. Once taxied clear of runway was asked to call the Tower."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While being vectored for the visual approach Runway XX into ZZZ we were being stepped down 15000 ft, then 14000, then 13000, and then 12000 ft. We read back each altitude as it was given as well as direction of flight. As we were given a turn to the left, and asked if we had the runway in sight, the Captain responded \"No\". There was a few clouds between us and the field and we didn't have the airport in sight yet. We were then giving a turn and asked to climb to 13000 ft. We complied. Next the Captain asked if the Controller indeed wanted us to climb to 13000 ft. and the Controller said yes because it was the minimum vectoring altitude in the area. We continued being vectored, picked up the runway, and was cleared for the visual and landed. Once taxied clear of runway, was asked the call the Tower."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile being vectored for a visual approach Runway XX into ZZZ we were stepped down 15000, then 14000, then 13000 ft. and then 12000 ft. I read back each altitude as it was given as well as direction of flight. As we were given a turn to the left and asked if we had the runway in sight I responded \"NO\". That there was a few clouds between us and the airport and we couldn't quite see it yet. We then were given a turn and asked to climb to 13000 ft. We complied. I asked if the Controller indeed wanted us to climb to 13000 ft. and Controller said yes because it was the minimum vectoring altitude in that this area. We continued being vectored, picked up the runway, was cleared for the visual and landed. Once taxied clear of runway was asked to call the Tower.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile being vectored for the visual approach Runway XX into ZZZ we were being stepped down 15000 ft, then 14000, then 13000, and then 12000 ft. We read back each altitude as it was given as well as direction of flight. As we were given a turn to the left, and asked if we had the runway in sight, the Captain responded \"No\". There was a few clouds between us and the field and we didn't have the airport in sight yet. We were then giving a turn and asked to climb to 13000 ft. We complied. Next the Captain asked if the Controller indeed wanted us to climb to 13000 ft. and the Controller said yes because it was the minimum vectoring altitude in the area. We continued being vectored, picked up the runway, and was cleared for the visual and landed. Once taxied clear of runway, was asked the call the Tower.",
    "synopsis": "Hawker flight crew reported receiving multiple step down altitudes from ATC on approach. Without the airport in sight, the flight crew was given a vector and a climb to the minimum vectoring altitude, then conducted another approach to a successful landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=127",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 127,
      "pageEnd": 129,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=127",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 127,
        "pageEnd": 129,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1958407 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Hawker flight crew reported receiving multiple step down altitudes from ATC on approach. Without the airport in sight, the flight crew was given a vector and a climb to the minimum vectoring altitude, then conducted another approach to a successful landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1957805",
    "date": "2022-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing",
      "Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb",
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Prior to the event, this session had been very taxing on both myself as a trainer and the trainee. For my experience level there wasn't much complexity if I had been working the traffic on my own. However, for the trainee it was which made it difficult for both of us. Earlier in the session, we had two VFR's in the pattern. I had to do a lot of prompting/teaching/training and it was a lot for both of us. After this, I noticed signs that the trainee was flustered. Stumbling over his words, making multiple typing errors etc. and I should have ended the training. If I had this would not have taken place. However, he continued training and continued struggling. Prior to the event the trainee made a decision that was not the most efficient/effective decision that I was explaining to him. During this time Aircraft X was on departure roll. The Aircraft Y had been maneuvering approximately 4 miles southeast ZZZ and never came further west than midfield. So they weren't a factor initially. So I looked away to jot down some notes. I heard and looked up when the Aircraft Y said their next operation would be 1 mile north ZZZ1. At that time they were still no factor for Aircraft X. I assumed they would go directly southbound and thus not be a factor for Aircraft X so I again looked away to write. I heard the trainee switch Aircraft X to ZZZ [Approach], then switch the Aircraft Y to ZZZ1 Tower. I was made aware of the developing situation by the Controller in Charge (CIC) after both aircraft had already been switched. When I looked up Aircraft X was about 1.5 miles northwest of the Aircraft Y who was flying due west. Aircraft X began to climb and at the point that he crossed directly overhead the Aircraft Y he was approximately 800 ft. above him. However, both aircraft had already been switched. The trainee said he called traffic but after listening to the tapes afterwards he hadn't. ZZZ called and reported that the Aircraft X reported a near mid-air. I immediately ended training at that point. I continued to work until being relieved. In our debrief, the trainee and I reviewed the tapes. We also reviewed the radar display replay with the Supervisor. There were several missed opportunities that would have/should have prompted the trainee to issue traffic. This particular trainee has nearly 400 hours and is currently on an extension. He was given nearly double the normal amount of hours allotted to local trainees because of Covid. The consensus of the training team is that he is close but he has to show consistency. I again feel bad because I wish I would have ended the session sooner and this would not have happened. I should have recognized we both were taxed from earlier in the session and possibly that's why we both missed it. I also feel like the Swiss cheese model, we were failed by the CIC who didn't see it until after both aircraft were already switched. I'm not really sure what to recommend. I will as a trainer going forward try and do better at realizing when either my trainee or myself is overwhelmed and either take over or end training. I also felt as if the Tower team failed. When I work CIC I take a more active hands on approach in assisting trainer/trainees because I know how taxing training can be and how easily things can be missed. Had the CIC recognized this sooner as well we could have resolved the issue."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Aircraft X departed Runway XXR and was given an altitude restriction of 4000 ft. in which said aircraft read back then begun departure procedures. Aircraft Y was performing east to west survey lines just east of ZZZ1 airspace restricted at 2700 ft. Aircraft Y was pointed out to ZZZ Area sector which was combined with Area 1 sector and also a verbal point out was approved by ZZZ1 Tower as well. Aircraft X was climbing via the ZZZZZ.3 departure and instructed to contact ZZZ Departure. Aircraft Y informed me that they would like to perform more survey work one mile north of ZZZ1 Airport and would like to contact ZZZ1 Tower. I then informed Aircraft Y radar services was terminated and to contact ZZZ1 Tower. Aircraft X had to performed a rapid climb out of 2500 ft. to climb above Aircraft Y which was at 2600 ft. Aircraft X climbed 800 ft. to 900 ft. above Aircraft Y. This happened because traffic was not exchanged between both aircraft and preventative measures was not set in place. First and foremost traffic should have been exchanged between both aircraft and if preventative measures was not set in place then it should have been a SAFETY ALERT. Aircraft Y should have been issued the traffic and instructed to descend into ZZZ1 airspace once all conflicts was resolved then instructed to contact ZZZ1 Tower. Aircraft X should have been informed of said traffic and instructed that said traffic was descending if preventative measures was in place. Above all a safety alert should have been issued before instructing either aircraft to contact the Area 1 sector or ZZZ1 Tower."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nPrior to the event, this session had been very taxing on both myself as a trainer and the trainee. For my experience level there wasn't much complexity if I had been working the traffic on my own. However, for the trainee it was which made it difficult for both of us. Earlier in the session, we had two VFR's in the pattern. I had to do a lot of prompting/teaching/training and it was a lot for both of us. After this, I noticed signs that the trainee was flustered. Stumbling over his words, making multiple typing errors etc. and I should have ended the training. If I had this would not have taken place. However, he continued training and continued struggling. Prior to the event the trainee made a decision that was not the most efficient/effective decision that I was explaining to him. During this time Aircraft X was on departure roll. The Aircraft Y had been maneuvering approximately 4 miles southeast ZZZ and never came further west than midfield. So they weren't a factor initially. So I looked away to jot down some notes. I heard and looked up when the Aircraft Y said their next operation would be 1 mile north ZZZ1. At that time they were still no factor for Aircraft X. I assumed they would go directly southbound and thus not be a factor for Aircraft X so I again looked away to write. I heard the trainee switch Aircraft X to ZZZ [Approach], then switch the Aircraft Y to ZZZ1 Tower. I was made aware of the developing situation by the Controller in Charge (CIC) after both aircraft had already been switched. When I looked up Aircraft X was about 1.5 miles northwest of the Aircraft Y who was flying due west. Aircraft X began to climb and at the point that he crossed directly overhead the Aircraft Y he was approximately 800 ft. above him. However, both aircraft had already been switched. The trainee said he called traffic but after listening to the tapes afterwards he hadn't. ZZZ called and reported that the Aircraft X reported a near mid-air. I immediately ended training at that point. I continued to work until being relieved. In our debrief, the trainee and I reviewed the tapes. We also reviewed the radar display replay with the Supervisor. There were several missed opportunities that would have/should have prompted the trainee to issue traffic. This particular trainee has nearly 400 hours and is currently on an extension. He was given nearly double the normal amount of hours allotted to local trainees because of Covid. The consensus of the training team is that he is close but he has to show consistency. I again feel bad because I wish I would have ended the session sooner and this would not have happened. I should have recognized we both were taxed from earlier in the session and possibly that's why we both missed it. I also feel like the Swiss cheese model, we were failed by the CIC who didn't see it until after both aircraft were already switched. I'm not really sure what to recommend. I will as a trainer going forward try and do better at realizing when either my trainee or myself is overwhelmed and either take over or end training. I also felt as if the Tower team failed. When I work CIC I take a more active hands on approach in assisting trainer/trainees because I know how taxing training can be and how easily things can be missed. Had the CIC recognized this sooner as well we could have resolved the issue.\n\nNarrative 2\nAircraft X departed Runway XXR and was given an altitude restriction of 4000 ft. in which said aircraft read back then begun departure procedures. Aircraft Y was performing east to west survey lines just east of ZZZ1 airspace restricted at 2700 ft. Aircraft Y was pointed out to ZZZ Area sector which was combined with Area 1 sector and also a verbal point out was approved by ZZZ1 Tower as well. Aircraft X was climbing via the ZZZZZ.3 departure and instructed to contact ZZZ Departure. Aircraft Y informed me that they would like to perform more survey work one mile north of ZZZ1 Airport and would like to contact ZZZ1 Tower. I then informed Aircraft Y radar services was terminated and to contact ZZZ1 Tower. Aircraft X had to performed a rapid climb out of 2500 ft. to climb above Aircraft Y which was at 2600 ft. Aircraft X climbed 800 ft. to 900 ft. above Aircraft Y. This happened because traffic was not exchanged between both aircraft and preventative measures was not set in place. First and foremost traffic should have been exchanged between both aircraft and if preventative measures was not set in place then it should have been a SAFETY ALERT. Aircraft Y should have been issued the traffic and instructed to descend into ZZZ1 airspace once all conflicts was resolved then instructed to contact ZZZ1 Tower. Aircraft X should have been informed of said traffic and instructed that said traffic was descending if preventative measures was in place. Above all a safety alert should have been issued before instructing either aircraft to contact the Area 1 sector or ZZZ1 Tower.",
    "synopsis": "Tower Local Controller reported a departing Air Carrier encountered a NMAC with a VFR survey mission aircraft. The Controller and their trainee failed to issue traffic information to either aircraft and handed them off to adjacent airspace frequencies.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=130",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 130,
      "pageEnd": 132,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=130",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 130,
        "pageEnd": 132,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1957805 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Tower Local Controller reported a departing Air Carrier encountered a NMAC with a VFR survey mission aircraft. The Controller and their trainee failed to issue traffic information to either aircraft and handed them off to adjacent airspace frequencies.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1950817",
    "date": "2022-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Returning from ZZZZ, expecting and set up for ILS 30. MIA in west ops for winds which were out of the north approximately 20-25 kts with higher gusts. Approach told us to expect ILS 27. I was Pilot Flying (PF). Pilot Monitoring (PM) set up ILS 27. Set up and briefed flaps 15 landing. Vectored by approached to intercept LOC while descending to intercept glidepath. Cleared for the approach and switched to Tower. We intercepted glideslope before LOC. Everything looked good until FAF when tower called us with an altitude alert. We were on glideslope but 250-300 low. PM called out ground contact (we were IMC) and position clear of buildings. We continued approach but several times the glideslope indications went both up and down quickly (as if an aircraft was taxiing past the transmitter). Broke out several hundred feet above mins and continued to landing. After landing PM called tower to inform them of the issues on the ILS. Tower responded that there were issues with the ILS and we should have been given the RNAV approach. Double checked the ATIS and it was showing ILS 27 available. Cause: Miss communication between tower and approach controller(s). Suggestions: Better, more timely, communication between controlling agencies."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Captain flying ILS to 27. Just past CHHAZ tower called out Low Altitude Alert for us. We showed on glide path. I referenced the approach and saw CHHAZ should be at 1,800 ft. We were just above 1,500 ft. showing on glide path. Something not correct obviously, I stated ground contact looking down at the shoreline. I could see forward and the ground just in front of the aircraft, but no approach lights yet. The glideslope then abruptly jumped up and then down and then something close to on glideslope. Just like you get when someone crosses the glideslope signal flying the ILS Runway 30. The ILS signal was steady after that. The Captain continued while I leaned forward and maintained visual with the ground just in front of the aircraft. At about 700-800 ft. AGL I called the approach lights in sight. Captain landed uneventfully. As we cleared I told the tower there was something wrong with the glideslope. Tower stated that had been reported and we should have been on the RNAV. Approach was still clearing aircraft for the ILS however. Cause: With a known problem with the glideslope, the ILS glideslope should have been turned off. Approach control should not have been clearing aircraft to fly it. Suggestions: The tower altitude alerting feature works well. We both missed the FAF crossing altitude check and were tracking the steady glideslope signal. The tower alert followed seconds later by a 3-5 second spurious signal certainly got our attention. Without the tower alert we may have never realized we must have crossed the FAF probably 150 ft. -250 ft. low showing on glideslope."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nReturning from ZZZZ, expecting and set up for ILS 30. MIA in west ops for winds which were out of the north approximately 20-25 kts with higher gusts. Approach told us to expect ILS 27. I was Pilot Flying (PF). Pilot Monitoring (PM) set up ILS 27. Set up and briefed flaps 15 landing. Vectored by approached to intercept LOC while descending to intercept glidepath. Cleared for the approach and switched to Tower. We intercepted glideslope before LOC. Everything looked good until FAF when tower called us with an altitude alert. We were on glideslope but 250-300 low. PM called out ground contact (we were IMC) and position clear of buildings. We continued approach but several times the glideslope indications went both up and down quickly (as if an aircraft was taxiing past the transmitter). Broke out several hundred feet above mins and continued to landing. After landing PM called tower to inform them of the issues on the ILS. Tower responded that there were issues with the ILS and we should have been given the RNAV approach. Double checked the ATIS and it was showing ILS 27 available. Cause: Miss communication between tower and approach controller(s). Suggestions: Better, more timely, communication between controlling agencies.\n\nNarrative 2\nCaptain flying ILS to 27. Just past CHHAZ tower called out Low Altitude Alert for us. We showed on glide path. I referenced the approach and saw CHHAZ should be at 1,800 ft. We were just above 1,500 ft. showing on glide path. Something not correct obviously, I stated ground contact looking down at the shoreline. I could see forward and the ground just in front of the aircraft, but no approach lights yet. The glideslope then abruptly jumped up and then down and then something close to on glideslope. Just like you get when someone crosses the glideslope signal flying the ILS Runway 30. The ILS signal was steady after that. The Captain continued while I leaned forward and maintained visual with the ground just in front of the aircraft. At about 700-800 ft. AGL I called the approach lights in sight. Captain landed uneventfully. As we cleared I told the tower there was something wrong with the glideslope. Tower stated that had been reported and we should have been on the RNAV. Approach was still clearing aircraft for the ILS however. Cause: With a known problem with the glideslope, the ILS glideslope should have been turned off. Approach control should not have been clearing aircraft to fly it. Suggestions: The tower altitude alerting feature works well. We both missed the FAF crossing altitude check and were tracking the steady glideslope signal. The tower alert followed seconds later by a 3-5 second spurious signal certainly got our attention. Without the tower alert we may have never realized we must have crossed the FAF probably 150 ft. -250 ft. low showing on glideslope.",
    "synopsis": "Flight crew reported ATC failed to issue the proper approach resulting in receiving erroneous glide slope references, low altitude alert and incorrect crossing altitude.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=133",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 133,
      "pageEnd": 135,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=133",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 133,
        "pageEnd": 135,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1950817 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Flight crew reported ATC failed to issue the proper approach resulting in receiving erroneous glide slope references, low altitude alert and incorrect crossing altitude.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1940351",
    "date": "2022-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were being vectored for the ILS to [Runway] XX. They leveled us off on the descent at FL180. We now were about 4000 ft. above the normal glide path. Approximately 5-7 miles from ZZZZZ they asked if we were going to be able to get down. I said we could use a turn to the north to buy some time to descend. Controller gave us a 300 degree heading. Shortly after the vector he said turn left to 180. Lots of weather and terrain to the west of our position. I requested a right turn, but he quickly said no, turn left immediately. So we did. We were cleared down to 8000 ft. Then he said turn left to a heading of 140 and descend to 5000 ft. The new Captain and I both pointed to 5000 in the altitude window and verbalized the assigned altitude. While passing through 5600 ft., the controller said to climb and maintain 6000 ft. and that there was a terrain warning. So we did. We were cleared for the approach and landed Runway XX. After landing we were told to call TRACON because of a possible altitude violation. 5000 ft. is low for ZZZ, but the altitude at ZZZZZ1 is 5100, so I thought that was a MVA altitude to get us under the rain so we could do a visual approach. We are human and sometimes make mistakes, but both of us really believe we heard and read back 5000 ft. Being held up way too high on a vector with lots of weather in the area. Several changes in altitudes and initial approach fixes to join the approach. This was a distraction. Approach offering other options after keeping us held up so high. I've had this happen several times over the years in ZZZ. We even talked about the possibility in our briefing of the approach at cruise."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "During the descent to ZZZ, we were assigned a late descent, to cross ZZZZZ at or above 8000 ft. and clear the ILS XX approach. Due to the multiple cells and a very deep descent rate, we asked for a north deviation. A clearance to deviate to the north was approved, followed by a clearance to descend to 8000 ft. Once our altitude was not a factor, we were given a south heading, to what we replied, that we wanted to continue on the north deviation. Controller replied that he was unable, and we were told to turn left to a 180 heading. As we tuned to the south, we were cleared to a further left turn, to a 140 heading and 5000 ft. to intercept the XX localize. Descending through 5600 ft., we were told that our last assigned altitude was 6000 ft. We stopped the descent and climb back up to 6000 ft. At that point we were given a clearance of, 140 heading, 6000 until establish and clear for the ILS XX. Convective weather, late descent clearance, followed by a multiple clearances that included different way-points, headings, and altitudes Suggestion: A better descent profile to the airport."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were being vectored for the ILS to [Runway] XX. They leveled us off on the descent at FL180. We now were about 4000 ft. above the normal glide path. Approximately 5-7 miles from ZZZZZ they asked if we were going to be able to get down. I said we could use a turn to the north to buy some time to descend. Controller gave us a 300 degree heading. Shortly after the vector he said turn left to 180. Lots of weather and terrain to the west of our position. I requested a right turn, but he quickly said no, turn left immediately. So we did. We were cleared down to 8000 ft. Then he said turn left to a heading of 140 and descend to 5000 ft. The new Captain and I both pointed to 5000 in the altitude window and verbalized the assigned altitude. While passing through 5600 ft., the controller said to climb and maintain 6000 ft. and that there was a terrain warning. So we did. We were cleared for the approach and landed Runway XX. After landing we were told to call TRACON because of a possible altitude violation. 5000 ft. is low for ZZZ, but the altitude at ZZZZZ1 is 5100, so I thought that was a MVA altitude to get us under the rain so we could do a visual approach. We are human and sometimes make mistakes, but both of us really believe we heard and read back 5000 ft. Being held up way too high on a vector with lots of weather in the area. Several changes in altitudes and initial approach fixes to join the approach. This was a distraction. Approach offering other options after keeping us held up so high. I've had this happen several times over the years in ZZZ. We even talked about the possibility in our briefing of the approach at cruise.\n\nNarrative 2\nDuring the descent to ZZZ, we were assigned a late descent, to cross ZZZZZ at or above 8000 ft. and clear the ILS XX approach. Due to the multiple cells and a very deep descent rate, we asked for a north deviation. A clearance to deviate to the north was approved, followed by a clearance to descend to 8000 ft. Once our altitude was not a factor, we were given a south heading, to what we replied, that we wanted to continue on the north deviation. Controller replied that he was unable, and we were told to turn left to a 180 heading. As we tuned to the south, we were cleared to a further left turn, to a 140 heading and 5000 ft. to intercept the XX localize. Descending through 5600 ft., we were told that our last assigned altitude was 6000 ft. We stopped the descent and climb back up to 6000 ft. At that point we were given a clearance of, 140 heading, 6000 until establish and clear for the ILS XX. Convective weather, late descent clearance, followed by a multiple clearances that included different way-points, headings, and altitudes Suggestion: A better descent profile to the airport.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier Check Airman and new Captain reported misunderstanding ATC and descending below the assigned altitude. The pilots stated the weather was poor, the descent clearance was late and delay vectors were being used to help with the descent.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=136",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 136,
      "pageEnd": 138,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=136",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 136,
        "pageEnd": 138,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1940351 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air Carrier Check Airman and new Captain reported misunderstanding ATC and descending below the assigned altitude. The pilots stated the weather was poor, the descent clearance was late and delay vectors were being used to help with the descent.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1938996",
    "date": "2022-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During the final descend to ZZZ we contacted ZZZ Approach and received instructions to descend 3000 ft. and expect vectors for ILS X at ZZZ airport. We descended through 4000 ft. to 3000 ft. with vertical speed 1000 fpm and received next instruction to descend to 2000 ft. I've read back this instructions with no ATC challenge and set 2000 ft. on altitude preselector. Pilot flying (PF) verbalize new altitude and we continued descend to 2000 ft. as instructed by ATC. We were in IMC conditions and experienced light turbulence also according SOPs pilot flying MFD was on terrain mode (for terrain airport) and my MFD was on Weather mode with radar on (due to Weather activity along the route). Terrain depiction on PF MFD was normal and did not lead us to query ATC instructions. When we crossed approximately 2500 ft. aural warning \"PULL UP TERRAIN\" went off and second later we executed terrain escape maneuver. Few second later during climb approximately at 3500 ft. ATC querying as about altitude and notified us what last assigned altitude was 3000 ft. I notified ATC what we executed terrain escape maneuver and we will climb to 5000 ft. We leveled off at 5000 ft. After level off I notified ATC and explain what happened. ATC query us about our intentions and after quick brief we decided to continue as planned to destination. Rest of the flight went uneventful. We didn't receive instructions to call ATC by phone. We debriefed this situation on the ground upon completion of the flight. During debrief we both agreed that ATC gave us instructions to descend to 2000 ft. but we should query this instructions because FAF altitude is 2600 ft. Both of us have never been at ZZZ and we were unfamiliar with common ATC procedures at this airport. Pilot Flying during approach briefing mentioned notes on 10-7 page for visual approach for Runway X but we did ILS approach and follow ATC instruction. We should query any ATC instructions if in doubt."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Late night on approach into ZZZ ILS X approach was briefed and told to be expected by ATC as the slightly gusty winds were right down the runway and the ceiling was somewhat low around 2000 ft. As I briefed the approach, I noted that it was a terrain airport due to terrain out west and I also noted the ridge that was around 1804 ft. and featured on the company notes page for ZZZ. This was primarily a caution for people executing a visual approach into Runway X not an ILS approach. Beginning the descent from 8000 to 3000 as instructed by ATC, ATC told us to expect vectors for the X ILS as briefed. As we closed in on leveling off at 3000 ft. (about 4-5 miles east south-east on downwind) we hear another instruction from approach control to descend and maintain 2000 ft. Pilot monitoring (PM) read back altitude with no challenge from ATC. 2000 was set in the altitude window and we began a descent (around 1000-1200 fpm). Within a very short window of time after this, with no other present warnings or cautions we got a GPWS \"GND PROX\", and \"Pull up\". With minimal delay I executed an escape maneuver and climbed to 5000 which was well clear of the terrain displayed on the MFD terrain display function. After recovering we queried ATC about the altitude they had assigned, ATC said it was 3000 and said we were coming in broken and unreadable. After the event we received vectors for the ILS X and then proceeded and landed without incident. Next time I will more than triple check the altitude that ATC has us to descending to intercept the course and glideslope. ATC made a clear error in issuing this clearance, and then after the fact said \"no I said to descend and maintain 3000\". I'm sure late night fatigue was at play, when people are saying one thing but meaning another. Whatever the case better work all around was due to help avoid a scenario like this. I should have caught right when the instruction was given that the glideslope intercept altitude was 2600 ft. on the approach not 2000 ft. It's a great idea to pay close attention to the lay of the land, even if it's only a dot or simple feature on our approach plates it's there for a reason. The terrain feature I suspect that must have triggered the terrain closure warning would have been the ridge that is mentioned to be at 1800 ft. on the airport 10-7. In our debrief we noticed on the plate the only significant terrain illustrated on the plate is out to the west, while the 1800 ft. peak is denoted only by a dot."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring the final descend to ZZZ we contacted ZZZ Approach and received instructions to descend 3000 ft. and expect vectors for ILS X at ZZZ airport. We descended through 4000 ft. to 3000 ft. with vertical speed 1000 fpm and received next instruction to descend to 2000 ft. I've read back this instructions with no ATC challenge and set 2000 ft. on altitude preselector. Pilot flying (PF) verbalize new altitude and we continued descend to 2000 ft. as instructed by ATC. We were in IMC conditions and experienced light turbulence also according SOPs pilot flying MFD was on terrain mode (for terrain airport) and my MFD was on Weather mode with radar on (due to Weather activity along the route). Terrain depiction on PF MFD was normal and did not lead us to query ATC instructions. When we crossed approximately 2500 ft. aural warning \"PULL UP TERRAIN\" went off and second later we executed terrain escape maneuver. Few second later during climb approximately at 3500 ft. ATC querying as about altitude and notified us what last assigned altitude was 3000 ft. I notified ATC what we executed terrain escape maneuver and we will climb to 5000 ft. We leveled off at 5000 ft. After level off I notified ATC and explain what happened. ATC query us about our intentions and after quick brief we decided to continue as planned to destination. Rest of the flight went uneventful. We didn't receive instructions to call ATC by phone. We debriefed this situation on the ground upon completion of the flight. During debrief we both agreed that ATC gave us instructions to descend to 2000 ft. but we should query this instructions because FAF altitude is 2600 ft. Both of us have never been at ZZZ and we were unfamiliar with common ATC procedures at this airport. Pilot Flying during approach briefing mentioned notes on 10-7 page for visual approach for Runway X but we did ILS approach and follow ATC instruction. We should query any ATC instructions if in doubt.\n\nNarrative 2\nLate night on approach into ZZZ ILS X approach was briefed and told to be expected by ATC as the slightly gusty winds were right down the runway and the ceiling was somewhat low around 2000 ft. As I briefed the approach, I noted that it was a terrain airport due to terrain out west and I also noted the ridge that was around 1804 ft. and featured on the company notes page for ZZZ. This was primarily a caution for people executing a visual approach into Runway X not an ILS approach. Beginning the descent from 8000 to 3000 as instructed by ATC, ATC told us to expect vectors for the X ILS as briefed. As we closed in on leveling off at 3000 ft. (about 4-5 miles east south-east on downwind) we hear another instruction from approach control to descend and maintain 2000 ft. Pilot monitoring (PM) read back altitude with no challenge from ATC. 2000 was set in the altitude window and we began a descent (around 1000-1200 fpm). Within a very short window of time after this, with no other present warnings or cautions we got a GPWS \"GND PROX\", and \"Pull up\". With minimal delay I executed an escape maneuver and climbed to 5000 which was well clear of the terrain displayed on the MFD terrain display function. After recovering we queried ATC about the altitude they had assigned, ATC said it was 3000 and said we were coming in broken and unreadable. After the event we received vectors for the ILS X and then proceeded and landed without incident. Next time I will more than triple check the altitude that ATC has us to descending to intercept the course and glideslope. ATC made a clear error in issuing this clearance, and then after the fact said \"no I said to descend and maintain 3000\". I'm sure late night fatigue was at play, when people are saying one thing but meaning another. Whatever the case better work all around was due to help avoid a scenario like this. I should have caught right when the instruction was given that the glideslope intercept altitude was 2600 ft. on the approach not 2000 ft. It's a great idea to pay close attention to the lay of the land, even if it's only a dot or simple feature on our approach plates it's there for a reason. The terrain feature I suspect that must have triggered the terrain closure warning would have been the ridge that is mentioned to be at 1800 ft. on the airport 10-7. In our debrief we noticed on the plate the only significant terrain illustrated on the plate is out to the west, while the 1800 ft. peak is denoted only by a dot.",
    "synopsis": "Flight crew reported they were descending to their ATC assigned altitude when they received a Terrain Warning.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=139",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 139,
      "pageEnd": 141,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=139",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 139,
        "pageEnd": 141,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
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        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1938996 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Flight crew reported they were descending to their ATC assigned altitude when they received a Terrain Warning.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1937836",
    "date": "2022-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Arrived at aircraft to find maintenance had deferred an aft outflow valve status message. It was not on our planning paperwork. Reading the deferral there was no pilot action required. Maintenance had put aft outflow valve in manual position with deferred sticker next to it. We took note and assumed switch position was correct for deferral. During climb noticed cabin climbing rapidly. At 10000 ft. Master caution went off, cabin altitude above 10000 ft. Pilot Flying (PF) Immediately with ATC permission descended below 10000 ft. Captain called Maintenance Control and he read deferral. The Captain suggested we put switch in auto position and Maintenance Control did not approve. We manually closed aft valve which brought cabin down. Masks never deployed. We took delay vectors while talking to Dispatch. [Requested priority handling] and returned to ZZZ, opting to land overweight instead of dumping fuel. Took our time ran all checklist and landed 5000 pounds overweight. Landing uneventful."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Arrived at Aircraft X for the Day 0 flight from ZZZ to ZZZZ, 1 hour prior to push. I met a mechanic at door 2L who was coming out. I asked if he was working an issue. He advised his colleague had just deferred the aft pressurization outflow valve and the new Maintenance Release was on its way. This condition was not included in the pre-flight paperwork, so it was a surprise to us. I jumped in the right seat and started my setup, noticing the AFT OUTFLOW valve switch was in MAN and had a deferral sticker above it. The Maintenance Release printed while I was setting up, so I handed it to the Captain as I continued loading the FMC and organizing the cockpit for departure. When the International Relief Officer (IRO) returned from the walk-around, the three of us conferred about the outflow valve, noting maintenance had left the switch in MAN and reading through the Maintenance Release deferral noted there was no pilot crew action required. Ground ops proceeded normally and we departed on Runway XXR via the ZZZZZ departure. During climb to 14000 ft., the Captain noted the cabin pressure was climbing, approaching 11000 ft. We briefly experienced the CABIN PRESSURE WARNING and quickly coordinated for a descent back to 10000 ft. (Passenger masks did NOT drop). The Captain directed myself to continuing flying and take the ATC radios while he and the IRO worked the problem. The Captain contacted Dispatch via sat comm and looped in Maintenance Control. I was working the ATC radio and flying, so was not directly listening to their conversation. I do recall the Captain asking Maintenance Control if we should place the AFT OUTFLOW switch back to AUTO, which they did not approve. I believe they intimated that something with the deferral was amiss and a return to ZZZ was advisable. The Captain continued coordinating with Dispatch and Maintenance Control regarding a return to base while the IRO worked communication with the Flight Attendants, informed passengers of our intentions and monitored my flying. ATC was vectoring us around at 10000 ft. while we worked the issue. We were 20000 pounds over max landing weight so I asked ATC for a location to dump fuel. After a delay and some coordination they responded they could not approve a fuel dump unless we were [requesting priority handling]. The Captain then came on the radio and [requested priority with ATC]. ATC then sent us to the ZZZZZ fix for holding and descended us to 5000 ft., but said nothing about approval to dump fuel. Re-configuring for a ZZZ return, completing checklists/coordination and starting the APU helped us burn sufficient fuel whereby we decided to land slightly overweight (5000 pounds) instead of dumping fuel given our height AGL and ATC's apparent confusion regarding fuel dump approval. Approach and landing to Runway XXC were uneventful and fire trucks escorted us back to gate, where we transitioned to a new tail and pressed ahead to get the passengers to ZZZZ."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nArrived at aircraft to find maintenance had deferred an aft outflow valve status message. It was not on our planning paperwork. Reading the deferral there was no pilot action required. Maintenance had put aft outflow valve in manual position with deferred sticker next to it. We took note and assumed switch position was correct for deferral. During climb noticed cabin climbing rapidly. At 10000 ft. Master caution went off, cabin altitude above 10000 ft. Pilot Flying (PF) Immediately with ATC permission descended below 10000 ft. Captain called Maintenance Control and he read deferral. The Captain suggested we put switch in auto position and Maintenance Control did not approve. We manually closed aft valve which brought cabin down. Masks never deployed. We took delay vectors while talking to Dispatch. [Requested priority handling] and returned to ZZZ, opting to land overweight instead of dumping fuel. Took our time ran all checklist and landed 5000 pounds overweight. Landing uneventful.\n\nNarrative 2\nArrived at Aircraft X for the Day 0 flight from ZZZ to ZZZZ, 1 hour prior to push. I met a mechanic at door 2L who was coming out. I asked if he was working an issue. He advised his colleague had just deferred the aft pressurization outflow valve and the new Maintenance Release was on its way. This condition was not included in the pre-flight paperwork, so it was a surprise to us. I jumped in the right seat and started my setup, noticing the AFT OUTFLOW valve switch was in MAN and had a deferral sticker above it. The Maintenance Release printed while I was setting up, so I handed it to the Captain as I continued loading the FMC and organizing the cockpit for departure. When the International Relief Officer (IRO) returned from the walk-around, the three of us conferred about the outflow valve, noting maintenance had left the switch in MAN and reading through the Maintenance Release deferral noted there was no pilot crew action required. Ground ops proceeded normally and we departed on Runway XXR via the ZZZZZ departure. During climb to 14000 ft., the Captain noted the cabin pressure was climbing, approaching 11000 ft. We briefly experienced the CABIN PRESSURE WARNING and quickly coordinated for a descent back to 10000 ft. (Passenger masks did NOT drop). The Captain directed myself to continuing flying and take the ATC radios while he and the IRO worked the problem. The Captain contacted Dispatch via sat comm and looped in Maintenance Control. I was working the ATC radio and flying, so was not directly listening to their conversation. I do recall the Captain asking Maintenance Control if we should place the AFT OUTFLOW switch back to AUTO, which they did not approve. I believe they intimated that something with the deferral was amiss and a return to ZZZ was advisable. The Captain continued coordinating with Dispatch and Maintenance Control regarding a return to base while the IRO worked communication with the Flight Attendants, informed passengers of our intentions and monitored my flying. ATC was vectoring us around at 10000 ft. while we worked the issue. We were 20000 pounds over max landing weight so I asked ATC for a location to dump fuel. After a delay and some coordination they responded they could not approve a fuel dump unless we were [requesting priority handling]. The Captain then came on the radio and [requested priority with ATC]. ATC then sent us to the ZZZZZ fix for holding and descended us to 5000 ft., but said nothing about approval to dump fuel. Re-configuring for a ZZZ return, completing checklists/coordination and starting the APU helped us burn sufficient fuel whereby we decided to land slightly overweight (5000 pounds) instead of dumping fuel given our height AGL and ATC's apparent confusion regarding fuel dump approval. Approach and landing to Runway XXC were uneventful and fire trucks escorted us back to gate, where we transitioned to a new tail and pressed ahead to get the passengers to ZZZZ.",
    "synopsis": "B777 flight crew reported departing with a deferred outflow valve. On climb, the cabin altitude began climbing rapidly. The flight crew descended and performed an air turn back to make a precautionary landing at departure airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=145",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 145,
      "pageEnd": 147,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=145",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 145,
        "pageEnd": 147,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1937836 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "B777 flight crew reported departing with a deferred outflow valve. On climb, the cabin altitude began climbing rapidly. The flight crew descended and performed an air turn back to make a precautionary landing at departure airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1934630",
    "date": "2022-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Falcon 7X",
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was Pilot Monitoring (PM) on our Part 91 Flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1. ZZZ Tower cleared us for take-off from Runway XXR. The Pilot Flying (PF), advanced the power levers and shortly after we began our takeoff roll, pulled the power levers to idle and stopped the aircraft on the runway. At the same time ZZZ canceled our takeoff clearance. The PF, had noticed that a B737 downfield at the approach end of YYL had crossed over the hold short line and was holding just short of the runway. Shortly after that, ATC cleared the B737 to cross the runway into the gate area. Once they were clear of the runway, ZZZ Tower cleared us for takeoff. This event shows how important it is for the crew to remain vigilant of other aircraft operating on and around your departure runway."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "I was Pilot Monitoring (PM) on our Part 91 flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1. ZZZ Tower cleared us for take-off from Runway XXR. The Pilot Flying (PF) advanced the power levers and shortly after we began our takeoff roll he pulled the power levers to idle. At the same time ZZZ Tower cancelled our takeoff clearance. The PF had noticed another aircraft that had crossed over the hold short line and was holding just short of the runway (Approach End YYL). Shortly after, ATC cleared the aircraft to cross Runway XXR. Once the aircraft was clear of the runway we were cleared for takeoff."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was Pilot Monitoring (PM) on our Part 91 Flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1. ZZZ Tower cleared us for take-off from Runway XXR. The Pilot Flying (PF), advanced the power levers and shortly after we began our takeoff roll, pulled the power levers to idle and stopped the aircraft on the runway. At the same time ZZZ canceled our takeoff clearance. The PF, had noticed that a B737 downfield at the approach end of YYL had crossed over the hold short line and was holding just short of the runway. Shortly after that, ATC cleared the B737 to cross the runway into the gate area. Once they were clear of the runway, ZZZ Tower cleared us for takeoff. This event shows how important it is for the crew to remain vigilant of other aircraft operating on and around your departure runway.\n\nNarrative 2\nI was Pilot Monitoring (PM) on our Part 91 flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1. ZZZ Tower cleared us for take-off from Runway XXR. The Pilot Flying (PF) advanced the power levers and shortly after we began our takeoff roll he pulled the power levers to idle. At the same time ZZZ Tower cancelled our takeoff clearance. The PF had noticed another aircraft that had crossed over the hold short line and was holding just short of the runway (Approach End YYL). Shortly after, ATC cleared the aircraft to cross Runway XXR. Once the aircraft was clear of the runway we were cleared for takeoff.",
    "synopsis": "Falcon 7X flight crew reported observing B737 over runway hold line resulted in rejected takeoff.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=148",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 148,
      "pageEnd": 150,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=148",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 148,
        "pageEnd": 150,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "Rejected takeoff after spotting aircraft over the hold line",
    "summary": "A Falcon 7X pilot stopped early in the takeoff roll after noticing a B737 beyond its hold line near the departure runway. The tower canceled the takeoff clearance at about the same time, allowed the other aircraft to cross, and then cleared the Falcon for takeoff again.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Communication",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1934572",
    "date": "2022-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated",
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Descending into LGA on the Milton 4 arrival. We were given a clearance to cross MARRC intersection at FL180. I read that back and we started down on path to cross MARRC at FL180. As we got close to MARRC, we encountered very strong wake turbulence. The aircraft encountered moderate turbulence and an uncommanded rolling moment. The Autopilot disconnected and we lost guidance both vertically and laterally. We got that straightened out fairly quickly. In the midst of dealing with that, we were cleared to cross BEUTY at 11,000 ft. I read back BEUTY at 11,000 ft. as normal, and as normal there is no reply to that from ATC. I noticed at the time that the chart showed to \"expect\" BEUTY at 13,000, but I didn't think much of that because many times we get altitudes other than the charted \"expect\" altitudes. We descended normally to cross BEUTY at 11,000 ft. and we got a frequency change. We checked in at 11,000 ft. and got no answer as the frequency was very congested. I waited a while and tried again. The controller asked what altitude we are at, which immediately sets off alarm bells in my head and the First Officer (FO) as well. I replied that we are at 11,000 ft. and there was no reply. I waited a moment as the controller dealt with other aircraft and I asked him why he asked us. He responded that we were assigned 13,000 by the last controller. I replied that we heard 11,000, and at that time I had read back 11,000. He had nothing else to say to us on the matter. We continued on to LaGuardia as normal with no further discussion with ATC on the matter. On the post flight debrief, the FO concurred that while he had his hands full as flying pilot due to the wake turbulence encounter that he heard 11,000 as well, and he heard me read back the clearance to cross BEUTY at 11,000. Also, he agrees that ATC did not reply with any correction at that time."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were on the Milton 4 arrival and instructed to cross MARRC at 18,000. As we were descending, we encountered what we believe was wake turbulence at approximately 19,000 and around 18,500 the autopilot went into CWS P and CWS R. At this point I was hand flying the airplane and the Captain was in the process of turning the flight directors off then on and restoring LNAV/VNAV, when ATC gave us a crossing restriction at BILEY. I thought I heard the controller say cross BILEY at 11,000. The Captain read back cross BILEY at 11,000, then he set 11,000 in the mode control panel. With LNAV/VNAV and the Autopilot on, we continued our descent. We leveled at 11,000 and ATC asked what our assigned altitude was, the Captain responded 11,000, that we had been told to cross BILEY at 11,000. ATC had us turn left then back to the right. I mentioned to the Captain, I wonder why he asked our assigned altitude, with BILEY being charted as expect to cross at 13,000, I wanted to know if we got the 11,000 altitude wrong. He queried ATC and the Controller said he was expecting us to cross BILEY at 13,000, he didn't know why the previous Controller would have instructed us to cross BILEY at 11,000. We landed in LGA and taxied to the gate. With the turbulence or wake turbulence, the automation going into CWS P and CWS R we had a lot going on. I thought I heard the crossing restriction being 11,000 and that's what the Captain heard as well. It's possible that we misheard the instruction and we should have confirmed the altitude with ATC."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDescending into LGA on the Milton 4 arrival. We were given a clearance to cross MARRC intersection at FL180. I read that back and we started down on path to cross MARRC at FL180. As we got close to MARRC, we encountered very strong wake turbulence. The aircraft encountered moderate turbulence and an uncommanded rolling moment. The Autopilot disconnected and we lost guidance both vertically and laterally. We got that straightened out fairly quickly. In the midst of dealing with that, we were cleared to cross BEUTY at 11,000 ft. I read back BEUTY at 11,000 ft. as normal, and as normal there is no reply to that from ATC. I noticed at the time that the chart showed to \"expect\" BEUTY at 13,000, but I didn't think much of that because many times we get altitudes other than the charted \"expect\" altitudes. We descended normally to cross BEUTY at 11,000 ft. and we got a frequency change. We checked in at 11,000 ft. and got no answer as the frequency was very congested. I waited a while and tried again. The controller asked what altitude we are at, which immediately sets off alarm bells in my head and the First Officer (FO) as well. I replied that we are at 11,000 ft. and there was no reply. I waited a moment as the controller dealt with other aircraft and I asked him why he asked us. He responded that we were assigned 13,000 by the last controller. I replied that we heard 11,000, and at that time I had read back 11,000. He had nothing else to say to us on the matter. We continued on to LaGuardia as normal with no further discussion with ATC on the matter. On the post flight debrief, the FO concurred that while he had his hands full as flying pilot due to the wake turbulence encounter that he heard 11,000 as well, and he heard me read back the clearance to cross BEUTY at 11,000. Also, he agrees that ATC did not reply with any correction at that time.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were on the Milton 4 arrival and instructed to cross MARRC at 18,000. As we were descending, we encountered what we believe was wake turbulence at approximately 19,000 and around 18,500 the autopilot went into CWS P and CWS R. At this point I was hand flying the airplane and the Captain was in the process of turning the flight directors off then on and restoring LNAV/VNAV, when ATC gave us a crossing restriction at BILEY. I thought I heard the controller say cross BILEY at 11,000. The Captain read back cross BILEY at 11,000, then he set 11,000 in the mode control panel. With LNAV/VNAV and the Autopilot on, we continued our descent. We leveled at 11,000 and ATC asked what our assigned altitude was, the Captain responded 11,000, that we had been told to cross BILEY at 11,000. ATC had us turn left then back to the right. I mentioned to the Captain, I wonder why he asked our assigned altitude, with BILEY being charted as expect to cross at 13,000, I wanted to know if we got the 11,000 altitude wrong. He queried ATC and the Controller said he was expecting us to cross BILEY at 13,000, he didn't know why the previous Controller would have instructed us to cross BILEY at 11,000. We landed in LGA and taxied to the gate. With the turbulence or wake turbulence, the automation going into CWS P and CWS R we had a lot going on. I thought I heard the crossing restriction being 11,000 and that's what the Captain heard as well. It's possible that we misheard the instruction and we should have confirmed the altitude with ATC.",
    "synopsis": "B737NG flight crew reported descending below cleared altitude on arrival into LGA following a miscommunication with ATC. A wake turbulence encounter earlier in the descent was cited as contributing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=151",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 151,
      "pageEnd": 153,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=151",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 151,
        "pageEnd": 153,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1934572 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "B737NG flight crew reported descending below cleared altitude on arrival into LGA following a miscommunication with ATC. A wake turbulence encounter earlier in the descent was cited as contributing.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1933983",
    "date": "2022-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng",
      "Single Engine Turboprop Undifferentiated"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We were cleared to Taxi [Taxiway] T lane, [Taxiway] E3 to [Runway] 31C, cross 31R. While crossing [Runway] 31R, we noticed an aircraft we thought was landing [Runway] 31C seemingly headed for us. We crossed the runway and simultaneously switched to Tower frequency to hear the Tower Controller telling the aircraft, an Aircraft Y, that he had been cleared to land [Runway] 31L and I believe he said, Cleared to land 31R. The aircraft landed 31R. We were on Taxiway E3, number 3 in line for take-off and not clear of the Runway 31R hold-short line. ATC should have sent the aircraft around."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We where cleared to taxi [Runway] 31C, cross [Runway] 31R, [Taxiway] E3 lane, and hold short 31C. Cleared final for 31R before crossing hold short line for 31R and noticed an aircraft on what looked to be on final for 31C. As we taxied to hold short 31C on E3 lane, the aircraft flew over us and landed 31R. We where number 3 in line for departure on the E3 lane when Tower cleared the Aircraft Y to land 31R. We departed for ZZZ with no further issues. ATC should have sent the aircraft around and the Pilot should not have over flown us to land 31R. Runway 31R should be decommissioned and used for a taxiway only."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe were cleared to Taxi [Taxiway] T lane, [Taxiway] E3 to [Runway] 31C, cross 31R. While crossing [Runway] 31R, we noticed an aircraft we thought was landing [Runway] 31C seemingly headed for us. We crossed the runway and simultaneously switched to Tower frequency to hear the Tower Controller telling the aircraft, an Aircraft Y, that he had been cleared to land [Runway] 31L and I believe he said, Cleared to land 31R. The aircraft landed 31R. We were on Taxiway E3, number 3 in line for take-off and not clear of the Runway 31R hold-short line. ATC should have sent the aircraft around.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe where cleared to taxi [Runway] 31C, cross [Runway] 31R, [Taxiway] E3 lane, and hold short 31C. Cleared final for 31R before crossing hold short line for 31R and noticed an aircraft on what looked to be on final for 31C. As we taxied to hold short 31C on E3 lane, the aircraft flew over us and landed 31R. We where number 3 in line for departure on the E3 lane when Tower cleared the Aircraft Y to land 31R. We departed for ZZZ with no further issues. ATC should have sent the aircraft around and the Pilot should not have over flown us to land 31R. Runway 31R should be decommissioned and used for a taxiway only.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported when cleared across runway, an aircraft overflew them landing on the wrong runway assigned, resulted in a runway incursion.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=154",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 154,
      "pageEnd": 155,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=154",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 154,
        "pageEnd": 155,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "Landing aircraft passes over a runway-crossing crew",
    "summary": "A crew cleared to cross Runway 31R reported seeing an approaching aircraft land on that runway while its own aircraft was still near the hold line. The accounts describe confusion about the approaching aircraft's assigned runway and say it passed over the taxiing aircraft.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Runway safety",
      "Communication",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1930863",
    "date": "2022-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "ZZZ Center left us high at about 17,000 feet 30 miles from the airport. I queried Center requesting a descent and was immediately given a descent to 8,000 feet and shortly thereafter a descent at pilot's discussion down to 3,000 feet. We were on an assigned heading on a downwind leg setting up for the ILS Runway XX. Abeam the final approach fix we began to wonder when we would get a base turn. As we got closer to abeam the initial approach fix, I queried Center. Center did not respond. I reached out to them twice more on XXX.Y before changing frequencies to the published approach frequency of XYX.Y. I contacted approach three times without a response then recognized that we were below the MSA. We initiated a climb to 3,600 feet for the MSA and I called Atlanta Center on guard three times again without a response. After I entered the lost communication squawk code, we were almost immediately contacted by another aircraft relaying a message. ZZZ Center asked us to contact them on XXX.Y. We responded that we have been contacting them on this frequency and we are not hearing a response. Shortly after, we heard a very broken transmission telling us to contact ZZZ Center on XZZ.ZZ. After contacting Center on this new frequency, the Controller apologized for not giving us a frequency change and said that they normally lose communication around 3,000 feet on XXX.Y. We had not been given a frequency change prior and because the tower was not open we were not able to contact them."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "ATC left us at 17,000 MSL 30 miles from airport (north east). We had not heard from ATC so we requested lower. We got 8,000. After that we were still high so requested another descent so ATC gave us 3,000 on a heading (downwind) for Runway XX in ZZZ. We leveled at 3,000 MSL abeam the airport on the downwind and continued flying that heading with an anticipation for a 90 deg turn right for vectors for the ILS XX, 2-5 miles past the IAF we queried ATC and received no response, we tried multiple times on the freq and on Guard Frequency but never got a response. We decided to climb to 3,600 MSL (the MSA) and proceed to the IAF for the procedure turn and ILS XX and squawk lost communications. Within a minute of this, ZZZ called us on Guard Frequency and we reestablished communications and landed without further issue. Cause - Dropped below ATC radio coverage according to ATC. Suggestion - Monitor MSA, and lost communications procedures late at night."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nZZZ Center left us high at about 17,000 feet 30 miles from the airport. I queried Center requesting a descent and was immediately given a descent to 8,000 feet and shortly thereafter a descent at pilot's discussion down to 3,000 feet. We were on an assigned heading on a downwind leg setting up for the ILS Runway XX. Abeam the final approach fix we began to wonder when we would get a base turn. As we got closer to abeam the initial approach fix, I queried Center. Center did not respond. I reached out to them twice more on XXX.Y before changing frequencies to the published approach frequency of XYX.Y. I contacted approach three times without a response then recognized that we were below the MSA. We initiated a climb to 3,600 feet for the MSA and I called Atlanta Center on guard three times again without a response. After I entered the lost communication squawk code, we were almost immediately contacted by another aircraft relaying a message. ZZZ Center asked us to contact them on XXX.Y. We responded that we have been contacting them on this frequency and we are not hearing a response. Shortly after, we heard a very broken transmission telling us to contact ZZZ Center on XZZ.ZZ. After contacting Center on this new frequency, the Controller apologized for not giving us a frequency change and said that they normally lose communication around 3,000 feet on XXX.Y. We had not been given a frequency change prior and because the tower was not open we were not able to contact them.\n\nNarrative 2\nATC left us at 17,000 MSL 30 miles from airport (north east). We had not heard from ATC so we requested lower. We got 8,000. After that we were still high so requested another descent so ATC gave us 3,000 on a heading (downwind) for Runway XX in ZZZ. We leveled at 3,000 MSL abeam the airport on the downwind and continued flying that heading with an anticipation for a 90 deg turn right for vectors for the ILS XX, 2-5 miles past the IAF we queried ATC and received no response, we tried multiple times on the freq and on Guard Frequency but never got a response. We decided to climb to 3,600 MSL (the MSA) and proceed to the IAF for the procedure turn and ILS XX and squawk lost communications. Within a minute of this, ZZZ called us on Guard Frequency and we reestablished communications and landed without further issue. Cause - Dropped below ATC radio coverage according to ATC. Suggestion - Monitor MSA, and lost communications procedures late at night.",
    "synopsis": "CRJ-900 flight crew reported they were not given a frequency change and were unable to reach ATC as they approached the airport. While attempting to establish communications the flight crew inadvertently descended below the minimum altitude for the area. Flight crew corrected altitude and established communication with ATC.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=156",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 156,
      "pageEnd": 158,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=156",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 156,
        "pageEnd": 158,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1930863 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "CRJ-900 flight crew reported they were not given a frequency change and were unable to reach ATC as they approached the airport. While attempting to establish communications the flight crew inadvertently descended below the minimum altitude for the area. Flight crew corrected altitude and established communication with ATC.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1928467",
    "date": "2022-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On approach to BUR, we were cleared for the ILS to Runway 8. We were in the middle of configuring for landing when about the time we were passing VNY airport, ATC (Approach) gave us a traffic advisory for an aircraft on our right that would be passing below and behind us. I looked down to see a converging symbol about 500 feet below us and instinctively turned off the autopilot anticipating a TCAS. Immediately following we received a \"monitor vertical speed\" then a \"Climb\" call and symbology. I hand flew the maneuver as required and noticed that the plane symbol appeared right below us at 400 feet. I want to say we were at flaps 15 and decelerating below 170 kts at the time though it all happened very quickly. We notified Approach we were responding to a TCAS RA. Soon after we received a \"clear of conflict\" message. Approach asked if we wanted to continue, and we said “Yes”. I finished configuring and we were able to get back on the glideslope and hit the 1,000 foot mark fully stabilized. The landing was uneventful. Personally, this was too close for me. I understand this is a busy place but we had a Controller, another Pilot who should have seen us, and clearance for an ILS approach. The only thing that saved us from hitting that aircraft was the TCAS. We were down to one slice of swiss cheese preventing us from what could have been a major accident. Please talk to ATC and see if there's a learning point for them in this. We did everything by the book and we almost got killed. Thank the Lord for TCAS and for our airline that has worked so hard on this training for so long. It paid off in spades today and I am thankful for all of you in Safety."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We were on the ILS Z for Runway 8 at BUR. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). We were inside of the FAF with flaps 15 and landing gear down. At around 1,800 feet - 2,000 feet MSL, ATC issued a Traffic Advisory (TA). The traffic was at our 1 o'clock position at one mile and 700 feet below us. I was looking but could not spot them as it was a little hazy. The visibility was at 7 SM. Soon after we received a TCAS \"Monitor Vertical Speed\" advisory followed shortly by a \"Climb\" RA. The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF). He had disengaged the autopilot, autothrottles and pitched up to satisfy the RA command. Once we were clear of the conflict we continued our descent to the runway and were stable at 1,000 feet AGL. We landed without any further incident. Pointing out traffic sooner during the approaches into BUR and paying extra attention to VFR traffic in that area."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn approach to BUR, we were cleared for the ILS to Runway 8. We were in the middle of configuring for landing when about the time we were passing VNY airport, ATC (Approach) gave us a traffic advisory for an aircraft on our right that would be passing below and behind us. I looked down to see a converging symbol about 500 feet below us and instinctively turned off the autopilot anticipating a TCAS. Immediately following we received a \"monitor vertical speed\" then a \"Climb\" call and symbology. I hand flew the maneuver as required and noticed that the plane symbol appeared right below us at 400 feet. I want to say we were at flaps 15 and decelerating below 170 kts at the time though it all happened very quickly. We notified Approach we were responding to a TCAS RA. Soon after we received a \"clear of conflict\" message. Approach asked if we wanted to continue, and we said “Yes”. I finished configuring and we were able to get back on the glideslope and hit the 1,000 foot mark fully stabilized. The landing was uneventful. Personally, this was too close for me. I understand this is a busy place but we had a Controller, another Pilot who should have seen us, and clearance for an ILS approach. The only thing that saved us from hitting that aircraft was the TCAS. We were down to one slice of swiss cheese preventing us from what could have been a major accident. Please talk to ATC and see if there's a learning point for them in this. We did everything by the book and we almost got killed. Thank the Lord for TCAS and for our airline that has worked so hard on this training for so long. It paid off in spades today and I am thankful for all of you in Safety.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe were on the ILS Z for Runway 8 at BUR. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). We were inside of the FAF with flaps 15 and landing gear down. At around 1,800 feet - 2,000 feet MSL, ATC issued a Traffic Advisory (TA). The traffic was at our 1 o'clock position at one mile and 700 feet below us. I was looking but could not spot them as it was a little hazy. The visibility was at 7 SM. Soon after we received a TCAS \"Monitor Vertical Speed\" advisory followed shortly by a \"Climb\" RA. The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF). He had disengaged the autopilot, autothrottles and pitched up to satisfy the RA command. Once we were clear of the conflict we continued our descent to the runway and were stable at 1,000 feet AGL. We landed without any further incident. Pointing out traffic sooner during the approaches into BUR and paying extra attention to VFR traffic in that area.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier Pilot crew reported a NMAC while on the ILS Z Rwy 8 to BUR. The pilot crew follow the RA maneuver and after the all clear, reestablished the ILS and landed.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=159",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 159,
      "pageEnd": 161,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=159",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 159,
        "pageEnd": 161,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1928467 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air Carrier Pilot crew reported a NMAC while on the ILS Z Rwy 8 to BUR. The pilot crew follow the RA maneuver and after the all clear, reestablished the ILS and landed.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1927304",
    "date": "2022-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR",
      "Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "When we reported \"ready to taxi\" at spot X, Ground Control cleared us \"Taxiway 1, Taxiway 2 to Runway XX cross Runway XY\". As we approached XY we cleared both ways and turned on the lights. At that same time Ground Control called us with instructions to follow behind a Learjet on Taxiway 3, other side of the Runway, to XXC. When we were well past the hold line and actually entering the Runway I looked left again and saw an aircraft on final for Runway XY. I added power to expedite our crossing and the aircraft on final executed a missed approach. Skies were overcast and Instrument approaches were in use. Runway XY was not listed as an active Runway on the ATIS. I believe there was miscommunication between the Ground Controller and the Tower Controller who may have been accommodating requests for that Runway to avoid thunderstorm activity in the area. Had I not been looking across the Runway for the traffic we were instructed to follow, I likely would have been looking left the whole time and may have picked up the traffic on approach sooner. Otherwise, better communication between Tower and Ground Control may need to be established when unusual Runway operations are being used."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We received our taxi clearance at spot X on the ramp at ZZZ. Our clearance was Taxiway 1, Taxiway 2 to Runway XXC, cross Runway XY. We read back taxi instructions and proceeded on our route. As we neared Runway XY and prepared to cross and checked for traffic, Ground control notified us of a Learjet on Taxiway 3 near Taxiway 4. They instructed us to follow the Learjet as they passed us from left to right to Runway XXC. After confirming those instructions we were past the hold short line for Runway XY. When the Captain checked final again he noticed an aircraft on final to land XY. At that point we were already inside the hold short line and the Captain added thrust to expedite our taxi across the Runway. By that time the plane final had initiated a go around. We finished our taxi to Runway XXC with no further incidents. Nothing was said to us by Ground or Tower about the aircraft that went around. The current ATIS at that time advertised Runway XXC for departure and approach but no mention of using Runway XY. There were thunderstorms all around the airport at the time of our departure. My best guess is that the inbound aircraft landing on XY, requested Runway XY for weather avoidance. It seems there could have been better coordination between Ground and Tower as to what Runways were being used. The timing of Ground telling us to follow an aircraft across the Runway from which we were to cross took our full attention away from more thoroughly scanning for traffic as we approached and crossed a Runway. The ATIS didn't mention Runway XY being open closed or in use. That information could have been another level of safety and added awareness."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhen we reported \"ready to taxi\" at spot X, Ground Control cleared us \"Taxiway 1, Taxiway 2 to Runway XX cross Runway XY\". As we approached XY we cleared both ways and turned on the lights. At that same time Ground Control called us with instructions to follow behind a Learjet on Taxiway 3, other side of the Runway, to XXC. When we were well past the hold line and actually entering the Runway I looked left again and saw an aircraft on final for Runway XY. I added power to expedite our crossing and the aircraft on final executed a missed approach. Skies were overcast and Instrument approaches were in use. Runway XY was not listed as an active Runway on the ATIS. I believe there was miscommunication between the Ground Controller and the Tower Controller who may have been accommodating requests for that Runway to avoid thunderstorm activity in the area. Had I not been looking across the Runway for the traffic we were instructed to follow, I likely would have been looking left the whole time and may have picked up the traffic on approach sooner. Otherwise, better communication between Tower and Ground Control may need to be established when unusual Runway operations are being used.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe received our taxi clearance at spot X on the ramp at ZZZ. Our clearance was Taxiway 1, Taxiway 2 to Runway XXC, cross Runway XY. We read back taxi instructions and proceeded on our route. As we neared Runway XY and prepared to cross and checked for traffic, Ground control notified us of a Learjet on Taxiway 3 near Taxiway 4. They instructed us to follow the Learjet as they passed us from left to right to Runway XXC. After confirming those instructions we were past the hold short line for Runway XY. When the Captain checked final again he noticed an aircraft on final to land XY. At that point we were already inside the hold short line and the Captain added thrust to expedite our taxi across the Runway. By that time the plane final had initiated a go around. We finished our taxi to Runway XXC with no further incidents. Nothing was said to us by Ground or Tower about the aircraft that went around. The current ATIS at that time advertised Runway XXC for departure and approach but no mention of using Runway XY. There were thunderstorms all around the airport at the time of our departure. My best guess is that the inbound aircraft landing on XY, requested Runway XY for weather avoidance. It seems there could have been better coordination between Ground and Tower as to what Runways were being used. The timing of Ground telling us to follow an aircraft across the Runway from which we were to cross took our full attention away from more thoroughly scanning for traffic as we approached and crossed a Runway. The ATIS didn't mention Runway XY being open closed or in use. That information could have been another level of safety and added awareness.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier flight crew reported they entered a Runway ATC cleared them to taxi across when they noticed another aircraft on short final executing a go-around maneuver.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=162",
      "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
      "pageStart": 162,
      "pageEnd": 164,
      "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/plt_ctlr.pdf#page=162",
        "reportSet": "Pilot / Controller Communications",
        "pageStart": 162,
        "pageEnd": 164,
        "fileName": "plt_ctlr.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "8a8cafd0c2ae2ffa7823fed195de85711c49ff819b8a367f2a4b2b1315c06efd",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Pilot / Controller Communications"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1927304 · Pilot / Controller Communications",
    "summary": "Air Carrier flight crew reported they entered a Runway ATC cleared them to taxi across when they noticed another aircraft on short final executing a go-around maneuver.",
    "themes": [
      "Communication"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2103107",
    "date": "2024-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Overweight landing after a Spoiler Fault on takeoff and [requested priority handling] to come back in and land. I was aware of the overweight landing no more than 1000 lbs but did not see the rate of descent on the VSI as we touched down. Cause: I was in an emergency situation with flight control malfunction. My First Officer was doing a good job flying the aircraft but required 2 hands to maintain control so I brought the throttles to idle and helped maintain centerline upon touchdown. I did brief that for an overweight landing we do need a lesser rate of descent but upon touchdown I was looking outside to bring the aircraft to a stop. Suggestions: The Spoiler Fault checklist should emphasize in a note the loss of lift on flare and to reference an overweight landing checklist if needed."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Overweight landing after spoiler fault on takeoff. I was pilot flying during the event. Cause: During our event I was having to maintain an excessive amount of aileron input on the flight controls to keep the aircraft in a wings level attitude. During the descent before touchdown the Captain and I were heavily engaged in ensuring I was keeping the plane in a stable position to land. I was focused mainly on keeping the aircraft wings level and not on our vertical descent. Suggestions: Spoiler Fault checklist should reference a potential loss of lift due to spoilers being deployed and have a reference to the overweight landing."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOverweight landing after a Spoiler Fault on takeoff and [requested priority handling] to come back in and land. I was aware of the overweight landing no more than 1000 lbs but did not see the rate of descent on the VSI as we touched down. Cause: I was in an emergency situation with flight control malfunction. My First Officer was doing a good job flying the aircraft but required 2 hands to maintain control so I brought the throttles to idle and helped maintain centerline upon touchdown. I did brief that for an overweight landing we do need a lesser rate of descent but upon touchdown I was looking outside to bring the aircraft to a stop. Suggestions: The Spoiler Fault checklist should emphasize in a note the loss of lift on flare and to reference an overweight landing checklist if needed.\n\nNarrative 2\nOverweight landing after spoiler fault on takeoff. I was pilot flying during the event. Cause: During our event I was having to maintain an excessive amount of aileron input on the flight controls to keep the aircraft in a wings level attitude. During the descent before touchdown the Captain and I were heavily engaged in ensuring I was keeping the plane in a stable position to land. I was focused mainly on keeping the aircraft wings level and not on our vertical descent. Suggestions: Spoiler Fault checklist should reference a potential loss of lift due to spoilers being deployed and have a reference to the overweight landing.",
    "synopsis": "ERJ-175 flight crew reported a spoiler flight control malfunction during takeoff. The crew returned to the departure airport and landed overweight safely.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=16",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 16,
      "pageEnd": 17,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=16",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 16,
        "pageEnd": 17,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2103107 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "ERJ-175 flight crew reported a spoiler flight control malfunction during takeoff. The crew returned to the departure airport and landed overweight safely.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2102021",
    "date": "2024-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb",
      "Descent",
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "As part of instrument rating and commercial certificate preparation and learning, I conducted a local solo flight, using a flight school owned aircraft, with the intention to practice commercial maneuvers and practice holds at and or near ZZZZZ waypoint. The flight was from and to ZZZ airport. I have chosen this waypoint due to a prominent visual landmark (a pump station), and a mayor highway that could be used for emergency landing, plus a nearby dirt/grass private runway, ZZZ1 Airport. I have also chosen to conduct these maneuvers at altitudes between 6,000 to 10,000 feet MSL with the intention to create plenty of separation between my aircraft and heavy training traffic commonly found around the area at lower altitudes, and present during this flight. My experience with this aircraft (Cessna Skyhawk C-172 S, 6 pack) at the time was limited, having significantly more time and knowledge on Piper PA 28-121 (Piper Pilot 100i with Garmin G3X. I started the flight by first being dispatched by school personnel. I had shown my required documents, answered questions regarding IMSAFE checklist, plan for the flight, weather briefing, legality of my navigation charts and documents, weight and balance and performance calculations. The only thing not asked during the process and important to the event was the planned altitudes which I already had decided on, and would have disclosed upon being asked. After taking off from ZZZ airport I initiated a climb up to 2,600 MSL due to the presence of clouds, staying under said clouds as required under VFR rules, until was able to resume a climb up to 9,000 msl, reaching altitude roughly around the area planned to conduct the maneuvers. As indicated on the aircraft climb and cruise checklists, I had configured the aircraft and have adjusted the air/fuel mixture upon leveling off under the cloud ceiling. Once clear of clouds, I resumed the climb in the direction to ZZZZZ, still leaned. Once reached desired altitude, I performed a dual VOR check using ZZZ VOR, then proceeded to hold at ZZZZZ, announcing intentions overa frequency, a frequency commonly used in the area for air to air communications and advisories, dominantly at this particular location, and a common frequency used between flight school aircraft. The weather throughout the flight was as brief and expected, being clear sky around my planned maneuvering area for more than enough distance. Expected winds and temperatures, not particularly turbulent or uncomfortable conditions. Once done holding for around 4-6 laps, I set the air-fuel mixture to full rich in preparation for the rest of the maneuvers. The reason for this is that up to this point, I have been instructed by all my CFI's to set the mixture to full rich before performing these type of maneuvers. Unfortunately, I was not fully aware that the POH indicates to lean the mixture for all operations over 3,000 MSL. I had the knowledge that the engine at such altitudes performs better with a leaner mixture, but wrongfully opted to follow what I have been told multiple times to do by my instructors. The instructions to set the mixture to full rich has always been given when at lower altitudes (1,000-5,000 MSL) but was never told it should only apply to low altitudes, as they have clearly never expected a student to choose higher altitudes to perform these maneuvers. I began practicing numerous maneuvers including parabolic climbs and descents, steep turns, chandelles, lazy eights, power on/off stalls, and others, occasionally announcing my movements over the frequency and looking for traffic by sight, as I did not had ADS-B in information available on the plane or on my EFB. Can't precisely recall the order, however, somewhere in between maneuvers I began a slow flight, testing the reaction of the controls at slow speed and high angle of attack, and eventually slowly entering into a power off stall maneuver as means to identify the aircraft stall indicated speed and following reactions to the stall condition. At roughly 8,400 MSL, as I was already near stall horn airspeed during slow flight, it only took a minor throttle movement to reach full idle, and was necessary to slowly add pitch up input to reach fluttering, then more pitch to reach a full stall condition. It took a fair amount of time between reducing speed to slow flight and the beginning of the stall, potentially giving the engine enough time to cool down excessively. In almost perfect synchrony, as the plane started to nose down during stall condition, the engine had a sudden drop of RPM and the propeller seemed to have come to a complete stop. Engine sound had mostly if not fully gone silent. I naturally and almost intuitively pitched down some to recover from the stall, stopping at a slight pitch down attitude. After a second or 2 just processing in my mind what just happened, I quickly assumed the engine stopped due to being too cold or for lacking air. I did not check the engine indications, instead, I quickly reacted by applying half throttle and at the same time, entering a descent maneuver to the left, in hope to get the propeller windmilling and restart the engine without using electricity. Given the altitude and proximity of suitable landing sites, this altitude tradeoff seemed plausible. Once reached fair amount of indicated airspeed in a matter of 3-5 seconds (likely aiming just below the start of yellow line on the speed indicator), I did not notice enough or no rotation at all from the prop. I turned the ignition key briefly (less than a second) to force the prop to rotate, and did start rotating, however, there was no clear immediate indication of the engine actually restarting (lack of loud engine sound, prop not rotating as fast as it would with the engine on). Now the prop turning at a slow speed and engine generating some sound, I adjusted the air/fuel mixture roughly to 50%, did not notice any immediate improvement, and quickly after, turned the ignition briefly once more, this time noticeably restarting the engine, prompting me to quickly adjust the throttle and mixture to a state where the engine ran comfortably, before setting full throttle and recover from the descent maneuver, returning in a timely manner to a higher altitude. The aircraft never came close to reach never exceed speed, or critical structural loads. The time between presumed engine off and engine restart felt as a duration of around 10 seconds in duration. I don't believe the altitude intentionally lost during the whole recovery process was greater than 1,000 feet. Once back in straight and level flight, I began assessing the situation, monitored engine and electrical indications, checked fuel indications and settings, finding no anomalies, no indications of malfunction, no improper configurations. Convinced that the engine had shut off due to air starvation / improper air/fuel mixture setting, I continued to fly the plane, using various levels of throttle, listening, monitoring the engine performance and other indications, not finding any indications of an unsafe condition of the aircraft, and believing the aircraft to be in safe working condition. I continued performing a few other maneuvers, this time properly leaned to the altitude and the engine running noticeable better. I returned to ZZZ airport as planned and uneventfully. I did not advise ATC or distress using radio or transponder, or requested any assistance throughout the flight, as I did not felt was necessary at the moment given the initial altitude and the following normal operating indications. I was aware of the landing alternatives near my location at all times during and after the event, but never made the decision to use them. I was sufficiently rested, sober from all substances, in a good emotional and health state, with no particular pressures or obvious factors that could have negatively contributed to the event. I believe the incident is a direct result of lack of knowledge on proper use of air/fuel mixture for high altitude operations, combined with unclear/partial information and direction from flight school instructors in regard to using full mixture for maneuvers. Instructors have in numerous times it is the recommended procedure as per flight school policy. It's important to note that I have never been given a document stating this information, but have only been told personally during flight instruction. Haven't closely studied the POH in its entirety, and the information regarding recommended leaning over 3,000 MSL, I was not aware of the proper setting as per manufacturer, and relied instead on wrong information for this particular scenario. School personal had assumed students would not use high altitudes for these maneuvers, and I was never asked during the dispatch process of the aircraft about my planned altitude for my maneuvers. Once back at the school, I returned the aircraft documents and keys, had the times logged, and communicated about the engine \"quitting on me\" during the flight. After brief questioning, the person also came to the conclusion that the engine was turned off by accident and was not due to malfunction. Unknown to me if the person reported the situation. Later that night, not knowing if the event was reported, I messaged the person in charge of my schedule and class, this time having the expected response to initiate a reporting process. Unknown if the aircraft was inspected before the next flight the following day. The school immediate halted solo flights from being scheduled to me, and I am still under that condition for at least the remaining of the commercial portion of the program. The reason given for this is not particularly the involuntary engine air starvation, but the decision making leading into, and after the event. I have acknowledged these mistakes and believe to have learned from the experience. Since then I have informed myself further on the aircraft configurations and systems, understood the importance of reacting with precaution, expecting a worst situation than the perceived. The school has not specifically given any additional instruction specifically addressing the concerns from this event, nor have provided opportunities to practice and develop further my decision making and procedures. The limitation on only flying with instructors has only created scenarios where I am in great part limited to follow instructions. I currently feel lacking proficiency on solo and cross country skills given the lack of opportunity execute and make decision on these. My flights has been reduced to simulated instrument and occasional closely monitored and controlled local flying. During this time where I have exclusively flown with instructors, I have witnessed unsafe practices such as flying inside clouds under VFR rules with me using a view limiting device and unable to properly identify the situation, an instructor pulling the AHRS circuit breaker (in flight, on an instrument approach) against school policy to simulate partial panel scenarios, an instructor falling asleep during cruise, an instructor mistaking left pattern/right pattern, going against of what was instructed by Tower ATC, several instructors teaching to use the GPS and a single VOR to performs VOR checks (using GPS in obs mode simulating dual vor, or using GPS waypoints instead of ground references). These situations feel unsafe and are creating a growing concern over safety."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAs part of instrument rating and commercial certificate preparation and learning, I conducted a local solo flight, using a flight school owned aircraft, with the intention to practice commercial maneuvers and practice holds at and or near ZZZZZ waypoint. The flight was from and to ZZZ airport. I have chosen this waypoint due to a prominent visual landmark (a pump station), and a mayor highway that could be used for emergency landing, plus a nearby dirt/grass private runway, ZZZ1 Airport. I have also chosen to conduct these maneuvers at altitudes between 6,000 to 10,000 feet MSL with the intention to create plenty of separation between my aircraft and heavy training traffic commonly found around the area at lower altitudes, and present during this flight. My experience with this aircraft (Cessna Skyhawk C-172 S, 6 pack) at the time was limited, having significantly more time and knowledge on Piper PA 28-121 (Piper Pilot 100i with Garmin G3X. I started the flight by first being dispatched by school personnel. I had shown my required documents, answered questions regarding IMSAFE checklist, plan for the flight, weather briefing, legality of my navigation charts and documents, weight and balance and performance calculations. The only thing not asked during the process and important to the event was the planned altitudes which I already had decided on, and would have disclosed upon being asked. After taking off from ZZZ airport I initiated a climb up to 2,600 MSL due to the presence of clouds, staying under said clouds as required under VFR rules, until was able to resume a climb up to 9,000 msl, reaching altitude roughly around the area planned to conduct the maneuvers. As indicated on the aircraft climb and cruise checklists, I had configured the aircraft and have adjusted the air/fuel mixture upon leveling off under the cloud ceiling. Once clear of clouds, I resumed the climb in the direction to ZZZZZ, still leaned. Once reached desired altitude, I performed a dual VOR check using ZZZ VOR, then proceeded to hold at ZZZZZ, announcing intentions overa frequency, a frequency commonly used in the area for air to air communications and advisories, dominantly at this particular location, and a common frequency used between flight school aircraft. The weather throughout the flight was as brief and expected, being clear sky around my planned maneuvering area for more than enough distance. Expected winds and temperatures, not particularly turbulent or uncomfortable conditions. Once done holding for around 4-6 laps, I set the air-fuel mixture to full rich in preparation for the rest of the maneuvers. The reason for this is that up to this point, I have been instructed by all my CFI's to set the mixture to full rich before performing these type of maneuvers. Unfortunately, I was not fully aware that the POH indicates to lean the mixture for all operations over 3,000 MSL. I had the knowledge that the engine at such altitudes performs better with a leaner mixture, but wrongfully opted to follow what I have been told multiple times to do by my instructors. The instructions to set the mixture to full rich has always been given when at lower altitudes (1,000-5,000 MSL) but was never told it should only apply to low altitudes, as they have clearly never expected a student to choose higher altitudes to perform these maneuvers. I began practicing numerous maneuvers including parabolic climbs and descents, steep turns, chandelles, lazy eights, power on/off stalls, and others, occasionally announcing my movements over the frequency and looking for traffic by sight, as I did not had ADS-B in information available on the plane or on my EFB. Can't precisely recall the order, however, somewhere in between maneuvers I began a slow flight, testing the reaction of the controls at slow speed and high angle of attack, and eventually slowly entering into a power off stall maneuver as means to identify the aircraft stall indicated speed and following reactions to the stall condition. At roughly 8,400 MSL, as I was already near stall horn airspeed during slow flight, it only took a minor throttle movement to reach full idle, and was necessary to slowly add pitch up input to reach fluttering, then more pitch to reach a full stall condition. It took a fair amount of time between reducing speed to slow flight and the beginning of the stall, potentially giving the engine enough time to cool down excessively. In almost perfect synchrony, as the plane started to nose down during stall condition, the engine had a sudden drop of RPM and the propeller seemed to have come to a complete stop. Engine sound had mostly if not fully gone silent. I naturally and almost intuitively pitched down some to recover from the stall, stopping at a slight pitch down attitude. After a second or 2 just processing in my mind what just happened, I quickly assumed the engine stopped due to being too cold or for lacking air. I did not check the engine indications, instead, I quickly reacted by applying half throttle and at the same time, entering a descent maneuver to the left, in hope to get the propeller windmilling and restart the engine without using electricity. Given the altitude and proximity of suitable landing sites, this altitude tradeoff seemed plausible. Once reached fair amount of indicated airspeed in a matter of 3-5 seconds (likely aiming just below the start of yellow line on the speed indicator), I did not notice enough or no rotation at all from the prop. I turned the ignition key briefly (less than a second) to force the prop to rotate, and did start rotating, however, there was no clear immediate indication of the engine actually restarting (lack of loud engine sound, prop not rotating as fast as it would with the engine on). Now the prop turning at a slow speed and engine generating some sound, I adjusted the air/fuel mixture roughly to 50%, did not notice any immediate improvement, and quickly after, turned the ignition briefly once more, this time noticeably restarting the engine, prompting me to quickly adjust the throttle and mixture to a state where the engine ran comfortably, before setting full throttle and recover from the descent maneuver, returning in a timely manner to a higher altitude. The aircraft never came close to reach never exceed speed, or critical structural loads. The time between presumed engine off and engine restart felt as a duration of around 10 seconds in duration. I don't believe the altitude intentionally lost during the whole recovery process was greater than 1,000 feet. Once back in straight and level flight, I began assessing the situation, monitored engine and electrical indications, checked fuel indications and settings, finding no anomalies, no indications of malfunction, no improper configurations. Convinced that the engine had shut off due to air starvation / improper air/fuel mixture setting, I continued to fly the plane, using various levels of throttle, listening, monitoring the engine performance and other indications, not finding any indications of an unsafe condition of the aircraft, and believing the aircraft to be in safe working condition. I continued performing a few other maneuvers, this time properly leaned to the altitude and the engine running noticeable better. I returned to ZZZ airport as planned and uneventfully. I did not advise ATC or distress using radio or transponder, or requested any assistance throughout the flight, as I did not felt was necessary at the moment given the initial altitude and the following normal operating indications. I was aware of the landing alternatives near my location at all times during and after the event, but never made the decision to use them. I was sufficiently rested, sober from all substances, in a good emotional and health state, with no particular pressures or obvious factors that could have negatively contributed to the event. I believe the incident is a direct result of lack of knowledge on proper use of air/fuel mixture for high altitude operations, combined with unclear/partial information and direction from flight school instructors in regard to using full mixture for maneuvers. Instructors have in numerous times it is the recommended procedure as per flight school policy. It's important to note that I have never been given a document stating this information, but have only been told personally during flight instruction. Haven't closely studied the POH in its entirety, and the information regarding recommended leaning over 3,000 MSL, I was not aware of the proper setting as per manufacturer, and relied instead on wrong information for this particular scenario. School personal had assumed students would not use high altitudes for these maneuvers, and I was never asked during the dispatch process of the aircraft about my planned altitude for my maneuvers. Once back at the school, I returned the aircraft documents and keys, had the times logged, and communicated about the engine \"quitting on me\" during the flight. After brief questioning, the person also came to the conclusion that the engine was turned off by accident and was not due to malfunction. Unknown to me if the person reported the situation. Later that night, not knowing if the event was reported, I messaged the person in charge of my schedule and class, this time having the expected response to initiate a reporting process. Unknown if the aircraft was inspected before the next flight the following day. The school immediate halted solo flights from being scheduled to me, and I am still under that condition for at least the remaining of the commercial portion of the program. The reason given for this is not particularly the involuntary engine air starvation, but the decision making leading into, and after the event. I have acknowledged these mistakes and believe to have learned from the experience. Since then I have informed myself further on the aircraft configurations and systems, understood the importance of reacting with precaution, expecting a worst situation than the perceived. The school has not specifically given any additional instruction specifically addressing the concerns from this event, nor have provided opportunities to practice and develop further my decision making and procedures. The limitation on only flying with instructors has only created scenarios where I am in great part limited to follow instructions. I currently feel lacking proficiency on solo and cross country skills given the lack of opportunity execute and make decision on these. My flights has been reduced to simulated instrument and occasional closely monitored and controlled local flying. During this time where I have exclusively flown with instructors, I have witnessed unsafe practices such as flying inside clouds under VFR rules with me using a view limiting device and unable to properly identify the situation, an instructor pulling the AHRS circuit breaker (in flight, on an instrument approach) against school policy to simulate partial panel scenarios, an instructor falling asleep during cruise, an instructor mistaking left pattern/right pattern, going against of what was instructed by Tower ATC, several instructors teaching to use the GPS and a single VOR to performs VOR checks (using GPS in obs mode simulating dual vor, or using GPS waypoints instead of ground references). These situations feel unsafe and are creating a growing concern over safety.",
    "synopsis": "C172 pilot conducting solo training maneuvers reported the engine quit during a maneuver due to the reporter using the wrong air/fuel mixture for their altitude and type aircraft.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=18",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 18,
      "pageEnd": 21,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=18",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 18,
        "pageEnd": 21,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2102021 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "C172 pilot conducting solo training maneuvers reported the engine quit during a maneuver due to the reporter using the wrong air/fuel mixture for their altitude and type aircraft.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2092291",
    "date": "2024-03",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Parked"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On Day 0, while operating a flight, the Captain and I noted the aileron trim did not stop when commanded while conducting the aileron trim check during the before start checklist flow. We made an logbook entry and ended up plane swapping. I followed the airplane for several days (out of curiosity because I had never encountered this maintenance item previously). The plane ended up being taken out of service for several days while they replaced the aileron quadrant springs (737-800). On Day 37, while operating a flight, the Captain and I noticed the aileron trim continued to move after releasing the aileron trim switches during the trim check. We made an logbook entry and ended up plane swapping. I mentioned the previous event to both the Captain and the mechanics - making clear to differentiate that the Day 0 event was a NG (Next Generation). The plane remained out of service for approximately 48 hrs while the aileron tap centering unit cam bearing was replaced (737-MAX 8). On Day 37, after plane swapping, we again found ourselves on another aircraft where the aileron trim did not stop when commanded while conducting the aileron trim check. We made another logbook entry. A mechanic reluctantly agreed to sign off the entry as \"normal\" after a maintenance supervisor boarded the aircraft. The supervisor stated he \"checked 4 other 737 Max aircraft and they all behave the same. Therefore, it must be normal.\" The logbook closure included a maintenance reference so the Captain and I accepted the aircraft. The rest of the flight was conducted normally (737-MAX 8). On Day 38, while conducting a flight the aileron trim behaved completely normally during the trim check - stopping when commanded and not drifting, continuing, etc (737-MAX 8). Having been on the fleet for 2 years, it has not been a normal occurrence for the aileron trim to continue to move once the switches are released during the trim check. We are taught to trust our mechanics. However, it is extremely disconcerting 3 separate, yet identical, maintenance events can result is 2 wildly different outcomes (1- aircraft taken out of service for days to replace parts or 2- told the situation is completely normal). If the situation is indeed normal, then why were the other 2 aircraft taken out of service for the same issue as the aircraft that was not removed from service? If it is normal for the aileron trim to continue to move after releasing the switches, then please update the aircraft operating manual accordingly."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "On Day 0 the aileron trim randomly coasted for .5 to 1 units after the trim switch was released during the preflight trim check. The aircraft went out service and replaced by another one, which had the exact same problem. A mechanic reluctantly signed off the issue after a maintenance supervisor walked onto the aircraft. The maintenance supervisor said he checked 4 other 737s and the aileron trim coasted on each one, therefore it was a normal event. The sign-off referenced a maintenance document, so I accepted the aircraft. The next day, I flew on another aircraft which did not have any coasting of the aileron trim. If it is normal for the aileron trim to randomly coast after the activation has stopped them place that info in the 737 operating manual."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn Day 0, while operating a flight, the Captain and I noted the aileron trim did not stop when commanded while conducting the aileron trim check during the before start checklist flow. We made an logbook entry and ended up plane swapping. I followed the airplane for several days (out of curiosity because I had never encountered this maintenance item previously). The plane ended up being taken out of service for several days while they replaced the aileron quadrant springs (737-800). On Day 37, while operating a flight, the Captain and I noticed the aileron trim continued to move after releasing the aileron trim switches during the trim check. We made an logbook entry and ended up plane swapping. I mentioned the previous event to both the Captain and the mechanics - making clear to differentiate that the Day 0 event was a NG (Next Generation). The plane remained out of service for approximately 48 hrs while the aileron tap centering unit cam bearing was replaced (737-MAX 8). On Day 37, after plane swapping, we again found ourselves on another aircraft where the aileron trim did not stop when commanded while conducting the aileron trim check. We made another logbook entry. A mechanic reluctantly agreed to sign off the entry as \"normal\" after a maintenance supervisor boarded the aircraft. The supervisor stated he \"checked 4 other 737 Max aircraft and they all behave the same. Therefore, it must be normal.\" The logbook closure included a maintenance reference so the Captain and I accepted the aircraft. The rest of the flight was conducted normally (737-MAX 8). On Day 38, while conducting a flight the aileron trim behaved completely normally during the trim check - stopping when commanded and not drifting, continuing, etc (737-MAX 8). Having been on the fleet for 2 years, it has not been a normal occurrence for the aileron trim to continue to move once the switches are released during the trim check. We are taught to trust our mechanics. However, it is extremely disconcerting 3 separate, yet identical, maintenance events can result is 2 wildly different outcomes (1- aircraft taken out of service for days to replace parts or 2- told the situation is completely normal). If the situation is indeed normal, then why were the other 2 aircraft taken out of service for the same issue as the aircraft that was not removed from service? If it is normal for the aileron trim to continue to move after releasing the switches, then please update the aircraft operating manual accordingly.\n\nNarrative 2\nOn Day 0 the aileron trim randomly coasted for .5 to 1 units after the trim switch was released during the preflight trim check. The aircraft went out service and replaced by another one, which had the exact same problem. A mechanic reluctantly signed off the issue after a maintenance supervisor walked onto the aircraft. The maintenance supervisor said he checked 4 other 737s and the aileron trim coasted on each one, therefore it was a normal event. The sign-off referenced a maintenance document, so I accepted the aircraft. The next day, I flew on another aircraft which did not have any coasting of the aileron trim. If it is normal for the aileron trim to randomly coast after the activation has stopped them place that info in the 737 operating manual.",
    "synopsis": "B737-800 flight crew reported a safety concern regarding a flight control system operation as described in the aircraft flight manual, conflicting with line maintenance troubleshooting of the system while on the ground.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=22",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 22,
      "pageEnd": 24,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=22",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 22,
        "pageEnd": 24,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2092291 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737-800 flight crew reported a safety concern regarding a flight control system operation as described in the aircraft flight manual, conflicting with line maintenance troubleshooting of the system while on the ground.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2087738",
    "date": "2024-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "Medium Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "It was my first trip into Aspen, working for company. The weather was CAVOK. I had loaded the RNAV-F. The two remaining approaches in the FMC database were the localizer to 15 and another RNAV approach, which we did not have a plate for. The PM notice the RNAV-F did not have a runway associated with it. It was decided that a RNWY EXT would be used in lieu of the localizer approach because it would provide vertical guidance using VNAV. Due to time pressure, being vector for the approach, the PM neglected to change the glide slope angle from 3° to 3.5°. Though The high on the generated VVAV path, a soft, terrain warning was followed by a hard terrain warning. In good VMC conditions, the descent rate was shallow, and the train was visually cleared. The approach was continued to a landing. The GPWS provided appropriate terrain warnings. Terrain avoidance was done visually. During the course of the flight, I inquired as to what approach we may get into Aspen. It was my understanding that company had a tailored approach to runway 15. The database only had two approaches that the crew had plates for. The database was checked to be current prior to the 1st flight of the day. The crew was late doing the approach checklist due to a late start getting landing data. The descent rate was shallowed, but not enough to prevent the train warning. The approach was continued with the terrain insight to a landing. It goes without saying, I should’ve went around."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nIt was my first trip into Aspen, working for company. The weather was CAVOK. I had loaded the RNAV-F. The two remaining approaches in the FMC database were the localizer to 15 and another RNAV approach, which we did not have a plate for. The PM notice the RNAV-F did not have a runway associated with it. It was decided that a RNWY EXT would be used in lieu of the localizer approach because it would provide vertical guidance using VNAV. Due to time pressure, being vector for the approach, the PM neglected to change the glide slope angle from 3° to 3.5°. Though The high on the generated VVAV path, a soft, terrain warning was followed by a hard terrain warning. In good VMC conditions, the descent rate was shallow, and the train was visually cleared. The approach was continued to a landing. The GPWS provided appropriate terrain warnings. Terrain avoidance was done visually. During the course of the flight, I inquired as to what approach we may get into Aspen. It was my understanding that company had a tailored approach to runway 15. The database only had two approaches that the crew had plates for. The database was checked to be current prior to the 1st flight of the day. The crew was late doing the approach checklist due to a late start getting landing data. The descent rate was shallowed, but not enough to prevent the train warning. The approach was continued with the terrain insight to a landing. It goes without saying, I should’ve went around.",
    "synopsis": "Fractional jet crew reported a terrain warning while on a visual approach in visual daylight conditions in mountainous terrain. The crew continued the approach with the shallow VNAV non-adjusted aircraft derived glidepath angle to a landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=25",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 25,
      "pageEnd": 26,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=25",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 25,
        "pageEnd": 26,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2087738 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Fractional jet crew reported a terrain warning while on a visual approach in visual daylight conditions in mountainous terrain. The crew continued the approach with the shallow VNAV non-adjusted aircraft derived glidepath angle to a landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2082212",
    "date": "2024-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After pushback, engine start, and completion of the After Start Checklist, we obtained taxi clearance from Ground to taxi to Runway 26 via B. Given the short taxi, the nighttime conditions and the moderate to heavy rain experienced during taxi, the CA (Captain) taxied at a slow speed to allow me to accomplish all my Before Takeoff tasks without being rushed. While taxiing straight on taxiway B, we performed the Flight Control checks, notified the FA’s (Flight Attendants), and performed the Before Takeoff Checklist in its entirety. After completing the checklists, I was heads up for the last portion of the taxi. While looking for the B13 entrance to the runway to hold short of Runway 26, the CA and I realized that we had taxied straight on B beyond B14 and could not maneuver the airplane in order onto Taxiway B14. The CA set the brake and I notified Ground that we has missed B14 and would need additional instructions. Ground coordinated with the Maintenance Ramp and cleared us to taxi via B, into the Maintenance Ramp and then exit onto R to join B14 and hold short of Runway 26. We then taxied into the Maintenance Ramp. One on the centerline of the Maintenance ramp, I couldn’t verify that we had the necessary clearance between our wingtip and the aircraft parked to our right, and the CA couldn’t verify our wingtip clearance on his side. We set the brake and coordinated with Ground and Maintenance, who sent marshallers to guide us and confirm we had wingtip clearance. The CA also called to notify the Duty Pilot and Dispatcher of our situation and delay. Once we had the Marshaller’s guidance and could guarantee our wingtip clearance, we continued our taxi out of the Maintenance Ramp onto R. On R we held short of B, verified we were set up, above MIN Fuel, and “in the green,” and we reran the Before Takeoff Checklist. After receiving takeoff clearance, we departed Runway 26 and the flight continued normally. We employed multiple barriers to try to catch the error including slow taxi speed, completing all procedures and checklists during a straightaway (low workload environment), and having me as the FO (First Officer) be heads up with the CA as much as possible. Still multiple threats contributed: nighttime, heavy rain at the time of taxi which obscured both of our vision even with the use of windshield wipers, and inadequate taxiway lighting. In addition, I was using the Jeppesen 10-9 airport diagram and I had difficulty figuring out if we were at B14 or B13 since ATC allowed us to use either entrance to 26 for a full-length takeoff. I think the ambiguity of the taxi clearance “Runway 26 via B” in which there are two possible B taxiways to use for a full length takeoff contributed to our confusion as well. Suggestions: Note in company pages that Runway 26 departures should be careful not to taxi on B beyond B14. Better taxiway marking or lighting and better signage to separate the direction to the runway from the entrance to the Maintenance Ramp. ATC should clarify whether a full length Runway 26 taxi clearance “via B” means B13 or B14 to improve standardization."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Runway 25R and 26 in use. Because runway is wet with slight tailwind, we requested Runway 26 for departure prior to push back for better performance. We exited the ramp normally with instruction B to Runway 26 from Point L. A band of heavy rain rolled over top of us while we were taxiing. I went as slow as possible to make sure we accomplished all tasks and procedures. I used the windshield wiper and followed the centerline. We came to B14 intersection, and I stopped. I noticed the sign to the right of intersection, and the airplane had just passed the intersection by few feet. We notified ATC. ATC amended the instruction and instructed us to turn around via Maintenance Ramp to R and hold short on B13. We entered the ramp and noticed there were many non-moving traffic. We stopped and requested assistance for ramp operation. While we were waiting for assistance, I called Duty Pilot to explain our situation and verified okay to continue. I contacted Dispatch to let him know where we were at and made sure we still met fuel requirements. A guide man and a wingman showed up to lead us onto Taxiway R. We made sure we were still legal and in compliance for takeoff, we ran the checklist again, then we were cleared for takeoff. The heavy rain dramatically reduced the visibility for taxi. At night, the taxiway end is not lighted enough and the centerline turned into lead-in line onto the ramp without any differentiation. There should be some division line or marking on the taxiway to notify us where the end of taxiway is for takeoff. In the day, you can easily distinguish. But at night with heavy rain, it is not so noticeable. ATC was great assisting us. The Jepps chart also does not emphasize the confusion in the area. Now I will draw my own division line mentally whenever I am approaching that intersection."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter pushback, engine start, and completion of the After Start Checklist, we obtained taxi clearance from Ground to taxi to Runway 26 via B. Given the short taxi, the nighttime conditions and the moderate to heavy rain experienced during taxi, the CA (Captain) taxied at a slow speed to allow me to accomplish all my Before Takeoff tasks without being rushed. While taxiing straight on taxiway B, we performed the Flight Control checks, notified the FA’s (Flight Attendants), and performed the Before Takeoff Checklist in its entirety. After completing the checklists, I was heads up for the last portion of the taxi. While looking for the B13 entrance to the runway to hold short of Runway 26, the CA and I realized that we had taxied straight on B beyond B14 and could not maneuver the airplane in order onto Taxiway B14. The CA set the brake and I notified Ground that we has missed B14 and would need additional instructions. Ground coordinated with the Maintenance Ramp and cleared us to taxi via B, into the Maintenance Ramp and then exit onto R to join B14 and hold short of Runway 26. We then taxied into the Maintenance Ramp. One on the centerline of the Maintenance ramp, I couldn’t verify that we had the necessary clearance between our wingtip and the aircraft parked to our right, and the CA couldn’t verify our wingtip clearance on his side. We set the brake and coordinated with Ground and Maintenance, who sent marshallers to guide us and confirm we had wingtip clearance. The CA also called to notify the Duty Pilot and Dispatcher of our situation and delay. Once we had the Marshaller’s guidance and could guarantee our wingtip clearance, we continued our taxi out of the Maintenance Ramp onto R. On R we held short of B, verified we were set up, above MIN Fuel, and “in the green,” and we reran the Before Takeoff Checklist. After receiving takeoff clearance, we departed Runway 26 and the flight continued normally. We employed multiple barriers to try to catch the error including slow taxi speed, completing all procedures and checklists during a straightaway (low workload environment), and having me as the FO (First Officer) be heads up with the CA as much as possible. Still multiple threats contributed: nighttime, heavy rain at the time of taxi which obscured both of our vision even with the use of windshield wipers, and inadequate taxiway lighting. In addition, I was using the Jeppesen 10-9 airport diagram and I had difficulty figuring out if we were at B14 or B13 since ATC allowed us to use either entrance to 26 for a full-length takeoff. I think the ambiguity of the taxi clearance “Runway 26 via B” in which there are two possible B taxiways to use for a full length takeoff contributed to our confusion as well. Suggestions: Note in company pages that Runway 26 departures should be careful not to taxi on B beyond B14. Better taxiway marking or lighting and better signage to separate the direction to the runway from the entrance to the Maintenance Ramp. ATC should clarify whether a full length Runway 26 taxi clearance “via B” means B13 or B14 to improve standardization.\n\nNarrative 2\nRunway 25R and 26 in use. Because runway is wet with slight tailwind, we requested Runway 26 for departure prior to push back for better performance. We exited the ramp normally with instruction B to Runway 26 from Point L. A band of heavy rain rolled over top of us while we were taxiing. I went as slow as possible to make sure we accomplished all tasks and procedures. I used the windshield wiper and followed the centerline. We came to B14 intersection, and I stopped. I noticed the sign to the right of intersection, and the airplane had just passed the intersection by few feet. We notified ATC. ATC amended the instruction and instructed us to turn around via Maintenance Ramp to R and hold short on B13. We entered the ramp and noticed there were many non-moving traffic. We stopped and requested assistance for ramp operation. While we were waiting for assistance, I called Duty Pilot to explain our situation and verified okay to continue. I contacted Dispatch to let him know where we were at and made sure we still met fuel requirements. A guide man and a wingman showed up to lead us onto Taxiway R. We made sure we were still legal and in compliance for takeoff, we ran the checklist again, then we were cleared for takeoff. The heavy rain dramatically reduced the visibility for taxi. At night, the taxiway end is not lighted enough and the centerline turned into lead-in line onto the ramp without any differentiation. There should be some division line or marking on the taxiway to notify us where the end of taxiway is for takeoff. In the day, you can easily distinguish. But at night with heavy rain, it is not so noticeable. ATC was great assisting us. The Jepps chart also does not emphasize the confusion in the area. Now I will draw my own division line mentally whenever I am approaching that intersection.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported they taxied past Taxiway B14 at night in the rain which is the last taxiway to access PHX Runway 26 and entered a maintenance ramp. The flight crew reported inadequate lighting, ambiguous taxi instructions and no advisory on the chart contributed to the event.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=27",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 27,
      "pageEnd": 29,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=27",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 27,
        "pageEnd": 29,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2082212 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported they taxied past Taxiway B14 at night in the rain which is the last taxiway to access PHX Runway 26 and entered a maintenance ramp. The flight crew reported inadequate lighting, ambiguous taxi instructions and no advisory on the chart contributed to the event.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2070271",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was on this leg and had the first break. Upon returning to the flight deck after the 1st break I was briefed that the aircraft had GPS L, ADS-B OUT L, and TERR POS EICAS messages displayed since shortly after departure. This status continued throughout the entire flight. ADS-B and GPS failures are somewhat expected in the area of the country of Turkey as GPS jamming is typical in that part of the world so it seemed unusual that these messages appeared so early in the flight and lasted as long as they did. The RC and I communicated to Dispatch several times throughout the flight informing them of the status of our aircraft. We were repeatedly assured that these aircraft system outages are known by the company, common on these routes and \"should return to normal status\" soon. On a previous flight from DEL to ZZZ I was told that the company is working on new procedures for these types of events and that guidance and new procedures will be printed and released \"soon\". We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance on SATCOM and we were informed that there is currently no procedure or checklist in the books for pilots to correct these issues while in flight. We expressed concerns about our Oceanic Crossing and RVSM airspace without these systems working properly. We asked for fuel planning numbers to be run at 28000 ft. in order to make the crossing outside of RVSM airspace and those numbers didn't work for our weight to reach our destination ZZZ or a closer airport such as ZZZ1. A diversion to ZZZZ was recommended by Dispatch if we felt that we could not legally continue the flight. While it is true that we do not need GPS to make an oceanic crossing as the Dispatcher made clear to us and wrote \"check your manuals\", we did not have enough fuel to do so. We were sent a message that we should request our clearance with BIRD [FIR] making them aware of our reduced equipment status and if their workload and level of aircraft traffic allowed, we may be able to complete the Oceanic Crossing at our planned and dispatched altitude and Mach number. We were sent a message from Dispatch, we would be able to complete our flight as planned with permission from BIRD if workloads allowed. That permission was granted and we made our Oceanic Crossing as planned. I was back on my 2nd break by the time the oceanic clearance was requested and received. When I returned from my 2nd break we were in the middle of our crossing. The EICAS messages remained. GPS message did finally go away I believe once we were well over Canadian land for over an hour or so. The aircraft was able to use ground based VOR positioning to keep RNP and ANP within acceptable limits. I fly New Delhi trips at least once a month for a while now. I've seen these messages before but never this early in the flight and remain for so long during the flight. Perhaps there is something or someone or some entity that is GPS jamming aircraft in India, soon after departure. Who knows. I realize that it is expected near Turkey. I've also done a bit of flying to Tel Aviv and it's expected, but this was unusual. On a previous flight when this similar situation occurred we were strongly urged to reset the GPS circuit breakers in flight to avoid diverting to ZZZZ1. Really hard to say how to prevent it. Having an approved, written and legal procedure or checklist to handle this type of situation would be helpful though. Much better and reassuring than just getting messages from Dispatch that this is a known issue/occurrence and systems should come back \"soon\" before the oceanic crossing."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was on this leg and had the first break. Upon returning to the flight deck after the 1st break I was briefed that the aircraft had GPS L, ADS-B OUT L, and TERR POS EICAS messages displayed since shortly after departure. This status continued throughout the entire flight. ADS-B and GPS failures are somewhat expected in the area of the country of Turkey as GPS jamming is typical in that part of the world so it seemed unusual that these messages appeared so early in the flight and lasted as long as they did. The RC and I communicated to Dispatch several times throughout the flight informing them of the status of our aircraft. We were repeatedly assured that these aircraft system outages are known by the company, common on these routes and \"should return to normal status\" soon. On a previous flight from DEL to ZZZ I was told that the company is working on new procedures for these types of events and that guidance and new procedures will be printed and released \"soon\". We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance on SATCOM and we were informed that there is currently no procedure or checklist in the books for pilots to correct these issues while in flight. We expressed concerns about our Oceanic Crossing and RVSM airspace without these systems working properly. We asked for fuel planning numbers to be run at 28000 ft. in order to make the crossing outside of RVSM airspace and those numbers didn't work for our weight to reach our destination ZZZ or a closer airport such as ZZZ1. A diversion to ZZZZ was recommended by Dispatch if we felt that we could not legally continue the flight. While it is true that we do not need GPS to make an oceanic crossing as the Dispatcher made clear to us and wrote \"check your manuals\", we did not have enough fuel to do so. We were sent a message that we should request our clearance with BIRD [FIR] making them aware of our reduced equipment status and if their workload and level of aircraft traffic allowed, we may be able to complete the Oceanic Crossing at our planned and dispatched altitude and Mach number. We were sent a message from Dispatch, we would be able to complete our flight as planned with permission from BIRD if workloads allowed. That permission was granted and we made our Oceanic Crossing as planned. I was back on my 2nd break by the time the oceanic clearance was requested and received. When I returned from my 2nd break we were in the middle of our crossing. The EICAS messages remained. GPS message did finally go away I believe once we were well over Canadian land for over an hour or so. The aircraft was able to use ground based VOR positioning to keep RNP and ANP within acceptable limits. I fly New Delhi trips at least once a month for a while now. I've seen these messages before but never this early in the flight and remain for so long during the flight. Perhaps there is something or someone or some entity that is GPS jamming aircraft in India, soon after departure. Who knows. I realize that it is expected near Turkey. I've also done a bit of flying to Tel Aviv and it's expected, but this was unusual. On a previous flight when this similar situation occurred we were strongly urged to reset the GPS circuit breakers in flight to avoid diverting to ZZZZ1. Really hard to say how to prevent it. Having an approved, written and legal procedure or checklist to handle this type of situation would be helpful though. Much better and reassuring than just getting messages from Dispatch that this is a known issue/occurrence and systems should come back \"soon\" before the oceanic crossing.",
    "synopsis": "An Air Carrier First Officer GPS jamming in VIDF international airspace.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=33",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 33,
      "pageEnd": 34,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=33",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 33,
        "pageEnd": 34,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2070271 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "An Air Carrier First Officer GPS jamming in VIDF international airspace.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2061468",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While conducting takeoffs and landings with an instructor in a recently purchased aircraft, we experienced a partial engine failure after turning left crosswind. We immediately [requested priority handling] and executed a turn to land opposite direction on the departure runway. The aircraft landed on the runway without any damage or incident and was able to exit onto the taxiway. Following the incident, the logbooks were re-examined and I was unable to locate an entry for a current 91.413 transponder check. The aircraft was purchased the day of the flight and the transponder check was missed somehow. In the future I will make sure to develop a more thorough process and list of items to check. The aircraft experienced a partial engine failure. I [requested priority], executed a 180 degree turn back and landed on Runway XXL. There were no injuries and no damage to the airplane other than the separated cylinder."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While conducting a training flight as a flight instructor with a highly competent student we experienced a partial engine failure while operating in the traffic pattern on the crosswind leg. We immediately [requested priority] with the Control Tower and returned to the departure runway landing in the opposite direction to normal traffic without incident. In reviewing the aircraft logbooks post incident it was discovered the transponder currency check required by 14 CFR 91. 215 to operate in Class C airspace had been accidentally overlooked. This was a newly purchased aircraft by the student that had been purchased the date of the incident and more attention should have been paid reviewing the documentation. In the future a checklist will be used. Partial engine failure on crosswind leg of traffic pattern. [Requested priority] and returned opposite direction to the departure runway."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile conducting takeoffs and landings with an instructor in a recently purchased aircraft, we experienced a partial engine failure after turning left crosswind. We immediately [requested priority handling] and executed a turn to land opposite direction on the departure runway. The aircraft landed on the runway without any damage or incident and was able to exit onto the taxiway. Following the incident, the logbooks were re-examined and I was unable to locate an entry for a current 91.413 transponder check. The aircraft was purchased the day of the flight and the transponder check was missed somehow. In the future I will make sure to develop a more thorough process and list of items to check. The aircraft experienced a partial engine failure. I [requested priority], executed a 180 degree turn back and landed on Runway XXL. There were no injuries and no damage to the airplane other than the separated cylinder.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile conducting a training flight as a flight instructor with a highly competent student we experienced a partial engine failure while operating in the traffic pattern on the crosswind leg. We immediately [requested priority] with the Control Tower and returned to the departure runway landing in the opposite direction to normal traffic without incident. In reviewing the aircraft logbooks post incident it was discovered the transponder currency check required by 14 CFR 91. 215 to operate in Class C airspace had been accidentally overlooked. This was a newly purchased aircraft by the student that had been purchased the date of the incident and more attention should have been paid reviewing the documentation. In the future a checklist will be used. Partial engine failure on crosswind leg of traffic pattern. [Requested priority] and returned opposite direction to the departure runway.",
    "synopsis": "General aviation pilot and instructor reported an engine malfunction during initial climb after takeoff, while in the traffic pattern. The pilot returned to the departure airport and landed safely in the opposite direction with no aircraft damage.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=35",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 35,
      "pageEnd": 37,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=35",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 35,
        "pageEnd": 37,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2061468 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "General aviation pilot and instructor reported an engine malfunction during initial climb after takeoff, while in the traffic pattern. The pilot returned to the departure airport and landed safely in the opposite direction with no aircraft damage.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2059201",
    "date": "2023-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb",
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While taxing we had an intermittent Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) comp mon fault. We slew the heading to fix the problem. The message would disappear for a length of time then reappear. We thought it was due to normal ground interface. After departure and during the normal clime out we noticed the heading and map information was inaccurate. Due to the inaccurate information. We were unable to use the autopilot and First Officer hand flew while I reference the QRH. During the trouble shooting we had slight speed and altitude deviations with quick corrections. We were unable to trouble shoot the problem and we [requested priority]. ATC gave us gyro vectors to back to the field. At one point it look liked my PDF was giving accurate information, and I took the controls from the First Officer (FO) and landed at the airport without any further incident. Suggestions: I’m not sure what the cause was, however after this situation I realize that EFIS Comp Mon can be more than a nuisance message. I will make sure I will give it greater attention in the future. As I will with all nuances messages."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While at the gate, EFIS comp mon Cockpit Access Security System (CASS) message appeared. We assumed this was due to the building in the surrounding area, and continued on with normal operations. We continued our taxi and the CASS message distinguished. During our taxi, we continued to receive intermittent EFIS comp mon CASS messages. It would appear momentarily and then extinguish for an extended amount of time, then reappear. As we were cleared onto the runway, we slewed the heading and continued on with with takeoff. The message was still intermittent. I incorrectly believed that because EFIS comp mon was classified as a nuisance message in the manual, we were allowed to depart with the intermittent message. However, I acknowledge, after reading manual section X.X.X (EFIC Comp Mon Magnetic Heading Disturbances Emanating During Ground Operations) that I was incorrect on my assumption. On departure, ATC gave us radar vectors. They soon contacted us and asked if we needed assistance, and informed us that they assigned us a heading and we were not adhering to it. We thought we were, but quickly realized there was an issue with both the captain and I's HSI's. I took radios and controls and instructed the Captain to reference the QRH for EFIS comp mon. As both HSI's were inoperative, I hand flew. During my hand flying, there were several altitude deviations approximately plus or minus 100 feet, with a quick response to correct. ATC asked if we would like gyro vectors, to which we accepted. We requested to return to ZZZ and prepared for our diversion. We were instructed to descend to 9,000 ft, and I mistakenly overspeed the FAR requiring 250 knots under 10,000 ft. I quickly corrected my mistake. I soon [requested priority] once I realized both the captains and I's task saturation that ultimately caused several airspeed and altitude deviations. After the Captain troubleshooted, he determined that his side seemed most accurate and conducted the approach via hand flying. He had a smooth landing and we did not require further assistance. Suggestions: The manual states \"If the caution message remains and it is known that the aircraft has been removed from all sources of magnetic anomalies, a system failure has occurred.\" I understand that even though com mon fault is classified as a nuisance message, it doesn't mean we can depart with an intermittent message. This was a tremendous learning moment for myself and I believe I am a better pilot because of it. Because I have taken the time to sit down and read what nuisance messages are, I am now equipped to handle a situation like this in the further. In the future, I will ensure there is no intermittent CASS message before departing."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile taxing we had an intermittent Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) comp mon fault. We slew the heading to fix the problem. The message would disappear for a length of time then reappear. We thought it was due to normal ground interface. After departure and during the normal clime out we noticed the heading and map information was inaccurate. Due to the inaccurate information. We were unable to use the autopilot and First Officer hand flew while I reference the QRH. During the trouble shooting we had slight speed and altitude deviations with quick corrections. We were unable to trouble shoot the problem and we [requested priority]. ATC gave us gyro vectors to back to the field. At one point it look liked my PDF was giving accurate information, and I took the controls from the First Officer (FO) and landed at the airport without any further incident. Suggestions: I’m not sure what the cause was, however after this situation I realize that EFIS Comp Mon can be more than a nuisance message. I will make sure I will give it greater attention in the future. As I will with all nuances messages.\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile at the gate, EFIS comp mon Cockpit Access Security System (CASS) message appeared. We assumed this was due to the building in the surrounding area, and continued on with normal operations. We continued our taxi and the CASS message distinguished. During our taxi, we continued to receive intermittent EFIS comp mon CASS messages. It would appear momentarily and then extinguish for an extended amount of time, then reappear. As we were cleared onto the runway, we slewed the heading and continued on with with takeoff. The message was still intermittent. I incorrectly believed that because EFIS comp mon was classified as a nuisance message in the manual, we were allowed to depart with the intermittent message. However, I acknowledge, after reading manual section X.X.X (EFIC Comp Mon Magnetic Heading Disturbances Emanating During Ground Operations) that I was incorrect on my assumption. On departure, ATC gave us radar vectors. They soon contacted us and asked if we needed assistance, and informed us that they assigned us a heading and we were not adhering to it. We thought we were, but quickly realized there was an issue with both the captain and I's HSI's. I took radios and controls and instructed the Captain to reference the QRH for EFIS comp mon. As both HSI's were inoperative, I hand flew. During my hand flying, there were several altitude deviations approximately plus or minus 100 feet, with a quick response to correct. ATC asked if we would like gyro vectors, to which we accepted. We requested to return to ZZZ and prepared for our diversion. We were instructed to descend to 9,000 ft, and I mistakenly overspeed the FAR requiring 250 knots under 10,000 ft. I quickly corrected my mistake. I soon [requested priority] once I realized both the captains and I's task saturation that ultimately caused several airspeed and altitude deviations. After the Captain troubleshooted, he determined that his side seemed most accurate and conducted the approach via hand flying. He had a smooth landing and we did not require further assistance. Suggestions: The manual states \"If the caution message remains and it is known that the aircraft has been removed from all sources of magnetic anomalies, a system failure has occurred.\" I understand that even though com mon fault is classified as a nuisance message, it doesn't mean we can depart with an intermittent message. This was a tremendous learning moment for myself and I believe I am a better pilot because of it. Because I have taken the time to sit down and read what nuisance messages are, I am now equipped to handle a situation like this in the further. In the future, I will ensure there is no intermittent CASS message before departing.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported aircraft navigational system comparison monitor showing an abnormal situation. Flight crew returned to departure airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=38",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 38,
      "pageEnd": 40,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=38",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 38,
        "pageEnd": 40,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2059201 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported aircraft navigational system comparison monitor showing an abnormal situation. Flight crew returned to departure airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2042854",
    "date": "2023-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "STL Ground Metering/Ground initially cleared us to taxi to Runway 12L via [taxiway] D, hold short Runway 06. Approaching Runway 06, Ground cleared us onto Runway 06, cross Runway 12R, hold short Runway 12L. Runway 06 does not intersect Runway 12R but passes behind it. On Runway 06, Ground cleared us to taxi F, S, hold short Runway 12L, switch to Tower. This clearance was partially blocked and Ground repeated it. At the same time, we were running the before takeoff checklist. Holding short of Runway 12L on [taxiway] S, Tower gave us takeoff clearance and we departed without incident. After departure, my Captain re-reviewed the taxi charts and became concerned that we might have crossed Runway 12L, hold short line on Runway 06 prior to receiving the Ground clearance to continue past this hold short line. We were not aware of a hold short line on Runway 06 for Runway 12L. My impression was that we most likely received the clearance to continue at or before this hold short line, but am not absolutely positive. ATC did not mention that we did anything wrong. A note in the company information page alerting pilots to the issue and a hot spot on the airport diagram may be helpful, especially during periods of additive conditions such as frequency congestion, rapid airport reconfiguration of open and closed runways and taxiways, men and equipment operating very near the taxiways and runways. It may help if ATC reinforces runway hold short lines on active runways during this time."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nSTL Ground Metering/Ground initially cleared us to taxi to Runway 12L via [taxiway] D, hold short Runway 06. Approaching Runway 06, Ground cleared us onto Runway 06, cross Runway 12R, hold short Runway 12L. Runway 06 does not intersect Runway 12R but passes behind it. On Runway 06, Ground cleared us to taxi F, S, hold short Runway 12L, switch to Tower. This clearance was partially blocked and Ground repeated it. At the same time, we were running the before takeoff checklist. Holding short of Runway 12L on [taxiway] S, Tower gave us takeoff clearance and we departed without incident. After departure, my Captain re-reviewed the taxi charts and became concerned that we might have crossed Runway 12L, hold short line on Runway 06 prior to receiving the Ground clearance to continue past this hold short line. We were not aware of a hold short line on Runway 06 for Runway 12L. My impression was that we most likely received the clearance to continue at or before this hold short line, but am not absolutely positive. ATC did not mention that we did anything wrong. A note in the company information page alerting pilots to the issue and a hot spot on the airport diagram may be helpful, especially during periods of additive conditions such as frequency congestion, rapid airport reconfiguration of open and closed runways and taxiways, men and equipment operating very near the taxiways and runways. It may help if ATC reinforces runway hold short lines on active runways during this time.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier pilot reported a possible runway incursion while taxiing on Runway 6 with instructions to hold short of Runway 12L. Pilot recommends a \"Hot Spot\" flag/designation for this location on the airport diagram to warn of potential for incursion.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=41",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 41,
      "pageEnd": 42,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=41",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 41,
        "pageEnd": 42,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2042854 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Air carrier pilot reported a possible runway incursion while taxiing on Runway 6 with instructions to hold short of Runway 12L. Pilot recommends a \"Hot Spot\" flag/designation for this location on the airport diagram to warn of potential for incursion.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2034107",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "SR20"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "10 minutes prior to landing at ZZZ a CHT CAS message appeared for CHT on Cylinder #1. The checklist called to reduce power, increase airspeed, and increase mixture. The CHT CAS message disappeared. I kept the mixture at the new setting while returning to ZZZ to land. After landing on [Runway] XXL at ZZZ my student rolled down the runway with the power at idle. Approaching Taxiway 1 and turning to exit, my student applied throttle to complete the turn and exit the runway at [Taxiway] 1. The engine started coughing and died and we rolled just past the runway edge marking and came to a stop well before the hold-short lines. I radioed the Tower Controller to let him know that our engine died - he replied that he understood and asked that we get out and push the airplane past the hold- short line to exit the airplane. I also heard the Tower Controller tell the aircraft on final to sidestep to the parallel runway for landing. The controller also told a business jet that their departure on [Runway] XXL would be slightly delayed due to a disabled aircraft still on the runway. After these radio calls I informed the Tower Controller that we would be getting out to push the aircraft past the hold-short line. As the instructor I exited the aircraft and pushed while I instructed my student to steer the aircraft. It took an estimated 3 minutes to push the airplane past the hold-short line. Once past the hold-short line I boarded the aircraft and attempted a hot start procedure - which was successful with a leaner than normal mixture setting and received clearance to taxi to parking without further problems. Our maintenance provider determined during their engine run that the engine will stall when advancing the throttle from idle with a full rich mixture, boost pump on, and air conditioning on. They also advised that with normal ground leaning that the engine appears to be running normally. Cirrus's SR20 POH does not have a high altitude ground leaning procedure. Their start procedure calls for the mixture to be set to full rich which is not ideal for operating at higher altitudes especially in ZZZ1. This incident occurred after landing where the throttle was at idle during the after landing roll-out, and because of the CHT CAS message 10 minutes prior to landing the mixture was more rich than normal - but not full rich. I believe that the student’s application of power to exit the runway may have been too abrupt and with the throttle at idle with a high mixture setting, may have caused this engine failure."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\n10 minutes prior to landing at ZZZ a CHT CAS message appeared for CHT on Cylinder #1. The checklist called to reduce power, increase airspeed, and increase mixture. The CHT CAS message disappeared. I kept the mixture at the new setting while returning to ZZZ to land. After landing on [Runway] XXL at ZZZ my student rolled down the runway with the power at idle. Approaching Taxiway 1 and turning to exit, my student applied throttle to complete the turn and exit the runway at [Taxiway] 1. The engine started coughing and died and we rolled just past the runway edge marking and came to a stop well before the hold-short lines. I radioed the Tower Controller to let him know that our engine died - he replied that he understood and asked that we get out and push the airplane past the hold- short line to exit the airplane. I also heard the Tower Controller tell the aircraft on final to sidestep to the parallel runway for landing. The controller also told a business jet that their departure on [Runway] XXL would be slightly delayed due to a disabled aircraft still on the runway. After these radio calls I informed the Tower Controller that we would be getting out to push the aircraft past the hold-short line. As the instructor I exited the aircraft and pushed while I instructed my student to steer the aircraft. It took an estimated 3 minutes to push the airplane past the hold-short line. Once past the hold-short line I boarded the aircraft and attempted a hot start procedure - which was successful with a leaner than normal mixture setting and received clearance to taxi to parking without further problems. Our maintenance provider determined during their engine run that the engine will stall when advancing the throttle from idle with a full rich mixture, boost pump on, and air conditioning on. They also advised that with normal ground leaning that the engine appears to be running normally. Cirrus's SR20 POH does not have a high altitude ground leaning procedure. Their start procedure calls for the mixture to be set to full rich which is not ideal for operating at higher altitudes especially in ZZZ1. This incident occurred after landing where the throttle was at idle during the after landing roll-out, and because of the CHT CAS message 10 minutes prior to landing the mixture was more rich than normal - but not full rich. I believe that the student’s application of power to exit the runway may have been too abrupt and with the throttle at idle with a high mixture setting, may have caused this engine failure.",
    "synopsis": "SR-20 flight Instructor reported a message that stated a cylinder problem appeared prior to landing but after following the checklist, the message was gone. Upon roll-out, the engine failed and the aircraft stopped partially on the runway. The flight Instructor and Student pilot coordinated pushing the aircraft off the runway, restarted the engine, and taxied to parking.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=43",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 43,
      "pageEnd": 45,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=43",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 43,
        "pageEnd": 45,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2034107 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "SR-20 flight Instructor reported a message that stated a cylinder problem appeared prior to landing but after following the checklist, the message was gone. Upon roll-out, the engine failed and the aircraft stopped partially on the runway. The flight Instructor and Student pilot coordinated pushing the aircraft off the runway, restarted the engine, and taxied to parking.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2031812",
    "date": "2023-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We operated this aircraft from ZZZ2 - ZZZ1 followed by ZZZ1 - ZZZ. We pushed from [Gate] XXX in ZZZ and disconnected. We then attempted to start the Number 2 Engine. The N2 peaked at 16% so the start was aborted. Fuel was never introduced. Ran aborted engine start QRC/QRH. We then attempted a second start on the #2 Engine this time with both my eyes and the FO (First Officer) watching closely and verifying switch positions. Again, the N2 peaked at 16% with slow acceleration. The manifold gauge showed sufficient air on both sides of the isolation valve. The packs were verified off. We terminated this start as well. Operations were notified that we would be returning to the gate. As an alternate to waiting for a tug we attempted to start the Number 1 Engine so that we could taxi back to the gate. Coincidentally, when the First Officer placed the start switch to \"ground\" on the number one engine the \"ENGINE OVERHEAT\" for the Number 2 Engine illuminated. I commanded the First Officer to abort the start - fuel had not been introduced. I asked for the QRH/QRC for engine overheat. Obviously the QRC assumes we are in flight. Regardless, it directed us to fire extinguishing agent followed by isolating bleed air. The overheat light extinguished after bleed air was removed. Considerable use of our company ADM (Aeronautical Decision Making) model directed our actions quickly back on track. Staying within the QRH firing both extinguishing bottles into the engine seemed unnecessary albeit a required step to comply with Company procedures. Company training allows deviation although emphasizes to accept no unnecessary risk. To not fire bottles increased risk. I thank our training for that."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We operated this aircraft with no issues on our first two legs. We pushed off Gate XXX in ZZZ and disconnected from the ground crew as we started Engine #2. During this first attempt to start Engine #2, I noticed that the N2 never reached above 16%, so the start was aborted. Fuel was never introduced. We then proceeded to run the aborted engine start QRC/QRH. After the checklist was preformed, we decided to try another engine start on Engine #2. We verified switch position and bleeds were configured correctly and attempted the start. Yet again, a slow start and N2 did not rise above 16%. We proceeded to conduct the Aborted Engine Start again, leading us to run the aborted engine start QRC/QRH Checklist. We noted that the manifold gauge on the bleed air supply showed sufficient pressure. After we finished the QRC/QRH Checklist, we called Operations informing them we needed to return to the gate. While waiting, we discussed the possibility of starting our #1 Engine as an option to taxi to back to the gate. As we started Engine #1, we received an ENGINE OVERHEAT caution on the #2 Engine. The Captain told me to abort the #1 Engine start. Fuel had not been introduced. We then conducted the QRC/QRH Checklist for ENGINE OVERHEAT. Regarding the QRC, it assumes we were inflight thus taking us to the QRH items for shutting the engine down and using the fire extinguishing agent and closing the bleeds for the #2 Engine. The ENGINE OVERHEAT light was extinguished after the bleed air was removed. We worked well together to come back on track after falling behind. Using our aeronautical decision-making method we continued to work through the situation presented to us. Remaining and complying within the QRH firing both extinguishing bottles into the #2 Engine seemed unnecessary. However, it was a required step to comply with Company procedures. Training allows deviation in such an event, but we are also emphasizing to accept no unnecessary risk while operating the aircraft."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe operated this aircraft from ZZZ2 - ZZZ1 followed by ZZZ1 - ZZZ. We pushed from [Gate] XXX in ZZZ and disconnected. We then attempted to start the Number 2 Engine. The N2 peaked at 16% so the start was aborted. Fuel was never introduced. Ran aborted engine start QRC/QRH. We then attempted a second start on the #2 Engine this time with both my eyes and the FO (First Officer) watching closely and verifying switch positions. Again, the N2 peaked at 16% with slow acceleration. The manifold gauge showed sufficient air on both sides of the isolation valve. The packs were verified off. We terminated this start as well. Operations were notified that we would be returning to the gate. As an alternate to waiting for a tug we attempted to start the Number 1 Engine so that we could taxi back to the gate. Coincidentally, when the First Officer placed the start switch to \"ground\" on the number one engine the \"ENGINE OVERHEAT\" for the Number 2 Engine illuminated. I commanded the First Officer to abort the start - fuel had not been introduced. I asked for the QRH/QRC for engine overheat. Obviously the QRC assumes we are in flight. Regardless, it directed us to fire extinguishing agent followed by isolating bleed air. The overheat light extinguished after bleed air was removed. Considerable use of our company ADM (Aeronautical Decision Making) model directed our actions quickly back on track. Staying within the QRH firing both extinguishing bottles into the engine seemed unnecessary albeit a required step to comply with Company procedures. Company training allows deviation although emphasizes to accept no unnecessary risk. To not fire bottles increased risk. I thank our training for that.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe operated this aircraft with no issues on our first two legs. We pushed off Gate XXX in ZZZ and disconnected from the ground crew as we started Engine #2. During this first attempt to start Engine #2, I noticed that the N2 never reached above 16%, so the start was aborted. Fuel was never introduced. We then proceeded to run the aborted engine start QRC/QRH. After the checklist was preformed, we decided to try another engine start on Engine #2. We verified switch position and bleeds were configured correctly and attempted the start. Yet again, a slow start and N2 did not rise above 16%. We proceeded to conduct the Aborted Engine Start again, leading us to run the aborted engine start QRC/QRH Checklist. We noted that the manifold gauge on the bleed air supply showed sufficient pressure. After we finished the QRC/QRH Checklist, we called Operations informing them we needed to return to the gate. While waiting, we discussed the possibility of starting our #1 Engine as an option to taxi to back to the gate. As we started Engine #1, we received an ENGINE OVERHEAT caution on the #2 Engine. The Captain told me to abort the #1 Engine start. Fuel had not been introduced. We then conducted the QRC/QRH Checklist for ENGINE OVERHEAT. Regarding the QRC, it assumes we were inflight thus taking us to the QRH items for shutting the engine down and using the fire extinguishing agent and closing the bleeds for the #2 Engine. The ENGINE OVERHEAT light was extinguished after the bleed air was removed. We worked well together to come back on track after falling behind. Using our aeronautical decision-making method we continued to work through the situation presented to us. Remaining and complying within the QRH firing both extinguishing bottles into the #2 Engine seemed unnecessary. However, it was a required step to comply with Company procedures. Training allows deviation in such an event, but we are also emphasizing to accept no unnecessary risk while operating the aircraft.",
    "synopsis": "B737-700 flight crew reported an engine overheat after starting up Engine #1 following two aborted start attempts on Engine #2 while on the ground. Although the QRH deemed firing both extinguishing bottles into the affected engine unnecessary, the flight crew’s company procedures had it as a required step.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=46",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 46,
      "pageEnd": 48,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=46",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 46,
        "pageEnd": 48,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2031812 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737-700 flight crew reported an engine overheat after starting up Engine #1 following two aborted start attempts on Engine #2 while on the ground. Although the QRH deemed firing both extinguishing bottles into the affected engine unnecessary, the flight crew’s company procedures had it as a required step.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2019819",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "This event took place during First Officer (FO) new hire IOE. The Captain/Check Airman Person A was Pilot Flying and the FO Person B was Pilot Monitoring. We also had a Company pilot jump seating in the flight deck who was commuting. During climb out on the ZZZZZ SID, the R BLEED DUCT warning message occurred around 12000 ft. MSL. The Captain said cancel/identify. FO responded and read EICAS. Captain stated \"I have the radios and controls, reference the QRH.\" We were not able to run the QRH fast enough and because the R BLEED DUCT warning stayed on for more than 30 seconds, the pressurization system automatically shut off both L/R bleed valves which resulted in a loss of pressurization capabilities. We were around 14000 ft. MSL when both Pressure (Regulating Shut Off Valve) PRSOVs L/R shut off. The Captain [requested priority handling] immediately following this event and initiated a descent to 10000 ft. MSL. The FO completed the QRH at 10000 ft. MSL, which following the QRH the airplane was then configured with EMER DEPRESS SWITCH engaged and PACKS OFF and ram air valve opened for unpressurized flight. We asked for a little lower to 8000 ft. and the cabin altitude caution message appeared because the cabin altitude was between 8500 - 10000 ft. This was associated and FO canceled the cabin altitude message which extinguished upon reaching 8000 ft. The passenger masks never dropped because the cabin altitude never went above 10000 ft. (masks drop automatically at 14000 +- 500 ). Captain told ATC \"we need to go back to ZZZ and that the checklists were done and the airplane was in a safe configuration but had no pressurization. We do not need assistance at this time other than returning back to ZZZ\" Captain told FO to set up the cockpit for visual XXL backed up by ILS. Captain called (Flight Attendant 1) (FA1) Person C and told them the airplane was safe and that landing would be normal but couldn't continue to destination. Captain informed passengers \"Airplane is safe and all checklists are completed. We lost pressurization and we were not high enough where we would need masks, this altitude is safe without pressurization but we are going to return to ZZZ for a normal landing. Talk to you soon with an update, thanks.\" ATC gave us a quick vector and Captain informed ATC we need to get a revector to finish our normal checklists and briefings for approach. After completing a revector and finishing approach briefings (during which we discovered the fuel gauges were dashed out, after taking off at 73400 lbs. we concluded that the 72000 lb. speed cards would be adequate and based on distances and speeds at that weight) we then proceeded to land and taxi to the gate. ATC had fire trucks ready per their protocols which followed Aircraft X back to the gate. After the shutdown checklist was complete, the Captain went into the cabin and made an announcement to passengers with further details and they seemed appreciative and comfortable. It was not until after the flight had ended where I saw 2 things I should have done differently. The first thing I should have done differently is to call for the checklist, I failed to realize this was an item on the checklist and only ran the QRH. As Captain/Check Airman I should have also recognized the need to transfer controls and perhaps run the QRH myself, especially because it was my FOs second time doing Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties during IOE. The QRH is a difficult checklist because it needs to be completed within 30 seconds otherwise this situation occurs with automatic complete shutdown of pressurization. I still believe that altogether the situation was handled safely but I do see areas for improvement for the QRH. I feel like I learned a valuable lesson myself. Suggestions are the L/R bleed duct item is the only item that is not transferred verbatim and boxed inside the QRH as well. Every other item has the same language verbatim (copied in the QRH) and then is elaborated in the QRH as well. However, the L/R Bleed Duct does not have this necessary detail in the QRH. The L/R Bleed Duct QRH item is a special item and situation because it is time limited (only 30 seconds to correct or else both PRSOVs shut off automatically). I have 2 very important suggestions. First and I believe most important, the L/R bleed duct should be copied verbatim and boxed like every other electrical item inside the QRH and then elaborated thereafter. The QRH version is highly unlikely to be able to finish in 30 seconds and it does not read as easily as the electrical checklist. If this was changed, future pilots in similar situations who call for the QRH by mistake, would still have the exact wording and reference as the electrical checklist, boxed and easy to read and should be able to finish in a timely manner. Second, this item should honestly be a required memory item and an immediate action item and boxed in on the electrical checklist as well because of the timely nature. But the QRH should be fixed first in my opinion to match the way every other electrical checklist is written and copied into the QRH."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nThis event took place during First Officer (FO) new hire IOE. The Captain/Check Airman Person A was Pilot Flying and the FO Person B was Pilot Monitoring. We also had a Company pilot jump seating in the flight deck who was commuting. During climb out on the ZZZZZ SID, the R BLEED DUCT warning message occurred around 12000 ft. MSL. The Captain said cancel/identify. FO responded and read EICAS. Captain stated \"I have the radios and controls, reference the QRH.\" We were not able to run the QRH fast enough and because the R BLEED DUCT warning stayed on for more than 30 seconds, the pressurization system automatically shut off both L/R bleed valves which resulted in a loss of pressurization capabilities. We were around 14000 ft. MSL when both Pressure (Regulating Shut Off Valve) PRSOVs L/R shut off. The Captain [requested priority handling] immediately following this event and initiated a descent to 10000 ft. MSL. The FO completed the QRH at 10000 ft. MSL, which following the QRH the airplane was then configured with EMER DEPRESS SWITCH engaged and PACKS OFF and ram air valve opened for unpressurized flight. We asked for a little lower to 8000 ft. and the cabin altitude caution message appeared because the cabin altitude was between 8500 - 10000 ft. This was associated and FO canceled the cabin altitude message which extinguished upon reaching 8000 ft. The passenger masks never dropped because the cabin altitude never went above 10000 ft. (masks drop automatically at 14000 +- 500 ). Captain told ATC \"we need to go back to ZZZ and that the checklists were done and the airplane was in a safe configuration but had no pressurization. We do not need assistance at this time other than returning back to ZZZ\" Captain told FO to set up the cockpit for visual XXL backed up by ILS. Captain called (Flight Attendant 1) (FA1) Person C and told them the airplane was safe and that landing would be normal but couldn't continue to destination. Captain informed passengers \"Airplane is safe and all checklists are completed. We lost pressurization and we were not high enough where we would need masks, this altitude is safe without pressurization but we are going to return to ZZZ for a normal landing. Talk to you soon with an update, thanks.\" ATC gave us a quick vector and Captain informed ATC we need to get a revector to finish our normal checklists and briefings for approach. After completing a revector and finishing approach briefings (during which we discovered the fuel gauges were dashed out, after taking off at 73400 lbs. we concluded that the 72000 lb. speed cards would be adequate and based on distances and speeds at that weight) we then proceeded to land and taxi to the gate. ATC had fire trucks ready per their protocols which followed Aircraft X back to the gate. After the shutdown checklist was complete, the Captain went into the cabin and made an announcement to passengers with further details and they seemed appreciative and comfortable. It was not until after the flight had ended where I saw 2 things I should have done differently. The first thing I should have done differently is to call for the checklist, I failed to realize this was an item on the checklist and only ran the QRH. As Captain/Check Airman I should have also recognized the need to transfer controls and perhaps run the QRH myself, especially because it was my FOs second time doing Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties during IOE. The QRH is a difficult checklist because it needs to be completed within 30 seconds otherwise this situation occurs with automatic complete shutdown of pressurization. I still believe that altogether the situation was handled safely but I do see areas for improvement for the QRH. I feel like I learned a valuable lesson myself. Suggestions are the L/R bleed duct item is the only item that is not transferred verbatim and boxed inside the QRH as well. Every other item has the same language verbatim (copied in the QRH) and then is elaborated in the QRH as well. However, the L/R Bleed Duct does not have this necessary detail in the QRH. The L/R Bleed Duct QRH item is a special item and situation because it is time limited (only 30 seconds to correct or else both PRSOVs shut off automatically). I have 2 very important suggestions. First and I believe most important, the L/R bleed duct should be copied verbatim and boxed like every other electrical item inside the QRH and then elaborated thereafter. The QRH version is highly unlikely to be able to finish in 30 seconds and it does not read as easily as the electrical checklist. If this was changed, future pilots in similar situations who call for the QRH by mistake, would still have the exact wording and reference as the electrical checklist, boxed and easy to read and should be able to finish in a timely manner. Second, this item should honestly be a required memory item and an immediate action item and boxed in on the electrical checklist as well because of the timely nature. But the QRH should be fixed first in my opinion to match the way every other electrical checklist is written and copied into the QRH.",
    "synopsis": "CRJ-200 Captain reported a right bleed duct warning message during climb out while operating a training flight. The Captain performed the checklist procedure and returned to the departure airport for a safe landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=49",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 49,
      "pageEnd": 51,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=49",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 49,
        "pageEnd": 51,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2019819 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "CRJ-200 Captain reported a right bleed duct warning message during climb out while operating a training flight. The Captain performed the checklist procedure and returned to the departure airport for a safe landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2018511",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I have flown 172s for the last 10 years. I recently purchased a 172G model. Placarded on the fuel selector is a note stating that pilots are to switch to a single tank from \"both\" after leveling off above 5000 feet. Almost no Cessna pilots do it, myself included until today. The general feeling around the community is that it is not important and that it was a political stunt by Cessna years ago while transitioning to Lycoming engines. I knew about the issue when I purchased the aircraft but don't fly often at higher altitudes and so didn't have it top of mind. I had looked into it at the time and found that it wasn't important based on community comments and so I forgot all about it. I was flying from ZZZ1 back to ZZZ2. As I was flying past ZZZ I noticed a temporary drop in engine RPMs. After about 30 seconds I lost engine power completely but then it would surge to full power and back to zero. Engine power continued to come and go. I followed the checklist, advised ATC and landed at ZZZ without issue. The issue was that the standard loss of engine checklist doesn't follow the required remediation for the issue, so pilots are not able to regain power. The published remediation requires you to fly on one tank for one minute, and then switch to the other tank, but this is not standard practice. The other issue is that the placard is down by the fuel selector, which is not something you look at often, so the issue is out of mind and often forgotten. Contributing factors are: 1. The Cessna pilot community doesn't see the issue as real. 2. The emergency checklist doesn't deal with the issue. 3. The placard is on the fuel selector where nobody is looking in flight. Other comments are that I found myself very distracted in taxiing back to the ramp. Controllers should realize that a pilot is not in his/her normal state of mind after an incident like this and offer more support for taxi at an airfield they are probably not familiar with nor have taxi diagrams ready, etc. A progressive taxi should be standard practice after a situation like this. Its easy to ask for, but I felt the controller was not aware of the compromised mental state a pilot might be in after a flight like this."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI have flown 172s for the last 10 years. I recently purchased a 172G model. Placarded on the fuel selector is a note stating that pilots are to switch to a single tank from \"both\" after leveling off above 5000 feet. Almost no Cessna pilots do it, myself included until today. The general feeling around the community is that it is not important and that it was a political stunt by Cessna years ago while transitioning to Lycoming engines. I knew about the issue when I purchased the aircraft but don't fly often at higher altitudes and so didn't have it top of mind. I had looked into it at the time and found that it wasn't important based on community comments and so I forgot all about it. I was flying from ZZZ1 back to ZZZ2. As I was flying past ZZZ I noticed a temporary drop in engine RPMs. After about 30 seconds I lost engine power completely but then it would surge to full power and back to zero. Engine power continued to come and go. I followed the checklist, advised ATC and landed at ZZZ without issue. The issue was that the standard loss of engine checklist doesn't follow the required remediation for the issue, so pilots are not able to regain power. The published remediation requires you to fly on one tank for one minute, and then switch to the other tank, but this is not standard practice. The other issue is that the placard is down by the fuel selector, which is not something you look at often, so the issue is out of mind and often forgotten. Contributing factors are: 1. The Cessna pilot community doesn't see the issue as real. 2. The emergency checklist doesn't deal with the issue. 3. The placard is on the fuel selector where nobody is looking in flight. Other comments are that I found myself very distracted in taxiing back to the ramp. Controllers should realize that a pilot is not in his/her normal state of mind after an incident like this and offer more support for taxi at an airfield they are probably not familiar with nor have taxi diagrams ready, etc. A progressive taxi should be standard practice after a situation like this. Its easy to ask for, but I felt the controller was not aware of the compromised mental state a pilot might be in after a flight like this.",
    "synopsis": "C172 pilot reported engine power fluctuations during cruise required a diversion to a nearby airport. Pilot stated the checklist does not provide a procedure for this problem and the placement of the placard for switching fuel tanks is in a location that is difficult to view.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=52",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 52,
      "pageEnd": 53,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=52",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 52,
        "pageEnd": 53,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2018511 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "C172 pilot reported engine power fluctuations during cruise required a diversion to a nearby airport. Pilot stated the checklist does not provide a procedure for this problem and the placement of the placard for switching fuel tanks is in a location that is difficult to view.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "2016795",
    "date": "2023-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "Navion"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I cranked up the Navion to do a check on the newly installed airspeed indicator. The run- up was uneventful and I departed from Runway XX due to unusually westerly winds. The day was HOT, above 90 degrees, high humidity, and a density altitude above 1500 ft.; I left the canopy open to get air circulation. I normally do a once around the pattern with a touch-and-go to test all systems and if all checks out, I may go for a leisurely flight up at a cooler level. On doing a left downwind approach procedure I noticed the gear horn was not audible due to the noise from the open canopy. I struggled with it until I felt I could barely hear it. I completed the rest of my prelanding check and set up for a 65-kt., full flap approach to landing. Everything was just right, airspeed indicator was dead on 65 kt. However, I did not check on the 3 green lights, trusting that the horn was not making noise. The plane landed gently just above stall but made a scraping sound - my heart sank! I turned fuel boost pump, fuel valve selector, electricals and breakers all off. Complete silence following. Airport personnel assisted in raising the plane high enough to drop the gear and subsequently tug the aircraft to its hangar. Airport Authority Representative along with an FAA Safety Inspector showed up to check on me, airplane and records. Needless to say, I ran this video through my brain over and over and I feel I know why this happened. The almighty checklist needs to be followed. Had I been returning from a more involved flight, I would have pressed the button on the Avidyne to show the prelanding checklist. Do not focus on just one instrument - in my case the airspeed indicator, but rather scan the panel and always look for the infernal THREE GREEN LIGHTS. Follow recommended routines without variance. The old manual says, \"On downwind pull the throttle until you hear the horn, then push forward to quiet the horn and lower the gear.\" That is the complete procedure just for the gear. I had modified that years ago and what I would do is slow the airplane under 87 kt., max flap and max gear speed, and then lower the gear. This eliminated the blaring horn. Hearing the horn is important! Why? Because if you don't hear the horn then you don't have safety redundancy, the blaring horn tells you have a problem, no \"three green lights\" tells you have a problem! As I slowed down, the horn never went off, even with the throttle at idle. The horn failed! The checklist failed! The instrument scan failed! See what's there and not what you want to be there! Thinking back at the whole thing, I don't think that horn ever blew. I wanted it to blow, the way it should, but I don't think it did, even on the ground with a dead engine and wheels retracted, dead silence!"
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI cranked up the Navion to do a check on the newly installed airspeed indicator. The run- up was uneventful and I departed from Runway XX due to unusually westerly winds. The day was HOT, above 90 degrees, high humidity, and a density altitude above 1500 ft.; I left the canopy open to get air circulation. I normally do a once around the pattern with a touch-and-go to test all systems and if all checks out, I may go for a leisurely flight up at a cooler level. On doing a left downwind approach procedure I noticed the gear horn was not audible due to the noise from the open canopy. I struggled with it until I felt I could barely hear it. I completed the rest of my prelanding check and set up for a 65-kt., full flap approach to landing. Everything was just right, airspeed indicator was dead on 65 kt. However, I did not check on the 3 green lights, trusting that the horn was not making noise. The plane landed gently just above stall but made a scraping sound - my heart sank! I turned fuel boost pump, fuel valve selector, electricals and breakers all off. Complete silence following. Airport personnel assisted in raising the plane high enough to drop the gear and subsequently tug the aircraft to its hangar. Airport Authority Representative along with an FAA Safety Inspector showed up to check on me, airplane and records. Needless to say, I ran this video through my brain over and over and I feel I know why this happened. The almighty checklist needs to be followed. Had I been returning from a more involved flight, I would have pressed the button on the Avidyne to show the prelanding checklist. Do not focus on just one instrument - in my case the airspeed indicator, but rather scan the panel and always look for the infernal THREE GREEN LIGHTS. Follow recommended routines without variance. The old manual says, \"On downwind pull the throttle until you hear the horn, then push forward to quiet the horn and lower the gear.\" That is the complete procedure just for the gear. I had modified that years ago and what I would do is slow the airplane under 87 kt., max flap and max gear speed, and then lower the gear. This eliminated the blaring horn. Hearing the horn is important! Why? Because if you don't hear the horn then you don't have safety redundancy, the blaring horn tells you have a problem, no \"three green lights\" tells you have a problem! As I slowed down, the horn never went off, even with the throttle at idle. The horn failed! The checklist failed! The instrument scan failed! See what's there and not what you want to be there! Thinking back at the whole thing, I don't think that horn ever blew. I wanted it to blow, the way it should, but I don't think it did, even on the ground with a dead engine and wheels retracted, dead silence!",
    "synopsis": "Navion pilot reported landing on the runway gear up and was assisted by airport personnel in tugging the aircraft to the hangar. It was a hot day and the pilot reported not following the checklist procedures properly, and did not confirm the landing gear was down and locked.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=55",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 55,
      "pageEnd": 57,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=55",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 55,
        "pageEnd": 57,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 2016795 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Navion pilot reported landing on the runway gear up and was assisted by airport personnel in tugging the aircraft to the hangar. It was a hot day and the pilot reported not following the checklist procedures properly, and did not confirm the landing gear was down and locked.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1993175",
    "date": "2023-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Prior to takeoff in ZZZ1, THE ANTI SKID INOP light was not illuminated. After takeoff from Runway XXR in ZZZ, First Officer (FO) requested gear up and I noticed the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminated. Once the after takeoff checklist was called and the gear handle was placed to the off position, the anti-skid light extinguished. At cruise, the auto brakes were selected to 1, 2, and 3 to check for proper operation due to previous write ups and the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminated and did not go away. Previous write-ups from today and Day 0 confirmed that this was a chronic issue with the auto brakes but did not reference the anti-skid system being inop. The previous write up from today also referenced a transducer #2 fault. The QRH was referenced regarding both ANTI SKID INOP and AUTO BRAKE DISARM. With the possibility of another transducer fault or a possible ANTI SKID failure, as a crew we discussed our options with an ANTI SKID failure and felt continuing to ZZZ was okay with good weather, long runways and a lighter weight and speed on landing. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were contacted to discuss the possibility of an anti skid system failure. Maintenance Control agreed with the Captain that there is a distinct possibility that the anti skid system is not working given the recent history of write ups along with the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminating now. We decided the ANTI SKID INOP QRH took precedent over the AUTO BRAKE DISARM QRH and planned for the possibility of an ANTI SKID INOP with no auto brakes on landing. My additional thoughts were that if the gear handle was placed to the down position on arrival and the ANTI SKID INOP light returned, we would be prepared. Further, with the two previous write ups including a transducer fault, it was a distinct possibility that the anti skid system was INOP. With the possibility of hot brakes, blown tires and a loss of directional control after landing without anti skid, it was decided that we would [request priority handling], continue to ZZZ and request to land on the longest Runway XX in ZZZ. The flight attendants including Purser Person A were then brought into the loop and were given information and a briefing. At this point we had 90 minutes until landing and we discussed that we would prepare the cabin for a [priority] landing and possible evacuation when we had 45 minutes prior to landing. At 45 minutes prior to landing, I made a PA to the passengers explaining the mechanical issue we were experiencing and that the flight attendants would be preparing the cabin for a [priority] landing in addition to assuring them that we fully expected this landing to be normal but we are going to prepare for a [priority] landing as a precaution. FO and I reviewed the ANTI SKID INOP QRH and performed a thorough threat briefing to include a flaps 40 landing, the non-normal landing distance chart, an early stable approach, Captain PA announcements, touching down in the touchdown zone, manual speed brake deployment, use of max reverse thrust longer than normal, braking according to the QRH and the possibility of blown tires and directional control issues if the main wheels lock up. FO did a great job managing the threats, slowed and became stable early for the approach. At 500 ft. and approximately 30 seconds prior to landing, I made the PA, brace, brace, brace. FO flew a stable descent and touched down on center line and in the touch down zone where I manually deployed the speed brakes. Maximum reverse thrust was selected, and light steady braking was used after the nose wheel touched down. I assumed command of the aircraft at about 80 kts. and kept maximum reverse thrust in until around 40-50 kts. We vacated the Runway at XX and taxied on to X where the PA, remain seated, remain seated was made. Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) responders met the aircraft and confirmed all looks normal and would follow us to the gate and check the brake temps after we parked. Brake temps were confirmed all normal after parking. The entire crew did an outstanding job preparing and executing on this situation. In the end we were able to manage the threats properly, execute a safe operation by minimizing any errors and prepared for the possibility of a non-normal landing according to our training. After we parked, Maintenance reviewed the faults and again came up with a transducer #2 fault. They assured me anti skid was indeed operative and decided to MEL the auto brake system for our next flight from ZZZ- ZZZ2 without any lengthy investigative work on the ANTI SKID INOP issues. I agreed to take the aircraft with the auto brakes MELed. On the next flight, once again the ANTI SKID INOP light was extinguished on departure but illuminated again when the gear was requested up and extinguished when the gear handle was placed to off. On this flight we suspected the anti skid was working after the assurance from ZZZ Maintenance and continued with the AUTO BRAKE DISARM MEL. Landing in ZZZ2 was uneventful. However, I believe this aircraft needs a more thorough review for ANTI SKID INOP issues given the two write ups today for ANTI SKID INOP light illuminating after takeoff. Finally, the FOM was referenced for required reports but we never did call the Chief Pilot before continuing our next flight from ZZZ to ZZZ2 due to time. However, we self-assessed as a crew and both felt comfortable continuing our day and final leg of the trip."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Prior to takeoff in ZZZ1, THE ANTI SKID INOP light was not illuminated. After takeoff from Runway XXR in ZZZ1, pilot flying (PF) requested gear up and pilot monitoring (PM) noticed the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminate. Once the after takeoff checklist was called and the gear handle was placed to the off position, the anti-skid light extinguished. At cruise, the auto brakes were selected to 1, 2, and 3 to check for proper operation due to previous write ups and the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminated and did not go away. The QRH was referenced regarding both ANTI SKID INOP and AUTO BRAKE DISARM. With the possibility of a possible ANTI SKID failure, as a crew we discussed our options with an anti skid failure and felt continuing to ZZZ was okay with good weather, long runways and a lighter weight and speed on landing. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were contacted to discuss the possibility of an anti skid system failure. Maintenance Control agreed with the Captain that there is a distinct possibility that the anti skid system could be INOP. We decided the ANTI SKID INOP QRH took precedent over the AUTO BRAKE DISARM QRH and planned for the possibility of an ANTI SKID INOP with no auto brakes on landing. Additional thoughts were that if the gear handle was placed to the down position on arrival and the ANTI SKID INOP light returned, we would be prepared. With the possibility of hot brakes, blown tires and a loss of control without anti skid, it was decided that we would [request priority handling], continue to ZZZ and request to land on the longest Runway XX in ZZZ. The flight attendants were then brought into the loop and were given information and a briefing. At this point we had 90 minutes until landing and we discussed that we would prepare the cabin for a [priority] landing and possible evacuation when we had 45 minutes prior to landing. At 45 minutes prior to landing, the Captain made a PA to the passengers explaining the mechanical issue we were experiencing and that the flight attendants would be preparing the cabin for a [priority] landing in addition to assuring them that we fully expected this landing to be normal but we are going to prepare for a [priority] landing. PF and PM reviewed the ANTI SKID INOP QRH and performed a thorough threat briefing to include a flaps 40 landing, the non-normal landing distance chart, an early stable approach, PA announcements, touching down in the touchdown zone, manual speed brake deployment, use of max reverse thrust longer than normal, braking according to the QRH and the possibility of blown tires and directional control issues if the main wheels lock up. Aircraft was slowed and became stable early for the approach. At 500 ft. and approximately 30 seconds prior to landing, the Captain made the PA brace, brace, brace. A stable descent resulted in a touch down on center line and in the touch down zone where the Captain manually deployed the speed brakes. Maximum reverse thrust was selected and light steady braking was used after the nose wheel touched down. The Captain assumed command of the aircraft at about 80 kts. and kept maximum reverse thrust in until around 40-50 kts. We vacated the runway at XX and taxied on to X where the PA, remain seated, remain seated was made. Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) responders met the aircraft and confirmed all looked normal and would follow us to the gate and check the brake temps after we parked. Brake temps were confirmed all normal after parking. The entire crew did an outstanding job preparing and executing on this situation. In the end we were able to manage the threats properly, execute a safe operation by minimizing any errors and prepared for the possibility of a non-normal landing according to our training."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nPrior to takeoff in ZZZ1, THE ANTI SKID INOP light was not illuminated. After takeoff from Runway XXR in ZZZ, First Officer (FO) requested gear up and I noticed the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminated. Once the after takeoff checklist was called and the gear handle was placed to the off position, the anti-skid light extinguished. At cruise, the auto brakes were selected to 1, 2, and 3 to check for proper operation due to previous write ups and the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminated and did not go away. Previous write-ups from today and Day 0 confirmed that this was a chronic issue with the auto brakes but did not reference the anti-skid system being inop. The previous write up from today also referenced a transducer #2 fault. The QRH was referenced regarding both ANTI SKID INOP and AUTO BRAKE DISARM. With the possibility of another transducer fault or a possible ANTI SKID failure, as a crew we discussed our options with an ANTI SKID failure and felt continuing to ZZZ was okay with good weather, long runways and a lighter weight and speed on landing. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were contacted to discuss the possibility of an anti skid system failure. Maintenance Control agreed with the Captain that there is a distinct possibility that the anti skid system is not working given the recent history of write ups along with the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminating now. We decided the ANTI SKID INOP QRH took precedent over the AUTO BRAKE DISARM QRH and planned for the possibility of an ANTI SKID INOP with no auto brakes on landing. My additional thoughts were that if the gear handle was placed to the down position on arrival and the ANTI SKID INOP light returned, we would be prepared. Further, with the two previous write ups including a transducer fault, it was a distinct possibility that the anti skid system was INOP. With the possibility of hot brakes, blown tires and a loss of directional control after landing without anti skid, it was decided that we would [request priority handling], continue to ZZZ and request to land on the longest Runway XX in ZZZ. The flight attendants including Purser Person A were then brought into the loop and were given information and a briefing. At this point we had 90 minutes until landing and we discussed that we would prepare the cabin for a [priority] landing and possible evacuation when we had 45 minutes prior to landing. At 45 minutes prior to landing, I made a PA to the passengers explaining the mechanical issue we were experiencing and that the flight attendants would be preparing the cabin for a [priority] landing in addition to assuring them that we fully expected this landing to be normal but we are going to prepare for a [priority] landing as a precaution. FO and I reviewed the ANTI SKID INOP QRH and performed a thorough threat briefing to include a flaps 40 landing, the non-normal landing distance chart, an early stable approach, Captain PA announcements, touching down in the touchdown zone, manual speed brake deployment, use of max reverse thrust longer than normal, braking according to the QRH and the possibility of blown tires and directional control issues if the main wheels lock up. FO did a great job managing the threats, slowed and became stable early for the approach. At 500 ft. and approximately 30 seconds prior to landing, I made the PA, brace, brace, brace. FO flew a stable descent and touched down on center line and in the touch down zone where I manually deployed the speed brakes. Maximum reverse thrust was selected, and light steady braking was used after the nose wheel touched down. I assumed command of the aircraft at about 80 kts. and kept maximum reverse thrust in until around 40-50 kts. We vacated the Runway at XX and taxied on to X where the PA, remain seated, remain seated was made. Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) responders met the aircraft and confirmed all looks normal and would follow us to the gate and check the brake temps after we parked. Brake temps were confirmed all normal after parking. The entire crew did an outstanding job preparing and executing on this situation. In the end we were able to manage the threats properly, execute a safe operation by minimizing any errors and prepared for the possibility of a non-normal landing according to our training. After we parked, Maintenance reviewed the faults and again came up with a transducer #2 fault. They assured me anti skid was indeed operative and decided to MEL the auto brake system for our next flight from ZZZ- ZZZ2 without any lengthy investigative work on the ANTI SKID INOP issues. I agreed to take the aircraft with the auto brakes MELed. On the next flight, once again the ANTI SKID INOP light was extinguished on departure but illuminated again when the gear was requested up and extinguished when the gear handle was placed to off. On this flight we suspected the anti skid was working after the assurance from ZZZ Maintenance and continued with the AUTO BRAKE DISARM MEL. Landing in ZZZ2 was uneventful. However, I believe this aircraft needs a more thorough review for ANTI SKID INOP issues given the two write ups today for ANTI SKID INOP light illuminating after takeoff. Finally, the FOM was referenced for required reports but we never did call the Chief Pilot before continuing our next flight from ZZZ to ZZZ2 due to time. However, we self-assessed as a crew and both felt comfortable continuing our day and final leg of the trip.\n\nNarrative 2\nPrior to takeoff in ZZZ1, THE ANTI SKID INOP light was not illuminated. After takeoff from Runway XXR in ZZZ1, pilot flying (PF) requested gear up and pilot monitoring (PM) noticed the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminate. Once the after takeoff checklist was called and the gear handle was placed to the off position, the anti-skid light extinguished. At cruise, the auto brakes were selected to 1, 2, and 3 to check for proper operation due to previous write ups and the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminated and did not go away. The QRH was referenced regarding both ANTI SKID INOP and AUTO BRAKE DISARM. With the possibility of a possible ANTI SKID failure, as a crew we discussed our options with an anti skid failure and felt continuing to ZZZ was okay with good weather, long runways and a lighter weight and speed on landing. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were contacted to discuss the possibility of an anti skid system failure. Maintenance Control agreed with the Captain that there is a distinct possibility that the anti skid system could be INOP. We decided the ANTI SKID INOP QRH took precedent over the AUTO BRAKE DISARM QRH and planned for the possibility of an ANTI SKID INOP with no auto brakes on landing. Additional thoughts were that if the gear handle was placed to the down position on arrival and the ANTI SKID INOP light returned, we would be prepared. With the possibility of hot brakes, blown tires and a loss of control without anti skid, it was decided that we would [request priority handling], continue to ZZZ and request to land on the longest Runway XX in ZZZ. The flight attendants were then brought into the loop and were given information and a briefing. At this point we had 90 minutes until landing and we discussed that we would prepare the cabin for a [priority] landing and possible evacuation when we had 45 minutes prior to landing. At 45 minutes prior to landing, the Captain made a PA to the passengers explaining the mechanical issue we were experiencing and that the flight attendants would be preparing the cabin for a [priority] landing in addition to assuring them that we fully expected this landing to be normal but we are going to prepare for a [priority] landing. PF and PM reviewed the ANTI SKID INOP QRH and performed a thorough threat briefing to include a flaps 40 landing, the non-normal landing distance chart, an early stable approach, PA announcements, touching down in the touchdown zone, manual speed brake deployment, use of max reverse thrust longer than normal, braking according to the QRH and the possibility of blown tires and directional control issues if the main wheels lock up. Aircraft was slowed and became stable early for the approach. At 500 ft. and approximately 30 seconds prior to landing, the Captain made the PA brace, brace, brace. A stable descent resulted in a touch down on center line and in the touch down zone where the Captain manually deployed the speed brakes. Maximum reverse thrust was selected and light steady braking was used after the nose wheel touched down. The Captain assumed command of the aircraft at about 80 kts. and kept maximum reverse thrust in until around 40-50 kts. We vacated the runway at XX and taxied on to X where the PA, remain seated, remain seated was made. Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) responders met the aircraft and confirmed all looked normal and would follow us to the gate and check the brake temps after we parked. Brake temps were confirmed all normal after parking. The entire crew did an outstanding job preparing and executing on this situation. In the end we were able to manage the threats properly, execute a safe operation by minimizing any errors and prepared for the possibility of a non-normal landing according to our training.",
    "synopsis": "B737 flight crew reported anti skid system failure after selecting gear up. The flight crew ran the QRH and checklists, then checked the autobrake system, which also failed. The flight crew continued to destination airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=58",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 58,
      "pageEnd": 61,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=58",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 58,
        "pageEnd": 61,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1993175 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737 flight crew reported anti skid system failure after selecting gear up. The flight crew ran the QRH and checklists, then checked the autobrake system, which also failed. The flight crew continued to destination airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1992246",
    "date": "2023-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "A319"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "At approximately FL350 in cruise, the ECAM HYD Y RSVR LO LVL appeared. ECAM actions were followed and after completion, the ECAM HYD Y ENG 2 PUMP LO PR appeared due to turning off the Eng 2 Pump as directed by the first ECAM. After completing the ECAM, Dispatch was contacted and Maintenance Control was patched in. After consultation with Dispatch and Maintenance Control and discussion amongst fellow crew members, the decision was made to return to ZZZ. [Priority handling was requested]. While in the turn the flight attendants were called and given a briefing. Shortly after, a PA was made to the passengers briefly explaining the situation and that we would be returning to ZZZ. As the ride was smooth, the FAs (Flight Attendant) were permitted to finish the service that they had already started in order to give a sense of normalcy and calmness in the cabin. Once the 180-[turn] was completed, ATC provided a route direct to ZZZ where we advised that we would require Runway XXR for landing due to its length. After making the turn back to ZZZ, we realized that the aircraft would be overweight upon landing so a descent to FL240 was requested from and granted by ATC. This was due to attempting to burn as much fuel as possible to be as close as possible to maximum landing weight upon arrival. The Overweight Landing Checklist was completed while still in cruise back to ZZZ. Landing distance was calculated by both Dispatch and myself and the values came to within approximately 200 ft. of each other at around 8,500 ft. This gross error check satisfied us that the calculations were accurate. While in cruise back to ZZZ, discussions were had regarding status page notes and stopping technique. It was noticed during discussion of status page notes that the ECAM had the crew turn on the electric yellow hydraulic pump during the approach phase while neither of the non-normal checklists in the FM (Flight Manual) contained that procedure. As the accumulator pressure was dropping slowly and the concern of losing any remaining fluid existed, the decision was made to follow the status notes in the FM non-normals section and not turn on the yellow electric pump during approach. A normal approach briefing then took place. Once the aircraft neared ZZZ, ATC provided vectors overhead for a right downwind to [Runway] XXR. The aircraft was configured early due to flap movement being slow and the desire to have extra altitude in the event another malfunction occurred. We were then vectored for approximately a 15-mile final where a visual approach was conducted. The autopilot was selected off at approximately the FAF to get a feel of how the aircraft would handle while having the yellow hydraulic system inoperative. A normal landing was made and the aircraft exited at Taxiway XX. After exiting the runway the aircraft was stopped and emergency vehicles surveyed the aircraft. Ground personnel advised that there was no evidence of hydraulic fluid on the aircraft. Emergency vehicles then cleared and the aircraft was taxied to the ramp where the engines were shut down and a tow-in was made to the final parking spot. Prior to the tow-in, the yellow electric pump was turned on momentarily to charge the accumulator in order to set the parking brake prior to shutting down engines and completing as much of a normal procedure as possible. After turning on the yellow electric pump, the hydraulic SD page was referenced and we noticed that the fluid quantity had dropped slightly. This led me to believe that if the pump was turned on according to the ECAM status notes during the approach phase and not left off according to the FM non-normal status notes, that all remaining fluid would have been lost. After shutting down the engines and waiting for the Tow Team to connect to the aircraft, it was discovered that the Tow Team did not have a headset available to communicate to the cockpit with. Instead, the busy Ramp frequency was used to communicate with the Tow Team, which led to confusion and a slight delay in getting the aircraft to the gate. After completion of the parking checklist, appropriate maintenance write-ups were made and debriefings took place with the crew, Operations Control Flight Operations Representative, and Chief Pilot."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAt approximately FL350 in cruise, the ECAM HYD Y RSVR LO LVL appeared. ECAM actions were followed and after completion, the ECAM HYD Y ENG 2 PUMP LO PR appeared due to turning off the Eng 2 Pump as directed by the first ECAM. After completing the ECAM, Dispatch was contacted and Maintenance Control was patched in. After consultation with Dispatch and Maintenance Control and discussion amongst fellow crew members, the decision was made to return to ZZZ. [Priority handling was requested]. While in the turn the flight attendants were called and given a briefing. Shortly after, a PA was made to the passengers briefly explaining the situation and that we would be returning to ZZZ. As the ride was smooth, the FAs (Flight Attendant) were permitted to finish the service that they had already started in order to give a sense of normalcy and calmness in the cabin. Once the 180-[turn] was completed, ATC provided a route direct to ZZZ where we advised that we would require Runway XXR for landing due to its length. After making the turn back to ZZZ, we realized that the aircraft would be overweight upon landing so a descent to FL240 was requested from and granted by ATC. This was due to attempting to burn as much fuel as possible to be as close as possible to maximum landing weight upon arrival. The Overweight Landing Checklist was completed while still in cruise back to ZZZ. Landing distance was calculated by both Dispatch and myself and the values came to within approximately 200 ft. of each other at around 8,500 ft. This gross error check satisfied us that the calculations were accurate. While in cruise back to ZZZ, discussions were had regarding status page notes and stopping technique. It was noticed during discussion of status page notes that the ECAM had the crew turn on the electric yellow hydraulic pump during the approach phase while neither of the non-normal checklists in the FM (Flight Manual) contained that procedure. As the accumulator pressure was dropping slowly and the concern of losing any remaining fluid existed, the decision was made to follow the status notes in the FM non-normals section and not turn on the yellow electric pump during approach. A normal approach briefing then took place. Once the aircraft neared ZZZ, ATC provided vectors overhead for a right downwind to [Runway] XXR. The aircraft was configured early due to flap movement being slow and the desire to have extra altitude in the event another malfunction occurred. We were then vectored for approximately a 15-mile final where a visual approach was conducted. The autopilot was selected off at approximately the FAF to get a feel of how the aircraft would handle while having the yellow hydraulic system inoperative. A normal landing was made and the aircraft exited at Taxiway XX. After exiting the runway the aircraft was stopped and emergency vehicles surveyed the aircraft. Ground personnel advised that there was no evidence of hydraulic fluid on the aircraft. Emergency vehicles then cleared and the aircraft was taxied to the ramp where the engines were shut down and a tow-in was made to the final parking spot. Prior to the tow-in, the yellow electric pump was turned on momentarily to charge the accumulator in order to set the parking brake prior to shutting down engines and completing as much of a normal procedure as possible. After turning on the yellow electric pump, the hydraulic SD page was referenced and we noticed that the fluid quantity had dropped slightly. This led me to believe that if the pump was turned on according to the ECAM status notes during the approach phase and not left off according to the FM non-normal status notes, that all remaining fluid would have been lost. After shutting down the engines and waiting for the Tow Team to connect to the aircraft, it was discovered that the Tow Team did not have a headset available to communicate to the cockpit with. Instead, the busy Ramp frequency was used to communicate with the Tow Team, which led to confusion and a slight delay in getting the aircraft to the gate. After completion of the parking checklist, appropriate maintenance write-ups were made and debriefings took place with the crew, Operations Control Flight Operations Representative, and Chief Pilot.",
    "synopsis": "A319 Captain reported that the ECAM HYD Y RSVR LO LVL appeared while in cruise. As the flight crew ran and followed the QRH and checklists, there was confusion regarding a procedure with a hydraulic pump. After consulting with Dispatch and Maintenance Control, the flight crew performed an air turnback.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=62",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 62,
      "pageEnd": 64,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=62",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 62,
        "pageEnd": 64,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1992246 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "A319 Captain reported that the ECAM HYD Y RSVR LO LVL appeared while in cruise. As the flight crew ran and followed the QRH and checklists, there was confusion regarding a procedure with a hydraulic pump. After consulting with Dispatch and Maintenance Control, the flight crew performed an air turnback.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1971341",
    "date": "2023-02",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Prior to departure, I discovered chips in the #13 and #15 N1 Fan Blade. This was written up following standard protocol. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and completed their procedures in order to return the aircraft to service. The flight continued as planned. In cruise an abnormal vibration was observed in the #2 Engine. This vibration was only an indication on the EICAS screen and was going from green to occasional yellow indication, but did not produce an EICAS Message/Caution/Warning. An exchange of flight controls occurred and the QRH procedure was followed for High Vibrations in the Engine. A few minutes after the QRH procedure was completed for Engine Vibration, a thud was heard from the right side of the airplane and N1 began decreasing. Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) then appeared to be increasing rapidly and was observed giving a Red indication. While I was watching the ITT rise, the Captain went right to securing the Engine, rather than running the QRC. We began a descent to a lower altitude, and controls were transferred over to the First Officer (FO). Following that, the Captain ran the QRH one engine inoperative approach and landing. In doing so, the QRC was missed for suspected engine damage. The QRH procedure was completed for single engine approach and landing. A diversion to ZZZ1 was decided and a landing was accomplished at the diversion airport without issue. Improper use of checklist. Speaking up when things appear to be done improperly is of upmost importance. Keep in mind standard procedure/protocol in emergencies. In post flight debriefing, it was decided that we actually should have suspected engine damage, rather than simply an engine failure. If something isn't completed in the proper order, I need to speak up. I should have said something and went back into querying about doing the QRC for suspected damage in flight"
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "While preparing for departure the First Officer (FO) noticed a few nicks on Engine 2 N1 blades. I entered a discrepancy in the Maintenance log, ZZZ line Maintenance repaired the aircraft and returned it to service. While enroute we got an abnormal vibration on Engine 2. I turned the flight controls over to the FO and ran QRH ENGINE ABNORMAL VIBRATION. This fixed the problem. I took the controls back and we continued the cruise uneventfully for about 15 minutes. After that time Engine 2 made a popping noise, N1 spooled down, and an amber FAIL icon displayed over the Engine 2 N1 gauge. I again turned the controls over to the FO. Since there was rotation in both N1 and N2, I incorrectly thought that there was no engine damage and consequentially did not run the ENGINE FIRE, SEVERE DAMAGE, OR SEPARATION QRC. I was instead looking for the ENGINE 2 FAIL QRH. As I was doing this, I noticed the Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) rising rapidly to the Red Line, and went directly to securing the engine. I did this without running the QRH because of the time pressure that the rapidly rising ITT created. After securing the engine we [requested priority handling] and diverted to ZZZ1. During the descent I ran the ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE APPROACH AND LANDING QRH. We asked for Crash Fire and Rescue (CFR) to be available on landing to ensure the aircraft was safe to taxi to the gate. We landed uneventfully. After CFR verified the aircraft was safe to taxi, we proceeded to the gate and deplaned. There were no passenger injuries, and I did not observe any video being recorded. In hindsight, my assessment of severe engine damage was incorrect. Since I did not know why the engine shut down, I should have considered it severely damaged and run the ENGINE FIRE, SEVERE DAMAGE, SEPARATION QRC. Additionally, I allowed the rapidly rising ITT influence my decision making towards turning the engine off rapidly to avoid an exceedance when I should have slowed down, allowed the exceedance and run the QRC. This self-imposed time pressure caused me to secure the engine without verification. Running the QRC gets one into the normal engine failure procedures and cadence."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nPrior to departure, I discovered chips in the #13 and #15 N1 Fan Blade. This was written up following standard protocol. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and completed their procedures in order to return the aircraft to service. The flight continued as planned. In cruise an abnormal vibration was observed in the #2 Engine. This vibration was only an indication on the EICAS screen and was going from green to occasional yellow indication, but did not produce an EICAS Message/Caution/Warning. An exchange of flight controls occurred and the QRH procedure was followed for High Vibrations in the Engine. A few minutes after the QRH procedure was completed for Engine Vibration, a thud was heard from the right side of the airplane and N1 began decreasing. Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) then appeared to be increasing rapidly and was observed giving a Red indication. While I was watching the ITT rise, the Captain went right to securing the Engine, rather than running the QRC. We began a descent to a lower altitude, and controls were transferred over to the First Officer (FO). Following that, the Captain ran the QRH one engine inoperative approach and landing. In doing so, the QRC was missed for suspected engine damage. The QRH procedure was completed for single engine approach and landing. A diversion to ZZZ1 was decided and a landing was accomplished at the diversion airport without issue. Improper use of checklist. Speaking up when things appear to be done improperly is of upmost importance. Keep in mind standard procedure/protocol in emergencies. In post flight debriefing, it was decided that we actually should have suspected engine damage, rather than simply an engine failure. If something isn't completed in the proper order, I need to speak up. I should have said something and went back into querying about doing the QRC for suspected damage in flight\n\nNarrative 2\nWhile preparing for departure the First Officer (FO) noticed a few nicks on Engine 2 N1 blades. I entered a discrepancy in the Maintenance log, ZZZ line Maintenance repaired the aircraft and returned it to service. While enroute we got an abnormal vibration on Engine 2. I turned the flight controls over to the FO and ran QRH ENGINE ABNORMAL VIBRATION. This fixed the problem. I took the controls back and we continued the cruise uneventfully for about 15 minutes. After that time Engine 2 made a popping noise, N1 spooled down, and an amber FAIL icon displayed over the Engine 2 N1 gauge. I again turned the controls over to the FO. Since there was rotation in both N1 and N2, I incorrectly thought that there was no engine damage and consequentially did not run the ENGINE FIRE, SEVERE DAMAGE, OR SEPARATION QRC. I was instead looking for the ENGINE 2 FAIL QRH. As I was doing this, I noticed the Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) rising rapidly to the Red Line, and went directly to securing the engine. I did this without running the QRH because of the time pressure that the rapidly rising ITT created. After securing the engine we [requested priority handling] and diverted to ZZZ1. During the descent I ran the ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE APPROACH AND LANDING QRH. We asked for Crash Fire and Rescue (CFR) to be available on landing to ensure the aircraft was safe to taxi to the gate. We landed uneventfully. After CFR verified the aircraft was safe to taxi, we proceeded to the gate and deplaned. There were no passenger injuries, and I did not observe any video being recorded. In hindsight, my assessment of severe engine damage was incorrect. Since I did not know why the engine shut down, I should have considered it severely damaged and run the ENGINE FIRE, SEVERE DAMAGE, SEPARATION QRC. Additionally, I allowed the rapidly rising ITT influence my decision making towards turning the engine off rapidly to avoid an exceedance when I should have slowed down, allowed the exceedance and run the QRC. This self-imposed time pressure caused me to secure the engine without verification. Running the QRC gets one into the normal engine failure procedures and cadence.",
    "synopsis": "ERJ 170/175 Flight Crew reported Engine #2 vibrations in flight. The Flight Crew ran the checklist and QRH, solving the vibration problem. Engine #2 then failed. The Flight Crew performed an in flight shut down, and diverted to make a precautionary landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=69",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 69,
      "pageEnd": 72,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=69",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 69,
        "pageEnd": 72,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1971341 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "ERJ 170/175 Flight Crew reported Engine #2 vibrations in flight. The Flight Crew ran the checklist and QRH, solving the vibration problem. Engine #2 then failed. The Flight Crew performed an in flight shut down, and diverted to make a precautionary landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1965134",
    "date": "2023-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Cabin Altitude Warning at FL330. 5 minutes into cruise at FL330 the Master Caution Illuminated and Cabin ALT Illuminated. I looked at Cabin Altitude and it was at 10,000 ft. We donned oxygen masks and carried out an emergency descent to 10,000 ft. During climb the pressurization was checked at 5,000, 10,000 and 18,000 ft. Both pilots recall the cabin being at 5,000 ft. with no climb and needles split. After the level off at 10 000 ft., we noticed the Pressure Source Selector was in OFF. It was selected to normal and the pressurization appeared to function normally. A return to ZZZ for a normal landing was completed and Maintenance called."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Cabin Attitude Warning at flight level 330 in early cruise. Cabin Altitude was checked 5,000, 10,000 and 18,000 ft. and the cabin altitude was set to 5,000 ft. and a differential was noticed. Noticed Cabin Altitude was 10,000 ft. and climbing, executed an immediate decent. After level off at 10,000 ft. we noticed the Pressure Source Selector was off. Once selected to normal, the Cabin Pressure appeared to function as normal. Continued back to ZZZ for a Maintenance inspection."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nCabin Altitude Warning at FL330. 5 minutes into cruise at FL330 the Master Caution Illuminated and Cabin ALT Illuminated. I looked at Cabin Altitude and it was at 10,000 ft. We donned oxygen masks and carried out an emergency descent to 10,000 ft. During climb the pressurization was checked at 5,000, 10,000 and 18,000 ft. Both pilots recall the cabin being at 5,000 ft. with no climb and needles split. After the level off at 10 000 ft., we noticed the Pressure Source Selector was in OFF. It was selected to normal and the pressurization appeared to function normally. A return to ZZZ for a normal landing was completed and Maintenance called.\n\nNarrative 2\nCabin Attitude Warning at flight level 330 in early cruise. Cabin Altitude was checked 5,000, 10,000 and 18,000 ft. and the cabin altitude was set to 5,000 ft. and a differential was noticed. Noticed Cabin Altitude was 10,000 ft. and climbing, executed an immediate decent. After level off at 10,000 ft. we noticed the Pressure Source Selector was off. Once selected to normal, the Cabin Pressure appeared to function as normal. Continued back to ZZZ for a Maintenance inspection.",
    "synopsis": "C560 Flight Crew reported 5 minutes into cruise at FL330 the Master Caution Illuminated and Cabin ALT Illuminated. The Flight Crew requested priority handling and descended, donning oxygen masks. After running the QRH, the Pressurization Control Source Selector was placed in normal and pressurization control was regained. The Flight Crew elected to perform an air turn back and land at departure airport for maintenance.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=73",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 73,
      "pageEnd": 75,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=73",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 73,
        "pageEnd": 75,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "Cabin-altitude warning with pressure source selected off",
    "summary": "A Citation crew received a cabin-altitude warning in cruise, donned oxygen masks, and made an emergency descent. After leveling at 10,000 feet, the crew found the pressure-source selector off; selecting normal restored apparent pressurization function, and the crew returned for a maintenance inspection.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Procedures",
      "Equipment"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1942258",
    "date": "2022-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "When we boarded the plane in ZZZ1 we noticed that the night before the plane had been written up for a large fuel imbalance during the flight that night. The write up had been checked and signed off so I noted the issue but felt since it had been signed off that it was safe to fly. We then departed for ZZZ2 with no issues during departure. During cruise approximately 1:30 into the flight, I noticed a 500 pound imbalance in the left wing from the right wing while still using center tank fuel. We discussed the possibility of a fuel leak since a similar write up had been made on the plane the night before. We had received a \"using reserve fuel\" on the FMC and the left side wing tank had 8.12 versus the right side of 8.52. The center tank had approximately 1.1-1.4 and since we were still using center tank fuel we knew that the left side should not have been reduced at that point. We talked with the Flight Attendants and had them inspect the wing for any fuel that could be coming out of the wing or engine spar. They reported that nothing appeared to be coming out of the wing. We then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and felt it was best to divert to ZZZ. After beginning to divert we used the remaining center tank fuel at which point the left wing fuel began to drastically drop (approximately 400 pounds in about 5 minutes). At this point we decided to run the fuel leak checklist which recommended that we shut down the engine. We did that and requested priority handling. We then ran the appropriate engine out checklists and proceeded to land in ZZZ with no further incident."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "The aircraft had overnighted in ZZZ1 and had been written up and serviced for a fuel imbalance on the inbound flight. The logbook had been closed out properly and signed off. We departed out of ZZZ1 without any issues and climbed to FL350. While at cruise (approximately 1.5 hours into flight) the Captain noticed we had a fuel Imbalance while we were still operating out of the center wing tank. We had received a \"using reserve fuel\" on the FMC. The left side wing tank had 8.12 versus the right side of 8.52. center tank had approximately 1.1-1.4. We started discussing the possibility of us losing fuel on the left side. I began logging our fuel imbalance. XA55 - LT 8.12/ RT 8.52. We ensured that the appropriate fuel pumps were on and that the cross feed was closed. We coordinated with the Flight Attendants and had them inspect the wing for any fuel that could be coming out of the wing or engine spar. They reported that nothing appeared to be coming out of the wing. At this point we were monitoring the fuel imbalance and began looking at the flight manual for a potential fuel leak checklist as well as considering drift down altitudes and diversion options and contingencies. By XB11 our fuel imbalance was LT 8.01/RT 8.51. At this point we had used all center wing tank fuel and had started operating from the wing tanks. The left tank fuel was leaving the tank distinctly faster than the right tank and both engine fuel flow rates were relatively similar and normal. XB15 - LT 7.85/ RT 8.28. By this point we had already made the decision to divert to ZZZ. While heading south we separated duties. I flew while the Captain coordinated with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. In their discussion they had recommended we follow the appropriate QRH. XB24 - LT 7.34/ RT 7.74. We remained at FL350 while preceding south to ZZZ until we got to the point in the checklist where we needed to shutdown and secure the left side engine for a suspected fuel leak. The Captain continued to run the checklist and set us up for the single engine approach and landing. We coordinated with ZZZ ATC and requested priority handling and proceeded in through the arrival (originally cleared ZZZZZ 3 arrival). As we got closer to ZZZ we got assigned direct to the field and then vectors for a left downwind for XXL. We transferred fight controls so the Captain could make the landing. The First Officer (FO) completed the remainder of the checklist, securing the pneumatics and the deferred landing checklist. The approach was visual and the landing was safe and without incident. We stopped off the runway at XX and coordinated with CFR and had our left engine inspected for any fuel leakage before proceeding to the gate without any further incident."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhen we boarded the plane in ZZZ1 we noticed that the night before the plane had been written up for a large fuel imbalance during the flight that night. The write up had been checked and signed off so I noted the issue but felt since it had been signed off that it was safe to fly. We then departed for ZZZ2 with no issues during departure. During cruise approximately 1:30 into the flight, I noticed a 500 pound imbalance in the left wing from the right wing while still using center tank fuel. We discussed the possibility of a fuel leak since a similar write up had been made on the plane the night before. We had received a \"using reserve fuel\" on the FMC and the left side wing tank had 8.12 versus the right side of 8.52. The center tank had approximately 1.1-1.4 and since we were still using center tank fuel we knew that the left side should not have been reduced at that point. We talked with the Flight Attendants and had them inspect the wing for any fuel that could be coming out of the wing or engine spar. They reported that nothing appeared to be coming out of the wing. We then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and felt it was best to divert to ZZZ. After beginning to divert we used the remaining center tank fuel at which point the left wing fuel began to drastically drop (approximately 400 pounds in about 5 minutes). At this point we decided to run the fuel leak checklist which recommended that we shut down the engine. We did that and requested priority handling. We then ran the appropriate engine out checklists and proceeded to land in ZZZ with no further incident.\n\nNarrative 2\nThe aircraft had overnighted in ZZZ1 and had been written up and serviced for a fuel imbalance on the inbound flight. The logbook had been closed out properly and signed off. We departed out of ZZZ1 without any issues and climbed to FL350. While at cruise (approximately 1.5 hours into flight) the Captain noticed we had a fuel Imbalance while we were still operating out of the center wing tank. We had received a \"using reserve fuel\" on the FMC. The left side wing tank had 8.12 versus the right side of 8.52. center tank had approximately 1.1-1.4. We started discussing the possibility of us losing fuel on the left side. I began logging our fuel imbalance. XA55 - LT 8.12/ RT 8.52. We ensured that the appropriate fuel pumps were on and that the cross feed was closed. We coordinated with the Flight Attendants and had them inspect the wing for any fuel that could be coming out of the wing or engine spar. They reported that nothing appeared to be coming out of the wing. At this point we were monitoring the fuel imbalance and began looking at the flight manual for a potential fuel leak checklist as well as considering drift down altitudes and diversion options and contingencies. By XB11 our fuel imbalance was LT 8.01/RT 8.51. At this point we had used all center wing tank fuel and had started operating from the wing tanks. The left tank fuel was leaving the tank distinctly faster than the right tank and both engine fuel flow rates were relatively similar and normal. XB15 - LT 7.85/ RT 8.28. By this point we had already made the decision to divert to ZZZ. While heading south we separated duties. I flew while the Captain coordinated with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. In their discussion they had recommended we follow the appropriate QRH. XB24 - LT 7.34/ RT 7.74. We remained at FL350 while preceding south to ZZZ until we got to the point in the checklist where we needed to shutdown and secure the left side engine for a suspected fuel leak. The Captain continued to run the checklist and set us up for the single engine approach and landing. We coordinated with ZZZ ATC and requested priority handling and proceeded in through the arrival (originally cleared ZZZZZ 3 arrival). As we got closer to ZZZ we got assigned direct to the field and then vectors for a left downwind for XXL. We transferred fight controls so the Captain could make the landing. The First Officer (FO) completed the remainder of the checklist, securing the pneumatics and the deferred landing checklist. The approach was visual and the landing was safe and without incident. We stopped off the runway at XX and coordinated with CFR and had our left engine inspected for any fuel leakage before proceeding to the gate without any further incident.",
    "synopsis": "Flight Crew reported a fuel imbalance that increased in flight. The Flight Crew ran the checklists and QRH. An in flight shut down of the left engine was accomplished and a request for priority handling was made. The Flight Crew elected to divert and make a precautionary landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=76",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 76,
      "pageEnd": 78,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=76",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 76,
        "pageEnd": 78,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1942258 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Flight Crew reported a fuel imbalance that increased in flight. The Flight Crew ran the checklists and QRH. An in flight shut down of the left engine was accomplished and a request for priority handling was made. The Flight Crew elected to divert and make a precautionary landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1935229",
    "date": "2022-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During climbout from ZZZ, flashing alert box for engine indications began and observed oil quantity had decreased to 13%. First Officer retarded the thrust lever and oil quantity indication returned to normal. We discussed gulping. Attempted to advance thrust level again past 82ish%, and again oil quantity decreased and engine alert box flashed. We made other attempts to advance thrust level, both level at 10000 ft. and 15000 ft. Both attempts yielded the same rapidly decreasing oil quantity. We referenced Quick Reference Handbook (QRH); however, there was no guidance. Made the decision to divert to ZZZ1 as we were essentially over the airport. Elected to not shut down engine due to normal engine indications at the lower power level. Diversion and landing were uneventful."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "During initial climb it was observed that the right engine oil quantity indications were decreasing and low. The flashing alert box began flashing and we soon observed the right engine oil quantity showing as low as 13% and decreasing. I disconnected the autothrottles, left the autopilot engaged and informed the Captain that I would decrease power and decrease pitch attitude. Upon decreasing power below approximately 82% N1 it was observed that right engine quantity levels began to return to normal readings. We tested our hypothesis by increasing the engine power above 85% to see if the oil quantity level on the right engine would decrease. We increased and decreased engine power three times, and each time right engine oil quantity decreased when power was increased beyond 85% N1. These attempts happened between 10000 ft. and 15000 ft. After referencing the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and discussion we made the decision to divert to ZZZ1. We opted to keep the affected engine operating as low power settings showed normal indications. The diversion, descent, approach, landing and taxi to the gate were uneventful."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring climbout from ZZZ, flashing alert box for engine indications began and observed oil quantity had decreased to 13%. First Officer retarded the thrust lever and oil quantity indication returned to normal. We discussed gulping. Attempted to advance thrust level again past 82ish%, and again oil quantity decreased and engine alert box flashed. We made other attempts to advance thrust level, both level at 10000 ft. and 15000 ft. Both attempts yielded the same rapidly decreasing oil quantity. We referenced Quick Reference Handbook (QRH); however, there was no guidance. Made the decision to divert to ZZZ1 as we were essentially over the airport. Elected to not shut down engine due to normal engine indications at the lower power level. Diversion and landing were uneventful.\n\nNarrative 2\nDuring initial climb it was observed that the right engine oil quantity indications were decreasing and low. The flashing alert box began flashing and we soon observed the right engine oil quantity showing as low as 13% and decreasing. I disconnected the autothrottles, left the autopilot engaged and informed the Captain that I would decrease power and decrease pitch attitude. Upon decreasing power below approximately 82% N1 it was observed that right engine quantity levels began to return to normal readings. We tested our hypothesis by increasing the engine power above 85% to see if the oil quantity level on the right engine would decrease. We increased and decreased engine power three times, and each time right engine oil quantity decreased when power was increased beyond 85% N1. These attempts happened between 10000 ft. and 15000 ft. After referencing the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and discussion we made the decision to divert to ZZZ1. We opted to keep the affected engine operating as low power settings showed normal indications. The diversion, descent, approach, landing and taxi to the gate were uneventful.",
    "synopsis": "B737 Flight Crew reported reference to the QRH for engine oil quantity alert failed to provide any situational information, resulting in a diversion.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=79",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 79,
      "pageEnd": 81,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=79",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 79,
        "pageEnd": 81,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1935229 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737 Flight Crew reported reference to the QRH for engine oil quantity alert failed to provide any situational information, resulting in a diversion.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1926048",
    "date": "2022-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While approaching ABQ on the LZZRD 4 to Runway 3, we received L and R GPS INVALID messages. We knew from the NOTAMs that GPS jamming was occurring in the White Sands Missile Range. We complied with the Operational Information guidance found in the back of the QRH and confirmed our position. Shortly thereafter we noticed an amber TERR POS indication on both NDs. Having experienced this before in ELP during jamming operations, I knew we would receive a PULLUP indication on approach at approximately 500 ft. Fortunately, the weather was VMC below 14,000 ft., so we elected to continue our visual approach with TERR INHIBIT selected. During landing rollout, our GPS's came back online and terrain data was once again displayed on our ND's. My concern is that there is no guidance on what to do for a TERR POS indication in the QRH."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile approaching ABQ on the LZZRD 4 to Runway 3, we received L and R GPS INVALID messages. We knew from the NOTAMs that GPS jamming was occurring in the White Sands Missile Range. We complied with the Operational Information guidance found in the back of the QRH and confirmed our position. Shortly thereafter we noticed an amber TERR POS indication on both NDs. Having experienced this before in ELP during jamming operations, I knew we would receive a PULLUP indication on approach at approximately 500 ft. Fortunately, the weather was VMC below 14,000 ft., so we elected to continue our visual approach with TERR INHIBIT selected. During landing rollout, our GPS's came back online and terrain data was once again displayed on our ND's. My concern is that there is no guidance on what to do for a TERR POS indication in the QRH.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier pilot reported GPS Jamming. The reporter also reported a lack of guidance in the QRH when receiving a Terrain Alert while encountering known GPS Jamming.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=82",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 82,
      "pageEnd": 83,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=82",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 82,
        "pageEnd": 83,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "GPS jamming exposes a terrain-alert checklist gap",
    "summary": "A crew approaching ABQ received GPS-invalid and terrain-position indications in an area of advertised GPS jamming. The crew confirmed its position and continued visually with terrain alerts inhibited; the reporting pilot said the handbook lacked guidance for the terrain-position indication.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Equipment",
      "Procedures"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1921992",
    "date": "2022-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Day started with one aircraft that had a maintenance item being worked on by Maintenance. The First Officer (FO) and myself began to set the aircraft up for the flight and then waited for the maintenance crew to complete their service of the aircraft when we were notified of a tail swap. Proceeded as normal on the second aircraft and boarded as per usual. We departed as usual and got a clearance to a fix and up to 13,000 ft. After passing 10,000 ft., we noticed the cabin pressure was not normal and before we knew it Cabin ALT HI EICAS message was up. We followed procedure and donned our masks, I (pilot monitoring (PM)) had called for the QRC as the FO was a little behind calling for it. I told him that he's pilot flying (PF) to descend to 10,000 ft. A moment of stress and confusion to be certain. I followed the checklist and notified ATC a return to ZZZ with a need for some time to set up as assured the FO that he is PF and I will run the checklists as PM. We finished the checklists and noticed the pressurization knob was on LFE (Landing Field Elevation) select and not AUTO. Let's return to this moment a little bit later. We continued configuring the aircraft and noticed normal pressurization on the return to ZZZ, the FO asked if I wanted to fly the aircraft and decided that would be a good decision. We configured the aircraft and set up and briefed the approach and notified ATC we are ready to head towards ZZZ...which resulted in a go around due to tight vectors from ATC to get us in causing us to become unstable. We came back around and landed safely. The moment we noticed the Pressurization Selector knob not in AUTO still dumbfounds both pilots as we are certain that we saw it facing up (auto) earlier but when we questioned each other about it we determined we were not certain if it was that aircraft or the one prior even though flows were done on both aircraft. Possible pilot error. Have a Crew Awareness EICAS message noting the pressurization knob is not in the normal position."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "We received a plane from maintenance due to our originally scheduled aircraft having the NAV lights MELed. The captain and I both did new originating receiving checklists due to getting a new aircraft. Climbing through 9,500 ft., I noticed the Cabin Altitude was higher than normal. I pointed this out and shortly after I pointed it out we got a \"Cabin Alt High\" EICAS message. Upon getting this EICAS message we accomplished the immediate action items and then promptly ran the QRC and then QRH for cabin altitude high. We leveled off around 11,000 ft. and per the QRC started a descent to 10,000 ft. While running the QRH we noticed the pressurization knob was set to \"LFE\" (which it would still be in automatic mode) instead of the normal \"auto\" position. We switched it back right away and got the pressurization back to normal and returned to ZZZ. The passenger masks did not deploy. I transferred controls to the Captain to make the approach and landing where we got vectored in tight to the runway to which the Captain elected to do a go around. We reset up for the approach and landed normally. Having a crew awareness EICAS message to alert the pilots of a non-normal configuration of a system would have resolved this issue."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDay started with one aircraft that had a maintenance item being worked on by Maintenance. The First Officer (FO) and myself began to set the aircraft up for the flight and then waited for the maintenance crew to complete their service of the aircraft when we were notified of a tail swap. Proceeded as normal on the second aircraft and boarded as per usual. We departed as usual and got a clearance to a fix and up to 13,000 ft. After passing 10,000 ft., we noticed the cabin pressure was not normal and before we knew it Cabin ALT HI EICAS message was up. We followed procedure and donned our masks, I (pilot monitoring (PM)) had called for the QRC as the FO was a little behind calling for it. I told him that he's pilot flying (PF) to descend to 10,000 ft. A moment of stress and confusion to be certain. I followed the checklist and notified ATC a return to ZZZ with a need for some time to set up as assured the FO that he is PF and I will run the checklists as PM. We finished the checklists and noticed the pressurization knob was on LFE (Landing Field Elevation) select and not AUTO. Let's return to this moment a little bit later. We continued configuring the aircraft and noticed normal pressurization on the return to ZZZ, the FO asked if I wanted to fly the aircraft and decided that would be a good decision. We configured the aircraft and set up and briefed the approach and notified ATC we are ready to head towards ZZZ...which resulted in a go around due to tight vectors from ATC to get us in causing us to become unstable. We came back around and landed safely. The moment we noticed the Pressurization Selector knob not in AUTO still dumbfounds both pilots as we are certain that we saw it facing up (auto) earlier but when we questioned each other about it we determined we were not certain if it was that aircraft or the one prior even though flows were done on both aircraft. Possible pilot error. Have a Crew Awareness EICAS message noting the pressurization knob is not in the normal position.\n\nNarrative 2\nWe received a plane from maintenance due to our originally scheduled aircraft having the NAV lights MELed. The captain and I both did new originating receiving checklists due to getting a new aircraft. Climbing through 9,500 ft., I noticed the Cabin Altitude was higher than normal. I pointed this out and shortly after I pointed it out we got a \"Cabin Alt High\" EICAS message. Upon getting this EICAS message we accomplished the immediate action items and then promptly ran the QRC and then QRH for cabin altitude high. We leveled off around 11,000 ft. and per the QRC started a descent to 10,000 ft. While running the QRH we noticed the pressurization knob was set to \"LFE\" (which it would still be in automatic mode) instead of the normal \"auto\" position. We switched it back right away and got the pressurization back to normal and returned to ZZZ. The passenger masks did not deploy. I transferred controls to the Captain to make the approach and landing where we got vectored in tight to the runway to which the Captain elected to do a go around. We reset up for the approach and landed normally. Having a crew awareness EICAS message to alert the pilots of a non-normal configuration of a system would have resolved this issue.",
    "synopsis": "EMB-170 Flight Crew reported a CABIN ALT HI EICAS Message illuminated passing 10,000 ft. The Flight Crew descended immediately and ran the QRH and checklists. It was discovered that the Cabin Pressurization Selector Knob was not in AUTO. The knob was placed in AUTO and the flight returned to departure airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=84",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 84,
      "pageEnd": 86,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=84",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 84,
        "pageEnd": 86,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1921992 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "EMB-170 Flight Crew reported a CABIN ALT HI EICAS Message illuminated passing 10,000 ft. The Flight Crew descended immediately and ran the QRH and checklists. It was discovered that the Cabin Pressurization Selector Knob was not in AUTO. The knob was placed in AUTO and the flight returned to departure airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1919153",
    "date": "2022-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "B757-200"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During cruise at FL 350, we received a Master Warning and CABIN ALTITUDE EICAS message. Cabin altitude was approximately 11,000 feet. Crew initiated QRH procedures and descended to FL290 Initially as cabin altitude dropped to less than 10,000 feet. We continued descent to FL250 to stabilize cabin alt below 8,500 feet and [requested priority handling] with ATC. We attempted second auto controller with no different result. Crew landed at destination with no other abnormal indications."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "During cruise at F350 which was our maximum altitude due to an MEL that made us single bleed, single pack, we received a Master Warning Cabin Altitude EICAS message. Cabin altitude was approximately 11,000 feet. We completed the QRH procedure and started a descent to lower altitude to FL 290 where we dropped below 10,000 feet cabin altitude. We continued to descent to FL250 where the cabin altitude was 8,500 feet. We [requested priority handling] and continued flight to our destination. We attempted to switch pressure controllers to reestablish proper pressurization but that did not work. Crew landed in ZZZ with no other issues or abnormal indications. Not watching the pressurization more vigilant on single air source. And the high cockpit temperature caused by the single pack. Possibly building the release on single pack single air source ops to a much lower altitude than the MEL limit of FL 350, this would have allowed more time for the crew to recognize the failure of the aircraft to maintain pressurization."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring cruise at FL 350, we received a Master Warning and CABIN ALTITUDE EICAS message. Cabin altitude was approximately 11,000 feet. Crew initiated QRH procedures and descended to FL290 Initially as cabin altitude dropped to less than 10,000 feet. We continued descent to FL250 to stabilize cabin alt below 8,500 feet and [requested priority handling] with ATC. We attempted second auto controller with no different result. Crew landed at destination with no other abnormal indications.\n\nNarrative 2\nDuring cruise at F350 which was our maximum altitude due to an MEL that made us single bleed, single pack, we received a Master Warning Cabin Altitude EICAS message. Cabin altitude was approximately 11,000 feet. We completed the QRH procedure and started a descent to lower altitude to FL 290 where we dropped below 10,000 feet cabin altitude. We continued to descent to FL250 where the cabin altitude was 8,500 feet. We [requested priority handling] and continued flight to our destination. We attempted to switch pressure controllers to reestablish proper pressurization but that did not work. Crew landed in ZZZ with no other issues or abnormal indications. Not watching the pressurization more vigilant on single air source. And the high cockpit temperature caused by the single pack. Possibly building the release on single pack single air source ops to a much lower altitude than the MEL limit of FL 350, this would have allowed more time for the crew to recognize the failure of the aircraft to maintain pressurization.",
    "synopsis": "B757 Flight Crew reported receiving a Master Warning and CABIN ALTITUDE EICAS message at cruise. The Crew immediately descended and ran the QRH procedures and were able to continue to the destination airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=87",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 87,
      "pageEnd": 89,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=87",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 87,
        "pageEnd": 89,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1919153 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B757 Flight Crew reported receiving a Master Warning and CABIN ALTITUDE EICAS message at cruise. The Crew immediately descended and ran the QRH procedures and were able to continue to the destination airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1909164",
    "date": "2022-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We received a clearance for a visual approach to [Runway] 35L with direct to the FAF. I was monitoring our class B floor to ensure compliance and the FO was flying 250 knots. I stepped down his altitude as required to remain in class B. ATC told us the airspeed was our discretion. As we approached the final marker we were high and fast. We did not intercept the glide slope at the marker and used vertical speed to continue. At 500 feet we were stable, but I did not get our flaps to 30. I did not hear a call and we were focused on salvaging the approach. The GPWS said \"terrain\" and I thought this was an error. At 50 feet I noticed the flap gauge at 25. Our Vref was 164 knots due to gusts. Clearly we should have gone around and I offer no excuse."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Expected ILS 35L at DEN, was given [Runway] 35R late in the descent. Pilot Flying changed ILS radio and minimus; however PF failed to change the runway in the ARR Page on the FMC. ILS 35R became visual 35R per approach control, which wasn't unexpected based on ATIS information. When the omission of the ARR runway was realized and was entered we lost vertical guidance on the PFD and added to the task saturation in the cockpit. PF attempted to slow to from 250 to 210 at approx 7 miles from FRONZ (FAF for 35R) on a 45 deg dogleg vector off the CLASH Arrival. Had to stay high due to Class B airspace airspeed restrictions, then was late to get down to 7000 feet by FRONZ which resulted in having to stay high and configure. Aircraft was high at FRONZ and for the remainder of the approach into 35R. Being high approaching FRONZ, attempted to utilize V/S Mode to capture the glide path, which resulted in a higher than necessary airspeed which then resulted in a late configuration and continuance above acceptable parameters for landing. Attempted to continue to recover the approach while still high and configuring the aircraft to a greater rate of descent to capture a stabilized approach. By 500 feet, was in excess of 1000 feet per/minute and only Flaps 25 with 1 Red and 3 white on the PAPIs Called for flaps 30 but did not verify flap movement and did not verify completion of landing checklist which would have precluded \"Too Low Terrain\" annunciation. Continued to landing which was uneventful and within acceptable landing parameters on the runway."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe received a clearance for a visual approach to [Runway] 35L with direct to the FAF. I was monitoring our class B floor to ensure compliance and the FO was flying 250 knots. I stepped down his altitude as required to remain in class B. ATC told us the airspeed was our discretion. As we approached the final marker we were high and fast. We did not intercept the glide slope at the marker and used vertical speed to continue. At 500 feet we were stable, but I did not get our flaps to 30. I did not hear a call and we were focused on salvaging the approach. The GPWS said \"terrain\" and I thought this was an error. At 50 feet I noticed the flap gauge at 25. Our Vref was 164 knots due to gusts. Clearly we should have gone around and I offer no excuse.\n\nNarrative 2\nExpected ILS 35L at DEN, was given [Runway] 35R late in the descent. Pilot Flying changed ILS radio and minimus; however PF failed to change the runway in the ARR Page on the FMC. ILS 35R became visual 35R per approach control, which wasn't unexpected based on ATIS information. When the omission of the ARR runway was realized and was entered we lost vertical guidance on the PFD and added to the task saturation in the cockpit. PF attempted to slow to from 250 to 210 at approx 7 miles from FRONZ (FAF for 35R) on a 45 deg dogleg vector off the CLASH Arrival. Had to stay high due to Class B airspace airspeed restrictions, then was late to get down to 7000 feet by FRONZ which resulted in having to stay high and configure. Aircraft was high at FRONZ and for the remainder of the approach into 35R. Being high approaching FRONZ, attempted to utilize V/S Mode to capture the glide path, which resulted in a higher than necessary airspeed which then resulted in a late configuration and continuance above acceptable parameters for landing. Attempted to continue to recover the approach while still high and configuring the aircraft to a greater rate of descent to capture a stabilized approach. By 500 feet, was in excess of 1000 feet per/minute and only Flaps 25 with 1 Red and 3 white on the PAPIs Called for flaps 30 but did not verify flap movement and did not verify completion of landing checklist which would have precluded \"Too Low Terrain\" annunciation. Continued to landing which was uneventful and within acceptable landing parameters on the runway.",
    "synopsis": "B737 NG Flight Crew reported receiving a terrain warning on short final approach to DEN airport due to flap misconfiguration. Flight crew stated they received a late runway change which resulted in a higher-than-normal rate of descent and not completing a checklist.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=90",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 90,
      "pageEnd": 92,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=90",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 90,
        "pageEnd": 92,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1909164 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737 NG Flight Crew reported receiving a terrain warning on short final approach to DEN airport due to flap misconfiguration. Flight crew stated they received a late runway change which resulted in a higher-than-normal rate of descent and not completing a checklist.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1903778",
    "date": "2022-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was PM during base leg of visual approach (XL via channel). Landing checklist had been completed at Flaps 15 per company SOP. PF called for F25, PM selected F25 and then noticed trailing edge flap asymmetry (L flap 15, R flap 25) on the flap comparator. PM alerted PF to asymmetry and visual approach was terminated and crew requested a turn and climb away from the airport to conduct checklist/QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) items. No rolling moment was felt by the PF once the AP was disengaged. QRH items completed and landing was uneventful. Flaps were left down for maintenance inspection upon taxi back to ramp. Contributing factors are many. One being the company's decision to continue to operate aging aircraft well past their prime. Second being a general hesitancy amongst the pilot group to report safety/aircraft reliability concerns due to fear of the operational impact. I have witnessed numerous mechanical discrepancies get passed to maintenance verbally vice being written in the logbook. This should not be tolerated as it does not allow a history of discrepancies for a particular mechanical issue to be documented which can impact troubleshooting. This ultimately impacts reliability and aircraft availability."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was PM during base leg of visual approach (XL via channel). Landing checklist had been completed at Flaps 15 per company SOP. PF called for F25, PM selected F25 and then noticed trailing edge flap asymmetry (L flap 15, R flap 25) on the flap comparator. PM alerted PF to asymmetry and visual approach was terminated and crew requested a turn and climb away from the airport to conduct checklist/QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) items. No rolling moment was felt by the PF once the AP was disengaged. QRH items completed and landing was uneventful. Flaps were left down for maintenance inspection upon taxi back to ramp. Contributing factors are many. One being the company's decision to continue to operate aging aircraft well past their prime. Second being a general hesitancy amongst the pilot group to report safety/aircraft reliability concerns due to fear of the operational impact. I have witnessed numerous mechanical discrepancies get passed to maintenance verbally vice being written in the logbook. This should not be tolerated as it does not allow a history of discrepancies for a particular mechanical issue to be documented which can impact troubleshooting. This ultimately impacts reliability and aircraft availability.",
    "synopsis": "B737 First Officer reported a flap asymmetry problem on approach. The Flight Crew executed a go-around and complied with the Checklist/QRH procedures. The Flight Crew then flew the approach to landing at destination airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=93",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 93,
      "pageEnd": 94,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=93",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 93,
        "pageEnd": 94,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1903778 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737 First Officer reported a flap asymmetry problem on approach. The Flight Crew executed a go-around and complied with the Checklist/QRH procedures. The Flight Crew then flew the approach to landing at destination airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1902025",
    "date": "2022-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After takeoff from ZZZ1 we had caution indication on EICAS High Stage Valve We are followed QRH. We stayed at 25,000 feet and had two issues to resolve first the fault and secondly FO (First Officer) Display which blinked relevant report. We were in contact with the Dispatcher who after informing him about the current situation sent us our latest fuel calculations and informed us that we should go to the ZZZ as divert airport. We Indeed they did go to the Divert Airport ZZZ and I immediately contacted him after landing and ask new information for the next flight ZZZ-ZZZ2. I contacted with Maintenance and informing him about the two remarks by filling in technical log book."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "In flight on the way from ZZZ to ZZZ1, EICAS message HS 1 Valve Fail came up. We ran the QRH procedure and diagnosed the problem. The message came back up on the EICAS shortly after so we ran the procedure again and it was diagnosed but then shortly after once again, the message came back up on the EICAS. We ran the QRH procedure differently this time and we shut bleed valve 1 off. We were limited to FL250 when we were originally planned for FL360. We sent for fuel numbers and it was determined by both Dispatch and the crew to divert to ZZZ due to a higher fuel burn and with a maintenance issue."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter takeoff from ZZZ1 we had caution indication on EICAS High Stage Valve We are followed QRH. We stayed at 25,000 feet and had two issues to resolve first the fault and secondly FO (First Officer) Display which blinked relevant report. We were in contact with the Dispatcher who after informing him about the current situation sent us our latest fuel calculations and informed us that we should go to the ZZZ as divert airport. We Indeed they did go to the Divert Airport ZZZ and I immediately contacted him after landing and ask new information for the next flight ZZZ-ZZZ2. I contacted with Maintenance and informing him about the two remarks by filling in technical log book.\n\nNarrative 2\nIn flight on the way from ZZZ to ZZZ1, EICAS message HS 1 Valve Fail came up. We ran the QRH procedure and diagnosed the problem. The message came back up on the EICAS shortly after so we ran the procedure again and it was diagnosed but then shortly after once again, the message came back up on the EICAS. We ran the QRH procedure differently this time and we shut bleed valve 1 off. We were limited to FL250 when we were originally planned for FL360. We sent for fuel numbers and it was determined by both Dispatch and the crew to divert to ZZZ due to a higher fuel burn and with a maintenance issue.",
    "synopsis": "EMB-145 Flight Crew reported the failure of the HS 1 bleed valve. The pilots stated they ran the QRH, descended to a lower altitude, realized there was not enough fuel to complete the mission at the lower altitude and diverted. The pilots were in communication with their Dispatcher.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=95",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 95,
      "pageEnd": 97,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=95",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 95,
        "pageEnd": 97,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1902025 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "EMB-145 Flight Crew reported the failure of the HS 1 bleed valve. The pilots stated they ran the QRH, descended to a lower altitude, realized there was not enough fuel to complete the mission at the lower altitude and diverted. The pilots were in communication with their Dispatcher.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1894250",
    "date": "2022-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "While on the arrival into ZZZ, passing through approximately 12,000 feet, we had an EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) advisory message \"HYD SYS 1 LO QTY\" appear after ATC issued a runway change. The captain advised me to run the HYD SYS 1 LO QTY QRH. We noted that our hydraulic quantity on system 1 was in the amber range. I proceeded to run the applicable checklist while the captain took over the radios and maintained control of the aircraft. Before completing the \"HYD SYS 1 LO QTY\" quick reference handbook procedure, it included HYD SYS 1 FAIL procedure to be followed \"as required\" I should have noticed that if \"HYD SYS FAIL\" EICAS messages were displayed-- the procedure WOULD be required. I was thinking that because our hydraulic quantity was low, we might have a system degradation based on what I read in the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH, and that it was required. I subsequently followed the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH and did not see the HYD SYS 1 FAIL EICAS messages that corresponded to the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH. I reviewed the entire HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH procedure once verbally all the way through with minor interruptions, and proceeded to review it two more times verbally, only highlighting the gear extension and degradation information. In error, we then proceeded to execute the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH which resulted in a manual gear extension. We took all of the precautions per the QRH that some aircraft systems may be degraded and completed the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH and landed. After landing the Captain and I debriefed the event where we read back through both of the QRH procedures that we had followed and then we realized that we could likely have closely monitored the applicable hydraulic systems and dropped the landing gear early and that HYD 1 LO QTY was not a trigger for the HYD SYS 1 fail QRH. Overall I felt that communication was high, but I failed to confirm that the EICAS messages for the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH were displayed, which might have changed our course of action. I believe that had I compared the messages only for the HYD SYS 1 FAIL that were not present on our aircraft then, the \"As required\" statement in the HYD 1 LO QTY QRH would have been more apparent to me. CRM was used throughout the entire flight including the emergency, but I could have done a better job at highlighting that the EICAS messages for the HYD 1 SYS FAIL were not present. I made an assumption when reading the QRH that though we didn't have a hydraulic system 1 failure indication, our lack of hydraulic quantity could lead to a degradation in hydraulic systems and made the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH required. This was not the case, I will make more emphasis in verifying the EICAS messages for the applicable QRH in order to achieve a higher level of CRM."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "On descent in the later part of the STAR into ZZZ the HYD 1 LOW QTY advisory was displayed on the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System). The HYD 1 sys was in the amber. After handling a late runway change the QRH was executed for HYD 1 LOW QTY, which at the end says to execute the HYD 1 FAIL QRH procedure 'as required'. This was misinterpreted as being told to act as though we were having a HYD 1 SYS failure. In hind sight it became clear that the HYD 1 SYS failure X of the QRH should not have been executed due to the fact that the trigger of having the \"HYD 1 FAIL' had not yet been explicitly displayed on the EICAS. Somehow in error this trigger was overlooked and a manual gear extension was conducted along with the assumption we would have several systems inop. In hind sight the most likely outcome had this not been overlooked would have been an attempt to lower the gear early and the system would simply be 'monitored' unless that failure EICAS was displayed in flight- as well as an emergency not being declared in that case (rather just heightened awareness of that situation and the implications). In hind sight I'm not sure how the HYD 1 FAIL requirement was overlooked. CRM was ideal overall and it may have come down to QRH assumptions or an interruption at that critical point of EICAS confirmation. As mentioned, it was interpreted in part as though the QRH was driving to act as though the system was failed or imminently going to be failed. Possibly to avoid this in the future extra emphasis should be on not only confirming the correct checklist but just as importantly the presence or the absence of the EICAS message triggers for QRH portions. Both crew in the debrief realized the QRH was incorrectly executed."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWhile on the arrival into ZZZ, passing through approximately 12,000 feet, we had an EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) advisory message \"HYD SYS 1 LO QTY\" appear after ATC issued a runway change. The captain advised me to run the HYD SYS 1 LO QTY QRH. We noted that our hydraulic quantity on system 1 was in the amber range. I proceeded to run the applicable checklist while the captain took over the radios and maintained control of the aircraft. Before completing the \"HYD SYS 1 LO QTY\" quick reference handbook procedure, it included HYD SYS 1 FAIL procedure to be followed \"as required\" I should have noticed that if \"HYD SYS FAIL\" EICAS messages were displayed-- the procedure WOULD be required. I was thinking that because our hydraulic quantity was low, we might have a system degradation based on what I read in the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH, and that it was required. I subsequently followed the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH and did not see the HYD SYS 1 FAIL EICAS messages that corresponded to the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH. I reviewed the entire HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH procedure once verbally all the way through with minor interruptions, and proceeded to review it two more times verbally, only highlighting the gear extension and degradation information. In error, we then proceeded to execute the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH which resulted in a manual gear extension. We took all of the precautions per the QRH that some aircraft systems may be degraded and completed the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH and landed. After landing the Captain and I debriefed the event where we read back through both of the QRH procedures that we had followed and then we realized that we could likely have closely monitored the applicable hydraulic systems and dropped the landing gear early and that HYD 1 LO QTY was not a trigger for the HYD SYS 1 fail QRH. Overall I felt that communication was high, but I failed to confirm that the EICAS messages for the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH were displayed, which might have changed our course of action. I believe that had I compared the messages only for the HYD SYS 1 FAIL that were not present on our aircraft then, the \"As required\" statement in the HYD 1 LO QTY QRH would have been more apparent to me. CRM was used throughout the entire flight including the emergency, but I could have done a better job at highlighting that the EICAS messages for the HYD 1 SYS FAIL were not present. I made an assumption when reading the QRH that though we didn't have a hydraulic system 1 failure indication, our lack of hydraulic quantity could lead to a degradation in hydraulic systems and made the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH required. This was not the case, I will make more emphasis in verifying the EICAS messages for the applicable QRH in order to achieve a higher level of CRM.\n\nNarrative 2\nOn descent in the later part of the STAR into ZZZ the HYD 1 LOW QTY advisory was displayed on the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System). The HYD 1 sys was in the amber. After handling a late runway change the QRH was executed for HYD 1 LOW QTY, which at the end says to execute the HYD 1 FAIL QRH procedure 'as required'. This was misinterpreted as being told to act as though we were having a HYD 1 SYS failure. In hind sight it became clear that the HYD 1 SYS failure X of the QRH should not have been executed due to the fact that the trigger of having the \"HYD 1 FAIL' had not yet been explicitly displayed on the EICAS. Somehow in error this trigger was overlooked and a manual gear extension was conducted along with the assumption we would have several systems inop. In hind sight the most likely outcome had this not been overlooked would have been an attempt to lower the gear early and the system would simply be 'monitored' unless that failure EICAS was displayed in flight- as well as an emergency not being declared in that case (rather just heightened awareness of that situation and the implications). In hind sight I'm not sure how the HYD 1 FAIL requirement was overlooked. CRM was ideal overall and it may have come down to QRH assumptions or an interruption at that critical point of EICAS confirmation. As mentioned, it was interpreted in part as though the QRH was driving to act as though the system was failed or imminently going to be failed. Possibly to avoid this in the future extra emphasis should be on not only confirming the correct checklist but just as importantly the presence or the absence of the EICAS message triggers for QRH portions. Both crew in the debrief realized the QRH was incorrectly executed.",
    "synopsis": "Flight crew reported confusion during QRH procedures for a hydraulic system low quantity event. This led to an unnecessary manual extension of the landing gear, complicating the landing at destination airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=98",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 98,
      "pageEnd": 100,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=98",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 98,
        "pageEnd": 100,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1894250 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Flight crew reported confusion during QRH procedures for a hydraulic system low quantity event. This led to an unnecessary manual extension of the landing gear, complicating the landing at destination airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1894045",
    "date": "2022-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Descent"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Descending to 8,000 feet we were assigned speed 190 knots. After selecting flaps 1, Autopilot A kicked off. I started to hand fly, and we noticed the lower amber band was above the flaps 1 maneuver bug. We selected flaps 5, the amber band did not move and then the First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) noticed the amber LE FLAPS TRANSIT was illuminated and flaps indicated < 1. We requested delay vectors from ATC and I transferred the plane and radios to the First Officer. We settled on the Trailing Edge Flap Disagree checklist in the Quick Reference Handbook. The alternate flap extension moved the flaps only to just above 1. We pulled up flap 1 data on the ACARS, and also referred to flaps up data provided by Dispatch to ensure we were able to safely land on Runway XXL. The approach and landing we uneventful, taxing clear at Taxiway N with normal braking. After parking we noticed the Proximity Electronics Unit light. Just request priority handling when dealing with flap issues, we initially did not and then got deep in the checklist and setting up for the approach and didn't think about it again."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDescending to 8,000 feet we were assigned speed 190 knots. After selecting flaps 1, Autopilot A kicked off. I started to hand fly, and we noticed the lower amber band was above the flaps 1 maneuver bug. We selected flaps 5, the amber band did not move and then the First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) noticed the amber LE FLAPS TRANSIT was illuminated and flaps indicated < 1. We requested delay vectors from ATC and I transferred the plane and radios to the First Officer. We settled on the Trailing Edge Flap Disagree checklist in the Quick Reference Handbook. The alternate flap extension moved the flaps only to just above 1. We pulled up flap 1 data on the ACARS, and also referred to flaps up data provided by Dispatch to ensure we were able to safely land on Runway XXL. The approach and landing we uneventful, taxing clear at Taxiway N with normal braking. After parking we noticed the Proximity Electronics Unit light. Just request priority handling when dealing with flap issues, we initially did not and then got deep in the checklist and setting up for the approach and didn't think about it again.",
    "synopsis": "First officer reported a Leading Edge Flaps in Transit light on approach. The flight crew requested vectors for troubleshooting and to perform the QRH procedures. The flight crew then resumed the approach to landing at destination airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=101",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 101,
      "pageEnd": 102,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=101",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 101,
        "pageEnd": 102,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "Flap disagreement requires delay vectors and alternate extension",
    "summary": "A B737 crew encountered a flap problem during descent, requested vectors, and worked through a checklist and alternate extension procedure. With only limited flap extension, the crew checked landing performance data and landed uneventfully; the reporter reflected that requesting priority handling earlier would have helped.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Equipment",
      "Procedures",
      "Communication"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1893085",
    "date": "2022-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-900"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "The aircraft had a history of flap issues and issues with the EECs that the Captain and I discussed in ops before the flight. In the carry forward items section of the release there was a long time fault with the #1 EEC. Then in the log history on Day 0 the aircraft had a leading edge flaps transit light stays on write up. There were a series of write ups with the flaps in the history saying #2 transit light on. The first one starting on Day 0, then Day 1 was the second occurrence, then Day 2, then on our flight on Day 3. All of these write ups had the leading edge flaps transit light on. We did discuss this history together before the flight. Normal flight up until top of descent point. Thunderstorms were starting to pop up into central [state] and there was holding into one of the airports, we think it was ZZZ1. Frequency was very saturated and difficult to get any word with ZZZ2 center or Center. We asked for lower 4 times on frequency before given our first descent and that this point we were 5000+ feet high on the arrival. When finally given descent via ZZZZZ1 landing east we told ATC we would be do are best but were already very high. Speeds on the arrival were complied with and full speed brakes were used from the TOD which was my best guess FL350 down to a cleared to bottom of 6,000 feet. When we switched to approach we were vectored off the arrival for traffic and told to maintain 6,000 feet. Approach gave us a vector off the arrival and then vectored us on ILS approach course. Thunder storms were building all around ZZZ and there were some buildups and rain that we went through when being vectored and re-vectored onto the arrival. At some point during these vectors back onto the ILS Runway XXL approach course we were given a speed reduction to 210 knots. This occurred somewhere on the base leg to final. At that time the Captain called for flaps 1. All indications with the Flap position indicator showed flaps 1, the handle was at flaps 1, but the LE Flaps transit light was still illuminated. A quick glance up at the Leading Edge Devices annunciator panel showed 1 amber light, the rest were green. The amber light was located on the left hand side underneath the flaps 1 number at the top of the annunciator. We were concerned with the approaching thunderstorms to the ZZZ airport so I pulled out the paper Quick Reference Handbook and we began running through the procedure while continuing on the approach. Went to the flight controls tab, then the leading edge flaps transit light page read the notes out loud quickly and then read through point 1 where it gives you the option to choose 1. We read through the first one and ruled it out and had a quick discussion that were was no roll or any indication of any asymmetry. Read the second one and again after some quick discussion agreed it was our problem. Went to step 7 and started to plan for a flaps 15 landing. We set Vref 15 +15 knots. This is where I made an initial error. I selected flaps 15 Vref speed and then put +15 in the wind additive so I think the flaps 15 speed was 160 and I put the plus 15 in the wind additive for a speed of 165 knots initially. Then step 9 is use normal wind additive winds were like 150@9 at the time so would of been + 5 but I did not change anything at this point. Step 10 is to put the ground proximity flap inhibit switch to inhibit so I confirmed that with the Captain and did that. Somewhere right in here we got are last turn on to the approach course and were cleared for the approach. The next step was to calculate landing distance so I had to go to my IPAD this the tables are removed in the Quick Reference Handbook for that. Hit they hyperlinks for the 900ER and found the table and read out the landing distance first for the Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry Flap lever 15 and then I realized this was not the right table and found the Leading edge flaps transit flaps 15 aircraft condition. We were approximately 145,000 pounds so I read out 5,000 feet needed for good braking and 7,000 for medium. I then looked at the adjustments to landing distance and the only one that applied was the add per C above ISA and it was minimal. Then went to step 3 for the 15% safety margin and if it went down to medium braking we needing about 8,200 feet of runway and less than 6,000 feet for good. The rain was not hitting the airport currently so we expected to have 600 braking. The runway is listed as 9,000 feet long on the 10-9 and 8,400 ft. available beyond the threshold. I did all this as fast as I could and while we were intercepting the glide slope and starting down on the approach. All through this the center and approach frequencies were completely saturated with constant communication from ATC to other aircraft and us with no real significant breaks between radio transmissions. I read aloud steps 13 and 14 and then went right into the deferred items because we were at that point already. Captain called for gear and flaps 15 somewhere in the middle of the deferred items checklist we finished the checklist somewhere between 1,500 feet and 1,000 feet. Captain asked if we were good and we both agreed we were to continue the approach. I double checked the whole procedure reading it quickly through again and realized I set the flaps 15 speed wrong so by the I think Vref 15 was 149 I added the 15 knots to 164 and put that in on the speed line and then changed the wind additive to +5 so we had an approach speed of 169. I did this right before we were at 1,000 feet. At some point during all of that we were switched over to Tower and cleared to land. There was a corporate jet on the runway and he was being told told we were fast approaching and to vacate the runway. Then given expedite instructions and then a little above 500 feet. tower issued go around instructions to us. We were given a heading slightly off from runway heading an initial climb to 2,000 feet Captain gave all the correct go around commands we went to heading select and flew the Tower assigned heading, we had a discussion of the missed approach instructions because Captain wanted to make sure he heard them correctly and also a discussion about going all the way to clean maneuvering speed or leaving flaps down. Captain wanted to try and recycle the flaps to see if we got the light again. So we did go all the way to flaps up and after takeoff. Eventually Tower gave us a turn to the downwind and a climb to 4,000 feet and switched us back over to approach. Approach re- vectored us on to the course for another ILS XXL approach. Captain redid an abbreviated approach brief and then we selected flaps 1 again and go the LE Flaps transit light. We went through the Quick Reference Handbook again and completed all the steps to the deferred item landing checklist. We completed the deferred item checklist after the gear was selected down and that finished the procedure. While being vectored I did let approach know that we were going to have a final approach speed of 170 knots we never [requested priority handling] or let any outside source know of the flap system malfunction. Our main concern was getting into the field before the thunderstorms passed over it. Captain made an uneventful flaps 15 landing. We exited at [taxiway] 1 and were told to go straight to ramp and ramp told us to go into [the gate]. We complied with instructions and safely parked. Completed the parking checklist and then called ops to let them know of the maintenance problem and Captain put the write up into the ELB."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nThe aircraft had a history of flap issues and issues with the EECs that the Captain and I discussed in ops before the flight. In the carry forward items section of the release there was a long time fault with the #1 EEC. Then in the log history on Day 0 the aircraft had a leading edge flaps transit light stays on write up. There were a series of write ups with the flaps in the history saying #2 transit light on. The first one starting on Day 0, then Day 1 was the second occurrence, then Day 2, then on our flight on Day 3. All of these write ups had the leading edge flaps transit light on. We did discuss this history together before the flight. Normal flight up until top of descent point. Thunderstorms were starting to pop up into central [state] and there was holding into one of the airports, we think it was ZZZ1. Frequency was very saturated and difficult to get any word with ZZZ2 center or Center. We asked for lower 4 times on frequency before given our first descent and that this point we were 5000+ feet high on the arrival. When finally given descent via ZZZZZ1 landing east we told ATC we would be do are best but were already very high. Speeds on the arrival were complied with and full speed brakes were used from the TOD which was my best guess FL350 down to a cleared to bottom of 6,000 feet. When we switched to approach we were vectored off the arrival for traffic and told to maintain 6,000 feet. Approach gave us a vector off the arrival and then vectored us on ILS approach course. Thunder storms were building all around ZZZ and there were some buildups and rain that we went through when being vectored and re-vectored onto the arrival. At some point during these vectors back onto the ILS Runway XXL approach course we were given a speed reduction to 210 knots. This occurred somewhere on the base leg to final. At that time the Captain called for flaps 1. All indications with the Flap position indicator showed flaps 1, the handle was at flaps 1, but the LE Flaps transit light was still illuminated. A quick glance up at the Leading Edge Devices annunciator panel showed 1 amber light, the rest were green. The amber light was located on the left hand side underneath the flaps 1 number at the top of the annunciator. We were concerned with the approaching thunderstorms to the ZZZ airport so I pulled out the paper Quick Reference Handbook and we began running through the procedure while continuing on the approach. Went to the flight controls tab, then the leading edge flaps transit light page read the notes out loud quickly and then read through point 1 where it gives you the option to choose 1. We read through the first one and ruled it out and had a quick discussion that were was no roll or any indication of any asymmetry. Read the second one and again after some quick discussion agreed it was our problem. Went to step 7 and started to plan for a flaps 15 landing. We set Vref 15 +15 knots. This is where I made an initial error. I selected flaps 15 Vref speed and then put +15 in the wind additive so I think the flaps 15 speed was 160 and I put the plus 15 in the wind additive for a speed of 165 knots initially. Then step 9 is use normal wind additive winds were like 150@9 at the time so would of been + 5 but I did not change anything at this point. Step 10 is to put the ground proximity flap inhibit switch to inhibit so I confirmed that with the Captain and did that. Somewhere right in here we got are last turn on to the approach course and were cleared for the approach. The next step was to calculate landing distance so I had to go to my IPAD this the tables are removed in the Quick Reference Handbook for that. Hit they hyperlinks for the 900ER and found the table and read out the landing distance first for the Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry Flap lever 15 and then I realized this was not the right table and found the Leading edge flaps transit flaps 15 aircraft condition. We were approximately 145,000 pounds so I read out 5,000 feet needed for good braking and 7,000 for medium. I then looked at the adjustments to landing distance and the only one that applied was the add per C above ISA and it was minimal. Then went to step 3 for the 15% safety margin and if it went down to medium braking we needing about 8,200 feet of runway and less than 6,000 feet for good. The rain was not hitting the airport currently so we expected to have 600 braking. The runway is listed as 9,000 feet long on the 10-9 and 8,400 ft. available beyond the threshold. I did all this as fast as I could and while we were intercepting the glide slope and starting down on the approach. All through this the center and approach frequencies were completely saturated with constant communication from ATC to other aircraft and us with no real significant breaks between radio transmissions. I read aloud steps 13 and 14 and then went right into the deferred items because we were at that point already. Captain called for gear and flaps 15 somewhere in the middle of the deferred items checklist we finished the checklist somewhere between 1,500 feet and 1,000 feet. Captain asked if we were good and we both agreed we were to continue the approach. I double checked the whole procedure reading it quickly through again and realized I set the flaps 15 speed wrong so by the I think Vref 15 was 149 I added the 15 knots to 164 and put that in on the speed line and then changed the wind additive to +5 so we had an approach speed of 169. I did this right before we were at 1,000 feet. At some point during all of that we were switched over to Tower and cleared to land. There was a corporate jet on the runway and he was being told told we were fast approaching and to vacate the runway. Then given expedite instructions and then a little above 500 feet. tower issued go around instructions to us. We were given a heading slightly off from runway heading an initial climb to 2,000 feet Captain gave all the correct go around commands we went to heading select and flew the Tower assigned heading, we had a discussion of the missed approach instructions because Captain wanted to make sure he heard them correctly and also a discussion about going all the way to clean maneuvering speed or leaving flaps down. Captain wanted to try and recycle the flaps to see if we got the light again. So we did go all the way to flaps up and after takeoff. Eventually Tower gave us a turn to the downwind and a climb to 4,000 feet and switched us back over to approach. Approach re- vectored us on to the course for another ILS XXL approach. Captain redid an abbreviated approach brief and then we selected flaps 1 again and go the LE Flaps transit light. We went through the Quick Reference Handbook again and completed all the steps to the deferred item landing checklist. We completed the deferred item checklist after the gear was selected down and that finished the procedure. While being vectored I did let approach know that we were going to have a final approach speed of 170 knots we never [requested priority handling] or let any outside source know of the flap system malfunction. Our main concern was getting into the field before the thunderstorms passed over it. Captain made an uneventful flaps 15 landing. We exited at [taxiway] 1 and were told to go straight to ramp and ramp told us to go into [the gate]. We complied with instructions and safely parked. Completed the parking checklist and then called ops to let them know of the maintenance problem and Captain put the write up into the ELB.",
    "synopsis": "B737 First Officer reported operating an aircraft with a long history of leading edge flap asymmetry discrepancies. This aircraft had a repeat discrepancy occur during approach to landing. The flight crew performed a go around and complied with the QRH procedures and rejoined the approach and landing at destination airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=103",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 103,
      "pageEnd": 106,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=103",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 103,
        "pageEnd": 106,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1893085 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737 First Officer reported operating an aircraft with a long history of leading edge flap asymmetry discrepancies. This aircraft had a repeat discrepancy occur during approach to landing. The flight crew performed a go around and complied with the QRH procedures and rejoined the approach and landing at destination airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1892419",
    "date": "2022-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "SA-227 AC Metro III"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Climb",
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During our Gear Up call out, the Captain made note of the hydraulic annunciator and we both verified loss of hydraulic pressure with the pressure gauge. ATC was then made aware of our situation. We asked for vectors to run checklists. We ran the hydraulic failure checklist and the Captain proceeded to call for the hydraulic failure checklist and the Captain proceeded to call for priority gear extension. Who omitted the landing gear lever down step due the Captain giving the checklist to me verbally and omitted the gear up step of the checklist because we received three green (down and locked) on the gear indication. We then asked for vectors back to the Runway XXR at ZZZ. As we made or final approach, the Captain notified the passengers of a possible evacuation of the aircraft on the ground. When then proceeded without final approach and landing after completing or gear down before landing checklist verifying again that we had 3 green indication and flaps still in the 1/4 position again not making note that the gear lever was still in the up position. We came to a stop toward the right side of the runway and we're in immediate contact with ops and fire. Once the aircraft was deemed safe the passengers were shuttled back to the gate and the aircraft was towed back."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring our Gear Up call out, the Captain made note of the hydraulic annunciator and we both verified loss of hydraulic pressure with the pressure gauge. ATC was then made aware of our situation. We asked for vectors to run checklists. We ran the hydraulic failure checklist and the Captain proceeded to call for the hydraulic failure checklist and the Captain proceeded to call for priority gear extension. Who omitted the landing gear lever down step due the Captain giving the checklist to me verbally and omitted the gear up step of the checklist because we received three green (down and locked) on the gear indication. We then asked for vectors back to the Runway XXR at ZZZ. As we made or final approach, the Captain notified the passengers of a possible evacuation of the aircraft on the ground. When then proceeded without final approach and landing after completing or gear down before landing checklist verifying again that we had 3 green indication and flaps still in the 1/4 position again not making note that the gear lever was still in the up position. We came to a stop toward the right side of the runway and we're in immediate contact with ops and fire. Once the aircraft was deemed safe the passengers were shuttled back to the gate and the aircraft was towed back.",
    "synopsis": "SA-227 Flight Crew reported landing gear failed to retract when selected up after take off. The Flight Crew ran the QRH procedures and elected to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing at departure airport.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=107",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 107,
      "pageEnd": 108,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=107",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 107,
        "pageEnd": 108,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1892419 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "SA-227 Flight Crew reported landing gear failed to retract when selected up after take off. The Flight Crew ran the QRH procedures and elected to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing at departure airport.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1885604",
    "date": "2021-11",
    "aircraft": [
      "Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "We took off on Runway XXR on the ZZZZZ departure. Climbing through 29000 ft., we received AFT COMPT LOOP FAULT. I leveled off at 30000 ft. and we ran the QRH checklist. We then received the CARGO COMPT SMOKE ECAM message and a Master Caution. I took over ATC comm 1 radio and [advised ATC] and requested return to ZZZ. The FO (First Officer) continued the checklist, changed the destination and set us up for a return to Runway XYR at ZZZ. We had an uneventful landing and the fire department used thermal cameras to check for heat signature in the AFT compartment. No indications were seen and we taxied back to the ramp. This is an edited version of my first [report] from this event. I was PF (Pilot Flying). We took off on [Runway] XXR on the ZZZZZ departure. Climbing through 29000 ft.,we had a AFT COMPT LOOP FAULT ECAM message with a Cargo Loop Fault procedure. My FO (First Officer) opened the QRH to the Cargo Loop Fault checklist. After further reflection on our actions during the event and referencing the Systems manual and QRH again, I realized the Cargo Loop Fault checklist does not fully explain how to do a Loop Test. The checklist states, \"Loop Test - Perform\" but does not go into detail on HOW to perform a loop test. The systems manual does, and on step X. Loop Test Pushbutton it states - \"Pressed and held IN\". My FO did not press and hold in the Loop Test button, he only pressed and released it. The next sentence in the QRH Cargo Loop Fault checklist states, \"If SMOKE light does not illuminate for affected compartment (smoke condition exists):\" My FO and I looked at each other and said, \"We must have smoke.\" We then continued the checklist by RE-SELECTING LOOP A (which had faulted) and turned OFF the OTHER LOOP. Almost immediately we received the CARGO COMPT SMOKE ECAM Master Warning and chime as the checklist states, Procedure: CARGO COMPT SMOKE. I took over ATC communications 1 radio and [requested priority handling], requested return to ZZZ as the FO continued the checklist, changed the destination and set us up for a return to XYR back at ZZZ. Uneventful landing and the fire department used thermal cameras to check for heat signature in the AFT compartment. No indications were seen and we taxied back to the ramp. If you look at the [Aircraft] System manual, you can see the photo of the Lower Cargo Smoke Detection system and see that by re- selecting a faulted LOOP A, and turning OFF the good LOOP B, you will receive a SMOKE detection, which is what we had. In addition, if you turn the page in the QRH you will see \"Additional Information\" which uses the example of an Illuminated LOOP A fault. This information is very important and a reference to it should be included on page XXX of the QRH. I would recommend a change to the QRH CARGO LOOP FAULT checklist to edit the \"LOOP TEST - PERFORM\" to closely match the Systems manual and should read, \"LOOP TEST - PRESS AND HOLD IN\". ALL lights on the Cargo Compartment Smoke Detection panel should illuminate which will confirm a faulty loop (see second boldfaced sentence). If the SMOKE light does NOT illuminate for affected compartment, smoke condition exists. If you flip the two boldface sentences, the checklist will make more sense after you \"perform a loop test\" by holding the button IN. Since our FO's do not perform a Main Deck or Cargo compartment LOOP test during their preflight, they may not understand you must hold the button in to do the loop test."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nWe took off on Runway XXR on the ZZZZZ departure. Climbing through 29000 ft., we received AFT COMPT LOOP FAULT. I leveled off at 30000 ft. and we ran the QRH checklist. We then received the CARGO COMPT SMOKE ECAM message and a Master Caution. I took over ATC comm 1 radio and [advised ATC] and requested return to ZZZ. The FO (First Officer) continued the checklist, changed the destination and set us up for a return to Runway XYR at ZZZ. We had an uneventful landing and the fire department used thermal cameras to check for heat signature in the AFT compartment. No indications were seen and we taxied back to the ramp. This is an edited version of my first [report] from this event. I was PF (Pilot Flying). We took off on [Runway] XXR on the ZZZZZ departure. Climbing through 29000 ft.,we had a AFT COMPT LOOP FAULT ECAM message with a Cargo Loop Fault procedure. My FO (First Officer) opened the QRH to the Cargo Loop Fault checklist. After further reflection on our actions during the event and referencing the Systems manual and QRH again, I realized the Cargo Loop Fault checklist does not fully explain how to do a Loop Test. The checklist states, \"Loop Test - Perform\" but does not go into detail on HOW to perform a loop test. The systems manual does, and on step X. Loop Test Pushbutton it states - \"Pressed and held IN\". My FO did not press and hold in the Loop Test button, he only pressed and released it. The next sentence in the QRH Cargo Loop Fault checklist states, \"If SMOKE light does not illuminate for affected compartment (smoke condition exists):\" My FO and I looked at each other and said, \"We must have smoke.\" We then continued the checklist by RE-SELECTING LOOP A (which had faulted) and turned OFF the OTHER LOOP. Almost immediately we received the CARGO COMPT SMOKE ECAM Master Warning and chime as the checklist states, Procedure: CARGO COMPT SMOKE. I took over ATC communications 1 radio and [requested priority handling], requested return to ZZZ as the FO continued the checklist, changed the destination and set us up for a return to XYR back at ZZZ. Uneventful landing and the fire department used thermal cameras to check for heat signature in the AFT compartment. No indications were seen and we taxied back to the ramp. If you look at the [Aircraft] System manual, you can see the photo of the Lower Cargo Smoke Detection system and see that by re- selecting a faulted LOOP A, and turning OFF the good LOOP B, you will receive a SMOKE detection, which is what we had. In addition, if you turn the page in the QRH you will see \"Additional Information\" which uses the example of an Illuminated LOOP A fault. This information is very important and a reference to it should be included on page XXX of the QRH. I would recommend a change to the QRH CARGO LOOP FAULT checklist to edit the \"LOOP TEST - PERFORM\" to closely match the Systems manual and should read, \"LOOP TEST - PRESS AND HOLD IN\". ALL lights on the Cargo Compartment Smoke Detection panel should illuminate which will confirm a faulty loop (see second boldfaced sentence). If the SMOKE light does NOT illuminate for affected compartment, smoke condition exists. If you flip the two boldface sentences, the checklist will make more sense after you \"perform a loop test\" by holding the button IN. Since our FO's do not perform a Main Deck or Cargo compartment LOOP test during their preflight, they may not understand you must hold the button in to do the loop test.",
    "synopsis": "Air Carrier Captain reported receiving a warning of smoke in the cargo compartment and returned to departure airport. The Captain reported the QRH does not adequately explain the procedure to resolve this warning.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=109",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 109,
      "pageEnd": 111,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=109",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 109,
        "pageEnd": 111,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1885604 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Air Carrier Captain reported receiving a warning of smoke in the cargo compartment and returned to departure airport. The Captain reported the QRH does not adequately explain the procedure to resolve this warning.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1861169",
    "date": "2021-12",
    "aircraft": [
      "B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On takeoff with ENGINE FIRE/FAILURE, EFB content locker crashed. Came back up with spinning wheel and eventually was able to get the QRC to run the checklist. Pulling paper QRHs off this fleet would be a giant mistake, in my opinion. This is not the first time I've had to report the EFB and associated apps."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn takeoff with ENGINE FIRE/FAILURE, EFB content locker crashed. Came back up with spinning wheel and eventually was able to get the QRC to run the checklist. Pulling paper QRHs off this fleet would be a giant mistake, in my opinion. This is not the first time I've had to report the EFB and associated apps.",
    "synopsis": "B757 Captain reported EFB content crashed while doing checklists for an engine fire. Reporter recommends retaining the paper copies of the QRH on the aircraft to mitigate this situation.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=112",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 112,
      "pageEnd": 113,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=112",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 112,
        "pageEnd": 113,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "Electronic checklist app crashes during an engine emergency",
    "summary": "A B757 captain reported that the electronic flight bag's content app crashed during an engine fire or failure on takeoff. The app eventually reopened and the crew could access the checklist; the captain argued for retaining paper reference handbooks.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Equipment",
      "Procedures"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1838870",
    "date": "2021-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 2 Eng, Retractable Gear",
      "Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing",
      "Final Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On Date, I conducted a multi-engine commercial examination in a [small two-engine aircraft]. While conducting a simulated engine failure single-engine ILS approach to Runway XX at ZZZ, ATC, (i.e., ZZZ Approach Control), vectored the applicant onto final. Once laterally established on the approach, ATC switched the applicant over to the common traffic advisory frequency. ATC provided no further traffic advisories or alerts The applicant then switched to the advisory frequency and announced his position as a five (5) mile final to Runway XX. Aircraft Y then announced downwind for Runway XY. I then told the applicant that in the event of go-around, both engines were available. The applicant continued while I searched for traffic in haze and seven mile visibility. The applicant reported a three (3) mile final. I continued to scan for Aircraft Y. I told the applicant that I had not spotted the traffic and then radioed that we were on a one and one-half (1 and ½) mile final. In response, Aircraft Y stated they had us in sight. I asked them to go-around. Instead, they called they were turning final for Runway XY. When the applicant called one hundred feet (100') above minimums, I spotted Aircraft Y. At that time, I told the applicant the runway was in sight and the applicant removed his foggles. I pointed the traffic to the applicant at one to two o'clock and less than a quarter (1/4) mile and again asked Aircraft Y to execute a go-around, which he then did as he flew over the top of us at the intersection of Runway XX and Runway XY. As the applicant flared to land, the tail struck the pavement. Only then did I realize that the applicant failed to complete the before landing checklist, by extending the gear, which I, in turn, failed to observe."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "On Date I was taking a multi-engine commercial check ride with Designated Pilot Examiner [DPE] Name. I was the pilot in command for the flight. After flying the maneuvers we set up for the ILS XX into ZZZ. We had a simulated engine failure during the approach. ZZZ approach approved frequency change and gave no traffic advisories. I made a 5 mile final call on the CTAF followed by a 3 mile final call. During a 2 mile final Aircraft Y made a final call for Runway XY. I still had the foggles on and the [DPE] was searching for the traffic. I announced we reached the DA, and at that time name told me to remove the foggles. He was still searching for the traffic and talking to the other aircraft. Aircraft Y announced they would go around and I continued my approach inbound for Runway XX. With all the confusion and concerns of a mid-air collision i failed to complete the before landing check. It wasn't realized that the gear was retracted until the tail struck. Distraction and pressure were two major human factors that contributed to this incident. The other aircraft distracted me from completing the before landing check. In addition, the pressure of flying the approach and completing the maneuver within standards played a role."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn Date, I conducted a multi-engine commercial examination in a [small two-engine aircraft]. While conducting a simulated engine failure single-engine ILS approach to Runway XX at ZZZ, ATC, (i.e., ZZZ Approach Control), vectored the applicant onto final. Once laterally established on the approach, ATC switched the applicant over to the common traffic advisory frequency. ATC provided no further traffic advisories or alerts The applicant then switched to the advisory frequency and announced his position as a five (5) mile final to Runway XX. Aircraft Y then announced downwind for Runway XY. I then told the applicant that in the event of go-around, both engines were available. The applicant continued while I searched for traffic in haze and seven mile visibility. The applicant reported a three (3) mile final. I continued to scan for Aircraft Y. I told the applicant that I had not spotted the traffic and then radioed that we were on a one and one-half (1 and ½) mile final. In response, Aircraft Y stated they had us in sight. I asked them to go-around. Instead, they called they were turning final for Runway XY. When the applicant called one hundred feet (100') above minimums, I spotted Aircraft Y. At that time, I told the applicant the runway was in sight and the applicant removed his foggles. I pointed the traffic to the applicant at one to two o'clock and less than a quarter (1/4) mile and again asked Aircraft Y to execute a go-around, which he then did as he flew over the top of us at the intersection of Runway XX and Runway XY. As the applicant flared to land, the tail struck the pavement. Only then did I realize that the applicant failed to complete the before landing checklist, by extending the gear, which I, in turn, failed to observe.\n\nNarrative 2\nOn Date I was taking a multi-engine commercial check ride with Designated Pilot Examiner [DPE] Name. I was the pilot in command for the flight. After flying the maneuvers we set up for the ILS XX into ZZZ. We had a simulated engine failure during the approach. ZZZ approach approved frequency change and gave no traffic advisories. I made a 5 mile final call on the CTAF followed by a 3 mile final call. During a 2 mile final Aircraft Y made a final call for Runway XY. I still had the foggles on and the [DPE] was searching for the traffic. I announced we reached the DA, and at that time name told me to remove the foggles. He was still searching for the traffic and talking to the other aircraft. Aircraft Y announced they would go around and I continued my approach inbound for Runway XX. With all the confusion and concerns of a mid-air collision i failed to complete the before landing check. It wasn't realized that the gear was retracted until the tail struck. Distraction and pressure were two major human factors that contributed to this incident. The other aircraft distracted me from completing the before landing check. In addition, the pressure of flying the approach and completing the maneuver within standards played a role.",
    "synopsis": "Flight crew reported distractions from a near mid air collision resulted in the landing check list not being performed and a gear up landing.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=114",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 114,
      "pageEnd": 116,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=114",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 114,
        "pageEnd": 116,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1838870 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Flight crew reported distractions from a near mid air collision resulted in the landing check list not being performed and a gear up landing.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1838807",
    "date": "2021-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Parked"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was made aware by the A [Flight Attendant] that we only had three of our four required emergency checklists for both ditching and land emergency evacuations. As a crew we determined this to be a \"no-go\" issue, so the A requested one each of the checklists that were missing. We were initially informed that the station didn't have any. Immediately upon being informed of the situation, the Captain became very agitated and began questioning the A as to why we needed the checklists. After an explanation was attempted, the Captain, again in a very agitated manner, proceeded to get on his cell and call the Chief Pilot. As a crew, we checked the manual to confirm that we were correct in our understanding that we had to have four on board and confirmed this to be accurate, to the best of our interpretation. Someone also called for an Inflight Supervisor to come to the gate, but I am not exactly certain which of the crew made that call. A Supervisor did arrive and informed us that they were looking for one, but she had been informed that we were ok using our [tablets] in the event they couldn't find one. At no point up to this time did I feel like anyone considered this more than an annoyance and an unnecessary interruption to their abilities to board the plane for an on time departure. I was even threatened with termination of my job after I said I would not fly if we didn't have the proper equipment. We as Flight Crew are already on high alert where safety and security was concerned, we all felt like no one else cared about anything else but the flight being delayed. I have never felt less supported or more pressured by a Captain in my time of flying. When all was said and done, they found additional copies in the training room, which was what we had recommended about 20 minutes prior."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was made aware by the A [Flight Attendant] that we only had three of our four required emergency checklists for both ditching and land emergency evacuations. As a crew we determined this to be a \"no-go\" issue, so the A requested one each of the checklists that were missing. We were initially informed that the station didn't have any. Immediately upon being informed of the situation, the Captain became very agitated and began questioning the A as to why we needed the checklists. After an explanation was attempted, the Captain, again in a very agitated manner, proceeded to get on his cell and call the Chief Pilot. As a crew, we checked the manual to confirm that we were correct in our understanding that we had to have four on board and confirmed this to be accurate, to the best of our interpretation. Someone also called for an Inflight Supervisor to come to the gate, but I am not exactly certain which of the crew made that call. A Supervisor did arrive and informed us that they were looking for one, but she had been informed that we were ok using our [tablets] in the event they couldn't find one. At no point up to this time did I feel like anyone considered this more than an annoyance and an unnecessary interruption to their abilities to board the plane for an on time departure. I was even threatened with termination of my job after I said I would not fly if we didn't have the proper equipment. We as Flight Crew are already on high alert where safety and security was concerned, we all felt like no one else cared about anything else but the flight being delayed. I have never felt less supported or more pressured by a Captain in my time of flying. When all was said and done, they found additional copies in the training room, which was what we had recommended about 20 minutes prior.",
    "synopsis": "Flight Attendant reported a required checklist was missing and was found to be non MELable. This caused a breakdown in crew communications and a delay.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=117",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 117,
      "pageEnd": 118,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=117",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 117,
        "pageEnd": 118,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1838807 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Flight Attendant reported a required checklist was missing and was found to be non MELable. This caused a breakdown in crew communications and a delay.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1836639",
    "date": "2021-09",
    "aircraft": [
      "EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Cruise"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Prior to departure we briefed the multiple MEL/CDL (Configuration Deviation List)/NEFs (Non-Essential for Flight) on file for this aircraft including MEL XX-XX-XX AUXILIARY POWER UNIT. While the Form sticker said BLEED APU LEAK, the APU as a whole was deferred, so we briefed and followed the procedures for MEL XX-XX-XX as opposed to MEL YY-YY-YY (which was not listed). While in cruise at approximately XA50Z the EICAS displayed caution message BLEED APU LEAK while the APU was inoperative, off and the APU BLEED button was pushed OUT. MEL XX-XX-XX makes no mention of BLEED APU LEAK being an expected EICAS message but the QRH procedure did not make sense to me in this situation. My FO (First Officer) and I decided together it would be best to contact Maintenance for further insight, so I transferred the radios and flight controls to the FO and proceeded to contact dispatch via ARINC (Commercial Radio) at around XA53Z. After a normal exchange with ZZZ1 Radio and patching into our Dispatcher I requested to talk to Maintenance and the Dispatcher responded that \"Maintenance would not talk to me in flight and to follow the QRH\" even after insisting several times. We proceeded to follow the remainder of the QRH and had to descend to FL300 and continue the flight with single bleed. Upon arrival into ZZZ2 I made the appropriate entry into the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) for a BLEED APU LEAK EICAS caution message. In my opinion this was a complete breakdown in CRM between the flight crew and Dispatch/Maintenance. I accept responsibility if this MEL was incorrect and should have been YY-YY-YY, but if that is the case, it has been incorrect for 10 days worth of flights. When I saw the APU deferred as a whole I considered that an acceptable solution to an APU Bleed leak, however there is no mention in XX-XX-XX of any special procedure for BLEED APU LEAK EICAS message. Furthermore, I do not have the full information in flight as to why the APU was deferred as opposed to the APU BLEED over a week prior to this event. I believe our decision to contact Maintenance for further guidance via ARINC was sound, and if they had simply answered our call for help we could have avoided descending to FL300 with a single bleed/PACK. There are numerous examples of NTSB accident reports where a safer outcome was achieved thanks to the pilots communicating with Maintenance while in flight, and throughout my training with Company I have always been trained to use all resources available. While I do not know whether Dispatch refused to talk to Maintenance or Maintenance refused to talk to me, I strongly recommend this practice of not allowing pilots to contact Maintenance during irregular situations in flight cease immediately."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nPrior to departure we briefed the multiple MEL/CDL (Configuration Deviation List)/NEFs (Non-Essential for Flight) on file for this aircraft including MEL XX-XX-XX AUXILIARY POWER UNIT. While the Form sticker said BLEED APU LEAK, the APU as a whole was deferred, so we briefed and followed the procedures for MEL XX-XX-XX as opposed to MEL YY-YY-YY (which was not listed). While in cruise at approximately XA50Z the EICAS displayed caution message BLEED APU LEAK while the APU was inoperative, off and the APU BLEED button was pushed OUT. MEL XX-XX-XX makes no mention of BLEED APU LEAK being an expected EICAS message but the QRH procedure did not make sense to me in this situation. My FO (First Officer) and I decided together it would be best to contact Maintenance for further insight, so I transferred the radios and flight controls to the FO and proceeded to contact dispatch via ARINC (Commercial Radio) at around XA53Z. After a normal exchange with ZZZ1 Radio and patching into our Dispatcher I requested to talk to Maintenance and the Dispatcher responded that \"Maintenance would not talk to me in flight and to follow the QRH\" even after insisting several times. We proceeded to follow the remainder of the QRH and had to descend to FL300 and continue the flight with single bleed. Upon arrival into ZZZ2 I made the appropriate entry into the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) for a BLEED APU LEAK EICAS caution message. In my opinion this was a complete breakdown in CRM between the flight crew and Dispatch/Maintenance. I accept responsibility if this MEL was incorrect and should have been YY-YY-YY, but if that is the case, it has been incorrect for 10 days worth of flights. When I saw the APU deferred as a whole I considered that an acceptable solution to an APU Bleed leak, however there is no mention in XX-XX-XX of any special procedure for BLEED APU LEAK EICAS message. Furthermore, I do not have the full information in flight as to why the APU was deferred as opposed to the APU BLEED over a week prior to this event. I believe our decision to contact Maintenance for further guidance via ARINC was sound, and if they had simply answered our call for help we could have avoided descending to FL300 with a single bleed/PACK. There are numerous examples of NTSB accident reports where a safer outcome was achieved thanks to the pilots communicating with Maintenance while in flight, and throughout my training with Company I have always been trained to use all resources available. While I do not know whether Dispatch refused to talk to Maintenance or Maintenance refused to talk to me, I strongly recommend this practice of not allowing pilots to contact Maintenance during irregular situations in flight cease immediately.",
    "synopsis": "EMB-175 Captain reported not finding a QRH procedure for an EICAS caution message and confusion over an associated MEL. The crew requested communicating with maintenance but was denied assistance while in flight.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=119",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 119,
      "pageEnd": 121,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=119",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 119,
        "pageEnd": 121,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1836639 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "EMB-175 Captain reported not finding a QRH procedure for an EICAS caution message and confusion over an associated MEL. The crew requested communicating with maintenance but was denied assistance while in flight.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1824764",
    "date": "2021-07",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I, the CA (Captain), was PM (Pilot Monitoring); the FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying). During the climb-out phase in level flight in mildly hazy VMC at 17,000 MSL at 290 KIAS with Autopilot B engaged the Master Caution, the \"FLT CONT\" item on the CA-side SAP (\"6-pack\"), and the right half only of the \"STAB OUT OF TRIM\" light illuminated. Press-to- test of the \"Stab out of trim\" light showed both bulbs operable. After establishing that FO was actively remaining the PF, I performed \"Stabilizer Out of Trim\" QRH procedure with the result that the autopilot electric trim and both pilot yokes trim switches were inoperative in both directions. I notified ATC that we had a mechanical problem that would eventually result in [requesting priority] and landing at a nearby airport, probably ZZZ, but for now we were content to remain at 17,000 slowly outbound from ZZZ while we worked the problem. Knowing we were also over landing weight, nicely under control, and still had a lot of checklists to run, I had no desire to rush into diving towards some final approach fix before we were ready to land. I performed the \"Stabilizer Trim Inoperative\" QRH procedure with the result that manual hand-cranked trimming was possible in either direction, albeit against unusually high resistance and with a \"cogging\" feel as if pushing against a powered but stalled electric motor. This was true even when the aircraft was in- trim. One pilot could move the trim using one arm, but two pilots using one arm each worked much better for anything more than a couple turns of the trim wheel. We found that one pilot could both hand-fly and crank the trim, but tended to make unwanted aileron inputs while doing so. So it was doable in a pinch but not smooth. The forces required to turn the trim wheel did not appreciably reduce as we later slowed & configured. In the course of reading & discussing or doing the \"deferred items\" section of the \"Stabilizer Trim Inoperative\" QRH I started to activate the GPWS Flap inhibit switch. The FO stopped me saying we were above the 250 KIAS speed limit at that time. That sounded familiar to me, but no such limitation is stated at that point in the QRH. Nevertheless, we chose to delay activating the GPWS flap inhibit until we had slowed to first configuration speed around 220KIAS. Discussed with [the] FO whether ZZZ was the best divert option and which runway to use. ZZZ & longer Runway XXL was the unanimous choice. By that time we were a few miles south of [the] VOR on a south-southwesterly course for ZZZZZ, roughly 100nm from ZZZ. I then performed the \"Non-routine Landing\" QRH procedure, alerting ATC for a return to ZZZ XXL with ARFF (Airport Rescue Firefighting) standing by. Coordinated with ATC for return via direct arrival for ILS XXL. Asked Company explicitly to alert ZZZ Approach & Tower of the intended non-standard XXL landing. Notified Dispatch via ACARS report. Briefed FAs via intercom, and passengers via PA on the situation, my expectations, and their roles. We selected the non-standard landing Runway XXL based on that runway being much longer than the more typical landing Runway XXR. That was a minor miscue, because I/we had not considered the effect of the large displaced threshold. Which I now consider insignificant. For landings eastbound the difference is 2500 feet and would be significant. Lesson learned: the big runway length number on the 10-9 page can be significantly misleading; take the time to dig into the 10-9A details page. The fact that was our takeoff runway and within Jepp FDPro I'd used the green highlighter to extend the highlighting all the way to the takeoff threshold didn't help. What had been useful to help direct my taxi to the correct threshold for takeoff became mildly misleading when evaluating which runway to land on. Which was not a side effect I noticed at the time or had considered previously. Still working as PM I performed normal divert preparations and top-of-descent procedures: Reconfigured FMS & ACARS for ZZZ arrival, obtained ATIS, set up radios and performed approach brief, landing assessment, etc. Notified ZZZ Ops of our return by direct radio call to obtain a gate assignment. We discussed that we'd be a little above the normal max landing weight, but the already requested priority covers for that administrative requirement, and the runway available was nearly double what the QRH procedure's performance chart said was required. Performed descent checklist and before landing checklists and flows as normal. Throughout the evolution the FO kept us neatly in control, tight on the FD despite sometimes having to hand-crank the trim himself, caught a few radio calls I missed, and demonstrated overall high situational awareness and excellent systems knowledge. This is especially impressive for someone fairly new to the airplane who is just back from 6 months of furlough. During descent below 10,000 ft approaching downwind we changed control to CA as PF w FO as PM. We sighted the field while on base. During the turn-on to final I was using visual lookout primary, backed up by the LNAV purple line and the ILS. There was a moment of confusion as the ILS and LNAV came together before I was aligned with what I had thought was the landing runway. Having landed on XXR dozens (hundreds?) of times over the decades, that habit was unhelpful for a few seconds before we got fully established pointing at the correct runway. We then realized that Runway XXR is concrete and very easy to see in mildly hazy conditions while Runway XXL is asphalt and much harder to see. In fact XXL was invisible until we got closer in following the LNAV & LOC. My general habit on any landing involving parallel runways is to verbalize seeing all the relevant runways by name and explicitly saying which one I'm aligning / aligned with. E.g. \"I see XXL and XXR. I'm aligning with XXL.\" For whatever reason that verbalization didn't occur; with sorta predictable results. Intercepted final outside intermediate fix in level flight at 3,000 ft. Configured to flaps 15 early and slowed gradually to Vapp of approximately 160KIAS before glideslope intercept at final approach fix. FO kept the airplane nicely in trim on my requests. Made a flaps 15 slightly overweight (approx. 148K#) approach and landing to a smooth touchdown on ZZZ Runway XXL just shy of the 2000ft marker. Upon stopping made a PA to reassure the passengers & remind them the safety vehicles would be seen around the airplane. ATC gave us an alternate frequency to contact ARFF on. Which surprised both of us a bit. Once we were communicating with ARFF I requested they inspect us for hot brakes or damaged tires. ARFF found normal brake temps and no tire damage. At ARFF's request I released them at that point and we taxied normally to [the] gate. Following shutdown the FO attempted to manually crank the trim to the usual post-shutdown 5 units from the 8-9 units we'd used at touchdown. At zero airspeed the trim was still \"cogging\" and almost as difficult to move as it had been in flight. So we left the trim at the landing setting for Maintenance's edification. Which point we discussed with the Chief Pilot who met the flight and again later with the maintenance folks who also met the flight. I made appropriate aircraft maintenance log book entries for the stab trim failure and for the overweight landing. Spoke with Dispatch by phone before leaving aircraft per FOM. The next morning I filed the required report. In all I think this event worked out pretty close to textbook, minus the small glitches identified above. The main electric trim failing was the causal factor. Everything else is just details. 1. Subsequent research on the ground shows that activating the GPWS Flap Inhibit switch is called for in 11 different QRH procedures, and in the Flaps 15 landing procedure. Only the \"One Engine Inoperative\" QRH procedure and the \"Flaps 15 Landing\" procedures mention that limit; the other 10 QRH procedures do not. I do not know whether those differences are deliberate or an oversight. Suggest someone on the 737 fleet team look into this. If the difference is deliberate there probably ought to some verbiage available in QRH or [procedures] to explain the rationale so others don't mistakenly apply a remembered restriction where it's not intended. 2. We were both surprised to see that only half of the \"Stab out of trim\" annunciator illuminated. Which left us wondering at first if we had a warning system malfunction or a trim malfunction. I surmise now that the right bulb is connected to FCC (Flight Control Computer) B and the left is connected to FCC A. And that had the Captain been PF, we'd have seen the left half illuminate instead. However it works, the details of left & right are not documented in [manual] where the annunciator is described. At a minimum there should be a statement like \"Only half of the annunciator may illuminate. That is still a valid indication of an out-of-trim condition.\" 3. Overall, from the \"Stab out of trim\" annunciator illuminating to touchdown was about 30 minutes. From reviewing the ACARS logs I know it was at least 28 minutes and less than 35. As the CA / PM / QRH operator I was working quickly and diligently almost the entire time to accomplish all the non-routine and normal procedures in full without hurrying. Had we turned back even a couple minutes earlier the airplane would have been approaching the airport before we were fully caught up and mentally transitioned from handling an [urgent inflight situation] to performing a normal low-stress, albeit flaps 15, landing. Given the reality that following all the procedures fully takes nearly 30 minutes, I believe we do a disservice to pilots in the sim, rushing around the traffic pattern with an engine out. That encourages hurrying, doing QRH steps without really thinking them and their implications through, etc. We fight how we train, and we're training to hurry. I question the wisdom of that. Further I question the wisdom of planned arrival fuels that only allow for approximately 30 minutes to flameout at traffic pattern altitudes. The so-called FAR \"45 minute reserve\" is 45 minutes at cruise, not 45 minutes at traffic pattern altitude with e.g. flaps stuck partly extended. I now conclude that performing a major QRH evolution discovered in the arrival traffic pattern while down near Company planned arrival fuels would necessitate skipping a lot of steps or giving them at best a lick and a promise. I believe it is unwise to plan arrival fuels that tightly. Yes, we commonly have additional hold and / or Dispatch fuels. But each of those may legitimately be burned in delays encountered before the [urgent situation] appears. This saves Company a lot of money on the many flights that don't turn out worst-case. But it really sucks to be the pilot who draws that short straw, and is faced with either doing a rushed job of handling the [situation] or running out of fuel. That's planning, in extremis, to fail. An industry-leading FAR 121 carrier should not be planning to fail. In extremis or otherwise."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "At a level off of 17,000 ft we noticed stab out of trim light. I was the PF so it was my aircraft. The Captain ran the stab out of trim QRH checklist which lead to the QRH stab trim inoperative checklist. We did not regain electric trim. Manual trim was what we were left with. Then the non-routine QRH checklist was performed. The manual trim wheel was difficult to work for both us even when the plane was near an in trim condition. Speed was slowed to about 270kts from about 290kts then. [ATC was advised] and we planned and set up for an arrival back to ZZZ. I flew the aircraft and worked the manual trim while the CA performed checklists, set up for the arrival and approach, and the briefings. Manual trim did not become much easier until on approach when aircraft was slowed to approach speed, however even then it was difficult. The CA took the aircraft and I became the PM. The landing was nice and smooth. Once on the ground using the manual trim wheel to reset the stab trim to 5 units was still very difficult."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI, the CA (Captain), was PM (Pilot Monitoring); the FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying). During the climb-out phase in level flight in mildly hazy VMC at 17,000 MSL at 290 KIAS with Autopilot B engaged the Master Caution, the \"FLT CONT\" item on the CA-side SAP (\"6-pack\"), and the right half only of the \"STAB OUT OF TRIM\" light illuminated. Press-to- test of the \"Stab out of trim\" light showed both bulbs operable. After establishing that FO was actively remaining the PF, I performed \"Stabilizer Out of Trim\" QRH procedure with the result that the autopilot electric trim and both pilot yokes trim switches were inoperative in both directions. I notified ATC that we had a mechanical problem that would eventually result in [requesting priority] and landing at a nearby airport, probably ZZZ, but for now we were content to remain at 17,000 slowly outbound from ZZZ while we worked the problem. Knowing we were also over landing weight, nicely under control, and still had a lot of checklists to run, I had no desire to rush into diving towards some final approach fix before we were ready to land. I performed the \"Stabilizer Trim Inoperative\" QRH procedure with the result that manual hand-cranked trimming was possible in either direction, albeit against unusually high resistance and with a \"cogging\" feel as if pushing against a powered but stalled electric motor. This was true even when the aircraft was in- trim. One pilot could move the trim using one arm, but two pilots using one arm each worked much better for anything more than a couple turns of the trim wheel. We found that one pilot could both hand-fly and crank the trim, but tended to make unwanted aileron inputs while doing so. So it was doable in a pinch but not smooth. The forces required to turn the trim wheel did not appreciably reduce as we later slowed & configured. In the course of reading & discussing or doing the \"deferred items\" section of the \"Stabilizer Trim Inoperative\" QRH I started to activate the GPWS Flap inhibit switch. The FO stopped me saying we were above the 250 KIAS speed limit at that time. That sounded familiar to me, but no such limitation is stated at that point in the QRH. Nevertheless, we chose to delay activating the GPWS flap inhibit until we had slowed to first configuration speed around 220KIAS. Discussed with [the] FO whether ZZZ was the best divert option and which runway to use. ZZZ & longer Runway XXL was the unanimous choice. By that time we were a few miles south of [the] VOR on a south-southwesterly course for ZZZZZ, roughly 100nm from ZZZ. I then performed the \"Non-routine Landing\" QRH procedure, alerting ATC for a return to ZZZ XXL with ARFF (Airport Rescue Firefighting) standing by. Coordinated with ATC for return via direct arrival for ILS XXL. Asked Company explicitly to alert ZZZ Approach & Tower of the intended non-standard XXL landing. Notified Dispatch via ACARS report. Briefed FAs via intercom, and passengers via PA on the situation, my expectations, and their roles. We selected the non-standard landing Runway XXL based on that runway being much longer than the more typical landing Runway XXR. That was a minor miscue, because I/we had not considered the effect of the large displaced threshold. Which I now consider insignificant. For landings eastbound the difference is 2500 feet and would be significant. Lesson learned: the big runway length number on the 10-9 page can be significantly misleading; take the time to dig into the 10-9A details page. The fact that was our takeoff runway and within Jepp FDPro I'd used the green highlighter to extend the highlighting all the way to the takeoff threshold didn't help. What had been useful to help direct my taxi to the correct threshold for takeoff became mildly misleading when evaluating which runway to land on. Which was not a side effect I noticed at the time or had considered previously. Still working as PM I performed normal divert preparations and top-of-descent procedures: Reconfigured FMS & ACARS for ZZZ arrival, obtained ATIS, set up radios and performed approach brief, landing assessment, etc. Notified ZZZ Ops of our return by direct radio call to obtain a gate assignment. We discussed that we'd be a little above the normal max landing weight, but the already requested priority covers for that administrative requirement, and the runway available was nearly double what the QRH procedure's performance chart said was required. Performed descent checklist and before landing checklists and flows as normal. Throughout the evolution the FO kept us neatly in control, tight on the FD despite sometimes having to hand-crank the trim himself, caught a few radio calls I missed, and demonstrated overall high situational awareness and excellent systems knowledge. This is especially impressive for someone fairly new to the airplane who is just back from 6 months of furlough. During descent below 10,000 ft approaching downwind we changed control to CA as PF w FO as PM. We sighted the field while on base. During the turn-on to final I was using visual lookout primary, backed up by the LNAV purple line and the ILS. There was a moment of confusion as the ILS and LNAV came together before I was aligned with what I had thought was the landing runway. Having landed on XXR dozens (hundreds?) of times over the decades, that habit was unhelpful for a few seconds before we got fully established pointing at the correct runway. We then realized that Runway XXR is concrete and very easy to see in mildly hazy conditions while Runway XXL is asphalt and much harder to see. In fact XXL was invisible until we got closer in following the LNAV & LOC. My general habit on any landing involving parallel runways is to verbalize seeing all the relevant runways by name and explicitly saying which one I'm aligning / aligned with. E.g. \"I see XXL and XXR. I'm aligning with XXL.\" For whatever reason that verbalization didn't occur; with sorta predictable results. Intercepted final outside intermediate fix in level flight at 3,000 ft. Configured to flaps 15 early and slowed gradually to Vapp of approximately 160KIAS before glideslope intercept at final approach fix. FO kept the airplane nicely in trim on my requests. Made a flaps 15 slightly overweight (approx. 148K#) approach and landing to a smooth touchdown on ZZZ Runway XXL just shy of the 2000ft marker. Upon stopping made a PA to reassure the passengers & remind them the safety vehicles would be seen around the airplane. ATC gave us an alternate frequency to contact ARFF on. Which surprised both of us a bit. Once we were communicating with ARFF I requested they inspect us for hot brakes or damaged tires. ARFF found normal brake temps and no tire damage. At ARFF's request I released them at that point and we taxied normally to [the] gate. Following shutdown the FO attempted to manually crank the trim to the usual post-shutdown 5 units from the 8-9 units we'd used at touchdown. At zero airspeed the trim was still \"cogging\" and almost as difficult to move as it had been in flight. So we left the trim at the landing setting for Maintenance's edification. Which point we discussed with the Chief Pilot who met the flight and again later with the maintenance folks who also met the flight. I made appropriate aircraft maintenance log book entries for the stab trim failure and for the overweight landing. Spoke with Dispatch by phone before leaving aircraft per FOM. The next morning I filed the required report. In all I think this event worked out pretty close to textbook, minus the small glitches identified above. The main electric trim failing was the causal factor. Everything else is just details. 1. Subsequent research on the ground shows that activating the GPWS Flap Inhibit switch is called for in 11 different QRH procedures, and in the Flaps 15 landing procedure. Only the \"One Engine Inoperative\" QRH procedure and the \"Flaps 15 Landing\" procedures mention that limit; the other 10 QRH procedures do not. I do not know whether those differences are deliberate or an oversight. Suggest someone on the 737 fleet team look into this. If the difference is deliberate there probably ought to some verbiage available in QRH or [procedures] to explain the rationale so others don't mistakenly apply a remembered restriction where it's not intended. 2. We were both surprised to see that only half of the \"Stab out of trim\" annunciator illuminated. Which left us wondering at first if we had a warning system malfunction or a trim malfunction. I surmise now that the right bulb is connected to FCC (Flight Control Computer) B and the left is connected to FCC A. And that had the Captain been PF, we'd have seen the left half illuminate instead. However it works, the details of left & right are not documented in [manual] where the annunciator is described. At a minimum there should be a statement like \"Only half of the annunciator may illuminate. That is still a valid indication of an out-of-trim condition.\" 3. Overall, from the \"Stab out of trim\" annunciator illuminating to touchdown was about 30 minutes. From reviewing the ACARS logs I know it was at least 28 minutes and less than 35. As the CA / PM / QRH operator I was working quickly and diligently almost the entire time to accomplish all the non-routine and normal procedures in full without hurrying. Had we turned back even a couple minutes earlier the airplane would have been approaching the airport before we were fully caught up and mentally transitioned from handling an [urgent inflight situation] to performing a normal low-stress, albeit flaps 15, landing. Given the reality that following all the procedures fully takes nearly 30 minutes, I believe we do a disservice to pilots in the sim, rushing around the traffic pattern with an engine out. That encourages hurrying, doing QRH steps without really thinking them and their implications through, etc. We fight how we train, and we're training to hurry. I question the wisdom of that. Further I question the wisdom of planned arrival fuels that only allow for approximately 30 minutes to flameout at traffic pattern altitudes. The so-called FAR \"45 minute reserve\" is 45 minutes at cruise, not 45 minutes at traffic pattern altitude with e.g. flaps stuck partly extended. I now conclude that performing a major QRH evolution discovered in the arrival traffic pattern while down near Company planned arrival fuels would necessitate skipping a lot of steps or giving them at best a lick and a promise. I believe it is unwise to plan arrival fuels that tightly. Yes, we commonly have additional hold and / or Dispatch fuels. But each of those may legitimately be burned in delays encountered before the [urgent situation] appears. This saves Company a lot of money on the many flights that don't turn out worst-case. But it really sucks to be the pilot who draws that short straw, and is faced with either doing a rushed job of handling the [situation] or running out of fuel. That's planning, in extremis, to fail. An industry-leading FAR 121 carrier should not be planning to fail. In extremis or otherwise.\n\nNarrative 2\nAt a level off of 17,000 ft we noticed stab out of trim light. I was the PF so it was my aircraft. The Captain ran the stab out of trim QRH checklist which lead to the QRH stab trim inoperative checklist. We did not regain electric trim. Manual trim was what we were left with. Then the non-routine QRH checklist was performed. The manual trim wheel was difficult to work for both us even when the plane was near an in trim condition. Speed was slowed to about 270kts from about 290kts then. [ATC was advised] and we planned and set up for an arrival back to ZZZ. I flew the aircraft and worked the manual trim while the CA performed checklists, set up for the arrival and approach, and the briefings. Manual trim did not become much easier until on approach when aircraft was slowed to approach speed, however even then it was difficult. The CA took the aircraft and I became the PM. The landing was nice and smooth. Once on the ground using the manual trim wheel to reset the stab trim to 5 units was still very difficult.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a Stabilizer Out of Trim problem during climb out. They completed the appropriate QRH checklist and performed an air turn back.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=122",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 122,
      "pageEnd": 126,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
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    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=122",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 122,
        "pageEnd": 126,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1824764 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a Stabilizer Out of Trim problem during climb out. They completed the appropriate QRH checklist and performed an air turn back.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1819346",
    "date": "2021-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 MAX 8"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "This was both pilots' second flight on the MAX Aircraft since its return. We briefed a single engine taxi, in order to save gas, due to carrying an alternate in ZZZ1. We determined to start the engine once we determined what the lineup was for takeoff. As we turned the corner, approaching taxiway, we saw that we were #4, and due to the long start of the MAX, we began to start the #1 engine. This turned out to still be almost too late to start the engine and ensure 3 minutes of stabilization at idle prior to takeoff. The engine was started by the time we turned onto taxiway, but both of us were very closely monitoring the time and taxiing slow as we were now #2 for takeoff. After stabilization, we remembered that we had also talked earlier in the trip about trying to remember to do the new VNAV programming procedures in order to build habit patterns. Having a minute to go before our three-minute stabilization time, we decided to program the computer for the practice. This was one more distraction added to that of watching the engine time. About the time we finished, we were cleared for takeoff with 30 seconds to go before three minutes. We saw that we were going to be good on the time, so acknowledged the clearance, turned on the lights, took the runway and took off. Only on climbout, after having cleaned up, did we realize that we had failed to run the Before Takeoff Checklist. We immediately checked in with the Flight Attendants, who confirmed the fact that we had not notified them of the takeoff clearance as required by our flows and the checklist. Due to the length of taxi, however, they were all seated with everything stowed, and nothing unfortunate occurred. The rest of the flight went uneventfully. Distractions piled up, due to being in a somewhat unfamiliar aircraft and trying to accomplish new programming procedures for climbout. While everything was being done to try to be procedurally correct in accordance with what the Company wants done, being out of normal habit patterns caused us to miss a checklist. I would suggest that regarding the MAX, until we are all much more familiar with the timing required to start the engines with motoring and still get the three minutes, that we minimize the times that we single engine taxi, doing so only when there will be an excessive amount of ground time anticipated. Beyond that, if we do accomplish a single engine taxi, and we approach the runway without the time required, rather than focus on slowing down to get the time, simply tell Tower we need a minute to allow for the three minute and accept the delay. Further, the timing for the VNAV programming needs to be codified. It can only be accomplished after the numbers are received from ATIS which is when everything is happening quickly to get us off the gate. It might be worth adding a \"VNAV Climbout programmed\" step to the Before Push or Before Taxi Checklist, to prevent distractions later on."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Second flight in the MAX 8, since its return to service. We taxied out single engine and saw the lineup was minimal for takeoff on [Runway] XXL. Began engine start, after exiting the ramp. Because of the slow engine start with the MAX, we were closely watching the timing to ensure we got three minutes after engine start. Engine was started as we turned onto taxiway, and the aircraft in front of us was cleared for takeoff. We taxied slowly, as it looked like we would make our engine warmup time with a slow taxi. We decided to load the new VNAV Takeoff Programming Procedures. Got that loaded, just as our engine time was completed and Tower cleared us for takeoff. We rolled onto the runway and had an uneventful takeoff and climbout. Because we were distracted, we failed to accomplish the Before Takeoff Checklist or ding the flight attendants. Loading of VNAV takeoff programming should be accomplished earlier than approaching the end of the runway. I'm not sure where the best time is to load the VNAV takeoff procedure, since we are very busy after we get our numbers. This would minimize distractions at a critical point in the taxi out. MAX engine start is slow. If it looked like we needed more time for engine warm up, we should not hesitate to let Tower know we need more time."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nThis was both pilots' second flight on the MAX Aircraft since its return. We briefed a single engine taxi, in order to save gas, due to carrying an alternate in ZZZ1. We determined to start the engine once we determined what the lineup was for takeoff. As we turned the corner, approaching taxiway, we saw that we were #4, and due to the long start of the MAX, we began to start the #1 engine. This turned out to still be almost too late to start the engine and ensure 3 minutes of stabilization at idle prior to takeoff. The engine was started by the time we turned onto taxiway, but both of us were very closely monitoring the time and taxiing slow as we were now #2 for takeoff. After stabilization, we remembered that we had also talked earlier in the trip about trying to remember to do the new VNAV programming procedures in order to build habit patterns. Having a minute to go before our three-minute stabilization time, we decided to program the computer for the practice. This was one more distraction added to that of watching the engine time. About the time we finished, we were cleared for takeoff with 30 seconds to go before three minutes. We saw that we were going to be good on the time, so acknowledged the clearance, turned on the lights, took the runway and took off. Only on climbout, after having cleaned up, did we realize that we had failed to run the Before Takeoff Checklist. We immediately checked in with the Flight Attendants, who confirmed the fact that we had not notified them of the takeoff clearance as required by our flows and the checklist. Due to the length of taxi, however, they were all seated with everything stowed, and nothing unfortunate occurred. The rest of the flight went uneventfully. Distractions piled up, due to being in a somewhat unfamiliar aircraft and trying to accomplish new programming procedures for climbout. While everything was being done to try to be procedurally correct in accordance with what the Company wants done, being out of normal habit patterns caused us to miss a checklist. I would suggest that regarding the MAX, until we are all much more familiar with the timing required to start the engines with motoring and still get the three minutes, that we minimize the times that we single engine taxi, doing so only when there will be an excessive amount of ground time anticipated. Beyond that, if we do accomplish a single engine taxi, and we approach the runway without the time required, rather than focus on slowing down to get the time, simply tell Tower we need a minute to allow for the three minute and accept the delay. Further, the timing for the VNAV programming needs to be codified. It can only be accomplished after the numbers are received from ATIS which is when everything is happening quickly to get us off the gate. It might be worth adding a \"VNAV Climbout programmed\" step to the Before Push or Before Taxi Checklist, to prevent distractions later on.\n\nNarrative 2\nSecond flight in the MAX 8, since its return to service. We taxied out single engine and saw the lineup was minimal for takeoff on [Runway] XXL. Began engine start, after exiting the ramp. Because of the slow engine start with the MAX, we were closely watching the timing to ensure we got three minutes after engine start. Engine was started as we turned onto taxiway, and the aircraft in front of us was cleared for takeoff. We taxied slowly, as it looked like we would make our engine warmup time with a slow taxi. We decided to load the new VNAV Takeoff Programming Procedures. Got that loaded, just as our engine time was completed and Tower cleared us for takeoff. We rolled onto the runway and had an uneventful takeoff and climbout. Because we were distracted, we failed to accomplish the Before Takeoff Checklist or ding the flight attendants. Loading of VNAV takeoff programming should be accomplished earlier than approaching the end of the runway. I'm not sure where the best time is to load the VNAV takeoff procedure, since we are very busy after we get our numbers. This would minimize distractions at a critical point in the taxi out. MAX engine start is slow. If it looked like we needed more time for engine warm up, we should not hesitate to let Tower know we need more time.",
    "synopsis": "Flight crew flying 737 MAX aircraft reported missing the before takeoff checklist and Flight Attendant notification prior to takeoff due to engine warm up time constraints.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=127",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 127,
      "pageEnd": 129,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=127",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 127,
        "pageEnd": 129,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1819346 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Flight crew flying 737 MAX aircraft reported missing the before takeoff checklist and Flight Attendant notification prior to takeoff due to engine warm up time constraints.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1817740",
    "date": "2021-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Pushing off gate/listening to Ground. There was a lot going on with weather approaching the field, certain departure gates shut off and others open. Push crew cleared off/weren't using headsets due to [weather hazards]. We were clearly distracted with what was going on with Ground as it was a question of starting one or both engines and whether we were delayed or departing immediately. We thought we were ready for taxi and with the frequency very busy; I called when there was a break. As the Captain powered up #2, it became immediately apparent that there was no nose wheel steering. Captain stopped the aircraft immediately and set parking brake. We were both at a loss that we had skipped the whole Before Taxi Flow/Checklist. We took a minute to discuss how we got there and knowing we had been distracted, \"reset\" ourselves and continued with the Before Taxi Flow and Checklist. [Suggest] Self awareness during high workload that things can unknowingly be skipped."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "Pushed back and disconnected from tug. Only started one engine for departure delays due to weather at the field. As I cleared off the tug, we heard over the Ground frequency that all departure gates were closed for weather. The FO (First Officer) and I discussed our plan to taxi off ramp and wait for weather to pass. After that, I must have believed that he did the after-start flow and we did the Before Taxi Checklist. However, I was wrong. We cleared left and right and I started to move the aircraft, but immediately I knew the aircraft was not configured properly for taxi. I stopped the aircraft and started the after- push procedures again. The distraction of the weather delays got me out of my normal routine, as well as the FO's. Neither one of us trapped the errors until too late. We ended up with a return-to-gate event. While we start engines routinely and do Before Taxi Checklists several times a day, we can get distracted by outside factors. I should have delayed the discussion about weather or anything else until after the start flow and Before Taxi Checklist was complete."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nPushing off gate/listening to Ground. There was a lot going on with weather approaching the field, certain departure gates shut off and others open. Push crew cleared off/weren't using headsets due to [weather hazards]. We were clearly distracted with what was going on with Ground as it was a question of starting one or both engines and whether we were delayed or departing immediately. We thought we were ready for taxi and with the frequency very busy; I called when there was a break. As the Captain powered up #2, it became immediately apparent that there was no nose wheel steering. Captain stopped the aircraft immediately and set parking brake. We were both at a loss that we had skipped the whole Before Taxi Flow/Checklist. We took a minute to discuss how we got there and knowing we had been distracted, \"reset\" ourselves and continued with the Before Taxi Flow and Checklist. [Suggest] Self awareness during high workload that things can unknowingly be skipped.\n\nNarrative 2\nPushed back and disconnected from tug. Only started one engine for departure delays due to weather at the field. As I cleared off the tug, we heard over the Ground frequency that all departure gates were closed for weather. The FO (First Officer) and I discussed our plan to taxi off ramp and wait for weather to pass. After that, I must have believed that he did the after-start flow and we did the Before Taxi Checklist. However, I was wrong. We cleared left and right and I started to move the aircraft, but immediately I knew the aircraft was not configured properly for taxi. I stopped the aircraft and started the after- push procedures again. The distraction of the weather delays got me out of my normal routine, as well as the FO's. Neither one of us trapped the errors until too late. We ended up with a return-to-gate event. While we start engines routinely and do Before Taxi Checklists several times a day, we can get distracted by outside factors. I should have delayed the discussion about weather or anything else until after the start flow and Before Taxi Checklist was complete.",
    "synopsis": "B737 flight crew reported that complications and distractions due to weather led to the lack of proper checklist completion, resulting in the nose wheel steering being unavailable during taxi.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=130",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 130,
      "pageEnd": 132,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=130",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 130,
        "pageEnd": 132,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1817740 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737 flight crew reported that complications and distractions due to weather led to the lack of proper checklist completion, resulting in the nose wheel steering being unavailable during taxi.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1813994",
    "date": "2021-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "During the final segment of the approach phase on short final, we hear gear up at 960 feet RA. Captain told Pilot Monitoring to put the gear down and decided to continue to land. We decided it was safer to land rather to do the balked landing. I believe the cause of the event was fatigue and complacency. I felt a little tired and did not scan and confirm Captain checklist items that were called for. It was night time with turbulence and at a critical phase of flight were several things were happening at the same time. I need to be more aware of confirming actual checklist items at critical phases of flight and scanning everything looks good when the Captain is focused on flying the aircraft into ZZZ."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDuring the final segment of the approach phase on short final, we hear gear up at 960 feet RA. Captain told Pilot Monitoring to put the gear down and decided to continue to land. We decided it was safer to land rather to do the balked landing. I believe the cause of the event was fatigue and complacency. I felt a little tired and did not scan and confirm Captain checklist items that were called for. It was night time with turbulence and at a critical phase of flight were several things were happening at the same time. I need to be more aware of confirming actual checklist items at critical phases of flight and scanning everything looks good when the Captain is focused on flying the aircraft into ZZZ.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier First Officer reported fatigue and procedural deviations led to the landing gear not being lowered per the checklist resulting in an unstabilized approach.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=133",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 133,
      "pageEnd": 134,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=133",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 133,
        "pageEnd": 134,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "Landing gear omission noticed on short final",
    "summary": "A crew heard a gear-up warning at 960 feet on approach. The captain instructed the pilot monitoring to lower the landing gear and chose to continue the landing. The first officer attributed the missed checklist verification to fatigue, complacency, turbulence, and several simultaneous tasks at night.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Procedures",
      "Fatigue",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1810675",
    "date": "2021-05",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Parked"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "I was doing the Captain preflight duties as specified by the Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM). This was the first time in an actual MAX aircraft (not counting the MAX return to service training in the SIM) since the aircraft were grounded 2+ years ago. As I was completing the preflight duties, I neglected to set the autobrakes to RTO. I believe the cause of this was, the autobrake selector in the MAX is in a different position than the NexGen aircraft, specifically in the center console rather than next to the landing gear selector lever. Also, the flight paperwork was placed in such a position as to cover the autobrake selector knob. When we accomplished the Before Start Checklist, of course one of the items is \"AUTOBRAKE\" with a response of \"RTO\". I responded with the appropriate call of \"RTO\" purely by rote memory without actually looking at the autobrake selector. I recall looking towards the landing gear lever where I expected to see the autobrake selector and for some reason was convinced I saw it and it was set properly to RTO. We taxied out and departed uneventfully. It was only upon accomplishing the clean-up items after flap retraction that we noticed the autobrake selector was in the off position. The rest of the flight continued uneventfully."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nI was doing the Captain preflight duties as specified by the Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM). This was the first time in an actual MAX aircraft (not counting the MAX return to service training in the SIM) since the aircraft were grounded 2+ years ago. As I was completing the preflight duties, I neglected to set the autobrakes to RTO. I believe the cause of this was, the autobrake selector in the MAX is in a different position than the NexGen aircraft, specifically in the center console rather than next to the landing gear selector lever. Also, the flight paperwork was placed in such a position as to cover the autobrake selector knob. When we accomplished the Before Start Checklist, of course one of the items is \"AUTOBRAKE\" with a response of \"RTO\". I responded with the appropriate call of \"RTO\" purely by rote memory without actually looking at the autobrake selector. I recall looking towards the landing gear lever where I expected to see the autobrake selector and for some reason was convinced I saw it and it was set properly to RTO. We taxied out and departed uneventfully. It was only upon accomplishing the clean-up items after flap retraction that we noticed the autobrake selector was in the off position. The rest of the flight continued uneventfully.",
    "synopsis": "B737 MAX Captain reported not activating the auto brake system for RTO when completing the before takeoff checklist.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=135",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 135,
      "pageEnd": 136,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=135",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 135,
        "pageEnd": 136,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1810675 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737 MAX Captain reported not activating the auto brake system for RTO when completing the before takeoff checklist.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1802425",
    "date": "2021-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Pushed back from Gate X, 10 minutes late, after a Supervisor was called to the aircraft, after boarding was complete, to assist with passengers traveling with a four-year-old child. The child would not keep his/her seat belt fastened and kept removing his/her face covering. The parents had become belligerent with the flight attendants. We received a runway change just prior to pushback that would have us departing on Runway XXR verses YYL. The takeoff data for XXR included the requirement to burn off additional fuel prior to takeoff. We loaded the new takeoff data and reran the Before Push Checklist. Then we began our pushback from the gate. Knowing it would be a very short taxi to the runway, we started both engines. During the First Officer's After Start flow, I believe I interrupted his thought process by starting to voice my idea that we could taxi a short distance via [intersection] to Taxiway 1 and wait the little bit of time to burn off the additional taxi fuel. After completing the After Start flow, the First Officer did not make the \"Standing by Flaps\" call. Instead, we talked for a few more seconds about moving the aircraft to a spot away from the ramp so that we could burn off the additional taxi fuel. The First Officer requested taxi clearance to Taxiway [Alphabet] and notified Ground Control that we would need to hold there, to burn off fuel prior to departing. We taxied forward onto [intersection] and made the left turn onto Taxiway 1 and brought the aircraft to a stop. Once the parking brake was set, we both realized that we had not performed the Before Taxi Checklist and subsequently had not set the flaps to the Takeoff setting prior to moving the aircraft. We then set the flaps to the Takeoff setting and ran the Before Taxi Checklist. After a couple of minutes, we had burned the proper amount of fuel for the taxi and we made an uneventful departure. It was immediately clear to me that I gave too much thought to the things that had happened prior to pushback and in doing that, caused me not to focus on the required duties after pushback. I also should have allowed the First Officer to focus entirely on the after-start process before diverting his thoughts to something else."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nPushed back from Gate X, 10 minutes late, after a Supervisor was called to the aircraft, after boarding was complete, to assist with passengers traveling with a four-year-old child. The child would not keep his/her seat belt fastened and kept removing his/her face covering. The parents had become belligerent with the flight attendants. We received a runway change just prior to pushback that would have us departing on Runway XXR verses YYL. The takeoff data for XXR included the requirement to burn off additional fuel prior to takeoff. We loaded the new takeoff data and reran the Before Push Checklist. Then we began our pushback from the gate. Knowing it would be a very short taxi to the runway, we started both engines. During the First Officer's After Start flow, I believe I interrupted his thought process by starting to voice my idea that we could taxi a short distance via [intersection] to Taxiway 1 and wait the little bit of time to burn off the additional taxi fuel. After completing the After Start flow, the First Officer did not make the \"Standing by Flaps\" call. Instead, we talked for a few more seconds about moving the aircraft to a spot away from the ramp so that we could burn off the additional taxi fuel. The First Officer requested taxi clearance to Taxiway [Alphabet] and notified Ground Control that we would need to hold there, to burn off fuel prior to departing. We taxied forward onto [intersection] and made the left turn onto Taxiway 1 and brought the aircraft to a stop. Once the parking brake was set, we both realized that we had not performed the Before Taxi Checklist and subsequently had not set the flaps to the Takeoff setting prior to moving the aircraft. We then set the flaps to the Takeoff setting and ran the Before Taxi Checklist. After a couple of minutes, we had burned the proper amount of fuel for the taxi and we made an uneventful departure. It was immediately clear to me that I gave too much thought to the things that had happened prior to pushback and in doing that, caused me not to focus on the required duties after pushback. I also should have allowed the First Officer to focus entirely on the after-start process before diverting his thoughts to something else.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier Captain reported not performing the Before Taxi Checklist and subsequently had not set the flaps to the takeoff setting prior to moving the aircraft. Reporter cited distraction from dealing with face mask issues in the cabin area may have contributed to the event.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=137",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 137,
      "pageEnd": 138,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=137",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 137,
        "pageEnd": 138,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1802425 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "Air carrier Captain reported not performing the Before Taxi Checklist and subsequently had not set the flaps to the takeoff setting prior to moving the aircraft. Reporter cited distraction from dealing with face mask issues in the cabin area may have contributed to the event.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1784065",
    "date": "2021-01",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Parked"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "At the gate we had a passenger board without permission from gate agent, then we had a non-compliant passenger not wearing a mask. That was mitigated when gate agent came and explained to the elderly passenger that masks must be worn. On taxi out Captain and First Officer were discussing mitigation strategies if that event were to re-occurrence on taxi and failed to run pre-takeoff checklist. Cause - Distraction by pre-flight events with gate agent and non-compliance of the passenger. Remain focused on task at hand. Not replay scenarios until the debrief phase of flight."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAt the gate we had a passenger board without permission from gate agent, then we had a non-compliant passenger not wearing a mask. That was mitigated when gate agent came and explained to the elderly passenger that masks must be worn. On taxi out Captain and First Officer were discussing mitigation strategies if that event were to re-occurrence on taxi and failed to run pre-takeoff checklist. Cause - Distraction by pre-flight events with gate agent and non-compliance of the passenger. Remain focused on task at hand. Not replay scenarios until the debrief phase of flight.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier Captain reported forgetting to do the pre-takeoff checklist due to being distracted by a passenger being boarded without permission and another passenger not complying with face mask policy.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=139",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 139,
      "pageEnd": 140,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=139",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 139,
        "pageEnd": 140,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "Passenger disruption distracts crew from takeoff checklist",
    "summary": "After handling passenger boarding and face-mask issues at the gate, a captain and first officer continued discussing how to handle a recurrence during taxi. The captain reported that this distraction led them to miss the pre-takeoff checklist.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Procedures",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1765654",
    "date": "2020-10",
    "aircraft": [
      "B767-300 and 300 ER"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After takeoff EICAS message IAS DISAGREE and other associated messages. Erroneous airspeed indications. Blocked Captains pitot tube. Manually flew the aircraft. Returned to ZZZ after completing checklist. While conducting the checklist, the checklist says to refer to Flight with Unreliable Airspeed table in the performance inflight chapter. During this emergency, I was flying the airplane manually and was not able to assist the First Officer much with the checklist. If the table in the performance inflight chapter could be incorporated into the emergency checklist, this would reduce much of the stress of the situation and allow for a safer operation in an emergency situation."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter takeoff EICAS message IAS DISAGREE and other associated messages. Erroneous airspeed indications. Blocked Captains pitot tube. Manually flew the aircraft. Returned to ZZZ after completing checklist. While conducting the checklist, the checklist says to refer to Flight with Unreliable Airspeed table in the performance inflight chapter. During this emergency, I was flying the airplane manually and was not able to assist the First Officer much with the checklist. If the table in the performance inflight chapter could be incorporated into the emergency checklist, this would reduce much of the stress of the situation and allow for a safer operation in an emergency situation.",
    "synopsis": "After returning to departure airport with unreliable airspeed indication, the Captain suggested moving necessary charts to the relevant portion of the QRH for ease in location and use.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=141",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 141,
      "pageEnd": 142,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=141",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 141,
        "pageEnd": 142,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "Unreliable airspeed reveals difficulty finding checklist tables",
    "summary": "A B767 crew encountered unreliable airspeed indications after takeoff, with the report identifying a blocked captain's pitot tube. The captain flew manually while the first officer worked the checklist, then the flight returned; the captain suggested placing required performance tables inside the emergency checklist.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Equipment",
      "Procedures"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1757535",
    "date": "2020-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "B747-400"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Initial Approach"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "ZZZ: Departed from runway XXL. On the approach into ZZZ1 RNP X RWY XX, PF (Pilot Flying) called for gear down, flaps 20. Immediately PM (Pilot Monitoring) extended the gear lever there was a warning horn and right body gear disagreed alert followed by an EICAS message \"Equipment Cooling\", the second time message showed up during the flight. At 1,000 feet both pilots called for \"Go Around\". PF requested for vector from ATC for an immediate landing ILS runway XX. PM worked the QRH read the gear disagreed checklist. Equipment Cooling non-normal checklist was completed earlier during cruise. The message went away both times. Please note there are lots of write ups on A/C X. (LE Flaps, Outflow Valve, Thrust Reverser, W&B Indication System, Cockpit Smoke Vision, Equipment Cooling, ATC failure & Landing Gear Config warning.). These were all the numerous write ups on the aircraft from our flight and previous flights. I suggested the Aircraft should be AOG with immediate effect and the above listed malfunctions should be rectified prior to the aircraft being released for operations. This is a classic example of chains of error, that should be broken before leading to an incident or accident. Thank you."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nZZZ: Departed from runway XXL. On the approach into ZZZ1 RNP X RWY XX, PF (Pilot Flying) called for gear down, flaps 20. Immediately PM (Pilot Monitoring) extended the gear lever there was a warning horn and right body gear disagreed alert followed by an EICAS message \"Equipment Cooling\", the second time message showed up during the flight. At 1,000 feet both pilots called for \"Go Around\". PF requested for vector from ATC for an immediate landing ILS runway XX. PM worked the QRH read the gear disagreed checklist. Equipment Cooling non-normal checklist was completed earlier during cruise. The message went away both times. Please note there are lots of write ups on A/C X. (LE Flaps, Outflow Valve, Thrust Reverser, W&B Indication System, Cockpit Smoke Vision, Equipment Cooling, ATC failure & Landing Gear Config warning.). These were all the numerous write ups on the aircraft from our flight and previous flights. I suggested the Aircraft should be AOG with immediate effect and the above listed malfunctions should be rectified prior to the aircraft being released for operations. This is a classic example of chains of error, that should be broken before leading to an incident or accident. Thank you.",
    "synopsis": "First Officer reported two EICAS messages on final, causing a go around to allow time to run the QRH, landing safely on next approach.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=143",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 143,
      "pageEnd": 144,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=143",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 143,
        "pageEnd": 144,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1757535 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "First Officer reported two EICAS messages on final, causing a go around to allow time to run the QRH, landing safely on next approach.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1757193",
    "date": "2020-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Climb"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Departing ZZZ, neither autopilot would engage during climb out. The first officer checked circuit breakers, reset the glareshield autopilot disconnect bar, and we tested each yoke disconnect button but neither autopilot would still engage. No QRH procedure could be found. We reported the autopilot issue to ATC and requested to stop our climb at an altitude below RVSM. Next we called ZZZ Maintenance and their suggestion to reset the stab trim autopilot cutout switches successfully restored autopilot function, and flight continued normally at normal cruise altitude. This was the first flight of the day for both pilots and the first flight in several days for the aircraft. Preflight distractions included a previously unseen route error that kept wanting to reload from the CPDLC auto load and update. During pushback, a ground crew wing walker wanted us to abort our number 2 engine start because she felt the tug driver had cleared us to start sooner than she wanted the engines started. After pushback ATC informed us we only had 3 minutes to taxi to make our departure slot time. Suggest adding \"Stab Trim Cutout Switches\" to the Before Start Checklist, and/or including a QRH Procedure for \"Neither Autopilot Will Engage.\""
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDeparting ZZZ, neither autopilot would engage during climb out. The first officer checked circuit breakers, reset the glareshield autopilot disconnect bar, and we tested each yoke disconnect button but neither autopilot would still engage. No QRH procedure could be found. We reported the autopilot issue to ATC and requested to stop our climb at an altitude below RVSM. Next we called ZZZ Maintenance and their suggestion to reset the stab trim autopilot cutout switches successfully restored autopilot function, and flight continued normally at normal cruise altitude. This was the first flight of the day for both pilots and the first flight in several days for the aircraft. Preflight distractions included a previously unseen route error that kept wanting to reload from the CPDLC auto load and update. During pushback, a ground crew wing walker wanted us to abort our number 2 engine start because she felt the tug driver had cleared us to start sooner than she wanted the engines started. After pushback ATC informed us we only had 3 minutes to taxi to make our departure slot time. Suggest adding \"Stab Trim Cutout Switches\" to the Before Start Checklist, and/or including a QRH Procedure for \"Neither Autopilot Will Engage.\"",
    "synopsis": "B737 Captain reported auto pilot not engaging as required and non QRH procedures were used to get autopilot to function correctly.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=145",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 145,
      "pageEnd": 146,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=145",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 145,
        "pageEnd": 146,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1757193 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737 Captain reported auto pilot not engaging as required and non QRH procedures were used to get autopilot to function correctly.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1756780",
    "date": "2020-08",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-700"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Landing"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "On approach to ZZZ XXL, First Officer called for Landing Checklist. We noticed no illuminated green \"leading edge flaps extended\". We did go-around and got vectors in the area at 3,000 feet while working the problem. I could not find a QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) checklist for the omission of that light. The FO (First Officer) and I exchanged controls. He was also unable to find a QRH checklist for this problem. While being vectored we extended the flaps and could visually see by looking out our windows that the leading edge flaps were indeed extending normally, and that it was an indication problem. The following lights were not illuminating at all. Leading Edge Flap Transit, Leading Edge Flap Extend, and the overhead Leading Edge devices indication lights. After triple checking no checklists would cover our problem, and after we verified the leading edge devices were fully extended, we made a normal flaps 30 uneventful landing. After landing the PSEU (Proximity Switch Electronics Unit) light illuminated."
      },
      {
        "number": 2,
        "text": "As the Pilot Flying (PF) I called for flaps 30 and the Before Landing Checklist on the visual approach to XXL into ZZZ. The Captain (Pilot Monitoring) ran the checklist and we discovered that the Leading Edge Flap Extend green light was not illuminated. We executed a go-around to give ourselves more time to assess the situation. At 3,000 feet and after ATC gave us vectors, the Captain proceeded to find the appropriate checklist in the QRH. He could not find any checklist for LE FLAPS EXT green light not illuminated. He then asked if I could look and I transferred aircraft control to the Captain. I looked and didn't find any checklist addressing our exact condition. At that time, I did a push to test on the LE FLAPS EXT (Green light), LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber light) and LE devices annunciator panel and all tested good. The Captain called for Flaps 1 and we verified visually by looking out the window that the LE Flaps did in fact deploy and the flap position indicator showed flaps 1, but LE FLAPS EXT (Green light), LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber light) and LE devices annunciator panel did not illuminate. I looked through the QRH again to see if we had missed anything and the closest checklist we could think was the LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber Light) but that light was not illuminated, so we elected to not use that checklist. Also searched the non-normal performance data to see if there was an option to select for our condition and there was not. After discussing together and visually confirming the LE flaps deployed, and no roll or yaw was felt in the controls and it correctly showed on the flaps position indicator, we elected to land normally with flaps 30. After landing during roll out, the PSEU illuminated. Maybe a QRH addressing this particular condition. In looking back, I believe that we could have used our commuting pilot in the cabin to visually check the inboard LE Flaps and Trailing Edge flaps were deployed. Also contacted Dispatch and got Maintenance to get another perspective on the indications we were seeing in the cockpit."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nOn approach to ZZZ XXL, First Officer called for Landing Checklist. We noticed no illuminated green \"leading edge flaps extended\". We did go-around and got vectors in the area at 3,000 feet while working the problem. I could not find a QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) checklist for the omission of that light. The FO (First Officer) and I exchanged controls. He was also unable to find a QRH checklist for this problem. While being vectored we extended the flaps and could visually see by looking out our windows that the leading edge flaps were indeed extending normally, and that it was an indication problem. The following lights were not illuminating at all. Leading Edge Flap Transit, Leading Edge Flap Extend, and the overhead Leading Edge devices indication lights. After triple checking no checklists would cover our problem, and after we verified the leading edge devices were fully extended, we made a normal flaps 30 uneventful landing. After landing the PSEU (Proximity Switch Electronics Unit) light illuminated.\n\nNarrative 2\nAs the Pilot Flying (PF) I called for flaps 30 and the Before Landing Checklist on the visual approach to XXL into ZZZ. The Captain (Pilot Monitoring) ran the checklist and we discovered that the Leading Edge Flap Extend green light was not illuminated. We executed a go-around to give ourselves more time to assess the situation. At 3,000 feet and after ATC gave us vectors, the Captain proceeded to find the appropriate checklist in the QRH. He could not find any checklist for LE FLAPS EXT green light not illuminated. He then asked if I could look and I transferred aircraft control to the Captain. I looked and didn't find any checklist addressing our exact condition. At that time, I did a push to test on the LE FLAPS EXT (Green light), LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber light) and LE devices annunciator panel and all tested good. The Captain called for Flaps 1 and we verified visually by looking out the window that the LE Flaps did in fact deploy and the flap position indicator showed flaps 1, but LE FLAPS EXT (Green light), LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber light) and LE devices annunciator panel did not illuminate. I looked through the QRH again to see if we had missed anything and the closest checklist we could think was the LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber Light) but that light was not illuminated, so we elected to not use that checklist. Also searched the non-normal performance data to see if there was an option to select for our condition and there was not. After discussing together and visually confirming the LE flaps deployed, and no roll or yaw was felt in the controls and it correctly showed on the flaps position indicator, we elected to land normally with flaps 30. After landing during roll out, the PSEU illuminated. Maybe a QRH addressing this particular condition. In looking back, I believe that we could have used our commuting pilot in the cabin to visually check the inboard LE Flaps and Trailing Edge flaps were deployed. Also contacted Dispatch and got Maintenance to get another perspective on the indications we were seeing in the cockpit.",
    "synopsis": "B737-700 flight crew could not find checklist for Leading Edge Devices Not Extended.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=147",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 147,
      "pageEnd": 149,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=147",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 147,
        "pageEnd": 149,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1756780 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737-700 flight crew could not find checklist for Leading Edge Devices Not Extended.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1748126",
    "date": "2020-06",
    "aircraft": [
      "Commercial Fixed Wing"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Taxi"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "After pushback and engine start, my before taxi was interrupted when I noticed the squawk was not inputted. I left the flow to enter the PDC and retrieve the code. I had some difficulty with the box, and it took longer than expected. Once the code was retrieved and entered, my concentration was interrupted by ground movement off our right wing that I was monitoring. Then Ground asked us if we were ready to taxi and I said yes. Once taxiing, we saw that the flaps were up. We stopped short of the runway and accomplished the flow checklist and looked for other errors we could have missed. I was definitely rusty having not flown much in the previous 30-90 days. So, finish a flow, accomplish the checklist, and slow down when things are busy."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nAfter pushback and engine start, my before taxi was interrupted when I noticed the squawk was not inputted. I left the flow to enter the PDC and retrieve the code. I had some difficulty with the box, and it took longer than expected. Once the code was retrieved and entered, my concentration was interrupted by ground movement off our right wing that I was monitoring. Then Ground asked us if we were ready to taxi and I said yes. Once taxiing, we saw that the flaps were up. We stopped short of the runway and accomplished the flow checklist and looked for other errors we could have missed. I was definitely rusty having not flown much in the previous 30-90 days. So, finish a flow, accomplish the checklist, and slow down when things are busy.",
    "synopsis": "Air carrier First Officer reported taxiing out to the runway and finding items were missed during their before taxi flow checklist.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=150",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 150,
      "pageEnd": 151,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=150",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 150,
        "pageEnd": 151,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "Interrupted before-taxi flow leaves flaps unset",
    "summary": "A first officer interrupted the before-taxi flow to find a transponder code, then was distracted by nearby ground movement and a radio call. During taxi the crew noticed the flaps were still up, stopped short of the runway, completed the flow and checklist, and checked for other omissions.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "method": "AI-authored title, summary and themes based on the source narratives; not independently validated.",
      "reviewStatus": "Needs human review",
      "authoredDate": "2026-09-22",
      "fieldProvenance": "title, summary and themes are AI enrichments. They are not NASA classifications or findings.",
      "summaryOrigin": "AI"
    },
    "aiThemes": [
      "Procedures",
      "Situational awareness"
    ]
  },
  {
    "accessionNumber": "1740617",
    "date": "2020-04",
    "aircraft": [
      "B737-800"
    ],
    "flightPhase": [
      "Takeoff / Launch"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      {
        "number": 1,
        "text": "Departed ZZZ Runway XX, Flaps 5. Reaching 1,000 ft., I called for flaps 1 and subsequently attempted activation of the Electric Trim switch. Left yoke stab trim did not function. Asked First Officer to try his yoke trim switch. Neither trim switches functioned. Ran QRH procedure for Stabilizer Trim Inoperative. ATC was notified of flight control problem and [priority handling requested]. A large amount of questions were asked during the initial run of the QRH. The QRH gives a condition: Both of these occur: Loss of electric trim through autopilot. Loss of electric trim through the control switches. As we got vectored off the departure procedure and distracted by ATC questions pertaining to the nature of our [situation], I didn't fully hear the initial reading of the condition calling for both of the above. As I had a heavy yoke from the takeoff configuration, I choose not to negative G unload the aircraft and turn on the autopilot. By not turning on the autopilot, I wasn't able to fully comply with the QRH conditions. QRH was continued and Stab Trim Cutout switches were selected to cutout. With the Cutout switches in cutout, the autopilot was not available. During our debrief and review of the QRH procedures it was discovered that the QRH called for loss of both items, loss of autopilot and flight control switches."
      }
    ],
    "narrative": "Narrative 1\nDeparted ZZZ Runway XX, Flaps 5. Reaching 1,000 ft., I called for flaps 1 and subsequently attempted activation of the Electric Trim switch. Left yoke stab trim did not function. Asked First Officer to try his yoke trim switch. Neither trim switches functioned. Ran QRH procedure for Stabilizer Trim Inoperative. ATC was notified of flight control problem and [priority handling requested]. A large amount of questions were asked during the initial run of the QRH. The QRH gives a condition: Both of these occur: Loss of electric trim through autopilot. Loss of electric trim through the control switches. As we got vectored off the departure procedure and distracted by ATC questions pertaining to the nature of our [situation], I didn't fully hear the initial reading of the condition calling for both of the above. As I had a heavy yoke from the takeoff configuration, I choose not to negative G unload the aircraft and turn on the autopilot. By not turning on the autopilot, I wasn't able to fully comply with the QRH conditions. QRH was continued and Stab Trim Cutout switches were selected to cutout. With the Cutout switches in cutout, the autopilot was not available. During our debrief and review of the QRH procedures it was discovered that the QRH called for loss of both items, loss of autopilot and flight control switches.",
    "synopsis": "B737 Captain reported failure to fully comply with QRH procedure following a pitch trim failure.",
    "source": {
      "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=152",
      "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
      "pageStart": 152,
      "pageEnd": 153,
      "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
      "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
      "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
      "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
    },
    "sources": [
      {
        "url": "https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/chklist.pdf#page=152",
        "reportSet": "Checklist Incidents",
        "pageStart": 152,
        "pageEnd": 153,
        "fileName": "chklist.pdf",
        "retrievedDate": "2026-09-22",
        "sha256": "bc654bb19473d50d5d73f3be3b11e86c9d68083831be1294fe2f7254e896fdf7",
        "fieldProvenance": "NASA ASRS PDF fields; only line-wrap whitespace normalized."
      }
    ],
    "collections": [
      "Checklist Incidents"
    ],
    "title": "ASRS 1740617 · Checklist Incidents",
    "summary": "B737 Captain reported failure to fully comply with QRH procedure following a pitch trim failure.",
    "themes": [
      "Procedures"
    ],
    "enrichment": {
      "summaryOrigin": "NASA",
      "method": "NASA synopsis reproduced verbatim after whitespace normalization. Title assembled from accession number and source collection. Topics reflect PDF membership, not inferred causes.",
      "reviewStatus": "Source account unverified",
      "authoredDate": "2026-11-09"
    }
  }
]
